Report

6 Policies Proved To Increase Union Membership

Evidence shows that more workers join unions when policies support workplace organizing, access, sectoral bargaining, the Ghent system, and dues paying, and provide funding.

In this article
Workers assemble Ford vehicles at the Chicago Assembly Plant in Chicago on June 24, 2019. (Getty/Scott Olson)

Introduction and summary

Although half of all workers in the United States would like to join unions, just 6 percent of private sector workers are union members.1 To counteract the forces that suppress union membership, policy must actively promote unions and collective bargaining.

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Many factors—including union organizing efforts, economic conditions, and individual characteristics and beliefs—affect whether workers join unions, but the policy environment is critical.2 Research from the United States and around the world shows that six policy strategies meaningfully boost union membership:

  • Strengthening workplace organizing and bargaining, such as limits on union busting
  • Improving worker access, including providing unions with workers’ contact information
  • Instituting sectoral bargaining, so unions can negotiate standards across an entire industry
  • Adopting the Ghent system, where unions help deliver governmental benefits
  • Supporting dues paying, including through repeal of right-to-work laws
  • Providing funding for union activities, such as unemployment insurance for striking workers

These policies work best when pursued together because workers join unions for different reasons and through different pathways. Workers are more likely to join when unions deliver higher wages, pro-union norms and solidarity are strong, and workers have frequent contact with unions inside and outside the workplace—and the incentives encourage them to do so. Indeed, research shows that strong workplace organizing, sectoral bargaining, and the Ghent system are mutually reinforcing, creating overlapping structures and inducements that encourage membership.3 This trio of policies are likely the most important for increasing union membership and thus should be prioritized, but all six matter, and progress will require a combination of strategies.

Ultimately, federal reforms are needed to fully enact these policies, but states have some room to move forward. For workers who are not covered by federal labor law, such as public sector workers and independent contractors, states have significant freedom. But for workers covered by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), states can enact only some of the policies, such as funding and the Ghent system.4

Labor unions and their allies are pursuing all six policy strategies to varying degrees. The Protecting the Right to Organize (PRO) Act—the primary federal legislation that aims to strengthen unions—focuses on two: improving workplace organizing and bargaining and supporting dues paying.5 Promoting access rights, sectoral bargaining, the Ghent system, and funding have received more attention at the state level.6

As powerful as these six strategies are, none on its own is enough to overcome the structural disadvantages unions face. But together, this suite of policies can create a broadly supportive environment for unions to thrive.

Strengthen workplace organizing and bargaining

The workplace is where people think most about work issues, where the culture of unionism often takes hold, where most collective bargaining in the United States occurs, and—if unions are successful—where people can experience higher wages, better benefits, and improved working conditions, as well as representation and voice.7 Yet, the NLRA stifles workplace organizing and bargaining: It subjects workers to rampant union busting by employers as workers seek to be recognized as a union and then forces them to endure an arduous negotiation process that too often fails to achieve a contract.8

Policy elements that help workers to successfully form a union at their worksite and secure a collective bargaining agreement, including limits on employer opposition, a favorable recognition process, and strong bargaining rights, have been found to increase union membership.9 More generally, research consistently finds that the presence of a strong union at the workplace significantly increases the likelihood a worker joins.10 In other words, successful organizing and collective bargaining at the worksite level is a bedrock of union membership, and policies that support such efforts boost membership.

The proposed federal PRO Act contains numerous elements to facilitate the process of workers forming a union and bargaining at their workplace, including promoting free and fair union elections, holding employers accountable for illegal union-busting activity, enhancing strike rights, and requiring mediation and arbitration to help workers secure first contracts.11 Several states have strengthened workplace representation and bargaining rights for public sector workers.12

Improve union access to workers

Unions that can communicate freely with workers have more opportunities to recruit and retain members. As a result, the rights of unions to access workers—especially at the workplace—facilitates recruitment and retention.13 Unfortunately, the NLRA makes it difficult for unions to connect with workers, particularly at their workplace: It requires unions to demonstrate the support of at least 30 percent of workers before they gain contact information and then go through the arduous process of winning a collective bargaining agreement to secure workplace access.14

Policymakers can provide unions with access to workers in a variety of ways, such as through the provision of emails and other contact information, rights to enter workplaces, a space at their worksite for workers to discuss workplace issues and problems free from managers’ interference or supervision,15 and the creation of works councils—a workplace committee that workers run.

California and Massachusetts provide unions with an easier path to access the contact information for all rideshare drivers in the sector.16 A number of states, including Maryland and New Jersey, allow unionized workers to meet with new public sector hires in the workplace and educate them on the benefits of union membership as well as ensure unions regularly receive updated contact lists for workers.17

Promote sectoral bargaining

Sectoral bargaining is a type of collective bargaining that creates minimum standards for all workers in an industry or occupation. The NLRA makes sectoral bargaining very difficult for workers to achieve.18

While it is more widely known that sectoral bargaining increases the number of workers covered by a union contract, it also increases union membership because it creates new organizing opportunities, reduces incentives for employers to fight worker efforts to unionize, and ensures that high-paying unionized firms can compete on a level playing field.19 Research finds that sectoral bargaining has a “significant, positive and robust impact on union growth.”20 This is especially true for workers in jobs that are hard to organize under worksite-level bargaining, such as in industries that are heavily contracted out or “fissured.”21 Indeed, modeling by the Center for American Progress suggests that sectoral bargaining could help significantly increase membership and coverage.22

Massachusetts and California have created sectoral bargaining systems for rideshare drivers.23

Create Ghent-like structures

The Ghent system—an arrangement in several countries whereby unions help deliver government-supported unemployment insurance—provides workers with an incentive to join unions and allows unions to have regular access to workers outside the workplace.24 The Ghent system has been shown to significantly increase union membership, with some studies estimating it provides more than a 20 percentage-point boost in density.25

Though the United States does not have the Ghent system, it does have a number of Ghent-like structures where unions deliver or help people access governmental benefits.26 In Maine, unions and other worker organizations receive public funding to help workers access unemployment and workforce training benefits,27 while in Oregon unions partner with the state to help public sector workers navigate their health and retirement benefit plans.28 Numerous states partner with unions to lead training programs, and several cities partner with unions and worker organizations to boost compliance with employment laws.29

Support dues paying

The structure and ease of membership dues payment influence whether workers join unions. Policies that allow unions to charge fees to workers covered by a contract have been shown to encourage workers to pay and join unions.30 In contrast, union membership is reduced when so-called right-to-work laws make it illegal for workers and employers to negotiate a contract requiring everyone at a worksite covered by a union contract to pay their fair share of the costs of administering it.31

Michigan repealed its right-to-work law in 2023, and the PRO Act would stop all state right-to-work laws.32 The NLRA allows unions and employers to negotiate over the use of payroll for dues, and most states—but not all—allow payroll deductions for public sector unions.33 Some states allow private sector workers to use payroll deductions to fund a range of organizations.34

Provide funding

Policies that reduce the costs of paying union dues or participating in union activities increase membership. For example, tax policies providing workers with a subsidy for a percentage of union dues have been shown to boost union density.35 Similarly, policies that provide unemployment benefits for striking workers—reducing the cost of lost wages for workers striking to gain union recognition or achieve a better contract—increase labor’s organizational capacity.36

The proposed federal Tax Fairness for Workers Act would restore the ability of workers to deduct union dues on their income taxes, which was removed by the first Trump administration’s 2017 tax law.37 Maryland, New York, Delaware, and Pennsylvania allow a state tax deduction for union dues, and California has a tax credit for union dues.38

Washington, Oregon, New York, and New Jersey provide unemployment insurance benefits to striking workers, and Illinois protects picketing workers from legal liability for unintentional property damage.39

Conclusion

Each of these six policy strategies has been proved to increase union membership. Other policies may also increase union membership, but those featured in this report have been extensively studied. The policies should be pursued together, providing multiple reasons and ways for workers to join unions.

Some think a renewed emphasis on union organizing is the only path to increasing membership and question the importance of policy.40 While increased union organizing may be necessary, it is clearly insufficient.41 There are few, if any, recent cases of labor unions being able to increase membership over any significant period when a country’s policy is unfavorable. But in contrast, with good policies, unions have attained very high membership levels in many different environments.42

Policy reforms are needed to encourage union membership not just because current laws make it far too difficult for workers to form unions and bargain collectively but also to counteract the larger forces that suppress union membership—the challenge of providing a public good and corporate opposition.43

Because unions provide a public good of higher wages, better benefits, and improved working conditions across segments of the economy, this creates a free-rider problem that can be limited but never fully solved.44 There will always be some nonunion workers benefiting from the higher standards that unions create, leading to reduced membership. Similarly, not every corporate action to restrict unions can legally be stopped. Some types of antiunion employer pressure on workers can be limited, but corporations have significant power and will find ways to oppose unions in an effort to keep the cost of wages down. As a result, countervailing policies that support union membership are needed.

In summary, unions face a number of structural disadvantages to achieving adequate membership and require a favorable policy environment that provides workers with multiple reasons to join unions in order to thrive. The six policies discussed in this report can do the job.

Endnotes

  1. Thomas Kochan and others, “Who Wants to Join a Union? A Growing Number of Americans,” The Conversation, August 30, 2018, available at https://theconversation.com/who-wants-to-join-a-union-a-growing-number-of-americans-102374; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Union Members — 2025,” Press release, February 18, 2026, available at https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_02182026.htm.
  2. See, among many others, Claus Schnabel, “Determinants of Trade Union Membership” (Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuremberg, 2002), available at https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/28298/1/361174594.PDF; Bernhard Ebbinghaus and Jelle Visser, “When Institutions Matter: Union Growth and Decline in Western Europe, 1950–1995,” European Sociological Review 15 (2) (1999): 135–158, available at https://academic.oup.com/esr/article-abstract/15/2/135/433965; Daniele Checchi and Jelle Visser, “Pattern Persistence in European Trade Union Density: A Longitudinal Analysis 1950–1996,” European Sociological Review 21 (1) (2005): 1–21, available at https://academic.oup.com/esr/article-abstract/21/1/1/586538; Christian Lyhne Ibsen and Maite Tapia, “Trade Union Revitalisation: Where Are We Now? Where to Next?”, Journal of Industrial Relations 59 (2) (2017): 170–191, available at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022185616677558.
  3. Sven Oskarsson, “Institutional Explanations of Union Strength: An Assessment,” Politics & Society 31 (4) (2003): 609–635; Christian Lyhne Ibsen, Jonas Toubøl, and Daniel Sparwath Jensen, “Social Customs and Trade Union Membership: A Multi-Level Analysis of Workplace Union Density Using Micro-Data,” European Sociological Review 33 (4) (2017): 504–517, available at https://academic.oup.com/esr/article-abstract/33/4/504/4037490; Jonas Toubøl and Carsten Strøby Jensen, “Why Do People Join Trade Unions? The Impact of Workplace Union Density on Union Recruitment,” Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 20 (1) (2014): 135–154; John Schmitt and Alexandra Mitukiewicz, “Politics matter: changes in unionisation rates in rich countries, 1960–2010,” Industrial Relations Journal, 43 (2012): 260–280
  4. San Diego Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), available at https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/359/236/; Wisconsin Department of Industry v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986), available at https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/475/282/; Center for Labor and a Just Economy, “Overcoming Federal Preemption: How to Spur Innovation at the State and Local Level” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, 2021), available at https://clje.law.harvard.edu/overcoming-federal-preemption-how-to-spur-innovation-at-the-state-and-local-level/.
  5. House Education and Workforce Committee Democrats, “Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2025 Fact Sheet” (Washington: U.S. House of Representatives, 2025), available at https://democrats-edworkforce.house.gov/imo/media/doc/protecting_the_right_to_organize_act_of_2025_fact_sheet.pdf.
  6. Karla Walter and David Madland, “State and Local Policymakers Can Raise Standards and Build Power for Workers” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2025), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/state-and-local-policymakers-can-raise-standards-and-build-power-for-workers/.
  7. On importance of experience in a union Alex Bryson and Rafael Gomez, “Buying into Union Membership,” in Gospel, H. and Wood, S. (eds.), Representing Workers: Trade Union Recognition and Membership in Britain (London: Routledge, 2003), 72–91.
  8. Lawrence Mishel, Lynn Rhinehart, and Lane Windham, “Explaining the Erosion of Private-Sector Unions: How Corporate Practices and Legal Changes Have Undercut the Ability of Workers to Organize and Bargain” (Washington: Economic Policy Institute, 2020), available at https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/publications/private-sector-unions-corporate-legal-erosion/.
  9. Adrienne E. Eaton and Jill Kriesky, “Union Organizing under Neutrality and Card Check Agreements,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 55 (1) (2001): 42–59; Henry S. Farber, “Union Membership in the United States: The Divergence between the Public and Private Sectors,” (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section, 2005), available at https://irs.princeton.edu/publications/working-papers/union-membership-united-states-divergence-between-public-and-private; Richard Freeman and Jeffrey Pelletier, “The Impact of Industrial Relations Legislation on British Union Density,” British Journal of Industrial Relations 28 (2) (1990): 141–164; Timothy D. Chandler and Rafael Gely, “Card-Check Laws and Public-Sector Union Membership in the States,” Labor Studies Journal 36 (4) (2011): 445–459; Chris Riddell, “Union Certification Success under Voting versus Card-Check Procedures: Evidence from British Columbia, 1978–1998,” ILR Review 57 (4) (2004): 493–517; Sara Slinn, “An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of the Change from Card-Check to Mandatory Vote Certification,” Canadian Labour and Employment Law Journal 11 (2004): 259–301.
  10. Claus Schnabel and Joachim Wagner, “Determinants of Union Membership in 18 EU Countries: Evidence from Micro Data, 2002/03,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 1464 (2005), available at https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/23772/1/dp31.pdf; Toubøl and Jensen, “Why Do People Join Trade Unions? The Impact of Workplace Union Density on Union Recruitment”; Jelle Visser, “Why Fewer Workers Join Unions in Europe: A Social Custom Explanation of Membership Trends,” British Journal of Industrial Relations 40 (3) (2002): 403–430, available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8543.00241; Bernhard Ebbinghaus, Claudia Göbel, and Sebastian Koos, “Social Capital, ‘Ghent’ and Workplace Contexts Matter: Comparing Union Membership in Europe,” European Journal of Industrial Relations 17 (2) (2011): 107–124; Ebbinghaus and Visser, “When Institutions Matter: Union Growth and Decline in Western Europe, 1950–1995.”
  11. House Education and Workforce Committee Democrats, “Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2025 Fact Sheet” (Washington: U.S. House of Representatives, 2025), available at https://democrats-edworkforce.house.gov/imo/media/doc/protecting_the_right_to_organize_act_of_2025_fact_sheet.pdf.
  12. Aurelia Glass and Karla Walter, “7 Ways State Lawmakers Can Build Public Sector Union Power” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2025), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/7-ways-state-lawmakers-can-build-public-sector-union-power/.
  13. Ebbinghaus and Visser, “When Institutions Matter: Union Growth and Decline in Western Europe, 1950–1995”; Jim Stanford, “International Approaches to Solving the ‘Free Rider’ Problem in Industrial Relations,” Labour and Industry: A Journal of the Social and Economic Relations of Work 31 (3) (2021), available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10301763.2021.1987052; Jelle Visser, “Trade Unions in the Balance” (Geneva: International Labor Organization, 2019), available at https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—ed_dialogue/—actrav/documents/publication/wcms_722482.pdf; Schnabel, “Determinants of Trade Union Membership”; Checchi and Visser, “Pattern Persistence in European Trade Union Density: A Longitudinal Analysis 1950–1996”; Eaton and Kriesky, “Union Organizing under Neutrality and Card Check Agreements.”
  14. Carolyn Liziewski, “The Supreme Court’s All-or-Nothing Approach to the Right to Exclude in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid,” Columbia Business Law Review, November 24, 2021, available at https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/announcement/view/455; Kauf, McGuire, and Margolis, “Supreme Court Limits Union Access to Employer Property,” April 1, 1992, available at https://www.kmm.com/supreme-court-limits-union-access-to-employer-property/#:~:text=In%20upholding%20the%20NLRB’s%20application,NLRB%2C%20914%20F.
  15. Alex Hertel-Fernandez, “Why Workers Need Physical Spaces for Workplace Discussions — And What Labor Law Can Do” (Washington: Data for Progress, 2020), available at https://www.filesforprogress.org/memos/worker_places.pdf.
  16. David Madland, “State Rideshare Collective Bargaining Policies Hold Great Promise” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2025), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/state-rideshare-collective-bargaining-policies-hold-great-promise/.
  17. Aurelia Glass and Karla Walter, “7 Ways State Lawmakers Can Build Public Sector Union Power” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2025), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/7-ways-state-lawmakers-can-build-public-sector-union-power/.
  18. Celine McNicholas and Lynn Rhinehart, “Collective Bargaining beyond the Worksite: How Workers and Their Unions Build Power and Set Standards for Their Industries” (Washington: Economic Policy Institute, 2020), available at https://www.epi.org/publication/collective-bargaining-beyond-the-worksite-how-workers-and-their-unions-build-power-and-set-standards-for-their-industries/.
  19. David Madland, “Sectoral Bargaining Can Support High Union Membership” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2024), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/sectoral-bargaining-can-support-high-union-membership/.
  20. Visser, “Why Fewer Workers Join Unions in Europe: A Social Custom Explanation of Membership Trends.” See also: Magnus Rasmussen, “Institutions (still) Rule: Labor Market Centralization and Trade Union Organization” (University of South-Eastern Norway, 2017), available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320273351_Institutions_still_Rule_Labor_Market_Centralization_and_Trade_Union_Organization; Ebbinghaus and Visser, “When Institutions Matter: Union Growth and Decline in Western Europe, 1950–1995”; Visser, “Trade Unions in the Balance”; Lyle Scruggs and Peter Lange, “Where Have All the Members Gone? Globalization, Institutions, and Union Density,” Journal of Politics 64 (1) (2002): 126–153; Guy Mundlak, Organizing Matters: Two Logics of Trade Union Representation (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2020), available at https://www.elgaronline.com/monobook-oa/book/9781839104039/9781839104039.xml. It is worth noting that there are outliers, such as France, that have low union membership because of unusual sectoral systems that hinder membership in a variety of ways. See, for example, Marine Cheuvreux and Corinne Darmaillacq, “Unionisation in France: paradoxes, challenges and outlook,” Trésor-Economics 129 (2014), available at https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Unionisation-in-France%3A-paradoxes%2C-challenges-and-Santos-Sode/01ae62acd132ea4f4c4fbf42ef014d1fc990a532. See also: Torgeir Flaarønning, “Union Decline Through Extension of Collective Agreements?”, British Journal of Industrial Relations 63 (2025): 100–129, available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/bjir.12832; Zoltán Fazekas, “Institutional Effects on the Presence of Trade Unions at the Workplace: Moderation in a Multilevel Setting,” European Journal of Industrial Relations 17 (2) (2011): 153–169.
  21. Rasmussen, “Institutions (still) Rule: Labor Market Centralization and Trade Union Organization”; OECD, “Collective Bargaining in a Changing World of Work,” available at https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/oecd-employment-outlook-2017_empl_outlook-2017-en.html (last accessed April 2026). See Figure 4.A1.7, which finds that only 7 percent of employees in small firms belong to a union on average across OECD countries, yet employees in small firms represent a larger share of trade union members in countries with sectoral bargaining, such as Belgium and Sweden.
  22. David Madland, “Modeling the Impact of Sectoral Bargaining for U.S. Workers” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2026), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/modeling-the-impact-of-sectoral-bargaining-for-u-s-workers/.
  23. Madland, “State Rideshare Collective Bargaining Policies Hold Great Promise.”
  24. David Madland and Malkie Wall, “American Ghent: Designing Programs to Strengthen Unions and Improve Government Services” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2019), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/american-ghent/. Note that the degree of government subsidy has been shown to affect the Ghent system’s impact on union membership.
  25. Kurt Vandaele, “A Report from the Homeland of the Ghent System: The Relationship between Unemployment and Trade Union Membership in Belgium,” Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 12 (4) (2006): 647–657; Tim Van Rie, Ive Marx, and Jeroen Horemans, “Ghent Revisited: Unemployment Insurance and Union Membership in Belgium and the Nordic Countries,” European Journal of Industrial Relations 17 (2) (2011): 125–139; Matthew Dimick, “Labor Law, New Governance, and the Ghent System,” North Carolina Law Review 90 (2) (2012): 1–55, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680900; Lyle Scruggs, “The Ghent System and Union Membership in Europe, 1970–1996,” Political Research Quarterly 55 (2) (2002): 275–297; Laust Høgedahl, “The Ghent Effect for Whom? Mapping the Variations of the Ghent Effect across Different Trade Unions in Denmark,” Industrial Relations Journal 45 (6) (2014): 469–485; Jochen Clasen and Elke Viebrock, “Voluntary Unemployment Insurance and Trade Union Membership: Investigating the Connections in Denmark and Sweden,” Journal of Social Policy 37 (3) (2008): 433–451. Bo Rothstein, “Labor-Market Institutions and Working-Class Strength,” in Steinmo, Sven, Thelen, Kathleen, and Longstreth, Franch (Eds.), Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 33–56; Magnus Bergli Rasmussen and Jonas Pontusson, “Working-Class Strength by Institutional Design? Unionization, Partisan Politics, and Unemployment Insurance Systems, 1870 to 2010,” Comparative Political Studies 51 (6) (2018): 793–828; Anders Kjellberg and Kristine Nergaard, “Union Density in Norway and Sweden: Stability versus Decline,” Nordic Journal of Working Life Studies 12 (S8) (2022): 51–72, available at https://tidsskrift.dk/njwls/article/view/131697; Kurt Vandaele, “A Half Century of Trade Union Membership. The Cyclical Macro-Determinants of Postwar Union Growth in Belgium,” World Political Science Review 1 (2) (2005/2006): Article 3; Ebbinghaus and Visser, “When Institutions Matter: Union Growth and Decline in Western Europe, 1950–1995”; Visser, “Trade Unions in the Balance”; Visser, “Why Fewer Workers Join Unions in Europe: A Social Custom Explanation of Membership Trends”; Ebbinghaus, Göbel, and Koos, “Social Capital, ‘Ghent’ and Workplace Contexts Matter: Comparing Union Membership in Europe,” European Journal of Industrial Relations 17 (2) (2011): 107–124. It is important to note that the degree of the Ghent effect on membership can be influenced by the degree of subsidization as noted in Anders Kjellberg, “The Swedish Ghent System and Trade Unions under Pressure,” Transfer 15 (3–4) (2009): 481–504; Flemming Ibsen, Laust Høgedahl, and Søren Scheuer, “Free Riders: The Rise of Alternative Unionism in Denmark,” Industrial Relations Journal 44 (5–6) (2013): 444–461.
  26. Madland and Wall, “American Ghent: Designing Programs to Strengthen Unions and Improve Government Services”; Center for Labor and a Just Economy, “Government Funding for Worker Organizations” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, 2026), available at https://clje.law.harvard.edu/app/uploads/2026/03/1.-Government-Funding-for-Worker-Organizations.docx.pdf.
  27. Michele Evermore, Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, and David Madland, “Community Navigators Can Increase Access to Unemployment Benefits and New Jobs While Building Worker Power” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2024), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/community-navigators-can-increase-access-to-unemployment-benefits-and-new-jobs-while-building-worker-power/.
  28. Karla Walter, “How States and Unions Can Partner To Build the Public Sector Workforce” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2023), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/how-states-and-unions-can-partner-to-build-the-public-sector-workforce/.
  29. Madland and Wall, “American Ghent: Designing Programs to Strengthen Unions and Improve Government Services”; For enforcement, see: Center for Labor and a Just Economy, “Government Funding for Worker Organizations.”
  30. Schnabel, “Determinants of Trade Union Membership”; Ebbinghaus and Visser, “When Institutions Matter: Union Growth and Decline in Western Europe, 1950–1995”; Farber, “Union Membership in the United States: The Divergence between the Public and Private Sectors”; David Peetz, “Co-operative Values, Institutions and Free Riding in Australia: Can It Learn from Canada?”, Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations 60 (4) (2005); Stanford, “International Approaches to Solving the ‘Free Rider’ Problem in Industrial Relations.” Though note that minimal impact is found in Sabine Blaschke, “Union Density and European Integration: Diverging Convergence,” European Journal of Industrial Relations 6 (2) (2000): 217–236.
  31. Joe C. Davis and John H. Huston, “Right-to-Work Laws and Union Density: New Evidence from Micro Data,” Journal of Labor Research, 16 (2) (1995): 223–229, available at https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF02685742; Ozkan Eren and Serkan Ozbeklik, “What Do Right-to-Work Laws Do? Evidence from a Synthetic Control Method Analysis,” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 35 (1) (2016): 173–194, available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pam.21861; David T. Ellwood and Glenn Fine, “The Impact of Right-to-Work Laws on Union Organizing,” Journal of Political Economy 95 (2) (1987): 250–273, available at https://ideas.repec.org/a/ucp/jpolec/v95y1987i2p250-73.html.
  32. Michigan Senate Bill 34 (2023-2024), 102nd Legislature (March 24, 2023), available at https://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2023-2024/publicact/pdf/2023-PA-0008.pdf (last accessed November 2025); Michigan House Bill 4004 (2023-2024), 102nd Legislature, available at https://legiscan.com/MI/bill/HB4004/2023.
  33. For federal see: Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850 (1951), enforced, 205 F.2d 131 cert, denied, 346 U.S. For states see Aurelia Glass and Karla Walter, “7 Ways State Lawmakers Can Build Public Sector Union Power” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2025), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/7-ways-state-lawmakers-can-build-public-sector-union-power/. For additional proposed variants see Center for Labor and a Just Economy, “Payroll Deductions to Fund Worker Power” (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law School, 2026), available at https://clje.law.harvard.edu/app/uploads/2026/03/2.-Payroll-Deductions-to-Fund-Worker-Power.pdf.
  34. Alexander Hertel-Fernandez and Paul Sonn, “Building Worker Power in a Precarious Federal Landscape: Funding Labor Organizations to Build Power,” OnLabor, March 18, 2026, available at https://onlabor.org/building-worker-power-in-a-precarious-federal-landscape-funding-labor-organizations-to-build-power/; Center for Labor and a Just Economy, “Payroll Deductions to Fund Worker Power.”
  35. Erling Barth, Alex Bryson, and Harald Dale-Olsen, “Do Public Subsidies of Union Membership Increase Union Membership Rates?”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 229 (2025): 106855, available at https://www.iza.org/publications/dp/13747/.
  36. Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, “A Solidarity Net, Not a Safety Net,” Democracy (80) (2026), available at https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/80/a-solidarity-net-not-a-safety-net/; Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, “The Unemployment Line to the Picket Line: How a Reimagined Safety Net Can Rebuild Worker Power” (forthcoming).
  37. Tax Fairness for Workers Act, H.R. 2671, 119th Cong., 1st sess. (April 7, 2025), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/2671; Alexandra Thornton, “Why All Workers Should Be Able To Deduct Union Dues” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2019), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/workers-able-deduct-union-dues/.
  38. An act concerning Income Tax – Subtraction Modification – Union Dues, Chapter 513, H.B. 2, General Assembly of Maryland (May 9, 2023), available at https://custom.statenet.com/public/resources.cgi?id=ID:bill:MD2023000H2&ciq=ncsl&client_md=139c62f605a125d9f21a3327bcdae81c&mode=current_text; Delaware S. 72, 152nd General Assembly (2023), available at https://custom.statenet.com/public/resources.cgi?id=ID:bill:DE2023000S72&ciq=ncsl&client_md=0cf1cd6739744ad84b3b4a70ea44baa4&mode=current_text; Kevin Eitzman, “Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation Allowing Full Union Dues to be Deducted From New York State Taxes,” New York AFL-CIO, May 5, 2017, available at https://nysaflcio.org/news/governor-cuomo-signs-legislation-allowing-full-union-dues-be-deducted; Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, “Unreimbursed Business Expenses,” available at https://www.pa.gov/agencies/revenue/resources/tax-types-and-information/personal-income-tax/unreimbursed-business-expenses (last accessed November 2025); Patrick Gleason, “California Governor Gavin Newsom Signs New Budget Creating Nation’s First Tax Credit for Union Dues,” Forbes, July 6, 2022, available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/patrickgleason/2022/07/06/california-governor-gavin-newsom-signs-new-budget-creating-nations-first-tax-credit-for-union-dues/.
  39. Concerns UI benefits during labor disputes, New Jersey Assembly Bill 4772, regular sess. (April 24, 2023), available at https://legiscan.com/NJ/bill/A4772/2022; Daniel Perez, “Extending unemployment insurance to striking workers would cost little and encourage fair negotiations,” Economic Policy Institute, January 29, 2024, available at https://www.epi.org/blog/extending-unemployment-insurance-to-striking-workers-would-cost-little-and-encourage-fair-negotiations/; Washington Senate Bill 5041, 2025–2026 Legislative Session, available at https://app.leg.wa.gov/BillSummary/?BillNumber=5041&Year=2025&Initiative=falsel (last accessed November 2025); Oregon Senate Bill 916 Enrolled, 2025 Regular Session, available at https://olis.oregonlegislature.gov/liz/2025R1/Measures/Overview/SB916 (last accessed November 2025); New York Senate Bill S4573, 2019-2020 Legislative Session, available at https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/S4573 (last accessed November 2025); Andrew Hensel, “New Illinois laws set up protections for union strikers,” The Center Square, June 15, 2023, available at https://www.thecentersquare.com/illinois/article_c4679d50-0bc7-11ee-8aef-0b903d27303a.html; Public Act 103-0040, H.B. 2907, Illinois General Assembly (January 1, 2024), available at https://ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name=103-0040; Public Act 103-0045, H.B. 3396, Illinois General Assembly (January 1, 2024), available at https://ilga.gov/legislation/publicacts/fulltext.asp?Name=103-0045.
  40. Hamilton Nolan, “Confirmed: Unions Squandered the Biden Years,” How Things Work, January 28, 2025, available at https://www.hamiltonnolan.com/p/confirmed-unions-squandered-the-biden.
  41. Henry S. Farber and Bruce Western, “Accounting for the Decline of Unions in the Private Sector, 1973–1998,” in James T. Bennett and Bruce E. Kaufman (Eds.) The Future of Private Sector Unionism in the United States (New York: Routledge, 2002), 28–58, available at https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315499093-3/ac; Lawrence Mishel and others, “Explaining the Erosion of Private-Sector Unions,” Economic Policy Institute, November 18, 2020, https://www.epi.org/unequalpower/publications/private-sectorunions-corporate-legal-erosion/; Bradley Bowden, “The Organising Model in Australia: A Reassessment,” Labour and Industry 20 (2) (2009): 138–158; Robert Hickey, Sarosh Kuruvilla, and Tashlin Lakhani, “No Panacea for Success: Member Activism, Organizing and Union Renewal,” British Journal of Industrial Relations 48 (1) (2010): 53–83; Melanie Simms, Jane Holgate, and Edmund Heery, Union Voices: Tactics and Tensions in UK Organizing (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012); Joseph B. Rose and Gary N. Chaison, “Unionism in Canada and the United States in the 21st Century: The Prospects for Revival,” Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations 56 (1) (2001): 34–65.
  42. See: David Madland, Re-Union: How Bold Labor Reforms Can Repair, Revitalize, and Reunite the United States (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2021), available at https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501755378/re-union/; David Madland, “What It Will Take To Increase Union Membership and Collective Bargaining Coverage,” Center for American Progress, January 18, 2024, available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/what-it-will-take-to-increase-union-membership-and-collective-bargaining-coverage/.
  43. Madland, Re-Union: How Bold Labor Reforms Can Repair, Revitalize, and Reunite the United States.
  44. Ibid.; Jim Stanford, “International Approaches to Solving the ‘Free Rider’ Problem in Industrial Relations,” Labour and Industry: A Journal of the Social and Economic Relations of Work 31 (3) (2021), available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10301763.2021.1987052; Barth, Bryson, and Dale-Olsen, “Do Public Subsidies of Union Membership Increase Union Membership Rates?”; Salvo Leonardi, “Trade Unions and Collective Bargaining in Italy during the Crisis,” in Steffen Lehndorff, Heiner Dribbusch, and Thorsten Schulten (Eds.), Rough Waters: European Trade Unions in a Time of Crisis (Brussels: ETUI, 2017), 83–108; Schnabel, “Determinants of Trade Union Membership.”

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David Madland

Senior Fellow; Senior Adviser, American Worker Project

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American Worker Project

The American Worker Project conducts research and advances policies to build power for working people; strengthen their right to unionize; and ensure that work pays and supports a dignified life.

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