This chapter is part of a report written in collaboration between the Center for American Progress and the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS).
The author, Ann Linde, was Sweden’s foreign minister from September 2019 to October 2022 and shepherded her country’s NATO accession path.
The transatlantic relationship faces a defining moment. As the United States contends with rising isolationism and growing skepticism toward global alliances, Europe must prepare for a more uncertain partner across the Atlantic. This chapter draws on the author’s experience as Sweden’s foreign minister and the country’s historic accession to NATO to reflect on how Russia’s war against Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped Europe’s security landscape—and how progressives on both sides of the Atlantic must respond. The chapter explores diverging trends in U.S. and EU foreign policy, the need for European strategic autonomy, and the critical importance of sustaining civil society cooperation.
Strategic context
On May 18, 2022, Sweden’s application for NATO membership was officially handed in to the NATO secretary general. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February of that same year led to this decision—a decision that ended 200 years of successful military nonalignment that kept Sweden and the Swedish people out of war. Russia’s brutal violation of international law—invading a peaceful country through violence, terror, and the murder and rape of civilians—profoundly affected people in Sweden and Finland. Both countries concluded that they needed NATO’s Article 5—in practice, the certainty that the United States would come to their aid if Russia subjected them to military conquest—in order to ensure the security of their populations. That protection arrived in earnest on March 7, 2024, when Sweden officially joined as the 32nd member of the NATO alliance.
Policy continuity and change
Since the second Trump administration came to power in the United States, a sense of insecurity has spread across Sweden and much of Europe. On several occasions, President Trump has expressed that he is not prepared in all situations to use military force to fulfil U.S. obligations under Article 5. These pronouncements have raised concerns in Sweden and across Europe. According to a survey published at the end of March 2025 of more than 10,000 Europeans in nine countries, 55 percent now believe that there is a high risk of an armed conflict breaking out in the EU’s territory in the coming years. Furthermore, 63 percent believe that the election of Donald Trump makes the world less secure, and a majority—51 percent—believe that he is an enemy of Europe.
In March 2025, a delegation from the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS) visited New York in connection with the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women. A series of talks were held with academics, diplomats, and politicians from the United States. The author’s predominant feeling following these conversations was fear. People fear expressing their true opinions about the unfolding political situation in the United States. Time and time again, the U.S. interlocutors said, “This is how I see it, but absolutely do not attribute these views to me.” Unfortunately, after the administration’s draconian firing of federal employees, the dismemberment of congressionally chartered federal agencies, and the suspension of funding for academic institutions, this fear is well founded. And this, of course, makes dialogue between progressives in Europe and the United States much more difficult. The question, therefore, is how progressives in Europe are going to deal with this new situation.
On the fundamental issue of peace and security, progressives on both sides of the Atlantic must continue to provide Ukraine with military, political, and humanitarian support. A situation in which Ukraine loses significant parts of its territory and is not allowed to choose its own security path forward would have devasting consequences.
Diverging interests and approaches between the United States and the European Union
Trump’s seismic decisions have accelerated the realization that European countries need to improve their defense capabilities—both individually as member states and together at the pan-European level. In Sweden, the Social Democratic Party has proposed a Total Defense Fund—both military and civilian—that would lend up to 25 billion euros to build up and enhance military and civilian defense. In Germany, the Christian Democrats, the Social Democrats, and the Greens have, in the most recent lame duck session, taken an affirmative step to deficit spend in support of critical defense and welfare needs.
For the current EU leadership, boosting EU defense initiatives by expanding and deepening projects such as Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defense Fund is seen as inevitable to reduce reliance on the U.S. European militaries need to further modernize their intelligence, cyber defense, and missile defense systems, as well as improve logistics and rapid troop deployments across Europe to improve deterrence capabilities. NATO’s European pillar must also be enhanced. A push for a more self-sufficient European contribution within the NATO alliance—one that avoids overdependence on American leadership—is sorely needed.
Although a strong transatlantic link remains critical, the time has come to strengthen Europe’s strategic autonomy. Europe needs to reduce reliance on U.S. technology by investing in European arms industries and critical technologies. To hedge against U.S. unpredictability, Europe should also diversify its security partnerships and build stronger ties with Canada, Japan, and Australia.
Advancing shared agendas
If the transatlantic link on the national level is weakened, it is more important than ever that progressives invest in deeper civil society cooperation. FEPS and the Center for American Progress have successfully cooperated for many years now. In these difficult times, cooperation should be made even stronger, with more common projects such as developing targeted messaging for different audiences across urgent policy spaces—chief among them, the mutual benefit derived from a strong transatlantic partnership. The following recommendations aim to guide future U.S. policymakers and progressive civil society leaders on both sides of the Atlantic in strengthening and defending the transatlantic relationship.
Future U.S. policymakers
Future U.S. policymakers should:
- Emphasize Europe’s role in hosting U.S. military bases that support global American operations.
- Show how European defense investments and NATO commitments reduce the burden on U.S. taxpayers.
- Highlight the economic and geopolitical risks of a weakened NATO, including the potential for greater Russian and Chinese influence.
For progressive civil society
Civil society actors such as think tanks, the media, and public opinion researchers should:
- Stress that European security directly protects U.S. interests, including supply chains, global trade, and counterterrorism efforts.
- Highlight that NATO allies supported the United States in Afghanistan and other global missions.
- Make the case that European allies help stabilize global conflicts, reducing the need for U.S. intervention.
- Highlight European contributions to NATO—such as Baltic defense, joint exercises, and counterterrorism—to counter the “Europe doesn’t pay its fair share” narrative.
- Engage with diaspora communities—such as Irish, German, Italian, Nordic, and Polish Americans—to rally support for strong U.S.-Europe relations.
It is clear that Europeans understand that the current situation is both dangerous and volatile, and that there is a need for enhancing European defense. But Progressives cannot accept this without balancing additional defense spending with maintaining welfare, education, and development aid—as with, for example, the recent decision by the United Kingdom to fund increased defense spending by reducing development aid. Progressives in both Sweden and Germany have decided to support loans to secure higher defense spending with the precondition that they also invest in urgent welfare needs. Other revenue avenues should also be explored, including targeted tax increases, perhaps for a limited period of time, as recently proposed by the Sweden Social Democrats’ so-called “contingency tax.”
Finally, there is an urgent need for more multilateralism, not less. European progressives should strengthen alliances with like-minded democracies to counter U.S. isolationism. Europe should also raise up its own progressive organizations, such as FEPS, and work with willing partners such as CAP on a host of transnational issue areas. Times are tough, but progressives have never shied away from facing difficult realities. Now is the time to present a clear political vision with progressive values, diplomacy, and dialogue at its core.