This chapter is part of a report written in collaboration between the Center for American Progress and the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS).
This chapter argues that progressives in Europe and the United States must reclaim the narrative on migration by rejecting the security-focused, fear-driven approaches that currently dominate policymaking. It urges policymakers to recognize migration as a constant, structural part of human development—not a crisis—and to build policies grounded in reality, rights, and economic need. Instead of competing with right-wing forces on punitive measures, progressives should advance humane, effective, and values-based alternatives focused on legal pathways, integration, and labor protections.
Strategic context
In Europe, no progressive party or candidate can win an election on the topic of migration—not in a political landscape poisoned by a decade of toxic discourse about migration and migrants. This past February’s federal election in Germany offers the most recent, though hardly the only, example. The Social Democratic Party’s “traffic light” coalition—made up of the Greens and the liberal Free Democratic Party—suffered a defeat, while the increasingly restrictive Christian Democrats won. The far-right Alternative for Germany party came in second by popular vote share after campaigning aggressively against immigration. Once again, a progressive party failed to regain control of the narrative on migration.
While migration remains top of mind for EU general public—and European right and far-right parties opportunistically keep it in the headlines by deliberately spreading disinformation—there is little hope that public attitudes toward migration will improve.
Regrettably, the broader geopolitical landscape presents a grim outlook. Ongoing conflicts in Ukraine, the Sahel, and Gaza; fragile states such as Syria; and the shift in U.S. migration policy under the second Trump administration—all occurring alongside climate change and the growth of populations and inequality—will further drive displacement. This, in turn, will bolster the pervasive and often inaccurate narrative of migration as being beyond control, framing the situation as an unprecedented “crisis” solvable only through extreme measures. These measures often include strict border controls, deportation, repatriation, or detention, primarily aimed at reducing numbers and criminalizing migrants.
To free themselves from this spiraling, security-focused approach, the United States and the EU must learn to see and address migration for what it is: an inherent and unavoidable element of the human, social, and cultural condition. As such, it is neither bad nor good. A clear understanding of the nature of migration will help U.S. and EU leaders recognize that trying to curb it is both impossible and often counterproductive. This, in turn, can pave the way for migration policies grounded in reality rather than misleading concepts—policies that can manage migration effectively.
Policy continuity and change
The current reality of migration is still one of deep divisions, both within and between countries.
In the European Union, while migration management is still largely in the hands of the member states, the notion that it can only be tackled collectively—especially in a jurisdiction where individuals can move freely across national borders—has led to attempts to harmonize and define common norms and procedures. Such attempts, however, have clashed with various ideological positions and perceived diverging interests—for example, between border member states or countries of first entry on one hand and internal member states or countries of destination on the other.
Over the past decade—since the crisis triggered by the failure of the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa, along with the decadeslong civil war in Syria—EU member states have increasingly diverged in their views on the principle of mutual solidarity. This divide has been especially visible in debates over which country should bear responsibility for processing asylum applications, blocking progress toward a common migration policy and reform of the asylum system.
In December 2023, after years of exhausting negotiations, the European legislative bodies—the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament—finally reached an agreement, and the new Pact on Migration and Asylum was finally adopted the following April. Just ahead of the June European elections and the start of a new EU political cycle, the long-awaited pact set out new rules to manage migration and reform the common asylum system. However, it is not yet clear whether this marked a true turning point. While the pact has faced deep criticism concerning its effectiveness, particularly that of its solidarity mechanism—which aims to distribute responsibility for asylum seekers among member states through relocations, financial contributions, or operational support—and of its capacity to safeguard human rights and vulnerable groups, the EU’s previous difficulties in finding a compromise on this contentious migration dossier make reopening debate on it highly undesirable.
EU member states have until June 2026 to implement the pact. However, despite the legislative framework being relatively new, several centrifugal forces seeking to pursue autonomous and stricter national migration policies have already emerged: Austria and Germany have resumed border control, Poland has suspended the right to asylum, and Italy has signed a memorandum with Albania that aims to externalize asylum processing from Italy to Albania for certain migrant categories intercepted at sea. This initiative, which is being challenged by Italian courts over its legality and human rights concerns, remains largely unapplied. At the time of publication, the Italian government has approved a new law to use the centers in Albania as repatriation hubs, and the initiative is being closely watched by the new European Commission and other EU member states that see it as a potential model.
To a certain extent, the commission’s March 2025 proposal for a return regulation aligns with the Italian-Albanian deal. Returns have long been a key priority for the European Union, as the limited success in enforcing the return of foreign nationals who do not meet legal residency requirements is widely seen as a major weakness of the EU migration system. The new proposal would enable EU member states to remove those who are not EU nationals staying irregularly to any third country, provided that there is a bilateral or EU-level agreement and human rights are respected. It would also mandate that EU states recognize return decisions made by another member state and increase the maximum detention period to up to 24 months—extendable in cases where people pose a public safety risk, as determined by competent national authorities.
European migration policy has shown a consistently restrictive trend, heavily prioritizing externalization, security, and border control. There is a disproportionate focus on irregular migration, even though International Organization for Migration (IOM) data show that irregular flows account for only about 6 percent of migration to Europe. Efforts to curb irregular migration have yet to produce clear results and have often come at the expense of human rights. Despite European leaders taking credit for the recent decline in irregular migration to the EU, a reduction in arrivals via one route does not necessarily signify an overall easing of migration pressures. Instead, it typically suggests a displacement of these flows to alternative routes.
Diverging interests and approaches between the United States and the European Union
As in many EU member states, recent U.S. presidential administrations have counted preventing unwanted migration as a key measure of success. Even before taking office for the second time, President Donald Trump pledged a stricter approach to immigration. True to his word, his first days in the White House were marked by a rapid succession of executive orders aimed at fulfilling this promise. These actions include measures to end birthright citizenship, halt the resettlement of tens of thousands of refugees, freeze funds for migrant aid organizations, and remove millions of unauthorized migrants through mass deportations.
This has created space for a potential theoretical alignment across both sides of the Atlantic. Both the United States and the European Union are highly preoccupied with curbing irregular migration, strengthening border controls, building physical barriers, and returning irregular migrants—one way or another—to their home countries or even to third countries. But a theoretical alignment does not guarantee that interests and policies will converge. Indeed, the United States’ revised immigration policy, as well as other policies, may very well directly or indirectly affect EU member states in the future.
First and foremost, greater obstacles to entering the United States could lead prospective migrants to seek opportunities elsewhere, potentially redirecting migration patterns toward the European Union. Migration to Europe is influenced by multiple factors; U.S. immigration policy is only one of them, and not even the most crucial one. However, one cannot rule out that the number of Latin American asylum applications in the European Union will increase as a consequence of President Trump’s security-focused migration policies.
Moreover, the United States has historically been a major financial contributor to key UN agencies and programs such as the IOM, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the World Foods Program. Therefore, the Trump administration’s decision to freeze humanitarian aid funds will have significant consequences for these and other agencies’ operations and, critically, for the vulnerable populations they support.
The potential impacts of this decision include the disruption of crucial programs, which may further exacerbate existing crises and enhance the volatility of global migration patterns. Other major donors may need to step in to fill the gap. Unfortunately, so far, EU countries such as France, the Netherlands, and Belgium—and, outside the EU, the United Kingdom—have substantially reduced their aid budgets to reallocate expenses to defense.
As highlighted above, the EU’s migration policies were already trending toward restriction. However, President Trump’s rhetoric is likely to further influence the already toxic narrative surrounding migration in Europe. Language, frameworks, and extreme ideas that are currently considered unacceptable are now at risk of becoming legitimized and normalized as they enter political discourse and public debate. Against this backdrop, political parties and governments may feel pressured to adopt increasingly hard-line positions and stricter agendas, further shifting the focus away from human rights and inclusion and toward security and control.
Ironically, tougher immigration policies risk exacerbating the very issues they aim to address. Making borders more difficult to cross and the journey more difficult to complete will not discourage migrants but will force them—and the smugglers who exploit them—to adjust their strategies and routes. Stricter policies will make migration more costly and dangerous; increase migrants’ vulnerability and force the death toll upward; and push immigrants further into irregularity. But at the end of the day, stricter policies will hardly prevent people from moving. Indeed, such migration policies may just present new obstacles to effective migration management in both the United States and the European Union.
Advancing shared agendas
The second Trump administration is introducing a set of executive orders aimed at cracking down on the entry of undocumented migrants into the United States, while the European Union has been moving toward increasingly restrictive migration and asylum policies to prevent irregular migrants’ arrival. In both cases, the goal has been to create the illusion that migration can be controlled through increasingly repressive policies. This approach may offer the perception of short-term political gains but will hardly “solve” the migration question.
Coupled with the irresponsibly aggressive rhetoric of U.S. and EU right-wing politicians, these harsher policies have poisoned the narrative surrounding migration. Far-right and extremist parties have thrived in this political climate, racism has spread, and migrants have been criminalized and dehumanized. On the other side of the political spectrum, progressive parties have struggled to gain traction, either unsuccessfully attempting to capitalize on the prevailing sentiment of the security-focused discourse or finding their voices increasingly marginalized.
Regaining control of the narrative around migration in the present political circumstance is certainly an arduous task. Negative rhetoric is now so pervasive, fake news so widespread, and extreme measures—once unthinkable—so normalized that even progressives may struggle not to view migration as a threat and to address it for what it is: one of the many drivers of human development.
Progressive policymakers have a responsibility to not propagate further disinformation about migration, to regain control of the migration narrative, and to realign their policy proposals with their fundamental values. This means focusing on both protecting human rights and supporting refugees, and on providing legal labor migration and integration pathways.
In April 2023, the Biden administration announced the opening of Safe Mobility Offices (SMOs). These are not physical offices but virtual initiatives launched in cooperation with host countries including Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Guatemala; UNHCR; and IOM to offer safer alternatives to irregular movement and provide a platform for applying for entry into the United States. They are not intended to process asylum claims. In January 2025, the Trump administration moved forward with a decision to close the SMOs. Yet, in spite of their shortcomings, the SMOs represent one of the few innovative proposals put forward so far to manage migration in a humane and effective way. Differences between the EU and U.S. contexts aside, SMOs could be one of a set of tools to manage legal migration.
The reality is that most migrants enter their countries of destination legally. However, the obsession with irregular migration has obscured this reality and undermined the very real need to establish more safe and legal pathways. It is also a fact that in Europe as well as in the United States, there is widespread demand for labor. Progressives should focus on formulating policy proposals that consider how their real migration needs could help address the reality of their countries’ economies and labor markets. Moreover, since migrant workers are vulnerable to exploitation, discrimination, bad working conditions, and low pay, progressives should address labor rights and protections—topics that concern both migrants and native workers. Doing so will help progressives in Europe and the United States reclaim the narrative on migration without ceding ground to a security-focused discourse.