Center for American Progress

100 Days of the Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy: Global Chaos, American Weakness, and Human Suffering
Report

100 Days of the Trump Administration’s Foreign Policy: Global Chaos, American Weakness, and Human Suffering

In only 100 days, the Trump administration has wrought chaos around the world and weakened the United States’ place in it—leaving the American people and billions of others worldwide to pay the price.

In this article
President Donald Trump is seen sitting at a table with members of his Cabinet.
President Donald Trump meets with members of his Cabinet in Washington, D.C., on April 10, 2025, following the announcement of a 90-day pause on reciprocal tariffs. (Getty/Brendan Smialowski/AFP)

Introduction and summary

In the middle of the 20th century, after decades of war that ravaged societies and economies, American leaders and their counterparts recognized that a peaceful, integrated world was needed to more effectively advance national interests. The United States has served as the architect and anchor of this global order ever since, creating the alliances, institutions, and norms that set its terms and conditions: trade conducted in U.S. dollars, security partnerships underwritten by American military power, and democracy premised on a separation of powers with attendant political rights and freedoms. For nearly a century, American leaders have recognized that global problems require cooperation and mechanisms to resolve differences in ways that avoid costly wars and economic destruction. Because of this project, Americans today have lived more prosperous, peaceful, and free lives than those of previous generations.

Yet just 100 days into his second term, President Donald Trump’s approach to foreign policy has rapidly reshaped this global order, dismantling the foundations of U.S. leadership in the world. President Trump has pushed away—or deliberately threatened1—American allies and trade partners, leaving the United States more isolated on the world stage. Since his inauguration on January 20, 2025, Trump has engaged in trade wars that have raised consumer costs, tanked markets, and jeopardized economic partnerships;2undermined U.S. commitment to NATO, creating ruptures with transatlantic allies; dismantled U.S. foreign assistance programs that exemplify U.S. leadership and generate global stability;3 and pulled the United States out of global compacts on climate, health, and human rights that make the world a safer place for all.4 While these acts undoubtedly affect millions all over the world, they also have already had real impacts here at home, jeopardizing Americans’ security and causing economic strife in only a few short weeks.

Trump has pushed away—or deliberately threatened—American allies and trade partners, leaving the United States more isolated on the world stage.

President Trump’s destructive foreign policy is not wholly unexpected—after all, he rode into office on a wave of American discontent around the status quo.5 While decades of U.S. global leadership have delivered greater wealth and security to many, the benefits of this order have been unequally distributed.6 Millions of jobs have moved overseas since 2001,7 because the so-called “China shock” and a “race to the bottom” incentivized low costs and efficiency above all else.8 The top 10 percent of the world’s population now owns more than three-quarters of global wealth,9 and the United States has the largest wealth inequality among developed nations.10 America’s long reliance on fossil fuels has enriched oil and gas tycoons while generating climate disasters that hit poor communities hardest.11 Beltway insiders have supported military adventurism in conflicts such as those in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan—at great financial cost to American taxpayers, loss of life to American families, and devastation to civilian populations on the ground.12 In recent decades, discontent over this kind of fundamental unfairness has often fueled a populist rise of the far right.13

But rather than implementing policies that mitigate this unfairness, Trump is exacerbating it, placing political loyalists and business affiliates in critical leadership positions14—even though many of these appointees have clear interests that conflict with those of the American people.15 Courting the influence of oligarchs and authoritarians abroad, Trump and his billionaire allies have been able to further their interests16 as they advance economic policies that will only widen the inequality gap.17 While pushing away allies, Trump has kowtowed to adversaries with vested interest in undermining American democracy and prosperity.18

President Trump says that this approach is about putting “America first,” but the record of his first 100 days is clear: Trump’s foreign policy has left America weak, and Americans are paying the price.

The record of his first 100 days is clear: Trump's foreign policy has left America weak, and Americans are paying the price.

The Trump administration’s trade wars have cost American prosperity

The Trump administration has singlehandedly—and unconstitutionally19—embarked on a unilateral trade war that has increased consumer costs, undermined American manufacturers and their workers, and created market instability that threatens Americans’ savings. While the Trump administration has invited foreign countries to negotiate over their tariff rates and sought to calm the markets, the chaotic approach to trade policy in Trump’s first 100 days has lasting implications. As the administration disregards treaty commitments and outlines the conflicting objectives of both bringing manufacturing jobs back to the United States and using tariffs as a tool in negotiations,20 foreign countries and global firms have begun to no longer see the United States as reliable.21 This self-imposed isolation only makes it harder to solve shared challenges and harms American competitiveness. While this approach may position Trump to make superficial pronouncements of “deals” with foreign counterparts and false claims about standing up for workers, he is leaving American families to foot the bill.22

Raising consumer costs

Since taking office, the Trump administration has imposed tariffs at a level not seen in more than a century. In his April 2 “Liberation Day” announcement, Trump levied tariffs that brought the United States’ average tariff rate to more than 22 percent,23 even more than the tariffs enacted by the infamous Smoot-Hawley Act that exacerbated the Great Depression.24 While Trump quickly paused some of his reciprocal tariffs, all countries still face a universal tariff of at least 10 percent. In many cases, these tariffs have been levied atop of already existing duties.25 In addition, the Trump administration has enacted tariffs on autos, auto parts, steel, and aluminum and has threatened additional tariffs on semiconductors, copper, lumber, and pharmaceuticals.

Meanwhile, Beijing has dug in its heels, sparking a tit-for-tat tariff escalation that has resulted in an overall 145 percent tariff rate on Chinese imports.26 These tariffs are hugely disruptive: The United States imports large quantities of machinery, computers, smart phones, furniture, toys, and other things from China.27 The National Association of Home Builders has said it imports 22 percent of its home building materials from China,28 leaving the housing industry bracing for impact on a market that has already left Americans across the country struggling to afford new homes or rent.29

Trump’s tariffs are expected to cost the average American family $4,600 annually, with the greatest impact felt by low and middle-income households.

In total, the Trump administration’s tariffs are expected to cost the average American family $4,600 annually, with the greatest impact felt by low- and middle-income households.30 President Trump may claim that he does not care if the cost of a new car goes up, but more expensive cars will go hand in hand with significant price increases on groceries, consumer goods, and other products that Americans rely on every day.31

Generating economic instability

The first weeks of President Trump’s second term saw a brief upturn in the U.S. markets,32 but these gains have been reversed less than three months into the new administration.33 After the “Liberation Day” announcement, the S&P 500, the Nasdaq composite, and the Dow Jones Industrial Average all experienced precipitous drops—nearly a 20 percent loss from their highs in early March to their lows in early April.34 The Trump administration’s chaotic approach to global trade has wiped out nearly $10 trillion in market value,35 creating panic for millions of Americans watching their retirement savings dwindle. While the markets regained some lost ground following the Trump administration’s 90-day pause on some of these tariffs, the medium- and long-term effects of this instability raise even more serious concerns.36Consumer confidence has plummeted,37 and many Americans have adjusted their spending habits: With fears of higher prices and uncertainty around retirement savings, families are forgoing big purchases or family vacations.38

The Trump administration has caused long-lasting damage to one of the foundational pillars of U.S. economic strength: stability.

In just a few short months, the Trump administration has threatened to levy tariffs, actually levied tariffs, and backed down from tariffs at breakneck speed—whipsaw policies that have generated enough uncertainty to increase concerns of a global recession.39 The Trump administration’s trade policy has also had significant impacts on the bond market, as investors increasingly see the United States as unreliable and therefore have begun to look elsewhere for safer returns.40 And though many nations may cooperate with Trump in the short term, the chaos and failure to articulate a coherent logic around economic policy has left foreign partners with no reason to trust the Trump administration in negotiations. The uncertainty is also bad for businesses. Both global corporations and small businesses tend to refrain from making major investments—drivers of new employment opportunities—under conditions of uncertainty.41 In sum, the Trump administration has caused long-lasting damage to one of the foundational pillars of U.S. economic strength: stability.

Undermining American competitiveness

The Trump administration’s unilateral trade war is not just bad for consumers; it is also harmful to the interests of many small- and medium-sized manufacturers who rely on imported parts and materials—particularly those from China—to support production in the United States. In fact, many U.S. producers will face both higher operating costs due to more expensive imports and a major decline in export competitiveness, as countries such as China and Canada place tariffs on U.S.-made goods42 and foreign buyers avoid products identified with the United States.43 The Center for American Progress estimates that at least 2.6 million people across the United States are employed in industries particularly vulnerable to job loss as China, Canada, and the European Union respond to Trump’s tariffs with tariffs of their own.44

At least 2.6 million people across the United States are employed in industries particularly vulnerable to job loss as China, Canada, and the European Union respond to Trump’s tariffs with tariffs of their own.

The Trump administration’s tariffs also have made it difficult to coordinate with the United States’ long-term partners and allies in responding to the threat posed by China’s predatory export practices.45 For example, under the Biden administration, the United States worked closely with Canada to build a strong North American auto market capable of protecting workers from the negative consequences of China’s efforts to flood markets with electric vehicles at falsely depressed prices.46 The Biden administration also worked with partners in Asia to build more resilient supply chains, recognizing the importance of collaboration when supply chains are so heavily integrated across borders.47 Now that collaboration is on hold, Canada is looking elsewhere for economic partnerships,48 and countries such as Japan and Korea are looking to work more closely with Beijing to support regional trade in Asia.49

The Trump administration has jeopardized security and put Americans in harm’s way

In only 100 days, the Trump administration has turned its back on U.S. allies and undermined national security functions, all while increasing the risk of conflict, intervention, and nuclear escalation.50 In his speech at the Munich Security Conference, Vice President JD Vance aggressively criticized European allies at a moment when the United States and Europe face an aggravated threat from Russia.51 Trump and Vance doubled down on this betrayal when they invited Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to Washington, D.C., only to ambush the wartime leader by regurgitating Kremlin propaganda and attempting to pressure him to sign over Ukrainian resources in a lopsided critical minerals deal.52 Trump administration officials at the highest levels of the Cabinet put servicemembers directly at risk by flouting security protocols and sharing attack plans in a commercial messaging application.53

At the same time, President Trump has shown that he has little interest in peacemaking: His promises to end deadly conflicts have proved little more than naked attempts to gain advantage in the 2024 election.54 He has abandoned the people of Ukraine and Gaza—as well as Israeli hostages—siding with the illiberal governments of Benjamin Netanyahu in Israel and Vladimir Putin in Russia instead.

These moves leave the United States in a precarious security position. The Trump administration’s actions have weakened the very coalitions that offer deterrence against adversaries—handing strategic advantage to rivals and leaving America standing alone in the face of mounting global threats. As a result, Americans today face a greater likelihood of costly interventions, attacks from domestic or foreign extremists, and—for the first time in generations—the threat of nuclear war.55

Increasing the likelihood of conflict

On the campaign trail, President Trump liked to portray himself as a peace candidate: In his inauguration address, he announced that he wanted to be “a peacemaker and a unifier.”56 Yet his erratic and aggressive foreign policy is standing in the way of peace and expanding conflicts around the world, making it more likely that the United States winds up in a major war.57 In Ukraine, Trump has been an obstacle to a lasting peace. He has sided with Russian President Vladimir Putin over the United States’ European allies, seemingly unwilling to exert pressure on Russia to commit to a ceasefire while simultaneously undermining the NATO alliance that has kept peace for more than a billion people across Europe and North America for nearly a century.58

In the Middle East, President Trump has failed to enforce the ceasefire in Gaza between Israel and Hamas as Israel has resumed massive military operations, killing more Palestinian civilians without advancing the security of the Israeli people.59The Trump administration has launched attacks against the Houthis in Yemen, killing noncombatants in an expansive bombing campaign that, despite Trump’s claims of “success,” has neither deterred Houthi aggression nor reopened international waterways—but which has depleted military resources needed for deterrence against China.60 Trump has also threatened miliary strikes against Iran if it does not agree to a nuclear deal. While the president’s envoy will hold direct talks with Iranian officials, it is unclear whether they could reach any agreement by Trump’s arbitrary and unrealistic two-month deadline.61 Troublingly, failed discussions have the potential to create incentives for nuclear proliferation and raise the specter of regional escalation.

While the Trump administration has displayed an isolationist approach in some aspects of its foreign policy, it has also dabbled in imperialist rhetoric by threatening military action in Mexico; calling to “reclaim” the Panama Canal, potentially by force; and continuing to agitate for annexing Canada and Greenland, even though the citizens of those countries have no interest in joining the United States.62 While some of this may be no more than bluster, this escalatory posturing is causing real harm to U.S. global standing, is diverting precious national security resources away from real challenges, and places the country at risk of a diplomatic miscalculation that could quickly lead to conflict.63

Making Americans more vulnerable to terrorist attacks

Trump has abused counterterrorism and wartime authorities to target people for political speech and deport people without due process.64 At the same time, he has gutted counterterrorism programs that keep Americans safe from domestic and foreign attacks, such as programs that study and track violent extremism.65 Trump has pardoned hundreds of violent extremists convicted of crimes from the January 6 insurrection and diverted FBI resources away from terrorism cases.66 Moreover, his cuts at the Transportation Security Administration and the Federal Emergency Management Agency have left officials less prepared to detect and respond to an attack.67

Trump and his administration are also taking unnecessary risks with intelligence by skirting security protocols and risking intelligence-sharing partnerships that save lives.68 The recent “Signalgate” scandal—wherein national security officials used the Signal messaging app to discuss forthcoming military strikes in Yemen—unnecessarily jeopardized the lives of American servicemembers by sharing details of their attack plans. The incident not only demonstrated a failure to adhere to established security protocols, but also exposed to allies carelessness of cabinet officials with sensitive and classified information.69Additionally, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard’s history of statements supportive of Russia and former Syrian dictator Bashar Assad have given American allies pause over concerns that they cannot trust her with their secrets.70 The White House’s temporary halt to intelligence sharing with Ukraine has further alarmed European officials and signaled a definitive breakdown in allied cohesion.71

Raising the specter of a new nuclear age

Trump’s threats to withdraw from NATO, refusal to commit to Article 5 guarantees, and boasts that he would “not protect” NATO members who do not spend enough on defense not only undermine deterrence but actively invite a Kremlin miscalculation.72 In an environment where ambiguity signals weakness, the Trump administration’s apparent shoot-from-the-hip bluster increases the risk of a catastrophic escalation, including nuclear confrontation should Moscow pursue a territorial incursion into NATO.73 Europe has taken note: Germany and Poland are openly discussing a European nuclear sharing framework, while France explores extending its own deterrent to fill the vacuum left by the United States.74 This alienation of allies extends to East Asia as well.75 Long-standing U.S. partners such as South Korea are losing faith in Washington’s guarantees and quietly revisiting once-taboo nuclear options.76 In Seoul, a growing chorus of voices now argues South Korea must seek its own nuclear deterrent should U.S. protection wane.77

Meanwhile, the Trump administration has doubled down on a unilateral missile shield—a fantastical “Iron Dome for America,” (also referred to as the “Golden Dome”).78 While Israel’s multitiered Iron Dome missile defense architecture has performed remarkably well against short-range rockets, artillery shells, and mortars, the same scheme cannot be extrapolated to a country the size of the United States nor to the kind of long-range ballistic missiles the United States requires defense against.79 The White House’s plans envision a sprawling national antimissile network that would cost roughly $2.5 trillion to build; even if such a plan were carried out, it would still be inadequate against nuclear-armed missiles.80 Policymakers are right to question the logic of investing trillions of dollars in a U.S.-only shield even as Washington considers pulling back from joint defenses that allies have already developed.81

Trump’s abdication of global leadership makes the world a more dangerous place

The Trump administration’s unraveling of foreign aid also demonstrates a poor understanding of the cost-effective nature U.S. foreign investment worldwide. As CAP has previously reported, foreign assistance constituted only 0.7 percent of the federal budget in 2024, while extending Trump’s 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act would represent nine times that amount.82 Modest investments in global stability pay dividends for Americans’ safety, health, and well-being: In a globalized world, many crises cannot be contained within state borders and risk fueling transnational instability. In his first 100 days, the Trump administration has rapidly made the world a more dangerous place for all, increasing the risk of infectious disease, climate disasters, and global conflict.

Foreign assistance constituted only 0.7 percent of the federal budget in 2024, while extending Trump’s 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act would represent nine times that amount.

In cutting off critical foreign assistance and ordering the United States to walk away from participation in multilateral institutions,83 the Trump administration has made an abrupt about-face on long-standing global partnerships—and on long-standing American values of charity and compassion for the world’s most vulnerable populations. The rapid and acute nature of Trump’s actions amounts to a swift undoing of decades of U.S. foreign policy posture in only three months, leaving many nations without the resources necessary to address complex crises. This callous reversal of U.S. policy leaves millions around the world to perish and suffer without any practical path to rapidly fill the critical funding gaps the United States has left behind.84

Jeopardizing public health

Prior to Trump’s inauguration, U.S. funding accounted for nearly one-third of global spending on public health—$12.4 billion in 202485—while representing only 0.08 percent of the federal budget.86 These cost-effective programs have combated the spread of infectious diseases,87 alleviated poverty and malnutrition for the world’s most vulnerable populations,88 and generated scientific breakthroughs to diagnose and prevent deadly illnesses.89 The Trump administration has quickly dismantled this global public good, cutting off funding to lifesaving programs—including those that Secretary of State Marco Rubio vowed would be preserved. 90 An example is the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), a decades-old program created to combat the global AIDS epidemic, that has enjoyed bipartisan support. 91 One of the most successful foreign assistance programs, PEPFAR has contributed to precipitous declines in HIV infections and placed the world on track to be HIV/AIDS free by 2030.92 But the Trump administration has terminated hundreds of millions of dollars in PEPFAR funding,93 and in March, PEPFAR’s authorization expired with no plans to resume its operation.94

Prior to Trump’s inauguration, U.S. funding accounted for nearly one-third of global spending on public health—$12.4 billion in 2024—while representing only 0.08 percent of the federal budget.

These cuts not only cost lives overseas—an estimated 3.3 million preventable deaths per year95—but will also affect the health of those in the United States, as the health of Americans cannot be disentangled from health conditions around the world. Funding for tuberculosis programs, for instance, ensure drug-resistant strains of the disease remain in check; without these programs, drug-resistant tuberculosis will affect more Americans, affecting health care systems and state and local budgets.96 The attack on global health programs comes only five years after the COVID-19 pandemic claimed more than 1.2 million lives in the United States; 97while the Trump administration slashes domestic health programs;98 and as Trump has undermined relationships with foreign partners and withdrawn from international agencies critical to collaborating on global pandemic response such as the World Health Organization.99 All these actions leave Americans more vulnerable to a future public health crisis that could cause even more devastation than the last.100

Sacrificing climate progress

Since Day 1 of his presidency, Trump has waged war against clean energy while simultaneously declaring a “national energy emergency”101 as a justification for increasing U.S. oil and gas production above the already historic levels reached during the previous administration.102 In addition to withdrawing from the Paris Agreement for a second time—after doing so during his first term before former President Joe Biden reversed that decision—President Trump has, in less than 100 days, halted U.S. international climate finance;103 pulled U.S. support from countries transitioning off coal,104 the dirtiest fossil fuel;105 rescinded the United States’ $4 billion commitment to support developing countries most vulnerable to harms from climate change;106 and dismantled an agency that administered lifesaving programs and notified people around the world of impending extreme weather events.107 This inexhaustive list of anti-climate actions amounts to a troubling conclusion: By systematically dismantling efforts around the world to decrease greenhouse gas emissions and protect communities against the deadly consequences of rising global temperatures, the Trump administration is content to sacrifice lives—including Americans’—in exchange for higher profits for the fossil fuel industry.108 

By systematically dismantling efforts around the world to decrease greenhouse gas emissions and protect communities against the deadly consequences of rising global temperatures, the Trump administration is content to sacrifice lives—including Americans’—in exchange for higher profits for the fossil fuel industry.

The toll that climate change wreaks on communities around the world, including in the United States, is well established: It costs lives, it costs money, and it costs security. The United States has suffered numerous climate-fueled disasters in the past six months alone, including a hurricane that brought devastating flooding to Asheville, North Carolina, which was once considered a “climate haven;”109and fires in Los Angeles, California, one of the country’s largest cities, which amounted to devastating losses.110 The Trump administration’s withdrawal of financial and diplomatic support from collective climate action as part of its foreign policy approach makes U.S. partners and allies around the world more vulnerable to climate harms and directly imperils the lives and livelihoods of Americans.

Fueling global instability

The harms of ending foreign assistance are particularly acute in fragile states. After concerted pressure, the Trump administration resumed some food aid in March, but it did not do so for programs in Yemen and Afghanistan, citing concerns that such programs could benefit the Houthis and the Taliban, respectively.111 While these extremists undoubtedly have diverted U.S. food aid, failing to deliver aid risks famine and the spread of acute poverty for more than 25 million people in these countries alone,112 creating a vicious cycle of suffering that extremist groups will exploit for their own ends. Even where aid has resumed—such as in Syria—the interruption in programs has had serious consequences. For example, the Al Hol camp in northeastern Syria houses 37,000 people, including Islamic State fighters, their families, and sympathizers.113 U.S. funding supports the maintenance of these camps to contain the Islamic State presence, but interruptions in assistance have destabilized the camp at a moment when the Islamic State has taken advantage of Assad’s fall to regroup and regain strength.114

Failing to deliver aid risks famine and the spread of acute poverty for more than 25 million people in these countries alone, creating a vicious cycle of suffering that extremist groups will exploit for their own ends.

Interruptions and cuts to foreign assistance for climate change mitigation, health, and humanitarian relief also raise the potential for increased displacement—all while also cutting up to $2.3 billion in programs that help foreign governments manage migration.115

Conclusion

The United States will face significant foreign policy challenges in the next decade. American leaders will need to contend with humanitarian crisis and conflict exacerbated by climate change; adversaries that seek to expand influence and exert power; autocrats that threaten democracy from within and without; and new technologies such as artificial intelligence that exacerbate the magnitude of existing threats while also creating new ones. Each of these challenges threatens the security, prosperity, and well-being of billions around the world—and millions of Americans here at home.

Future American leaders will contend with these challenges in a new era of global leadership. The post-Cold War period of U.S. hegemony is over: While the United States remains the world’s largest military and economic power, China’s rise, the influence of global authoritarian powers such as Russia, and the divergent interests of rising economies such as the BRICS constrain Washington’s ability to unilaterally set the terms of the world order. The Trump administration’s hypernationalistic approach to foreign policy fundamentally weakens U.S. global leadership at a time when partnerships and alliances are critical to meeting these challenges.

Endnotes

  1. Laura Kayali and others, “‘Punching allies in the face’: Trump sparks US weapons conundrum for Europe,” Politico, March 18, 2025, available at https://www.politico.eu/article/punching-allies-in-the-face-how-trump-is-making-europe-question-us-arms-deals/.
  2. Chad P. Bown, “US-China Trade War Tariffs: An Up-to-Date Chart,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 11, 2025, available at https://www.piie.com/research/piie-charts/2019/us-china-trade-war-tariffs-date-chart.​
  3. The White House, “Reevaluating and Realigning United States Foreign Aid,” January 20, 2025, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/reevaluating-and-realigning-united-states-foreign-aid/.​
  4. The White House, “Withdrawing the United States from and Ending Funding to Certain United Nations Organizations and Reviewing United States Support to All International Organizations,” February 4, 2025, available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/02/withdrawing-the-united-states-from-and-ending-funding-to-certain-united-nations-organizations-and-reviewing-united-states-support-to-all-international-organizations/.​
  5. Katrina vanden Heuvel, “Americans are desperate for change. Electing Trump was a misguided message,” The Guardian, November 7, 2024, available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2024/nov/07/discontent-americans-wanting-change-elect-trump.​
  6. Council on Foreign Relations, “How Did the United States Become a Global Power?”, February 14, 2023, available at https://education.cfr.org/learn/reading/how-did-united-states-become-global-power.​
  7. Jack Kelly, “The Globalization And Offshoring Of U.S. Jobs Have Hit Americans Hard,” Forbes, October 15, 2024, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2024/10/15/the-globalization-and-offshoring-of-us-jobs-have-hit-americans-hard/.
  8. ​ David Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon Hanson, “On the Persistence of the China Shock,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (2021): 381–447, available at https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/gordonhanson/files/hanson_gordon_et_al_on_the_persistence_of_the_china_shock.pdf; Ryan Mulholland, “A Trade Strategy for the Post-Neoliberal World” (Washington, D.C.: Center for American Progress, 2024), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/a-trade-strategy-for-the-post-neoliberal-world/.​
  9. bne IntelliNews, “IMF: Three quarters of the world’s wealth is owned by 10% of its people, who account for half of the CO2 emissions,” July 15, 2024, available at https://www.intellinews.com/imf-three-quarters-of-the-world-s-wealth-is-owned-by-10-of-its-people-who-account-for-half-of-the-co2-emissions-333650/.​
  10. ​World Economics, “Economies by Inequality Levels,” available at https://www.worldeconomics.com/Rankings/Economies-By-Inequality.aspx (last accessed April 2025).
  11. Savannah Bertrand, “Fact Sheet | Climate, Environmental, and Health Impacts of Fossil Fuels (2021),” Environmental and Energy Study Institute, December 17, 2021, available at https://www.eesi.org/papers/view/fact-sheet-climate-environmental-and-health-impacts-of-fossil-fuels-2021; Aysha Gilmore, “Investors continue to back fossil fuels with $4.3 trillion still invested,” Net Zero Investor, October 7, 2024, available at https://www.netzeroinvestor.net/news-and-views/investors-continue-to-back-fossil-fuels-with-4.3trn-still-invested.​
  12. Amin Saikal, “Half a century of failed US adventures, from Vietnam, to Afghanistan,” The University of Western Australia, November 10, 2023, available at https://www.uwa.edu.au/news/article/2023/november/half-a-century-of-failed-us-adventures.
  13. Zack Beauchamp, “Why the far right is surging all over the world,” Vox, July 17, 2024, available at https://www.vox.com/politics/361136/far-right-authoritarianism-germany-reactionary-spirit.
  14. Domenico Montanaro, “Trump is creating team of loyalists after conflicts with Cabinet members in 1st term,” NPR, November 16, 2024, available at https://www.npr.org/2024/11/16/g-s1-34532/trump-cabinet-loyalists.
  15. Public Citizen, “Tracker: Trump Appointees’ Corporate Conflicts of Interest,” available at https://www.citizen.org/article/tracker-trump-appointees-in-the-pocket-of-big-corporations/ (last accessed April 2025).
  16. Mohamed Bazzi, “Trump’s PGA-LIV Merger Raises Concerns over Saudi Influence,” The Guardian, February 27, 2025, available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/feb/27/trump-pga-liv-saudi-arabia; Sophia Gonsalves-Brown and Maha Quadri, “Elon Musk Has Grown Even Wealthier Through Serving in Trump’s Administration,” Campaign Legal Center, March 13, 2025, available at https://campaignlegal.org/update/elon-musk-has-grown-even-wealthier-through-serving-trumps-administration; Abdallah Fayyad, “Trump and Musk have huge conflicts of interest. Who’s policing them?”, Vox, March 14, 2025, available at https://www.vox.com/policy/403900/trump-musk-conflicts-of-interest-ethics-rules.​
  17. Josh Bivens, “There will be pain: Continuing low tax rates for the rich and corporations will hurt working families,” Economic Policy Institute, February 13, 2025, available at https://www.epi.org/publication/tcja-extensions-2025/#full-report.​
  18. Erin Banco, Gram Slattery, and Humeyra Pamuk, “Trump envoy’s embrace of Russian demands worries Republicans, U.S. allies,” Reuters, April 11, 2025, available at https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-envoys-embrace-russian-demands-worries-republicans-us-allies-2025-04-11/.
  19. Inu Manak, “Trump’s Tariffs Are an Unconstitutional Power Grab,” Foreign Policy, February 7, 2025, available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/02/07/trump-tariffs-canada-mexico-china-trade-allies-border-fentanyl-migration/.
  20. Max Yeoli, “Trump’s tariff policy undermines his own Agenda and Foundations of U.S. Economic Power,” Chatham House, March 26, 2025, available at https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/03/trumps-tariff-policy-undermines-his-own-agenda-and-foundations-us-economic-power.​
  21. The New York Times, “Canada’s Prime Minister Says U.S. Is ‘No Longer a Reliable Partner’ on Trade,” available at https://www.nytimes.com/live/2025/03/27/business/trump-tariffs (last accessed April 2025).
  22. Ryan Mulholland and Natalie Baker, “Trump’s Tariff Pause Doesn’t Pause Economic Pain and Will Cost Families $4,600 Per Year,” Center for American Progress, April 10, 2025, available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/trumps-tariff-pause-doesnt-pause-economic-pain-and-will-cost-families-4600-per-year/.​
  23. Reuters, “US tariff rate rockets to 22%, highest since 1910, Fitch economist says,” April 2, 2025, available at https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/us-tariff-rate-rockets-22-highest-since-1910-fitch-economist-says-2025-04-02/.
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Authors

Allison McManus

Managing Director, National Security and International Policy

Ryan Mulholland

Senior Fellow, International Economic Policy

Andrew Miller

Senior Fellow, National Security and International Policy

Dan Herman

Senior Director, Democratic Accountability

Robert Benson

Associate Director, National Security and International Policy

Courtney Federico

Associate Director, International Climate

Department

National Security and International Policy

Advancing progressive national security policies that are grounded in respect for democratic values: accountability, rule of law, and human rights.

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