Nearly three years into a deadly war, Ukraine faces two starkly different futures: sustained U.S. support that strengthens its position in negotiations or concessions that leave it vulnerable to further Russian aggression. History offers two sharply contrasting models that shed light on how these competing futures might unfold—West Germany’s successful integration into the Western fold after World War II and Georgia’s more recent exclusion from Euro-Atlantic institutions, marked by fractured politics and frozen conflict.
Over the past three years, Ukrainians have defied expectations, displaying extraordinary courage and resilience against unrelenting Russian aggression. But new foreign policy leadership in Washington brings competing visions and priorities that will reshape the conflict in ways yet unknown. Some dynamics, however, are evident: A return to strongman politics, strained alliances, and a more transactional approach to U.S. foreign policy are all to be expected under a second Trump administration.
U.S. President Donald Trump will likely choose one of two paths as he pursues negotiations: 1) provide significant economic and military support to Ukraine as part of high-stakes deal-making, aligning with the German model, or 2) double down on disengagement in an effort to end U.S. involvement in foreign wars he views as misaligned with American core interests, paving the way for the much more precarious Georgian scenario.
These paths would chart dramatically different futures for Ukraine and for U.S. security interests. Here’s how they might unfold.
The German model: A prosperous peace
The new administration faces an inescapable reality: Ukraine, starved of critical support, teeters on the brink. The 740-mile front, marked by incremental Russian advances, is on the verge of breaking, with nothing but open plains separating the occupied territories from Kyiv—and then the border with Poland.
Eager to avoid the political fallout of an Afghanistan-like collapse, Trump could direct his administration to fully support Ukraine, providing offensive weapons alongside the political and diplomatic backing needed to expedite NATO and EU integration for the unoccupied territories west of the Dnipro River. The stakes for Kyiv could not be higher. While some suggest Trump could adopt a middle path, offering limited support to maintain leverage in negotiations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, this seems improbable. Trump’s aversion to incrementalism, desire for sharp contrasts with his predecessor, and penchant for unpredictable, even rash, decision-making make any phased approach unlikely.
In deciding to fully support Ukraine, the new administration can draw valuable lessons from West Germany’s post-war integration into the Euro-Atlantic fold. In the early 1950s, West Germany, under Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, made the painful decision to forgo reunification in favor of NATO membership and economic integration with France and the Benelux countries in the precursor organization to the European Union. Adenauer recognized two critical points: The Soviet Union could not be trusted to honor promises for free elections in a unification proposal, and Western integration offered the only viable path to West Germany’s economic recovery and democracy.
The resulting arrangement was imperfect but effective. West Germany forswore military action as a means of reunification while refusing to diplomatically recognize East Germany. Crucially, the Federal Republic of Germany maintained that East Germans were citizens of the West, should they ever cross the contact line. The cornerstone of the deal centered on defining the parameters of collective defense. Article 5 guarantees were explicitly limited to the territory of the Federal Republic, deliberately excluding West Berlin and the East. This distinction, though tense and requiring deft handling, ensured that the partition status did not become a trigger for all-out war. For Ukraine, a similar arrangement could involve Western Ukraine joining NATO and the European Union while leaving Russian-occupied territories unresolved. This would not only secure Ukraine’s democratic future but also bolster NATO’s eastern flank with real-world combat experience.
Prioritizing rapid fiscal and political integration would not only stabilize Ukraine, as it did for West Germany, but also create the essential preconditions for economic growth and democracy.
To address grievous economic needs, the Allied nations forgave much of West Germany’s war debt at the 1953 London Conference, laying the groundwork for its so-called Wirtschaftswunder, or “economic miracle.” Similarly, prioritizing rapid fiscal and political integration would not only stabilize Ukraine, as it did for West Germany, but also create the essential preconditions for economic growth and democracy. However, unlike Germany, Ukraine is not the aggressor in this war, making its case for international support even more compelling. Ukraine’s reconstruction and recovery are projected to require approximately $486 billion over the next decade—a scale of need comparable to the Marshall Plan, yet achievable without burdening U.S. taxpayers. A promising funding source lies in immobilized Russian assets, including approximately $300 billion in frozen central bank reserves. By directly seizing these assets, the international community can deliver the support Ukraine needs for economic recovery without placing additional financial burdens on taxpayers.
Acceding to the European Union presents a much steeper, yet ultimately surmountable, collection of challenges. The European Commission would need to waive as much of the lengthy accession process as possible while immediately prioritizing the necessary reforms to accommodate a country of about 37 million people—which would rank sixth in the union, after Poland—and incorporating an area roughly the size of Texas. For Brussels, Ukrainian integration would involve brokering a series of political compromises while adjusting European fiscal and security policy to accommodate a much larger and geopolitically vital member.
The Georgian scenario: A frozen conflict
Another scenario could see Trump preemptively trading away Kyiv’s future in the Euro-Atlantic community for an immediate end to hostilities, pressuring Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to accept terms negotiated over his head. This scenario would likely relegate Ukraine to a future of perpetual frozen conflict and diminished sovereignty, leaving it a rump state awash in weapons and fractured politics. Such a trajectory amounts to defeat in all but name: the absence of security guarantees, the forfeiture of key territories, and an entrenched Russian influence that abets kleptocracy and erodes democracy. The scenario grows increasingly likely if Trump negotiates with Moscow without first ensuring Ukraine’s long-term defense, whether a concrete NATO invitation to Ukraine’s western regions or interim security guarantees from the United States and a coalition of nuclear-armed European states.
History provides a troubling case study. Georgia, once courted by Western countries, now lies well outside their orbit, mired in grievance, Russian interference, and a democracy-busting kleptocracy. The Georgian scenario stems from decades of Western indecision, during which U.S. and EU leaders made commitments, revised them, and ultimately failed to follow through. At the 2008 NATO Bucharest summit, Georgia and Ukraine received promises of alliance membership but no concrete invitations. This created a dangerous gray zone that Russia ruthlessly exploited, invading Georgia’s breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia later that year. The West’s response in 2008 was swift but profoundly insufficient: International condemnation came without the backing of sanctions, offering a muted rebuke that did little to restrain Moscow’s expansionist ambitions. Today, one-fifth of Georgian territory remains occupied by Russia.
For Georgia, public disgust over this geopolitical purgatory precipitated the rise of the populist Georgian Dream (GD) party, which has increasingly courted Moscow while derailing EU accession reforms. In the October 2024 parliamentary elections, GD secured 54 percent of the vote amid allegations of widespread electoral fraud and reports of violent voter intimidation. Popular protests erupted in Tbilisi, reflecting a desperate electorate whose aspirations for Euro-Atlantic integration appear increasingly remote. On the streets, state violence now dominates, with young Georgians draped in EU flags regularly blasted with water cannons in scenes reminiscent of Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity.
[The Georgian] scenario would likely relegate Ukraine to a future of perpetual frozen conflict and diminished sovereignty, leaving it a rump state awash in weapons and fractured politics.
The implications for Ukraine—and its neighbors—are clear. If Ukraine is shut out of Euro-Atlantic institutions, as Georgia was, it risks widespread disillusionment among its citizens, potentially fueling the rise of GD-like populist movements driven by frustration and unmet aspirations. Discontent could also permeate the military, raising the possibility of mass defection or, worse yet, an armed coup.
A Russia-dominated Ukraine would also likely trigger a massive wave of refugees to the European Union. The ongoing war has already resulted in the displacement of some 8 million Ukrainians across Europe. In the regions currently under Russian occupation, there is mounting evidence of torture, terror, denunciations, and deportations. Millions—potentially tens of millions—more refugees could flee, creating a humanitarian crisis and placing immense strain on member states such as Germany, where right-wing populists like the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party have capitalized on external migration pressures to fuel their rise. A “sold-out” Ukraine could send shock waves across Europe, emboldening populist firebrands from Bucharest to Budapest to Bratislava and beyond.
The withdrawal: Leaving Europe exposed
A third possibility could see the administration pursuing a premature U.S. withdrawal from Europe altogether, even if it does not formally withdraw from NATO. Trump seems to imagine a world ruled by a chummy oligarchy of strongmen, each carving out spheres of influence for exploitation without interference—a dramatic departure from America’s three-quarter-century-long commitment to collective security.
Absent additional support for Ukraine and with a focus on reorienting American foreign policy away from Europe, a future deal under Trump could include withdrawing U.S. forces from NATO countries, leaving core European allies exposed. This might mean ending rotational deployments of U.S. troops in Romania, Poland, or Germany—all crucial deterrents to Russian aggression. Trump has repeatedly voiced his disdain for U.S. commitments to collective defense, while influential figures in his orbit, such as Elbridge Colby, Trump’s nominee for undersecretary of defense for policy, have championed a decisive pivot to the Pacific. This would represent a strategic miscalculation.
If the United States were to accept a renegotiated settlement that sacrifices Ukraine’s security and undermines NATO, the consequences would reverberate far beyond Europe.
Putin’s opposition to NATO does not stem from legitimate security fears but from the recognition that NATO’s strength undermines his ambition to restore Russian dominance in Europe. His objective is not security but hegemony. A premature U.S. withdrawal from Europe would embolden Putin’s efforts to fracture NATO and restore Russian influence across the continent. It would also augur the return of “great power politics,” where powerful nations see themselves as the arbiters of global order, dictating the fates of weaker states.
If the United States were to accept a renegotiated settlement that sacrifices Ukraine’s security and undermines NATO, the consequences would reverberate far beyond Europe. Revisionist powers such as China would likely interpret such a move as tacit approval of aggressive territorial ambitions, including potential escalations against Taiwan and in the South China Sea. Far from ensuring stability, any such post-war settlement would set a dangerous precedent, eroding trust in the United States as a reliable security partner and paving the way for an era defined by unchecked authoritarian aggression.
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Conclusion
Ukraine has every right to self-determination and has plainly affirmed its place in the Euro-Atlantic community. The United States can adopt a similar approach to the West German model by extending a concrete invitation for NATO membership to Ukraine’s western regions and by facilitating their rapid integration into the trans-Atlantic fold. This would involve recognizing the de facto contact line as an interim border and consolidating the remaining territory under a provisional security guarantee.
On the other hand, failure to secure Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration would embolden authoritarian powers and signal that brute force can redraw international borders at will. While Washington is undoubtedly aware of these risks, some in the Trump administration might welcome these developments. A deal imposed over the objection Ukraine and NATO allies would fracture trans-Atlantic unity and weaken the collective security framework that Trump has frequently derided as a burden. It would embolden the MAGA movement’s ideological allies within the EU, amplifying divisions and fueling antidemocratic forces across the continent. Such a deal would fundamentally dismantle the post-World War II security architecture, ushering in a period of instability and realignment unseen since the end of the Cold War—an outcome both desired by Putin and dangerous to U.S. national security.