The Trump-Putin Alaska Meeting: Preventing a Surrender Summit

For the first time since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in February 2022, the Kremlin will get what it has wanted all along: a direct, in-person conversation with the U.S. president on American soil—without Ukraine at the table. If the reported terms for the discussion are accurate, this so-called breakthrough meeting will not be a negotiated settlement worthy of a Nobel Peace Prize, but rather the terms of a weak surrender to Russian President Vladimir Putin. After years of war and investment, democratic leaders in the United States and throughout Europe must clearly and forcefully stand in opposition to this likely capitulation and unite in support of Ukraine. If Putin is allowed to pursue his goals by force, Ukraine will not be his last victim—a fact acutely felt by countries across Europe.

Since returning to office, U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly tried to broker a deal with Putin, failing at every turn. He issued arbitrary deadlines—first 50 days, then 10—for Russia to end the war, but Putin ignored them all, escalating his missile and drone barrages against Kyiv in the process. Putin has also rejected U.S.-backed ceasefire proposals, snubbed the May Istanbul peace talks he himself proposed, and told Trump outright that Russia “will not back down” and that negotiations must address the “root causes” of the war—Kremlin code for undermining Ukraine’s independence and blocking its path to NATO. Each failure has only reinforced that Trump is negotiating from a position of weakness, emboldening Putin while diminishing America’s leverage.

If Trump walks into that Alaska meeting signaling that Ukraine must accept “neutrality” or forego NATO membership in exchange for peace, he will hand Putin a victory no number of battlefield gains could match. Enshrining neutrality would lock in a security vacuum, invite renewed aggression, and destroy the principle that sovereign nations have the right to choose their own alliances. It would send an unmistakable message of weakness to every would-be aggressor: Armed coercion works.

Russia does not get a veto over NATO membership

Allowing Russia a veto over who joins NATO would not only strip Ukraine of its sovereign right to choose its alliances; it would set a precedent that any powerful neighbor can dictate the security posture of weaker states, hollowing out NATO’s “open door policy” and destabilizing Europe’s security architecture. Congress has repeatedly affirmed support for NATO’s open door policy. In 2017, the Senate voted 97-2 to approve Montenegro’s accession, declaring in the ratification resolution that any European country may seek membership if it meets NATO’s criteria. That understanding is bipartisan. Former Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL), who now serves as Trump’s secretary of state, publicly affirmed as much in a January 2022 letter to then-President Joe Biden: “Russia does not have veto power on NATO enlargement and expansion of the Alliance; this will be decided solely by NATO members themselves.” Sen. Rubio was right.

Ukraine’s experience underscores why that commitment matters. Since regaining independence in 1991, Ukraine has endured two major Russian assaults—the first in 2014, when Moscow seized Crimea and fueled war in the Donbas, and the second in 2022 with the full-scale invasion. The lesson: Without a hard deterrent, Moscow will come back.

Neutrality is not peace. Finland and Austria’s Cold War neutrality was accepted because it was voluntary, verifiable, and embedded in a broader European security framework. Ukraine’s “neutrality” under Russian diktat would be none of those things; it would be imposed under the shadow of ongoing partial occupation, enforced by a Kremlin that has repeatedly broken every security commitment it has ever signed, and would almost certainly seize the first opportunity to strike again.

An alternative position

This not a distant European fight but a test of whether the United States will defend the principle that borders cannot be changed by force. Undermining that principle in Ukraine would reverberate far beyond Eastern Europe, emboldening China in the Taiwan Strait, North Korea on the Korean Peninsula, and any autocrat with designs on a weaker neighbor.

Progressives in the United States have long stood for a foreign policy that defends democratic self-determination, rejects militarism for its own sake, and pursues diplomacy grounded in justice. That is why it is vital to oppose any deal that trades away Ukraine’s right to choose its own security arrangements for a hollow peace. True diplomacy does not force the victim of aggression to accept the aggressor’s veto over its future.

Ceding on NATO or neutrality would also fracture the trans-Atlantic alliance. NATO unity has been a rare bright spot in an otherwise grim conflict. It has kept Europe engaged, deterred Russian attacks beyond Ukraine, and signaled to other allies that the United States honors its commitments. A side deal with Moscow over the heads of U.S. allies would shatter that unity—and much of NATO’s credibility with it.

Instead, progressives should press for a settlement that is enforceable, backed by credible security guarantees, and designed to prevent renewed aggression. That could mean bilateral defense pacts or a European-led “Coalition of the Willing” with U.S. backing. It cannot mean surrendering the principle at stake.

Putin cannot be trusted

Putin’s behavior over the past several months leaves no doubt about his intentions. In March, Ukraine accepted a U.S. proposal for a 30-day unconditional ceasefire; Putin rejected it, offering only to pause strikes on energy infrastructure while continuing to hit cities. In May, he failed to show up for U.S.-brokered talks in Istanbul despite Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s willingness to attend. In July, Putin told Trump that Russia “will not back down,” even as Trump claimed multiple times that a deal was “close.” Each time, the cordial calls were followed by fresh missile strikes—a cycle Trump himself has described as “[Putin] talks nice and then he bombs everybody.” While true, Trump has proven unwilling to back up this rhetoric with commensurate action.

This is not a negotiating partner seeking a fair compromise; it is an aggressor playing for time and advantage. Meeting him without Ukraine at the table rewards that strategy.

The bottom line

The Alaska meeting will be watched not only in Kyiv and Moscow, but in Beijing, Pyongyang, and capitals across Europe. If the United States is seen to pressure Ukraine into neutrality under Russian threat, it will undercut American deterrence everywhere. If it instead makes clear that any settlement must preserve Ukraine’s sovereign choices, while being realistic about military and political constraints, the United States can protect its interests without endorsing endless war.

That is the balance progressives should champion: peace, but not at any price; compromise, but not capitulation; diplomacy that defends the weak rather than rewarding the strong.

Conclusion

The Alaska meeting offers an opportunity to test whether Trump is truly committed to ending the war and achieving a just and lasting peace. So far, his record—missed deadlines, generous concessions, and praise for Putin’s “strength”—suggests he is not. If Trump capitulates to Putin, progressives should call this meeting what it is: a surrender summit.

The United States should support a settlement that ends the war without negating Ukraine’s right to chart its own sovereign course. That means no backroom deals on NATO, no imposed neutrality, and no legitimization of Russia’s veto over democratic choice. Anything less is not peace; it’s delay until the next Russian attack.