Why was there an apparent breakthrough now?
While Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is attributing Hamas’ conditional acceptance of the proposal to Israeli military pressure, Trump’s personal involvement in the negotiations and the endorsement of most Arab and Muslim countries—which did not want to rebuff a plan associated with Trump—probably exerted greater influence over the terrorist group’s decision-making. As the proposal commanded broad global support, Hamas would have risked isolating itself had it rejected the ceasefire out of hand. To be fair, Israeli military progress against Hamas may have softened the group’s red lines, such as freeing all hostages up front instead of staggering their release over time. Even in that case, however, it is hard to disentangle the impact of diplomatic versus military pressure. Hamas may have recognized that while global public opinion had shifted clearly against Israel, continuing to hold hostages was becoming as much a liability as an asset.
Similarly, Trump’s level of involvement likely was decisive for Israel—and Netanyahu in particular. The primary reason Netanyahu had refused prior proposals was because the opposition of his far-right coalition partners in the Jewish Home and Religious Zionist (RZP) parties had not changed. Sustained engagement from the president and his team along with an invitation to the White House for a public ceremony increased the costs of Netanyahu saying no to the president. Israel has proven its willingness to act unilaterally, but it cannot afford to be completely isolated, which is the prospect that Netanyahu and his government would face if they were to finally lose U.S. support for the war.
As for why Trump chose to intervene more forcefully at this time, Israel’s unprecedented military strike in Qatar—a close U.S. partner and the host of the largest American base in the region—may have been the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back. The president’s frustration with Netanyahu over civilian deaths and famine conditions in Gaza had been growing for months, with Trump saying Israel had “gone too far” and expressing discomfort about “real starvation” in the territory. He had also warned Israel that continued fighting was “hurting” its international image; though the administration defended Israel’s recent interception of a humanitarian flotilla to Gaza and the detention of more than 400 people in international waters, such heavy-handed tactics have only exacerbated these concerns.
What are the major obstacles?
With both the Israeli government and Hamas expressing reservations about Trump’s proposal, there is no shortage of potential roadblocks that could derail a ceasefire. Their agreement to defer post-conflict issues to a later stage in favor of a more limited first phase in which the hostages are exchanged for prisoners, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) redeploy to their “initial withdrawal” line, and humanitarian aid is surged facilitated rapid progress. This arrangement is easier for Netanyahu to accept, as he can argue that he has not conceded the Israeli far right’s aspirations for the Israeli annexation of Gaza and the forcible displacement of Palestinians. Jewish Home’s Itamar Ben Gvir is unlikely to be satisfied with this explanation, but RZP’s Bezalel Smotrich could use it to justify staying in the coalition, thereby preserving Netanyahu’s preferred right-wing government. The prime minister’s alternative is bringing centrist parties such as Blue and White and Yesh Atid into the coalition, but those parties will not support Netanyahu’s other priorities, especially judicial “reform,” in which he has a vested interest.
Once the hostages are released, the Israeli public’s top concern, Netanyahu may find it easier to resume the war and avoid making more costly concessions that would scuttle his coalition. The release of the hostages is an irreversible concession by Hamas—it is fortunately in too weak a position to take additional hostages—while Israeli concessions are less definitive. Israel has previously rearrested Palestinian prisoners who were freed as part of agreements with Hamas, and though costly, the IDF could always retake the territory from which it just withdrew. In other words, Hamas’ concern that Netanyahu may not have an incentive to continue an agreement’s implementation following hostage release is exactly what could have made this arrangement appealing to the prime minister and his coalition partners. This is why Hamas was reportedly seeking more robust assurances that Israel will continue to comply with an agreement after hostages are released.
With the first hurdle cleared, the following post-conflict issues are among the sticking points most likely to complicate implementation of the rest of Trump’s plan:
- The disarmament of Hamas: Trump’s proposal calls for Hamas to “decommission” its weapons, but the group has previously opposed surrendering its arms and has yet to expressly agree to this condition. This is likely a red line for Netanyahu, as Hamas can not only use these weapons to threaten Israelis but also use them to control governance in Gaza.
- Hamas involvement in governance of Gaza: In its response to Trump, Hamas has technically agreed to support a technocratic government in Gaza, but the reference to it being “based on Palestinian national consensus” suggests Hamas wants at least indirect influence over governance. Though Israel and Hamas have agreed that the latter will not govern Gaza, it is unclear they mean the same thing.
- Full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza: Trump’s proposal calls for IDF withdrawal in stages but does not identify a specific timeline or a clear set of conditions in which this would occur. Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza is not only a condition of Hamas but also of Arab countries expected to contribute to the International Stabilization Force. Israel will seek to hold onto at least some territory in northern Gaza or around the perimeter to create greater standoff from Israeli population centers, and Netanyahu has tied withdrawal to Hamas’ demobilization, which as noted above is contested.
- Creation of a Palestinian state: Netanyahu explicitly rejected the formation of a Palestinian state in his public response, issued from the White House, and he has the support of the Israeli public on this issue. On the other side, Hamas has never accepted a Palestinian state alongside Israel as a permanent resolution of the conflict; some Hamas leaders have indicated support for a state on the 1967 lines but only on a time-delimited basis.
- Palestinian Authority (PA) governance role and Gaza’s reunification with the West Bank: A role for the PA in Gaza is the other condition Netanyahu explicitly rejected. He and his government have conflated the imperfect but largely peaceful PA with Hamas in an obvious effort to delegitimize the government that used to control both territories. Keeping Gaza and the West Bank separate is part of Israel’s effort to prevent a Palestinian state and is consistent with the government’s desire to annex the West Bank.
- International Stabilization Force: Hamas has rejected the deployment of an international force, even one comprising Arab and Muslim states. If Hamas backs down, Israel may not agree to the conditions that most countries will demand before joining the force: full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and a political horizon (i.e., a Palestinian state).
Will a ceasefire last, even if Israel and Hamas agree on implementation?
Trump’s efforts have brought Israel and Hamas to the point where a permanent ceasefire appears plausible, and its fate is in his hands. Israel and Hamas conditionally accepted his proposal not because their disagreements had been resolved, but despite them. As the Center for American Progress has argued previously, the president is in an unusually strong position to exercise pressure on Israel, owing to the strength of his support within the Republican Party and the perception that he is genuinely pro-Israel. If Trump is prepared to hold his ground, Netanyahu cannot easily outmaneuver the president in U.S. domestic politics to protect Israel’s international flank. And when a U.S. president demonstrates a willingness to press the Israelis, it strengthens the ability and appetite of Arab and Muslim states to coerce Hamas into concessions. Gaza is now Trump’s war, and he will own the outcome, for good or for ill.
The key question is whether the president can sustain the level of interest and engagement necessary to overcome remaining obstacles and to navigate any future impediment or challenge to implementation. On the one hand, Trump seems well motivated; he seeks the validation of a Nobel Peace Prize, and ending the war in Gaza is a precondition to further progress on regional integration. On the other hand, President Trump’s track record on policy follow-through is not encouraging. It is not difficult to envision a scenario in which he loses interest in Gaza after the hostages—his own top priority—are released. Additionally, while Netanyahu cannot overpower Trump, he has proved adept at goading the president into actions he originally opposed, whether it be U.S. participation in Israel’s 12-day war with Iran or making zero enrichment the standard in the preceding nuclear talks.
Bringing the war to an end is the outcome that best serves U.S., Israeli, and Palestinian interests and protects human life, and so Americans should hope that Trump is successful in achieving that outcome, irrespective of their views of the president. At the same time, the progress Trump has made so far corroborates his influence over the conflict, an influence that could have been used at any point over the past eight months to advance a similar ceasefire proposal. Why did he wait and dither? Since the last ceasefire collapsed under Trump’s watch, another 13,588 Palestinians have died, including 401 from malnutrition, of whom at least 147 were children.
What impact would a permanent ceasefire have on dynamics in the Middle East?
An end to the war in Gaza could potentially create the conditions for resuming normalization discussions between Israel and other Arab and Muslim countries. Both Trump and Netanyahu certainly hope that is the case. Amid a mounting death toll, ghastly images, and demagogues pursuing personal political profit on the back of Palestinian suffering, additional movement on regional integration has been impossible. The Abraham Accords and other normalization agreements have been exposed to severe stress, and questions have been raised about the future of the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty.
All else being equal, the restoration of calm in Gaza would increase the probability of further normalization. What is less clear is whether a ceasefire is sufficient in and of itself to precipitate a breakthrough, or breakthroughs. In the case of the “crown jewel” of normalization, Saudi Arabia, it depends on both Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s calculus and the terms of the ceasefire. Saudi Arabia has reportedly conditioned normalization with Israel not just on peace in Gaza but a credible pathway to a Palestinian state. As discussed above, Trump’s proposal refers to a possible Palestinian state, but it is difficult to see any Israeli government supporting tangible progress toward Palestinian statehood in the near future. If Mohammed bin Salman’s position does not change, Israeli-Saudi normalization is by no means inevitable.
Beyond Gaza and normalization, there are two reasons to be circumspect regarding the regional ramifications of a ceasefire. First, the October 7 terrorist attacks and the war in Gaza have repudiated the central premise of normalization—that regional countries no longer care about the Palestinian issue and can bypass the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to cooperate with Israel. Even with genuine peace in Gaza, the potential for further violence in East Jerusalem and the West Bank remains alarmingly high. Second, Israel and the Trump administration have already sowed instability by attacking Iran’s nuclear program instead of continuing negotiations. Iran is likely more determined to acquire a nuclear weapon capacity than at any other point in the past 25 years. This all but guarantees further military action against Iran will be necessary to disrupt efforts at reconstitution, sustaining the ongoing cycle of violence. If anything, a ceasefire will give Israel a freer hand in both the West Bank and Iran, suggesting that peace in Gaza is not tantamount to peace in the Middle East.