Iraq: A Strategy for Progress

Iraq: A Strategy for Progress • Executive Summary • Introduction • The Strategy • On the Home Front • Download Report: PDF

The war in Iraq is far from a mission accomplished. Today we face a crisis with grave implications for our national security and the future of the Iraqi people. The Bush Administration's mismanagement of post-war Iraq has left the United States unprepared for the instability that continues to grow. America is standing virtually alone in confronting a counter-insurgency struggle with no clear end in sight. The United States can still succeed in Iraq and fulfill its commitments to the Iraqi people, but it will require a plan – one that provides for new international arrangements to manage the political, security and economic aspects of Iraq 's transition.

The record is all too clear. The Bush Administration's intolerance of dissent has left America without enough allies to share the burden of funds and forces. The White House and the Pentagon willfully ignored the recent history of post-conflict experience and the specific warnings of the State Department. The Administration invested authority in a group of exiles and gave American companies a monopoly on contracts to rebuild Iraq. And it has insisted on absolute control, leaving the United States unaided by the wisdom, insights and engagement of the Iraqi people and the international community.

By focusing almost exclusively on military force as the primary means of social transformation and on Baghdad as the geographical engine of political change, the United States failed to wage a parallel campaign to win the consent of the Iraqi people. The Bush Administration also failed to use America's economic and diplomatic resources to generate widespread popular support for and engagement in the process of moving Iraq from its autocratic past and towards a democratic future.

The net result is that America is unable to guarantee security for the Iraqi people. Coalition forces have little control of major urban centers such as Fallujah and Najaf. Insurgents, terrorists and criminals have significantly slowed major elements of the reconstruction effort. One year after the invasion, too many Iraqis have yet to see a material improvement in their lives.

Getting out of the mess created by the Bush Administration will certainly prove more difficult than getting into it. We have four options.

The first option is to maintain the current course, and essentially keep going it alone without a real strategy, continuing to ignore the facts on the ground. This inevitably means dispatching more American troops and further burdening American taxpayers – without an exit strategy. Absent either political credibility or a plan, the United States would be forced to rely increasingly on the military, alienating the now fractured "Coalition of the Willing." This is the option preferred by President Bush, who continues to see the current difficulties in Iraq as a speed bump on the road to democracy.

The second option is to withdraw U.S. troops following the June 30 handover to a yet-to-be-named Iraqi institution. This course of action would ease the burden on the budget and our overstretched military. But it would likely bring about one of three unpalatable scenarios: the ascendance of a hard-line government hostile to the United States; the rise of sub-regional warlordism within Iraq; or the opening of Iraqi borders to the free movement of terrorists and criminals. It would also devastate America's reputation around the world as a nation that makes good on its commitments.

A third option – and one that is gaining increasing currency in Washington – is to "internationalize" the Iraq operation by bringing in the United Nations, NATO and more troop-contributing nations. Clearly, it would be desirable to reduce the burden on the United States while at the same time showing an international face to an Iraqi populace grown wary of the American occupation. But there are several daunting obstacles. Current trends are running against internationalization – Spain, Honduras and the Dominican Republic have pulled out of the coalition and others have indicated they may depart shortly. The Administration – having dismissed the concerns of other nations and excluded non-coalition members from the reconstruction effort – has already drained its capital with the international community.

The horrific pictures of abuse and humiliation at the Abu Ghraib prison have only made things worse.

This leads us to a fourth option, one that contains several items unfamiliar to or rejected by the current White House. Our plan relies on a strategic vision, the strength to concede mistakes and make mid-course corrections, and an ability to recognize stark reality. Our Strategy for Progress is based on providing the assurances our allies need about security and the overall management of Iraq's transition in order to overcome their reluctance to participate.

At this stage of the game, it is not possible to lay out a strategy that will guarantee a stable, secure, and prosperous Iraq, or even win and sustain the peace. The Bush Administration's gross mismanagement of post-war Iraq leaves us without the option of choosing good policies over bad, or safe options over calculated risks. Instead, the only option is to balance the trade-offs and determine which course of action poses the greatest chance of achieving a level of stability that will allow for a transition from the handover on June 30 to elections in January 2005. We must make difficult choices.

The first choice is between handing over responsibility for security exclusively and entirely to the Iraqis or, alternatively, striking an arrangement that allows the international community to compensate for the fragility of Iraq 's nascent security forces. We believe the latter is the only and best option, not only to protect the Iraqi people but also to advance reconstruction.

The second choice focuses on sovereignty. It is at best inaccurate and at worst disingenuous for the Bush Administration to suggest that Iraqis will control their destinies after June 30. The massive U.S. and international troop presence in Iraq will continue to wield far greater power and authority than any interim caretaker government. There is no such thing as "partial sovereignty," however, and the most realistic option is to consider the period from July to elections next January as a transition from occupation to sovereignty – a concept already validated by U.N. Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi.

While some elements in Iraq may perceive this as an attempt by international powers to meddle in their internal affairs, the Bush Administration's failure to develop a responsible alternative to spiraling political chaos leaves no other realistic choice.

Third and last, the United States must make a fundamental choice between maintaining exclusive control over Iraq's future – and bearing the entire resource, troop and political burden – or opening up the challenge to the advice and support of the international community. We believe the only viable option is to cede America's exclusive monopoly on Iraq in exchange for the engagement of our allies, Iraq's neighbors, the United Nations, and NATO.

Given the current context, there are few ideal policy options. With so much at stake, we have no option but to think creatively, understanding that at the end of the day what is possible is primarily a function of political will.