While advocates of military action have argued that these limited U.S. strikes were necessary to impede the Iranian nuclear program, the strikes are unlikely to result in the end of Iran’s nuclear activities and could increase its perceived imperative to develop a weapon. It is unlikely that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will abandon his pursuit of regime change in Iran, raising the specter of long-term instability and further demands for U.S. military commitments. And while Iran’s initial retaliation against the United States was limited to a volley of missiles toward Qatar that were intercepted, the Iranian regime may seek further retribution.
Further escalation—particularly with U.S. involvement—carries grave risks that could play out over an extended period of time. Already, in 12 days of hostilities between Israel and Iran, at least 24 Israelis and hundreds of Iranian civilians have been killed. In this fragile environment, it is critical that the U.S. Congress assert its prerogative to prevent the president from continued military involvement in the conflict.
What was the nature of the U.S. strikes?
The June 21 U.S. military attacks targeted three locations in Iran associated with its nuclear program: the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant, the Natanz Nuclear Facility, and the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Center. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had already inflicted substantial damage on Natanz and Isfahan through repeated airstrikes. Having established air supremacy early in the campaign, the Israeli Air Force has been able to operate with impunity over Iranian skies.
Prior to the United States joining the conflict, Israeli planes not only destroyed the above-ground enrichment operation at Natanz, Iran’s largest enrichment facility; according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, they also inflicted damaged on Natanz’s subterranean section, where more advanced centrifuges had been operating. During the June 21 U.S. strikes, B-2 stealth bombers dropped 30,000-pound, “bunker buster” GBU-57 bombs on Natanz, likely with the intent of eliminating any remaining equipment in the underground structure. Israeli planes also had damaged the Isfahan facility, the location of Iran’s equipment for converting uranium gas into metal, one of the final steps in producing weapons-grade material. A U.S. Navy submarine appears to have completed the destruction of Isfahan with more than two dozen Tomahawk missiles launched from the Arabian Sea.
Most significantly, U.S. B-2s used 12 GBU-57s against heavily fortified Fordow, Iran’s most advanced enrichment facility. Military experts assess that an aerial attack on the structure, buried deep beneath a mountain, could only be accomplished with the enormous bunker busters, which are only in the possession of the U.S. military. Though President Trump claimed the United States had “obliterated” Fordow, U.S. government sources said on background that the facility remains intact.
What is the impact of the U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear program?
While Israel and the United States have degraded Iran’s enrichment capacity, there is no indication they have destroyed or rendered useless Iran’s existing stockpile of highly enriched uranium. With hundreds of pounds of uranium enriched to the 60 percent level, Iran’s pre-war centrifuge assemblies could produce sufficient weapons-grade uranium (90 percent) for a bomb in approximately one to two weeks. The enrichment process is not linear, and once the 60 percent level is reached, it is a short sprint to “breakout”—the point at which enough fissile material can be enriched to weapons-grade levels for the construction of a nuclear weapon. By comparison, converting natural uranium into weapons-grade material would have taken at least four months prior to the war. The deterioration of Iran’s enrichment capacity did, in and of itself, buy Israel more space, but to maximize breakout time, the existing stockpile would also need to be neutralized.
In the absence of more precise information regarding what specifically has been destroyed, it is challenging to estimate Iran’s current breakout time after the U.S. and Israeli airstrikes. Reporting on early intelligence assessments indicates that the strikes set back Iran’s nuclear program only by “a few months, tops,” contradicting initial U.S. and Israeli officials’ claims that Iran’s ability to build a bomb may have been lengthened to a few years. When compared with the minimum one-year breakout time under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), from which President Trump withdrew the United States, the U.S. and Israeli achievement is less obvious—particularly given that the JCPOA was accompanied by a stringent verification mechanism to detect possible cheating. In addition, Israeli intelligence revealed that the Iranians moved some equipment from Fordow before the U.S. strike, raising the possibility that the Islamic Republic has retained at least some enrichment capacity. Similarly, it is important to acknowledge that Iranian nuclear knowledge cannot be destroyed.
Why did Israel and the United States carry out these strikes now?
Israel has long advocated for military action against Iran and its nuclear program, given Iran’s past efforts to develop a weapon and its public pledge to annihilate the Jewish state. Prime Minister Netanyahu has been skeptical about the utility of diplomatic agreements with the Islamic Republic’s leadership. Due to Israel’s inability to breach Fordow from the air, his ideal scenario entailed the U.S. military joining the IDF in prosecuting attacks, as played out in the past week. Netanyahu had reportedly sought approval from—and been rebuffed by—every U.S. president since George W. Bush for military action against Iran’s nuclear program, whether a unilateral or joint attack.
There are three reasons why Israel launched a military campaign on June 13. First, U.S. President Donald Trump did not try to stop the operation. After initial indications that Trump unsuccessfully sought to persuade Netanyahu to stand down, more recent reports suggest that, while the president refused to join the campaign at that time, he did not convey meaningful opposition to Israel’s plans. Second, Netanyahu recognized that Israeli military action would complicate the ongoing U.S.-Iranian negotiations he mistrusted, potentially scuttling them all together. Third, the Israeli government assessed that it had a unique window of opportunity to conduct airstrikes against Iran at significantly reduced risk to Israeli pilots due to the IDF’s destruction of Iran’s most sophisticated air defenses last October. Once Iran had replaced these systems, the costs of Israeli action would rise steeply.
The U.S. intelligence community, according to Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, does not share Netanyahu’s assertion that Iran had already made a decision to build a nuclear weapon. Its enrichment of uranium above levels required for civilian use shows that Iran was deliberately cutting its breakout time, either to increase its leverage in talks or should the decision be made to field a bomb. However, the IDF boasted significant success in its strikes after June 13, and according to reporting from The New York Times, Trump was eager to claim a role in the operations after watching positive coverage of the action.
What are the potential triggers for further escalation?
While a tentative ceasefire was reached on June 23, several factors may precipitate further escalation that risks drawing the United States back into conflict. Israel may persist in its objective of seeking regime change, and as previously indicated, U.S. and Israeli military success may increase Iran’s incentive to develop a nuclear weapon. Iran could seek to rebuild its inventory of centrifuges; prior to the conflict, it said it would establish a new, undisclosed enrichment facility, and on June 16, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the parliament is preparing legislation on Iran’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which provides the legal basis for international inspections of Iran’s nuclear facilities. In either instance, the administration may seek to carry out further airstrikes on nuclear facilities or expand its targeting to Iranian leadership or infrastructure, as Israel has done.
Furthermore, a resumption of hostilities could be prompted by potential Iranian strikes—whether direct or through proxies—on U.S. personnel or assets in the region. The United States currently has around 40,000 military personnel stationed across the Middle East. While the Trump administration had evacuated some diplomatic personnel from the region prior to June 13 and has facilitated the egress of American civilians from Israel, there are at least hundreds of thousands of Americans remaining in the region. On June 23, Iran launched a volley of missiles against the largest U.S. military base in the Middle East, Qatar’s Al Udeid Air Base, giving advance warning of the attack. While all missiles were intercepted, any further retaliation could be designed to inflict greater damage; an attack that kills or injures American troops or civilians would exponentially increase the likelihood that the United States’ role in the conflict expands.
There also remains potential for Iran to target energy infrastructure in the Gulf, or for Israel to strike Iran’s export facilities should fighting resume, precipitating Iranian retaliation against infrastructure in Arab countries. Similarly, other strikes that significantly disrupt global economic activity, including energy or maritime commerce, risk raising the stakes of the conflict and drawing the United States further into the fray. Iran, for instance, could seek to block the Strait of Hormuz—a major transportation chokepoint between Iran and the Gulf Arab countries of Oman and the United Arab Emirates, through which one quarter of global oil shipments move.
What actions can Congress take?
A key feature of President Trump’s second term has been a penchant for unilateral executive action. The latest strikes were no different, and whether or not a ceasefire holds, Congress should exercise its Article I powers, making the case to the president and the American people that only Congress has the authority to declare acts of war—and asserting its opposition to further action in a conflict that carries far greater risks than benefits.
Indeed, members of Congress have introduced legislation over the past week to exert that authority. On June 23, Reps. Gregory Meeks (D-NY), Adam Smith (D-WA), and Jim Himes (D-CT) introduced a War Powers Resolution to “remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities with Iran.” And last week, Reps. Thomas Massie (R-KY), Ro Khanna (D-CA), and others introduced a similar bipartisan resolution that would block U.S. involvement in the conflict—though Massie later announced he would withdraw it if the ceasefire held. In the Senate, Sen. Tim Kaine (D-VA) has introduced a similar resolution; this legislation is privileged in the Senate, meaning Sen. Kaine can force a vote on the resolution on the Senate floor. Members of Congress should support these efforts both as a necessary confirmation of Congress’ constitutionally mandated role in matters of war and to ensure the administration does not resume hostilities, urging a return to the negotiating table and a peaceful path forward.
Moreover, members of Congress should seek to exercise their oversight authority, ensuring that the Trump administration is held to account in full view of the American public. In relevant hearings, these lawmakers should ask:
- What are the complete damage assessments of the recent strikes? How successful were they in destroying enrichment capacity? What is the status of Iran’s stockpiles of highly enriched uranium? Are there other sites where Iran has centrifuges?
- Does the administration support Israel’s goal of regime change in Iran?
- What does the ceasefire between Israel and Iran entail? Is the United States responsible for enforcing its terms, and will the Trump administration commit to doing so?
- What framework will the Trump administration pursue to return to negotiations on a nuclear deal? How will it ensure Iranian and Israeli buy-in for negotiations? What actions are on the table if diplomacy fails to achieve a deal, and on what timelines?
- What actions have the Trump administration taken to protect U.S. service members, civilians, and interests from Iranian or Iranian proxy attacks?
Conclusion
In striking Iran, President Trump needlessly dragged the United States into an ongoing conflict that caused significant loss of life, did not achieve its most important aim of permanently ending Iran’s nuclear program, and risked further destabilizing the region. In failing to assert U.S. diplomatic leadership and privileging military action, President Trump bears considerable responsibility for any future rise in instability and has not demonstrated the will or capacity to effectively preserve American interests in the region. In this light, any further U.S. military engagement is more likely to hinder than advance U.S. interests in nonproliferation, economic stability, and the security of Israel and key Gulf partners.
Regardless of any tentative ceasefire in place, given the enormous stakes at play, Congress must exercise its powers to prevent any further U.S. military intervention in the conflict. It is imperative that the United States use the full length of any truce period to pursue all peaceful options to achieve a sustainable solution to the potential threat posed by Iran’s nuclear program.