More than 14 months after the October 7, 2023, Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel, the recent Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire agreement mediated by the Biden administration and France provides perhaps the best opportunity to achieve an enduring calm in the Middle East following a year of costly warfare. At the same time, the election of Donald Trump, who has called for ceasefires in the Middle East before his inauguration, introduces a wild card that could either reinforce de-escalatory trends or, intentionally or unintentionally, further fuel the conflict. What transpires in the weeks ahead will be determined primarily by how the Biden and Trump administrations—both as separate administrations and together during the transition period—manage the ceasefire in the north, the war in Gaza, and the risk of regional escalation. The conditions and incentives for de-escalation in the Middle East exist, but absent a ceasefire in Gaza, the conflict could intensify and spread to other parts of the region at any time.
Ceasefire in Lebanon
Achieving a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah reflected commendable perseverance on the part of President Joe Biden’s senior aides, after months of increasingly deadly tit-for-tat attacks and an Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon, which displaced more than 1 million Lebanese and 60,000 Israelis. Despite violations by both Israel and Hezbollah, the ceasefire appears to be holding so far.
The election of Donald Trump introduces a wild card that could either reinforce de-escalatory trends or, intentionally or unintentionally, further fuel the conflict.
It is no coincidence that Israel only consented to the ceasefire once the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) reached Lebanon’s Litani River, the original goal of the ground operation. Having thinned out Hezbollah forces and short-range munitions in the south of Lebanon, the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces alongside a new oversight committee led by the United States and France offers the best chance for displaced Israelis to return to their communities near the border in the short term, relieving a major source of pressure on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government. For Hezbollah’s part, the suspension of Israel’s withering attacks on Hezbollah leadership and infrastructure, coupled with the IDF’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon, is the most for which it could have hoped.
Reaching an agreement required close coordination between the outgoing Biden administration and the incoming Trump team, which will be true for any additional progress during the pre-Inauguration Day period. Israel otherwise may have strong incentives to wait out the Biden administration in the hope of better terms under Trump, and so President Biden’s ability to sustain international influence for the rest of his term in great part depends on the Trump world sending clear signals of support for Biden’s positions.
The ceasefire calls for the withdrawal of the IDF and Hezbollah from the area south of the Litani and the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces to fill the vacuum before January 26 but does not specify the precise timetable and sequencing of the disengagement process. Now, notwithstanding the alignment of interests in support of a ceasefire, the United States will need to carefully manage the implementation of this necessarily ambiguous agreement to avoid a return to conflict.
While waiting until the deadline could prove a recipe for disaster, it is unclear whether Israel or Hezbollah can be persuaded to begin their withdrawals without an action-forcing event. With Trump one phone call away, Israel may be tempted to play administrations off each other to defer implementation of its commitments to the very end of the period. And, of course, the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in neighboring Syria could have unforeseen consequences for both parties’ compliance with the agreement. Ultimately, the ceasefire will probably hold if Israelis begin returning to northern Israel, but that may not begin for several weeks.
Ceasefire in Gaza?
Turning to Gaza, U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan had made clear that President Biden hopes to negotiate a ceasefire and hostage release deal in the waning days of his presidency. Both U.S. and Israeli officials believe that the ceasefire in Lebanon will further isolate Hamas, putting pressure on the terrorist organization to concede to Israeli demands regarding hostage releases and the right to resume military operations after a future time-bound ceasefire agreement would expire. They interpret Hamas’ willingness to resume negotiations in Cairo based on an Israeli proposal for a 42- to 60-day ceasefire as an encouraging sign.
At this point in the electoral cycle, President Biden’s ability to influence Prime Minister Netanyahu is limited. If the question over the past year has been whether the Biden administration is prepared to apply leverage toward Israel, it is now more a matter of whether it has any leverage at all, with President Trump’s second term fast approaching. Netanyahu has, for all intents, abandoned any pretense that he views a ceasefire agreement as the potential basis for a longer-term calm, and developments on the ground indicate that the IDF is planning to retain a persistent presence in Gaza for the foreseeable future. Thus, the Biden administration’s ability to reach a ceasefire in its remaining time in office will ultimately depend on how much Hamas is willing to capitulate on its prior red lines—including an assurance the ceasefire is expected to last beyond the initial, time-bound pause in hostilities.
The question is whether Trump is prepared to use his influence with Israel more aggressively than did Biden.
Should a ceasefire fail to materialize before the transition, President Trump may find himself in a stronger position than President Biden to succeed. Like Biden, President Trump will not hesitate to turn the screws on Hamas, recently threatening the terrorist group that there will be “all hell to pay” if the hostages are not released before he takes office. Unlike President Biden, however, Trump probably understands that Netanyahu cannot defeat him in the American political arena. The level of support Trump enjoys from his base effectively insulates him from the political blowback that most American politicians elicit when they apply pressure on Israel. This can translate into more leverage over Netanyahu, which could prove the difference in finalizing a ceasefire. The question is whether Trump is prepared to use his influence with Israel more aggressively than did Biden.
Of course, even if Trump persuades Israel to change course, his administration could continue to encounter recalcitrance from Hamas, for whom this war is of existential importance. But the greatest source of uncertainty once Trump assumes power is how he ultimately defines a ceasefire. Will he adopt the existing framework: a pause in hostilities in Gaza leading to a permanent ceasefire, the eventual withdrawal of all Israeli forces, agreement that Hamas has no role to play in governance, the return of the remaining hostages, and a surge in humanitarian aid to Palestinians in the stricken territory? Or is Trump just looking for something that he can present as an end to the war but in practice would simply reduce the intensity of hostilities? The latter approach may betray the hostages, allow for Israeli reoccupation in Gaza, perpetuate Palestinian starvation, and leave no credible alternative to Hamas in Gaza.
Escalation risks
As long as the war in Gaza continues, both President Biden and President Trump will have to attend carefully to the risks of further escalation in the Middle East. Fortunately, both presidents will benefit from several factors that reduce the prospects for a full-scale regional war. For one, the military capabilities of Iran and Hezbollah have proved weaker than expected, and Israel has been successful in degrading their forces, penetrating intelligence networks, and defending Israeli territory. Israeli missile defense systems, including the Arrow 3 system that intercepts incoming missiles in the exoatmosphere, have performed spectacularly alongside U.S. assets. Due to these limitations, both Iran and Hezbollah have demonstrated greater risk aversion than originally anticipated, seemingly calibrating their attacks to avoid inflicting maximum damage.
Likewise, but to a lesser extent, Israeli capabilities are limited in important areas. Israel does not have an expeditionary military capacity, which would prevent it from deploying forces in large numbers to Iran, Iraq, and Yemen. This diminishes the value proposition of escalation from an Israeli perspective, as there is only so much Israel can achieve on its own. Israel also lacks the wherewithal to eliminate the entirety of the Iranian nuclear program through the air without direct U.S. assistance.
On the other hand, the risk of further regional escalation remains much too high for comfort, and the United States does not control the escalation ladder, leaving it in the hands of others who may not share the same interest in de-escalation. For Israel, with the ability to defeat incoming attacks, its risk tolerance appears to have grown. Some of Israel’s most ambitious attacks, including killing the leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah, may not have happened if Israel thought the response would have been more severe. With old assumptions regarding Iran’s willingness to use force disproven, it is possible that Israel and the United States could overcorrect, concluding that Iran and Hezbollah are incapable of more forceful retaliation or at least reluctant to respond in such a manner. Overestimating the risk tolerance of the Iranian threat network over the past year may lead to underestimating it now. These calculations will take place against a return to a Trump administration’s maximum pressure campaign that will raise the heat in the Middle East, potentially incentivizing an off-ramp or creating a new powder keg. At the very least, Iran can be expected to continue supporting terrorism and cyberattacks even if it refrains from conventional operations.
Opportunities for de-escalation will coexist with threats of further escalation.
Finally, at this early stage, it is hard to speculate on the net effect of the Assad regime’s demise on escalatory dynamics within the region. Yet uncertainty is seldom conducive to lowering tensions. Israel’s decision to deploy troops into Syrian territory to guard the approach to the Golan Heights could become more of a source of tension than deterrence. Iran can be expected to test whether it can cooperate with the new Syrian leadership to continue supplying Hezbollah. And the extremist background of many Syrian rebels raises questions about their intentions toward Israel.
Conclusion
Opportunities for de-escalation will coexist with threats of further escalation. The achievement of ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon is essential to de-escalating violence in the region. However, this would be just the beginning of a long road to achieving stability in the Middle East. And continued progress on this path will require sustained U.S. diplomatic leadership in close coordination with regional and global partners. Such an undertaking would be a tall order for any administration, and by any measure, we should not expect just “any administration” over the next four years.