Center for American Progress

Sectoral Bargaining Can Support High Union Membership
Report

Sectoral Bargaining Can Support High Union Membership

Sectoral bargaining should be part of a broad set of reforms to rebuild unions in the United States.

In this article
Two body welders are seen at work at New Way Trucks in Scranton, Iowa, on April 22, 2022. (Getty/Bonnie Jo Mount)

Introduction and summary

Sectoral bargaining is a type of collective bargaining that provides union contract coverage for most or all workers in a particular sector. Depending on how sectoral bargaining is structured, it is sometimes known as broad-based, multiemployer, national, or industrywide bargaining. It typically operates in conjunction with workplace-level bargaining, setting sectorwide standards that workers can seek to bargain above at their worksite.

Sectoral bargaining increases the number of workers whose pay and benefits are set by union contracts compared with the worksite-only collective bargaining that is more common in the United States.1 It also reduces economic inequality, closes racial and gender pay gaps, and boosts economic productivity.2

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Despite the significant benefits of sectoral bargaining, some union allies may worry that it could reduce the number of workers who join unions because it can create a free-rider problem, whereby similarly placed workers are covered by a union contract whether they are members or not. Yet, there is little evidence that union membership is hindered by sectoral bargaining. Rather, research demonstrates that sectoral bargaining can help support high union membership. As one academic study found, sectoral bargaining has a “significant, positive and robust impact on union growth.”3 This is especially true for workers in jobs that are “inherently hard to organize,” such as those with many small employers or heavily contracted, fissured industries.4 Indeed, the seven countries with the highest union membership in the OECD—Iceland, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and Italy—all have sectoral systems.5

This report explains the relationship between sectoral bargaining and union density. It first provides the theory for how sectoral bargaining can support high union membership and then offers evidence from the United States and countries around the world showing that sectoral bargaining typically produces higher union density than worksite-only bargaining. The report synthesizes evidence showing how countries that moved away from sectoral bargaining lost union members, while countries that moved toward sectoral bargaining increased union density. Cross-country comparisons demonstrate that sectoral bargaining and high membership often go together and find that exceptions to the rule, such as France, have unusual systems that hinder membership in a variety of ways. The report also provides case studies of successful organizing campaigns under sectoral systems.

The seven countries with the highest union membership in the OECD—Iceland, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and Italy—all have sectoral systems.

Ultimately, the report makes clear that sectoral bargaining policies can support high membership and thus should be considered in debates about how to best increase union membership in the United States. The degree to which sectoral bargaining supports union density depends on many factors, including how the bargaining is structured, the quality of grassroots organizing, and whether other pro-union policies are present. Therefore, to best promote union membership, policymakers in the United States should engage in a broad set of labor reforms, including the Protecting the Right to Organize Act, to strengthen workers’ rights6 as well as policies that increase union access to workers and support sectoral bargaining.

Why sectoral bargaining supports high union membership

It is intuitive that sectoral bargaining would increase the percentage of workers covered by union contracts—known as the collective bargaining coverage or union coverage rate—compared with worksite-only bargaining. Yet to some union advocates, it may seem puzzling that sectoral bargaining can also increase the share of workers who are members of unions—known as union density or the union membership rate.

Under sectoral bargaining systems, employers face similar labor costs whether their workers are unionized or not.

Under sectoral bargaining, all similarly placed workers are covered by a union contract whether they are members or not. This free-rider problem can reduce workers’ incentives to join unions to varying degrees, depending on the specifics of how each sectoral system works: Systems that legally extend all terms of union contracts to nonunion workers, such as in France, have a greater free-rider problem than systems that extend only, for example, wage standards or do not have government extension, such as in Italy and Denmark, respectively. But sectoral bargaining also creates forces that encourage union membership—and these forces are generally more powerful than the free-rider problem it fosters.

As a result, employers have less incentive to fight their workers’ efforts to unionize, which can make organizing workers easier. 7 Sectoral bargaining also creates a more level playing field that protects unionized workers and high union standards from being undercut by low-paying companies. Without sectoral bargaining, unionized workers are under constant threat that companies will find ways to do similar work at lower standards.

Sectoral bargaining also gives workers and their unions new organizing opportunities. Sectoral bargaining provides unions greater recruitment opportunities with workers that they already have a connection to because the number of people covered by sectoral agreements is greater than the number covered by worksite-only agreements. Furthermore, unions can take certain types of recruitment actions in sectoral systems that they cannot under workplace-only systems. For example, workers can seek to organize and take collective actions to ensure that nonunion employers comply with sectoral agreements.8

In addition, workers still have incentives to unionize in sectoral bargaining systems to have greater voice and power in negotiations. The incentive to organize to influence bargaining that occurs purely at the sectoral level may be more attenuated than in worksite-only systems, but sectoral systems typically also have worksite-level bargaining. Worksite bargaining in sectoral systems can address certain pay and benefit issues as well as shop-specific concerns that are more appropriately addressed at that level than at a sectoral table. Integrating sectoral and worksite-level bargaining creates strong incentives for workers to stay engaged and participate in the union. Indeed, worksite-level union activities are key to recruitment efforts in sectoral systems.9

Finally, sectoral systems often include additional policies that facilitate or encourage union membership and further overcome the free-rider problem, such as strong protections for worker rights, union access to worksites for recruitment, and the Ghent system, where unions help deliver governmental benefits to their members. These factors are critical to supporting high union membership.10

Evidence showing that sectoral bargaining supports high density

Multiple types of evidence indicate that sectoral bargaining usually leads to higher union membership than worksite-only bargaining. This evidence also points to some of the elements that the United States should include in any labor law reforms.

Countries with sectoral systems as diverse as Sweden, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, Italy, and Demark have all maintained high union density and high collective bargaining coverage over relatively long periods of time, indicating that there are many ways to successfully design sectoral systems. There are exceptions to the rule of sectoral bargaining and high membership going together, such as France with its low union membership rates—but France has a peculiar sectoral system that disincentivizes union organizing. Successful sectoral systems typically find ways to help unions bring multiple employers to the bargaining table and spread union contracts broadly, as well as include policies that ensure workers have strong rights and provide them union access. These systems also incentivize workers to join and unions to recruit.

The three main ways to study the impact of sectoral bargaining on union density—before and after analysis of policy change in particular countries, cross-country comparisons, and case studies of organizing campaigns—all point in the same direction.

Single country studies examining the impact of changing between different types of bargaining systems demonstrate the importance of sectoral bargaining for union membership. Australia, New Zealand, and Britain all saw union density fall significantly after weakening their sectoral bargaining systems, and subsequent improvements to workplace bargaining failed to increase membership. Now, the labor movements in these countries are seeking to reinstate sectoral bargaining.

Cross-country comparisons, from simple correlations to rigorous academic studies, also find that sectoral bargaining systems generally lead to higher membership. Finally, case studies of union organizing under sectoral systems highlight how sectoral bargaining can support worker activism and encourage union membership. Sectoral systems can give workers a focal point for their activism, as well as make their success more likely, spurring their efforts to continue.

Before-and-after studies of single countries

Before-and-after studies from countries around the world highlight the importance of sectoral bargaining for supporting high union membership. For example, the decline in union density in Israel after 1987 coincided with the decentralization of collective bargaining, while the promotion of sectoral bargaining has been an important part of the revival of labor union membership in Uruguay since 2005.11 Indeed, Uruguay’s revival of its version of sectoral bargaining and wages councils helped “revitalized labor unions” and dramatically increase union membership.12

Though some researchers may question the applicability to the United States of these examples,13 the experiences of Australia, New Zealand, and Britain are particularly relevant because all share similar cultural, economic, and legal processes with the United States.

Previously, Australia, New Zealand, and Britain maintained high density under sectoral systems, but unions quickly lost membership when their labor laws were changed in ways that, among other things, weakened or eliminated their sectoral systems. There were many reasons unions in these countries lost members, but the weakening or elimination of sectoral bargaining was at least part of the story. Furthermore, each country subsequently attempted improvements to their workplace-level bargaining systems that failed to increase density. Labor union confederations in the three countries now believe that recreating sectoral bargaining systems is a key part of their revival. In short, all three countries demonstrate that sectoral bargaining can support high membership and suggest that reviving it is critical to increasing union membership.

Australia

From the early 1900s through the 1980s, Australia had a sectoral system that led to high union density and coverage—with density at 50 percent and coverage at 85 percent in 1980.14 Then, in the mid-1980s and especially in the 1990s, Australia began dismantling its sectoral labor system, causing coverage and density to steeply decline.15 Attempts over the years to modestly improve workplace bargaining did not increase union membership,16 and union density is now less than 14 percent.17 For years, the Australia Council of Trade Unions pushed for major legal changes to recreate a sectoral bargaining system,18 and in December 2022, it won smaller legal changes to the “Single Interest Bargaining Stream” to improve access to sectoral bargaining for workers in franchised sectors, which may increase coverage and density in covered sectors.19

New Zealand

New Zealand’s experience with sectoral bargaining is similar to Australia’s.

For much of the 20th century, New Zealand had a sectoral bargaining system that supported high union membership and high bargaining coverage—with union density around 65 percent and collective bargaining coverage almost 70 percent in the early 1980s.20 But in the late 1980s and early 1990s, New Zealand essentially eliminated sectoral bargaining and shifted to a primarily worksite-based bargaining system, leading to a steep and dramatic decline in both coverage and density; by the late 1990s, density had fallen to 22 percent.21 In 2000, New Zealand passed legislation to increase legal protections for unions and workplace-level bargaining, but these changes had little effect on union density.22 New Zealand’s most recent union membership figures were 18 percent.23

Over the course of many years, the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions sought to restore a sectoral bargaining system24 and ultimately succeeded in 2022 when New Zealand enacted fair pay agreements.25 While the law held great promise to increase density and coverage, it was overturned in 2023.26

Britain

In 1979, union density in Britain was 55 percent and collective bargaining coverage was 70 percent,27 with sectoral bargaining a part of this success. According to Keith Ewing, professor of public law at King’s College London, and John Hendy, chair of the Institute of Employment Rights, “The ‘system’ in place in the post-war era was one of sectoral bargaining underpinning establishment level negotiation.”28

However, Margaret Thatcher changed labor policies in many ways, including weakening sectoral bargaining,29 so that union density and coverage dropped precipitously.30 The weakening of sectoral bargaining was but one of many reasons for union decline. Still, labor union membership has continued to decline over recent decades31—in large part because legal reforms have not markedly altered Thatcher’s changes32 and pushed only modest reforms to improve worksite-level bargaining by, for example, making it easier to demonstrate majority support at a workplace.33  Today, union density is less than 24 percent.34 The British Trades Union Congress now supports reforms that would create sectoral fair pay agreements, akin to what New Zealand briefly enacted.35

Cross-country comparisons

Academic studies comparing union membership across countries find that sectoral bargaining supports high union density. These studies typically focus on the dominant level of bargaining in a country, as most countries have multiple levels of bargaining, with sectoral systems setting minimum standards for most workers and workplace bargaining providing a way to improve upon those standards.

Jelle Visser, a professor at the University of Amsterdam, studied union membership in European countries over several decades to find that greater bargaining centralization (with sectoral bargaining more centralized than worksite bargaining) has a “significant, positive and robust impact on union growth.”36 Visser’s data on union membership and collective bargaining coverage has been adopted by the OECD as its official database on the subject.37

A study of union membership in economically advanced countries since 1950 by Columbia University’s Bruce Western found that more centralized bargaining was one of three institutional conditions “essential for union growth.”38

Magnus B. Rasmussen, professor at the University of South Eastern Norway, studied 35 countries over recent decades, as well as a smaller sample of 12 advanced countries from 1911 to 2000, to find that sectoral bargaining is more “conducive to union growth,” than worksite-only bargaining.39 Rasmussen also found that workers in jobs that are “inherently hard to organize” are much more likely to be covered under sectoral systems than under workplace only bargaining. Research by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and International Labor Organization also indicates that people with “nonstandard employment” or who work for small firms are more likely to be unionized under sectoral bargaining.40

In short, the general thrust of cross-country academic studies finds that sectoral bargaining usually supports high union density, though there are some exceptions and nuances in the research.41

The basic results of the academic findings cited above can be seen in a simple comparison. As shown in Figure 1, sectoral bargaining is typically associated with higher union membership than workplace-level bargaining. The figure shows the union density and predominant bargaining type (from sectoral to intermediate to workplace) for OECD countries. Countries with the highest union densities—from one-third to more than 90 percent—all have sectoral systems, while the lowest membership levels of 12 percent or less are almost exclusively in countries where worksite-level bargaining is the primary bargaining level. The middle tier of union membership includes a mix of dominant bargaining types, with some sectoral systems, some workplace, and some intermediate.

In addition to the broad trends, the figure also highlights the position of a few countries.

As previously noted, Iceland, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, and Italy have the highest densities in the OECD, and all have sectoral systems. Their sectoral systems are structured in different ways: Belgium and Italy have extension mechanisms to spread union contracts to other workers, while the Nordic countries rely more on direct negotiations between unions and employers to achieve a similar goal.42 This indicates that different types of sectoral systems can lead to high union density. It is also important to note that these countries have additional policies that support union membership: For example, all have strong workers’ rights and most have versions of the Ghent system.43

Canada, with more than 28 percent density, has the highest union membership rates of any country with predominantly workplace-level bargaining, indicating that workplace-level bargaining can achieve moderately high union membership levels. Still, it is worth noting that Quebec, the Canadian province with the most significant version of sectoral bargaining, has a higher membership rate (35 percent) than the national average and just about the highest rate of any province in the country.44 Furthermore, the relatively high overall membership rates in Canada are due in significant part to the public sector. Canada’s public sector has a significantly higher unionization rate (73 percent) than the public sector in the United States (33 percent), and the public sector is a larger share of the economy in Canada than it is in the United States  (45 percent compared with 33 percent).45 Private sector membership in Canada is just 14 percent and has been declining for decades.46

Figure 1 also highlights that a few countries with sectoral systems, most notably France, have quite low union densities. As a result, some policymakers might worry that if the United States were to promote sectoral bargaining, its union membership would remain stuck at very low levels or even decline further. Yet, a closer look at the French system shows that it is designed in ways that hinder union membership, so it is not a model the United States should emulate to boost union density.

French union membership is low in part because, as in the United States, workers are afraid of employer retaliation due to weak enforcement of legal rights.47 But the primary reason density in France is low is that there are few incentives for unions to recruit members and for workers to join.48

In the French system, unions have little need to recruit members. Unions receive most of their funding from the government and employers rather than member dues, thus low membership does not significantly affect their finances.49 Furthermore, union bargaining power does not depend on membership: The bargaining system provides unions the ability to bargain based on the support they receive in special workplace elections for employee representatives, which means unions do not need many members to negotiate with employers.50 In addition, French workers receive virtually all rights and benefits of union contracts whether they are members or not. This creates a greater free rider problem than in other sectoral systems,51 as other types of sectoral systems extend only some elements of union contracts to nonmembers—such as wages, but not all benefits or on-the-job protections.52

As a French government report summarized:

Low union density in France is due to a number of factors: (i) the unions’ weight in collective bargaining does not depend on how many members they have, but on their workplace election results; (ii) union membership does not give workers many rights and benefits compared with a good number of our European neighbours; and (iii) the unions are not funded mainly by member dues, but essentially by government, employers and labour-management organisations.53

Without mass membership, the ability to motivate the more activist members to strike is particularly important in the French system. Not surprisingly, then, most union members in France are union leaders and activists rather than rank-and-file workers.54

In short, bargaining in France is designed to lead to low union membership. The French case indicates that while it is possible to create a sectoral system with low membership, doing so requires many choices that reduce incentives for recruitment and membership. As a result, France is an outlier in the cross-country academic research, which finds that sectoral systems generally lead to higher union density.

Case studies of organizing campaigns

Case studies of union organizing campaigns indicate that sectoral bargaining can facilitate worker organizing and membership and highlights the mechanisms through which this happens.

As the cases of Amazon workers in Italy and organizing campaigns in several U.S. cities and states show, the structures of sectoral bargaining systems can motivate workers and help them succeed. In these cases, workers organized around sectoral issues, rather than free riding. Workers struck or took other actions to pressure employers, and the sectoral systems helped workers achieve their goals and motivated further organizing. In these cases, there was also often an interplay between workplace and sectoral organizing, with efforts at both levels supporting the other.

Amazon workers organized in Italy

Organizing workers at Amazon, the large, multinational tech company, is notoriously difficult, yet Italian workers succeeded—agreeing to a “historic” first contract in 2021.55 Workers achieved this success in significant part because Italy’s sectoral bargaining system supported their activism.56 Indeed, the Italy case highlights how sectoral bargaining can support worker activism and union membership and sheds light on how Italy is able to maintain a union density rate of around one-third, including nearly 30 percent in the private sector.57

Amazon workers took several strike actions—including a massive systemwide strike in March 2021—in part to get Amazon to fully comply with national sectoral agreements for similar workers.58 Workers wanted Amazon to agree to every term of the sectoral agreements, not only the minimum wages of the sectoral agreement to which they were legally entitled. In other words, sectoral bargaining helped motivate Amazon workers to organize and take actions.

The sectoral system also anchored worker demands and helped them succeed. Indeed, the first bullet point in the historic September 2021 framework agreement references the sectoral agreements, and the second bullet highlights that Amazon will comply with them.59 Local unions also sought to get paid more than the minimums required in the sectoral agreements.60 Finally, because the Italian sectoral system required Amazon to pay the minimum wages of the sectoral agreement, it put additional reputational risk on Amazon for failing to comply, as well as made it less costly for the company to come to an agreement with the unions.61

Securing a contract with Amazon also benefitted union organizing and recruitment. Not only can success help motivate workers, but the contract provides tangible benefits to facilitate union recruitment, such as company-supported communication channels with workers.62

Workers organized around worker standards boards in U.S. states

Since 2018, six states and three local governments have enacted versions of worker standards boards—governmental bodies that include representatives of workers, employers, and the public to set sectoral standards—for a variety of industries, including home care, nursing homes, and fast food.63 Thousands of workers have mobilized as part of these sectoral efforts—not just to provide the political muscle necessary to pass the policies into law, but also to pressure the board to raise standards. For example, as part of a series of strikes and other labor actions in March 2024, Minnesota nursing home workers rallied to push their newly created board to create high workplace standards.64 Similarly, fast food workers in California mobilized at the first hearing of the state sectoral standards board in March 2024.65 These examples reinforce the idea that workers can mobilize and organize around sectoral issues.

Because most of these laws were passed recently—for example, Minnesota, Colorado, and California’s boards only became law in 202366 —it is still too early to tell whether mobilization efforts will lead to significantly increased union membership. Still, there are signs that sectoral processes may help foster unionization. Some fast-food workers are joining a minority union in California in part to push the state sectoral council to raise standards.67 In Nevada, whose law was passed in 2021 and was fully implemented in 2023, home-care workers unionized several employers as an outgrowth of their efforts around a sectoral standards board.68

To be sure, state-level worker standards boards are not exactly sectoral bargaining, as government plays a direct role in the negotiations. Indeed, because federal law largely preempts U.S. states from passing laws that directly support union organizing and collective bargaining,69 state worker standards boards are far from the model version of sectoral bargaining systems that could be enacted at the federal level. Still, workers have frequently taken actions and joined unions in part because of the sectoral structures they create.

In short, even under the strict legal limits of state worker standards boards, there is some evidence that sectoral standards can help support worker organizing.

Workers organized around sectoral minimum wages

A number of U.S. cities have passed laws creating minimum wages for particular sectors, such as the hotel industry. While these laws are even further removed from sectoral bargaining than worker standards boards, they can also help shed light on union organizing and the free-rider problem under sectoral systems because all covered workers receive wage increases regardless of whether they are union members.

The research is clear: Sectoral bargaining typically increases contract coverage in ways that do not hinder union membership.

The evidence suggests that sectoral minimum standards laws can help increase union membership, particularly when accompanied by workplace organizing. According to a review of sectoral minimum wages and similar policies by the Institute for Research on Labor and Employment at The University of California, Berkeley: “We do not see any evidence that mandated standards reduced the demand for workers to join a union.”70 Rather, the authors wrote that unions “continued to grow membership in locations covered by the policies in subsequent years.”71 Indeed, they found, for example, that union density for large hotels in Santa Monica, California, went from 0 percent to 70 percent under a sectoral minimum wage.72

The authors argued that sectoral minimum wage standards facilitated this increase. Sectoral standards helped “lower hotels’ resistance to bargaining demands,” creating conditions that aided worker organizing and success.73 Furthermore, the process of creating and enforcing the sectoral standards provided unions with additional organizing opportunities.

Finally, the authors emphasized the importance of workplace organizing operating in conjunction with sectoral minimum standards to build power for workers at multiple levels and make success—including higher workplace standards and increased union membership—more likely.

Conclusion

The research is clear: Sectoral bargaining typically increases contract coverage in ways that do not hinder union membership. Rather, sectoral bargaining can encourage worker engagement and make their efforts more likely to succeed, creating a virtuous circle that boosts union membership. Thus, sectoral bargaining can support high union membership.

Still, sectoral bargaining best fosters union membership when it operates in conjunction with grassroots organizing and other policies such as strong worker rights, union access to workers, and policies that incentivize membership. Therefore, policies to promote sectoral bargaining in the United States should be advanced together with other reforms.

Endnotes

  1. As the OECD explains, “collective bargaining coverage is high and stable only in countries where multi-employer agreements (i.e. at sector or national level) are negotiated.” OECD, “Collective bargaining in a changing world of work” (Paris: 2017), available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/empl_outlook-2017-en/1/2/4/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/empl_outlook-2017-en&_csp_=55459d499ec59fbfddc806ba1252bdeb&itemIGO=oecd&itemContentType=book#chap00004.
  2. David Madland and Malkie Wall, “What Is Sectoral Bargaining?”, Center for American Progress Action Fund, March 2, 2020, available at https://www.americanprogressaction.org/article/what-is-sectoral-bargaining/.
  3. Jelle Visser, “Why Fewer Workers Join Unions in Europe: A Social Custom Explanation of Membership Trends,” BJIR 40 (3) (2002): 403–430, available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8543.00241.
  4. Magnus Rasmussen, “Institutions (still) Rule: Labor Market Centralization and Trade Union Organization”(University of South-Eastern Norway, 2017), available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320273351_Institutions_still_Rule_Labor_Market_Centralization_and_Trade_Union_Organization; OECD, “Collective bargaining in a changing world of work.” See Figure 4.A1.7, which finds that only 7 percent of employees in small firms belong to a union on average across OECD countries, yet employees in small firms represent a larger share of trade union members in countries with sectoral bargaining such as Belgium and Sweden.
  5. OECD, “Trade Unions Dataset,” available at https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TUD (last accessed April 2024); OECD, “Collective Bargaining,” available at https://www.oecd.org/employment/collective-bargaining.htm (last accessed April 2024).
  6. Protecting the Right to Organize Act of 2023, H.R. 20, 118th Cong., 1st sess. (February 28, 2023), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/house-bill/20.
  7. Bruce Western, Between Class and Market (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); David Blanchflower and Richard Freeman, “Going Different Ways: Unionism in the U.S. and Other Advanced O.E.C.D. Countries,” (Cambridge, MA: NBER, 1990), available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w3342; Bernhard Ebbinghaus and Jelle Visser, “When Institutions Matter: Union Growth and Decline in Western Europe, 1950-95” (Mannheim, Germany: MZES, 1998), available at https:s//www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/publications/wp/wp1-30.pdf.
  8. David Madland, “Lessons From Italian Unions’ Historic Agreement With Amazon” (Washington: Center for American Progress Action Fund, 2022), available at https://www.americanprogressaction.org/article/lessons-from-italian-unions-historic-agreement-with-amazon/.
  9. Bob Hancké, “Trade Union Membership in Europe, 1960–1990: Rediscovering Local Unions,” BJIR Volume 31 (4) (1993): 593–613, available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1993.tb00415.x.
  10. Bernhard Ebbinghaus and Jelle Visser, “When Institutions Matter: Union Growth and Decline in Western Europe, 1950-95” (Mannheim, Germany: MZES, 1998), available at https:s//www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/publications/wp/wp1-30.pdf.
  11. For Uruguay, see the following citations: Maria Cook and Joseph Bazler, “Bringing Unions Back In: Labor Policy and Left Governments in Latin America” (Cornell University: 2013), available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/348169350_Bringing_Unions_Back_In_Labor_Policy_and_Left_Governments_in_Latin_America; Marcos Supervielle and Mariela Quiñones, “Uruguay’s Miracle: Redistribution and the Growth of Unionism,” Global Dialogue, February 10, 2014, available at https://globaldialogue.isa-sociology.org/uruguays-miracle-redistributionand-the-growth-of-unionism; Álvaro Padrón and Achim Wachendorfer, “Trade Unions in Transformation: Uruguay: Building Trade Union Power” (Washington: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2017), available at http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/13845.pdf. For Israel, see: Tali Kristal and Yinon Cohen, “Decentralization of Collective Agreements and Rising Wage Inequality in Israel,” Industrial Relations 46 (3) (2007): 614 – 635, available at  https://www.columbia.edu/~yc2444/Decentralization%20of%20Collective%20Wage%20Agreements%20and%20Rising%20Wage%20Inequality%20In%20Israel.pdf.
  12. Ana Laura Ermida and Cesar Rosado Marzan, “Wage Boards and Labor Revitalization: U.S. Aspirations and Uruguayan Realities ,” Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 32 (2021): 109–151, available at  https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1582&context=djcil
  13. Ibid.
  14. For union figures, see Figure 5 here: Joe Isaac, “Why Are Australian Wages Lagging and What Can Be Done about It?” Australian Economic Review 51 (2018): 175–190, available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-8462.12270; and see Figure 3 here: Jim Stanford, “Fair Go No More,” in Damien Cahill and Philip Toner, eds., Wrong Way: How Privatization and Economic Reform Backfired (Melbourne, AU: Black Inc., 2018). For a broad overview, see: David Madland, “Re-Union: How Bold Labor Reforms Can Repair, Revitalize, and Reunite the United States” (Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 2021).
  15. Isaac, “Why Are Australian Wages Lagging and What Can Be Done About It?”; Andrew Stewart, Jim Stanford, and Tess Hardy, The Wages Crisis in Australia (Adelaide, Australia: University of Adelaide Press, 2018). Rae Cooper and Bradon Ellem, “Cold Climate: Australian Unions, Policy, and the State” (Sydney: The University of Sydney, 2017), available at https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/cllpj38&collection=journals&id=469&startid=&endid=490.
  16. Andreas Pekarek et al., “Old Game, New Rules? The Dynamics of Enterprise Bargaining under the Fair Work Act,” Journal of Industrial Relations 59 (1) (2016): 44–64, available at  https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022185616662311; Mark Bray and Johanna MacNeil, “Reforming Collective Bargaining” in Hancock and Lansbury, eds., Industrial Relations Reform (Alexandria, Australia: The Federation Press, 2016); Anthony Forsyth  and others, “Establishing the Right to Bargain Collectively in Australia and the UK: Are Majority Support Determinations under Australia’s Fair Work Act a More Effective Form of Union Recognition?” Industrial Law Journal 46 (3) (2007): 335–65, available at https://academic.oup.com/ilj/article-abstract/46/3/335/2991782?redirectedFrom=PDF.
  17. Isaac, “Why Are Australian Wages Lagging and What Can Be Done About It?”; Stewart, Stanford, and Hard, The Wages Crisis in Australia; Jeff Borland, “Has Declining Union Density Contributed to Growing Earnings Inequality in Australia?” Labor Market Snapshot 43 (2018): 3 https://sites.google.com/site/borlandjum/labour-market-snapshots; OECD, “Trade Unions Dataset.”
  18. Sally McManus, “Change the rules for more secure jobs and fair pay,” Australian Council of Trade Unions, March 21, 2018, available at https://storage.googleapis.com/actu_old_site_bucket/media/1033746/180320-national-press-club-speech-sally-mcmanus-march-21-2018.pdf.
  19. Australian Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, “Secure Jobs, Better Pay,” available at https://www.dewr.gov.au/secure-jobs-better-pay (last accessed April 2024); Australian Department of Employment and Workplace Relations, “Removing barriers to the Single Interest Bargaining Stream,” available at https://www.dewr.gov.au/secure-jobs-better-pay/resources/removing-barriers-single-interest-bargaining-stream (last accessed April 2024); Fair Work Commission, “New single interest employer agreements,” available at https://www.fwc.gov.au/about-us/secure-jobs-better-pay-act-whats-changing/bargaining-support-6-june-2023/new-single (last accessed April 2024).
  20. Jelle Visser, “ICTWSS: Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 55 countries between 1960 and 2018: Version 6.1 – November 2019,” Amsterdam Institute for Advanced Labor Studies, available at http://uva-aias.net/en/ictwss (last accessed April 2024). For a review of this database, see: David Madland, “Lessons from New Zealand’s New Sectoral Bargaining Law” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2022), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/lessons-from-new-zealands-new-sectoral-bargaining-law/.
  21. For the 1980s, see: Avalon Kent, “New Zealand’s fair pay agreements: a new direction in sectoral and occupational bargaining,” Labour and Industry: A Journal of the Social and Economic Relations of Work 31 (3) (2021): 235–254, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10301763.2021.1910899. For more on the history of collective bargaining in New Zealand, see: John Chelliah and Serge Mukhi, “A Chronological Analysis of the Evolution of Industrial Relations in New Zealand,” in Steward and Hyland, eds., Proceedings of the 12th Annual Conference of the International Employment Relations Association: Regionalism and Globalisation: The Challenge for Employment Relations (Brussels: International Employment Relations Association, 2004), pp. 77–84, available at https://opus.lib.uts.edu.au/bitstream/10453/7669/1/2004000719.pdf; Michael Barry, “Transforming workplace relations in New Zealand: a retrospective,” Labour and Industry: A Journal of the Social and Economic Relations of Work 28 (1) (2018): 82–92, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/10301763.2018.1427426?needAccess=true.
  22. Barry, “Transforming workplace relations in New Zealand: a retrospective”; Chelliah and Mukhi, “A Chronological Analysis of the Evolution of Industrial Relations in New Zealand.”
  23. OECD, “Trade Unions Dataset.”
  24. New Zealand Council of Trade Unions, “Fair Pay Agreements: set to deliver on real fairness at work,” May 7, 2021, available at https://union.org.nz/fair-pay-agreements-set-to-deliver-on-real-fairness-at-work/.
  25. Madland, “Lessons from New Zealand’s New Sectoral Bargaining Law.”
  26. Employment New Zealand, “The repeal of Fair Pay Agreements legislation,” December 20, 2023, available at https://www.employment.govt.nz/about/news-and-updates/the-repeal-of-fair-pay-agreements-legislation/#:~:text=The%20Fair%20Pay%20Agreements%20(FPA,other%20employment%20legislation%20still%20apply.
  27. Visser, “ICTWSS: Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 55 countries between 1960 and 2018: Version 6.1 – November 2019.”
  28. Keith Ewing and John Hendy, “New Perspectives on Collective Labour Law: Trade Union Recognition and Collective Bargaining,” Industrial Law Journal 46 (1) (2017): 23–51, available at https://academic.oup.com/ilj/article-abstract/46/1/23/3059300.
  29. Richard Freeman and Jeffrey Pelletier, “The Impact of Industrial Relations Legislation on British Union Density,” BJIR 28 (1990): 141–164, available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8543.1990.tb00360.x.
  30. John Pencavel, “The Surprising Retreat of Union Britain” (Cambridge, MA: NBER, 2003), available at https://www.nber.org/papers/w9564.
  31. Chris Howell, Trade Unions and the State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).
  32. Anna Pollert, “Britain and Individual Employment Rights: ‘Paper Tigers, Fierce in Appearance but Missing in Tooth and Claw’,” Economic and Industrial Democracy 28 (1) (2007): 110–139, available at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0143831X07073031; Paul Smith and Gary Morton, “Nine Years of New Labour: Neoliberalism and Workers’ Rights,” BJIR 44 (2005): 401–420, available at https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1467-8543.2006.00506.x.
  33. Alan Bogg, “The Death of Statutory Union Recognition in the United Kingdom,” Journal of Industrial Relations 54 (3) (2012): 409–25 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022185612442274; Chris Howell, Trade Unions and the State: The Construction of Industrial Relations Institutions in Britain, 1890–2000 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), especially Chapter 6; Paul Smith and Gary Morton, “Nine Years of New Labour: Neoliberalism and Workers’ Rights,” British Journal of Industrial Relations 44 (3) (2006): 401–20; Pollert, “Britain and Individual Employment Rights: ‘Paper Tigers, Fierce in Appearance but Missing in Tooth and Claw’”; Linda Dickens, “Legal Regulation, Institutions and Industrial Relations” Warwick Papers in Industrial Relations 89 (2008),  https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/wbs/research/irru/publications/warwickpapers_industrialrelations/wpir_89.pdf.
  34. OECD, “Trade Unions Dataset.”
  35. Labour Party, “New Deal for Working People” (London: 2022), available at https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/New-Deal-for-Working-People-Green-Paper.pdf; Trade Unions Congress, “Raising Pay for Everyone” (London: 2022), available at https://www.tuc.org.uk/research-analysis/reports/raising-pay-everyone.
  36. Vesser, “Why Fewer Workers Join Unions in Europe: A Social Custom Explanation of Membership Trends.”
  37. OECD, “OECD/AIAS ICTWSS Database Codebook,” available at https://www.oecd.org/els/emp/Codebook-OECD-AIAS-ICTWSS.pdf (last accessed April 2024).
  38. Western, Between Class and Markets, p. 1.
  39. Rasmussen, “Institutions (still) Rule: Labor Market Centralization and Trade Union Organization”; Western, Between Class and Markets; Blanchflower and Freeman, “Going Different Ways: Unionism in the U.S. And Other Advanced O.E.C.D. Countries”; Ebbinghaus and Visser, “When Institutions Matter: Union Growth and Decline in Western Europe, 1950-95.”
  40. OECD, “Collective Bargaining in a Changing World of Work”; Minawa Ebisui, “Non-standard Workers: Good Practices of Social Dialogue and Collective Bargaining” (Geneva: ILO, 2012), available at https://www.ilo.org/publications/working-paper-no-36-non-standard-workers-good-practices-social-dialogue-and.
  41. Zoltán Fazekas, “Institutional effects on the presence of trade unions at the Workplace” (Vienna: University of Vienna, 2010), available at https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=e050caaa37464b221e218d5083c32000c2a74565; Lane Kensworthy, “Wage-Setting Measures,” World Politics 54 (2001): 57–98, available at https://lanekenworthy.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/2001wp.pdf; Rasmussen, “Institutions (still) Rule: Labor Market Centralization and Trade Union Organization.”
  42. Torsten Muller, Kurt Vandaele, and Jeremy Waddington, eds., Collective bargaining in Europe: Towards an Endgame (Brussels: European Trade Union Institute Brussels, 2019), available at https://www.etui.org/publications/books/collective-bargaining-in-europe-towards-an-endgame-volume-i-ii-iii-and-iv.
  43. Kurt Vandaele, “A Report from the Homeland of the Ghent System: The Relationship between Unemployment and Trade Union Membership in Belgium,” Transfer: European Review of Labour and Research 12 (4) (2006): 647–57. While Italy is not typically considered a Ghent country, it has related policies. Salvo Leonardi, “Trade unions and collective bargaining in Italy during the crisis,” in Heiner Dribbusch, Steffen Lehndorff, and Thorsten Schulten, eds., Rough waters: European trade unions in a time of crises (Brussels: ETUI, 2018), available at https://www.etui.org/sites/default/files/ez_import/04%20Trade%20unions%20and%20collective%20bargaining%20in%20Italy.pdf.
  44. Statistics Canada, “Union status by geography,” available at https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1410012901&pickMembers%5B0%5D=2.5&pickMembers%5B1%5D=3.1&pickMembers%5B2%5D=4.1&cubeTimeFrame.startYear=1997&cubeTimeFrame.endYear=2023&referencePeriods=19970101%2C20230101 (last accessed April 2024); Sara Slinn, “Collective Bargaining” (York, UK: York University, 2015), available at https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1177&context=reports.
  45. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, “Union Members – 2023,” Press release, January 23, 2024, available at  https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf; Statistics Canada, “Public Sector Universe, 2022,” available at https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/daily-quotidien/231122/dq231122c-eng.htm (last accessed April 2024); Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “Government Current Expenditures/Gross Domestic Product,” available at https://fred.stlouisfed.org/graph/?g=8fX (last accessed April 2024); Statistics Canada, “Long Term Trends in Unionization,” available at https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/75-006-x/2013001/article/11878-eng.htm (last accessed April 2024)  
  46. Statistics Canada, “Long Term Trends in Unionization”; Statistics Canada, “Unionization in Canada, 1918 to 2022,” available at https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/n1/pub/36-28-0001/2022011/article/00001-eng.htm (last accessed April 2024); Jason Clemens, Niels Veldhuis, and Amela Karabegovic, “Explaining Canada’s High Unionization Rates” (Vancouver, CA: Fraser Institute, 2005), available at https://www.fraserinstitute.org/sites/default/files/explaining-canadas-high-unionization-rates.pdf; Statistics Canada, “Union Status by Industry,” available at https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=1410013201&pickMembers%5B0%5D=2.5&pickMembers%5B1%5D=4.1&cubeTimeFrame.startYear=2019&cubeTimeFrame.endYear=2023&referencePeriods=20190101%2C20230101 (last accessed April 2024).
  47. Udo Rehfeldt and Catherine Vincent, “France: Fragmented trade unions, few members, but many voters and much social unrest” in Jeremy Waddington, Torsten Muller and Kurt Vandaele, eds., Trade Unions in the European Union (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2023), available at https://www.etui.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/Chapter11_France_Fragmented%20trade%20unions%2C%20few%20members%2C%20but%20many%20voters%20and%20much%20social%20unrest_2023.pdf.
  48. Tresor Economics, “Unionisation in France: paradoxes, challenges and outlook” (Paris: 2014), available at https://www.tresor.economie.gouv.fr/Articles/9954f2b9-a806-4e39-83f0-4ada9979a9f0/files/bb05a34d-95c8-458d-a3ec-a6ff03d6395f.
  49. Ibid.; Rehfeldt and Vincent, “France: Fragmented trade unions, few members, but many voters and much social unrest.”
  50. European Trade Union Institute, “Industrial Relations in France: Background Summary” (Brussels: 2016), available at https://www.etui.org/covid-social-impact/france/industrial-relations-in-france-background-summary; Tresor Economics, “Unionisation in France: paradoxes, challenges and outlook”; Rehfeldt and Vincent, “France: Fragmented trade unions, few members, but many voters and much social unrest.”
  51. Olivier Guillot, Magali Jaoul-Grammare, and Isabelle Terraz, “Union Membership in France: An Empirical Study” (Strasbourg, France: BETA, 2019), available at https://beta.u-strasbg.fr/WP/2019/2019-04.pdf; Mathieu Bunel and Giles Raveuad, “Union Membership Does Not Pay” (Burgundy, France: University of Burgundy, 2008), available at https://www.researchgate.net/profile/MathieuBunel/publication/242336189_Union_Membership_does_not_pay_Evidence_from_recent_French_Micro_Data/links/00b7d53b523bc6bb71000000/Union-Membership-does-not-pay-Evidence-from-recent-French-Micro-Data.pdf; Tresor Economics, “Unionisation in France: paradoxes, challenges and outlook”; Rehfeldt and Vincent, “France: Fragmented trade unions, few members, but many voters and much social unrest.”
  52. For a U.S. analog, see prevailing wage policies here: David Madland, Malkie Wall, and Karla Walter, “Prevailing Wages: Frequently Asked Questions” (Washington: Center for American Progress, 2020), available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/prevailing-wages-frequently-asked-questions/; David Madland, “How to Promote Sectoral Bargaining in the United Staes” (Washington: Center for American Progress Action Fund, 2019), available at https://www.americanprogressaction.org/article/promote-sectoral-bargaining-united-states/.
  53. Tresor Economics, “Unionisation in France: paradoxes, challenges and outlook.”
  54. Rehfeldt and Vincent, “France: Fragmented trade unions, few members, but many voters and much social unrest.”
  55. Stephen Jewkes and Elvira Pollina, “Amazon reaches agreement with trade unions in Italy,” Reuters, September 15, 2021, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210923214038/https://www.reuters.com/business/amazon-reaches-agreement-with-trade-unions-italy-2021-09-15/; UNI Global Union, “After massive mobilization, Italian unions reach historic national agreement with Amazon,” Press release, September 16, 2021, available at https://web.archive.org/web/20210921181455/https://uniglobalunion.org/ItalyAgreement.
  56. Madland, “Lessons from Italian Unions’ Historic Agreement With Amazon.”
  57. OECD, “OECD/AIAS ICTWSS Database”; Visser, “ICTWSS: Database on Institutional Characteristics of Trade Unions, Wage Setting, State Intervention and Social Pacts in 55 countries between 1960 and 2018: Version 6.1 – November 2019.”
  58. Riccardo Emilio Chesta, “A New Labour Unionism in Digital Taylorism? Explaining the First Cycle of Contention at Amazon Logistics,” in Matthias Klumpp and Caroline Ruiner, eds., Digital Supply Chains and the Human Factor (Berlin: Springer, 2021), available at https://www.academia.edu/45027462/A_New_Labour_Unionism_in_Digital_Taylorism_Explaining_the_First_Cycle_of_Contention_at_Amazon_Logistics; Manola Cavallini, Bargaining Area Leader, CGIL, interview with author via phone, March 30, 2022, on file with author.
  59. Agreement on file with author. This point was also noted by Giuilo Centamore, professor, University of Bologna, personal communication with author via phone, March 17, 2022, on file with author.
  60. Peter Olney, “Strike Hard, Have Fun, Make History – Amazon General Strike in Italy,” The Stansbury Forum, March 25, 2021, available at https://stansburyforum.com/2021/03/25/strike-hard-have-fun-make-history-amazon-general-strike-in-italy-march-22-2021.
  61. Manola Cavallini, personal communication with author via phone; Giulio Centamore, personal communication with author via phone.
  62. Agreement on file with author.
  63. Aurelia Glass and David Madland, “Momentum for Worker Standards Boards Continues To Grow,” Center for American Progress, September 7, 2023, available at https://www.americanprogress.org/article/momentum-for-worker-standards-boards-continues-to-grow/.
  64. Harold Meyerson, “Turning the Tables in Minnesota,” The American Prospect, March 13, 2024, available at https://prospect.org/labor/2024-03-13-turning-tables-minnesota-labor-unions/?vgo_ee=FIZ%2FaYezEPYCTZvIXfKBCZM%2FSjaAAEvEaRbcW27JKs6wzgaABXuarQUGXxqk%3AbC4FPf%2FNdFXsk8%2FQsmlLMST4IcC%2FG0q6; Josh Henreckson, “Historic strike over wages, staffing may hit at least 10 unrelated nursing homes,” McKnights, February 22, 2024, available at https://www.mcknights.com/news/historic-strike-over-wages-staffing-may-hit-at-least-10-unrelated-nursing-homes/.
  65. SEIU, “March 15: Rally in Oakland with fast-food workers as they take their seat on council,” March 12, 2024, available at https://www.seiu1021.org/article/march-15-rally-oakland-fast-food-workers-they-take-their-seat-council; Peter Romeo, “Don’t hit snooze on this industry alarm,” Restaurant Business Online, March 12, 2024, available at https://www.restaurantbusinessonline.com/workforce/dont-hit-snooze-industry-alarm.
  66. Glass and Madland, “Momentum for Worker Standards Boards Continues To Grow.”
  67. Suhauna Hussain, “California fast-food workers form an unusual union in a bid for higher wages, better working conditions,” The Los Angeles Times, February 9, 2024, available at https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2024-02-09/california-fast-food-workers-form-a-unique-union-for-higher-wages-better-working-conditions.
  68. Chrystal Taylor, “Minimum wage increase will help home care workers support families, clients,” The Nevada Independent, July 12, 2023, available at https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/minimum-wage-increase-will-help-home-care-workers-support-families-clients; McKenna Ross, “Nevada workers in growing health care industry are unionizing,” Las Vegas Review-Journal, August 31, 2023, available at  https://www.reviewjournal.com/business/nevada-workers-in-growing-health-care-industry-are-unionizing-2896793/.
  69. Kate Andrias, “Social Bargaining in States and Cities: Towards and More Egalitarian and Democratic Workplace Law” (2017), paper prepared for Harvard Law School Symposium “Could Experiments at the State and Local Levels Expand Collective Bargaining and Workers’ Collective Action,” available at https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/2000/.
  70. Ken Jacobs, Rebecca Smith, and Justin McBride, “State and Local Policies and Sectoral Labor Standards: from Individual Rights to Collective Power,” IRLE Working Paper No. 104-21, available at https://irle.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/State-and-Local-Policies-and-Sectoral-Labor-Standards-WP-104.pdf.
  71. Ibid.
  72. Ibid.
  73. Ibid.

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