While both President Donald Trump and Elon Musk have claimed that DOGE operates with “maximum transparency,” the administration has offered little insight into its operations beyond its vague directive to “maximize efficiency.” In fact, to shield the initiative from public scrutiny, Trump strategically rebranded the U.S. Digital Service (USDS) as DOGE and declared it “established in the Executive Office of the President.” Previously, the USDS operated under the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and was subject to Title 5 regulations, including the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). However, if DOGE is no longer under the OMB and now functions within the Executive Office of the President, it would instead be subject to Title 3 and the Presidential Records Act, exempting it from FOIA disclosure requirements.
DOGE itself has also ignored demands to preserve its records under the Federal Records Act, and agencies have failed to provide meaningful oversight of DOGE’s activities despite the sensitive nature of the data it manages. This lack of transparency and oversight has obstructed public understanding, raised serious concerns about accountability, and intensified fears that DOGE is breaking the law. As the Center for American Progress noted in a prior analysis, DOGE’s actions may be infringing on laws such as the Privacy Act of 1974.
Americans deserve clarity on how DOGE is operating and whether it is violating the law. As journalists, Congress, and litigators seek to uncover DOGE’s secretive activities, this column highlights the key questions necessary to understand the full scope of its actions.
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What data did DOGE access and how?
A crucial first step in understanding DOGE’s activities is determining the chain of custody for the data—specifically, identifying the full extent of DOGE’s access to federal records. This means determining which databases and systems DOGE personnel have been able to access, who accessed them, for what purpose, and how the data were used. Currently, there are limited accounts, and it is possible that other agencies have been involved, yet their participation has not yet come to light.
Key questions
- Which federal databases and systems did DOGE personnel have direct access to or receive information from, and for what purpose? Press reports have identified systems such as the payment system at the Treasury Department and the student loan database at the Education Department as having been accessed.
- What level of access have DOGE personnel had to federal records, both currently and in the past? This inquiry is crucial, as the Treasury Department initially claimed DOGE personnel had “read-only” access, but it was later revealed that one of Musk’s recruits had briefly been granted improper “read/write” access.
- Were access logs maintained? If so, do they show whether any data were copied, transferred, exported, or modified?
- Were data transferred to any privately owned computers or cloud servers and, if so, which ones? Were these data run through any machine learning or artificial intelligence (AI) models, either for analysis or for training purposes?
- Were any access logs or other audit trails designed to track data usage deleted or modified? If so, what was deleted and by whose order?
- Did agencies track the date, nature, and purpose of each disclosure to DOGE as well as the name and address of the recipient of the information, as required by the Privacy Act of 1974?
- Were any cybersecurity protocols disabled or overridden to facilitate DOGE’s access?
- Did DOGE personnel require specific credentials or security clearances to access federal data, or were barriers bypassed?
- Did Elon Musk or DOGE personnel have access to any private information of Musk’s competitors, such as patent applications, contract bids, or other sensitive business data?
What is DOGE and who runs it?
The inner workings of DOGE remain largely unknown, with little public information on its hires, legal authority, and oversight of personnel handling sensitive federal data. While President Trump positioned Elon Musk as its leader, the government has represented in court filings that Musk is neither the DOGE service administrator—a role held by Amy Gleason—nor an official DOGE employee. The administration has only acknowledged him as a “special government employee” serving as a senior adviser to President Trump within the executive office without formal decision-making authority. Yet in his address to the nation, the president continued to claim DOGE “is headed by Elon Musk.” Adding to the confusion, some DOGE personnel have been listed as employees in agency directories, despite DOGE being housed within the Executive Office of the President.
Key questions
- What legal authority or regulations govern DOGE’s operations, and how does the initiative justify its actions under these frameworks?
- What official role and authority has Elon Musk been appointed to within DOGE, and how does his formal position affect decision-making and operations?
- Is Elon Musk giving orders to the DOGE staff within the Executive Office of the President or those embedded in agencies?
- Does Elon Musk currently have or has he had direct access to any data or been allowed access using someone else’s credentials?
- Are DOGE personnel screened and cleared before being granted access to federal data systems and facilities? If so, how does DOGE vet and monitor its personnel?
- Are there mechanisms in place to ensure that DOGE’s personnel adhere to established cybersecurity protocols, legal requirements, and data-handling policies?
- Were any internal or external warnings raised to DOGE that its actions violated relevant laws, regulations, or policies or posed privacy and security risks?
Did agencies ignore concerns regarding DOGE’s access to records?
Understanding how agencies have responded to DOGE’s request to records is critical, particularly in light of warnings, such as the one issued to the Treasury Department, which flagged DOGE’s access to a sensitive payment network as an “unprecedented insider threat” and urged its immediate suspension. If such privacy or security concerns were raised but ignored, it would indicate a disturbing abuse of executive power.
Key questions
- Were any internal or external warnings raised to agencies that DOGE’s actions violated relevant laws, regulations, or policies or posed privacy and security risks?
- Were there internal discussions acknowledging that DOGE’s access might be illegal, but it was granted anyway?
- Did agency employees refuse requests for access but were overruled? If so, by whose authority?
- Did any employees face retaliation from their agency for questioning or resisting DOGE’s access to records?
- Were any agency inspectors general prevented from conducting independent reviews of DOGE’s activities?
- Does DOGE have access to any whistleblower reports that might be reporting DOGE violations?
Were federal data transferred to private companies?
One of the most serious concerns is whether DOGE shared government data with private companies. This concern has intensified following reports that DOGE received the U.S. Department of Labor’s approval to use software capable of transferring large amounts of data out of its systems. With DOGE personnel potentially maintaining ties to Musk-affiliated businesses, it is essential to determine whether federal data were improperly transferred or monetized.
Key questions
- How did DOGE ensure that operatives still employed by Musk-owned companies—such as SpaceX, X, and the Boring Company—adhered to federal regulations and avoided conflicts of interest while accessing sensitive government records?
- Were any federal data transferred to private companies, either for commercial gain or as part of an undisclosed agreement? If so, how was this facilitated and documented?
- Did any private companies affiliated with DOGE operatives receive privileged access to federal databases or information from such databases, either directly or indirectly?
- If DOGE provided any external third party with access to data, were any records kept? Were any legal agreements executed?
- Were federal data transferred to privately owned computers or cloud servers, including but not limited to Microsoft’s Azure cloud computing service? If so, which ones received data, and were private companies given access for AI processing, analysis, or training purposes?
Are federal data powering Musk’s AI?
Reports indicate that DOGE has begun feeding sensitive data from the U.S. Department of Education into AI software, raising concerns about privacy, national security, and regulatory compliance. It is crucial to determine which AI tools DOGE is using and whether they are properly certified by the U.S. government.
Key questions
- Which specific AI tools or models hosted on Microsoft’s Azure cloud computing service did DOGE use, and were they developed internally or sourced from third-party vendors?
- Are any large language models (LLMs) or AI tools used by DOGE being hosted by external vendors? If so, are those vendors appropriately certified by the U.S. government through programs such as the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP)? If using a FedRAMP-approved cloud service, such as Microsoft Azure or Amazon Bedrock, are these services being used to deploy LLMs that are approved by the U.S. government?
- Are any data accessed by DOGE being used to train Elon Musk’s xAI LLM Grok or any other nongovernment models?
Was DOGE shielded from scrutiny?
There is growing concern that DOGE’s actions have not only gone unchecked but have been actively shielded from oversight. By establishing DOGE within the Executive Office of the President and subjecting it to the Presidential Records Act, the administration has ensured its records are exempt from public records requests and will remain sealed until 2034. This deliberate move begs the question of whether there have been other instances of DOGE being shielded from scrutiny.
Key questions:
- Were there discussions in the White House acknowledging that DOGE’s access might be illegal, but it was granted anyway?
- Were any White House officials involved in directing or coordinating DOGE’s data-collection efforts?
- Did any administration officials, including President Trump, threaten retaliation against federal workers who denied DOGE access to sensitive records? If so, who was responsible?
- Was any federal employee’s decision to deny DOGE access to federal records overruled by political appointees? If so, by whom?
- Did the White House or U.S. Department of Justice take any actions to justify, defend, or shield DOGE from legal challenges and accountability?
Conclusion
The sheer number of unanswered questions about DOGE makes one thing clear: The Trump administration’s claims of transparency do not match how DOGE actually operates. The administration insists DOGE operates openly, yet its structure, data access, and decision-making remain obscured. This contradiction is exactly why a thorough investigation is necessary. Without proper scrutiny, DOGE risks setting a dangerous precedent for unchecked executive power and misuse of federal data. We cannot rely on the administration’s assurances; accountability is the only way to get the truth.