Iraq: A Strategy for Progress

Iraq: A Strategy for Progress • Executive Summary • Introduction • The Strategy • On the Home Front • Download Report: PDF

Iraq: Strategy for Progress aims to achieve five principal objectives:

• To position the United States to meet the challenges we face in Iraq;
• To establish a clear path for a political transition until Iraqi elections;
• To secure our significant military and financial investments to date;
• To build a strong international coalition; and
• To enlist sustainable and popular support here at home for ongoing operations in Iraq.

As a first and necessary step, President Bush should immediately convene an emergency International Summit on Iraq to enlist support for a strategic shift and to strike concrete agreements with our partners. The Summit would provide an opportunity for the President to confer with other heads of state and to develop consensus on the international architecture for political, security, and economic arrangements in Iraq. The meeting, held outside of the United States, should include representatives from the Arab League, countries currently serving on the United Nations Security Council, major NATO allies, and core coalition partners. The Summit's goal should be to establish an Iraq Contact Group to which authorities in Iraq will report.

The United States must go in with a plan that provides for new international arrangements to manage the political, security and economic aspects of Iraq's transitions, and includes reorienting American policy to reflect those new international arrangements.

The recommendations below constitute a plan of action for dramatically shifting strategic direction. The primary recommendations provide the foundation for specific actions in the areas of political transition, security, and reconstruction. The secondary recommendations spell out targeted policy changes necessary to restore our credibility with international partners and, in turn, to empower the Iraqi people and advance reconstruction.

Primary recommendation

Authorize the creation of an international High Representative for Iraq. The United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII authority of the U.N. Charter, should authorize an international High Representative to take responsibility for enforcing and ensuring the transition from the Iraqi caretaker government proposed by U.N. Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi. A highly respected diplomat credible in the region, the High Representative should work with Iraqi civil society to facilitate the convening of a national conference and establishment of an Iraqi Consultative Assembly. While the Iraqi caretaker government would assume significant authority over the state of affairs in Iraq, the High Representative would possess emergency powers to veto controversial laws, policies, budgetary items, and government appointments. On a day to day basis, a Governing Authority – consisting of the Prime Minister of the Iraqi caretaker government, the High Representative, and the military commander in charge of security operations – would be responsible for strategic decisions. As an independent international official, the High Representative would report to the Contact Group, not the United Nations.

Secondary recommendations

The United States should formally open the American Embassy in Baghdad prior to June 30. Ambassador John Negroponte should be dispatched immediately to Iraq to begin the process of transferring U.S. authority from the Pentagon to the State Department. The complete transition from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the new embassy should be accomplished by the June 30 deadline rather than initiated at that time. This approach would reduce the risk of critical issues falling through the cracks of the inter-agency transition, and ensure that he is fully operational as the lead U.S. representative on July 1.

The White House should immediately nominate a new U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. At this critical juncture, the United States needs a new Ambassador to the United Nations to lead efforts to secure a Security Council resolution on Iraq. Replacing Ambassador Negroponte in New York should be addressed with the same urgency as was his Senate confirmation. The appointment of a highly respected and effective diplomat would bolster the Administration's credibility at the United Nations.

The Pentagon should terminate monthly payments to the Iraqi National Congress and its special relationship with Ahmed Chalabi. With the formation of a new caretaker government, there is no credible rationale for direct U.S. support to the Iraqi National Congress (currently $340,000 a month). Continued support for Chalabi fuels Iraqi suspicions and lends credence to allegations of an American political agenda within Iraq.

The new Iraqi caretaker government should repeal the decree on Iraqi press censorship. A vibrant free press is critical for a democratic Iraq and the United States should support open public dialogue, transparency in operations, and accountability at all levels. Any decision to address what might be considered illegal press activity should be undertaken by the Iraqi caretaker government in consultation with the High Representative.

The new Iraqi caretaker government should amend the statute for the current Iraqi Special Tribunal to allow greater U.N. involvement and funding. Following the models of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodia, through an agreement with the U.N. Secretariat, a reconstituted Tribunal would carve out an explicit role for U.N.-endorsed judicial and administrative appointees, generate the necessary funding, and ensure adherence to international standards. Rather than having the U.S. bear the costs alone (estimated at over $75 million) the funding for the tribunal should come from assessments from U.N. member-states, as was the case with the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

The Pentagon should take immediate steps to reassure Iraqi citizens and the world that U.S.-controlled prisons in Iraq are in compliance with international standards and treaty obligations. Reports of abuse and humiliation of Iraqi detainees have done great damage in Iraq and throughout the region. Opening up the U.S.-administered prison system in Iraq to international inspection is the only way to restore lost credibility. The Pentagon's internal report on Abu Ghraib should be made public, to the extent possible, to demonstrate that immediate steps were taken to sanction criminal activity. A Permanent Committee for Monitoring Prison Conditions should be established with representatives from the international security force, the Iraqi caretaker government, Iraqi civil society, the International Committee of the Red Crescent and the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. The new Iraqi Ministry of Interior should establish a citizen's liaison to compile and keep a centralized database of all detainees in Iraqi prisons.

Primary recommendation

Give NATO command of security operations in Iraq. The Administration should request that NATO assume command of security and stabilization operations in Iraq. The core of an adequate NATO force in Iraq already exists. Establishing a formal mission would make larger and more sustainable contributions by both NATO and non-NATO countries possible. Over time, better training of Iraqi forces and broader international participation would allow the United States to reduce its troop presence as the security situation improves.

To meet security needs, the total number of military forces, including American and international troops, should be increased to at least 200,000. This will not only provide greater security in Iraq , but will also allow the borders to be more effectively guarded. Non-member states, particularly from Muslim countries, should be actively encouraged to participate in the operation, as they did in the Balkans. The mission's security mandate should include the following components: countering the insurgency; improving security and controlling borders; and protecting humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. Expanded security forces will also ensure an atmosphere in which U.N. and Iraqi officials can safely administer the upcoming electoral process, and candidates, party activists and voters can freely participate.

General Abizaid should be given provisional NATO command authority as Supreme Allied Commander Middle East with overall responsibility for NATO operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Political guidance should be provided through the North Atlantic Council (NAC). NATO should also consider using this opportunity to develop better political and military relationships in the Middle East. Iraq, for example, could ultimately be offered partnership status through NATO's Mediterranean Initiative.

Secondary recommendations

The United States should increase troop levels to 150,000. The recent U.S. increase to 135,000 was made possible by temporarily delaying the return of selected units for up to three months. For improved security, in the short-term, as Iraq prepares for elections and insurgents can be expected to challenge such progress, the United States must assume greater responsibility. To meet the troop level required, the redeployment of the Third Infantry Division should be moved up from its planned November date, and elements of the Third Marine Expeditionary Force based in Okinawa and the First Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division should be sent ahead of schedule. Force levels can be adjusted downwards only as overall security improves, transition milestones are achieved, greater international troop contributions are realized and Iraqi forces demonstrate an ability to assume greater responsibility.

The United States should work to double international troop participation to at least 50,000. Non-American forces, primarily the British, add roughly 24,000 troops to the current coalition, but this component has shrunk with the recent departure of Spanish and Honduran forces. The United States must work with NATO allies and regional partners to increase long-term international involvement in the multinational force, with particular emphasis on contributions from Muslim countries. In addition to ensuring a troop presence capable of providing security, increased international troop contributions would reduce the need for private security forces, reduce the security and legal complications created by the presence of a large number of private contractors, and free up additional funds for reconstruction.

The NATO mission should establish a dedicated force to protect and operate in and around sacred cities and sites. Comprised of troops from moderate Muslim countries and working under the NATO mission, this small force would advise and participate in security operations in the most culturally sensitive sites. Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia are three possible candidates.

The NATO mission should devise a long-term strategy for developing and sustaining professional Iraqi security forces. The existing timetable for training the police and military should be extended to between two and three years to ensure that new Iraqi forces are adequately trained, vetted and able to assume responsibility for Iraq's security. Iraqi forces currently on duty should be re-vetted to avoid potential security problems.

The NATO mission should conditionally allow individual members of militias to participate in new Iraqi security forces. The CPA's decision to bar selected militia from serving in the new Iraqi security forces ostracized them and thus provided them with an incentive to support the insurgency. Instead of polarizing a volatile and hostile segment of Iraqi society, transitional authorities should weaken and co-opt militias by disbanding units and absorbing vetted and separated individuals into programs closely monitored by U.S. authorities. There should be no wholesale incorporation of fixed units.

The United States should conclude the Iraqi Survey Group review and transfer those responsibilities to U.N. weapons inspectors by June 30. Further accounting for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs should be transitioned back to the U.N. mission (UNMOVIC), consistent with existing U.N. Security Council resolutions. This would send a strong signal to the international community that the United States is ready to share responsibility in Iraq. The U.S. government's work should be completed prior to June 30.

Primary Recommendation

Create the Iraqi Transition and Reconstruction Fund. The activities of the Transition and Reconstruction Fund should have a triple mandate: first, to build and sustain Iraqi capacity in preparation for the ascendance of an elected government; second, to develop, for consideration by the elected Iraqi government, a detailed proposal for an Oil Trust Fund; and third, to ensure that there is no gap in payment of civil service salaries, through the Iraqi national budget, during the transition period. The activities of the Transition and Reconstruction Fund would be closely coordinated with the International Reconstruction Fund Facility established and led by the United Nations and World Bank.

The new Fund, authorized by the U.N. Security Council, would take over responsibility and assets from the Coalition Provisional Authority for the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI). A full accounting of DFI funds expended to date should be completed by the CPA by June 30 at the latest. The existing International Advisory Monitoring Board should be retained and amended to include no fewer than two representatives designated by the Iraqi caretaker government.

The Fund would be managed by an Executive Director named by the international High Representative and approved by the Contact Group. On a day-to-day basis, the Executive Director would report to the High Representative. The High Representative would appoint two Iraqi deputies chosen by the new caretaker government and approved by the Contact Group.

Secondary Recommendations

U.S.-funded reconstruction programs should make job creation and the provision of basic social services top priorities, with specific emphasis on programs for demobilized soldiers. Significant funds should be allocated to create special opportunities for demobilized soldiers. Working with the High Representative, World Bank and other donors, the U.S. should support a demobilization program providing job training and start-up capital. Credits should be provided to companies that hire demobilized soldiers for reconstruction contracts. To reintegrate soldiers from rural backgrounds, the transitional authority should work with local authorities to identify productive opportunities.

All U.S.-funded contracts should be awarded on the basis of open, competitive bidding. The proceedings of contract bidding, award and evaluation should be made available in full detail to the public= Regional and Iraqi firms and non-governmental organizations should be encouraged to compete and, where necessary, Iraqi entities provided with the assistance required to meet U.S. procurement, financial and other legal requirements.

Responsibility for U.S.-funded reconstruction programs should be shifted from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the U.S. Agency for International Development. Congress should give USAID the necessary flexibility to fund critical reconstruction programs with special attention to streamlined approval for funding to Iraqi civil society organizations. The United States should ensure that the Commander's Emergency Response Fund (CERF) remains replenished until civilian management of the reconstruction is fully operational.

The High Representative should work closely with the caretaker Iraqi government to draw up plans for an Iraqi Oil Trust Fund. The fund should be financed by a reasonable percentage of oil profits and governed transparently by a board of representatives comprised of Iraqi governmental and non-governmental representatives. The Trust Fund would use most of its funds for training and seed capital to increase Iraqi capacity to manage and serve the oil industry, as well as to support environmental, social and job-creation programs in oil-producing areas.

U.S.-funded reconstruction efforts should be re-oriented to expand Iraqi involvement and extend the benefits of democratization beyond key urban centers. In particular, efforts should be made to incorporate Iraqi expertise and participation in program design and implementation, including through the more than 200 local councils currently operating around the country. As security improves, concerted efforts should be made to increase the flow of development assistance to rural areas and to expand U.S. engagement with Iraqi institutions and local and international non-governmental organizations.

The United States should actively work to mobilize additional financial support. Former Secretary of State James Baker's current mandate should be broadened to seek greater financial support for the reconstruction efforts in Iraq, particularly from Middle East and Gulf states that will significantly benefit from a more stable Iraq. To support Baker's efforts, the Administration should launch a new initiative on eliminating odious debt at the upcoming G-8 Summit, with the recommendation that Iraq be among the first countries considered for inclusion. The initiative should provide limited debt relief based on an assessment of the legitimacy of the debt incurred during Saddam Hussein's reign. Other countries undergoing major political or security transitions should also be considered in the first round of the initiative.