At Home or Abroad, U.S. Firearms Should Not Fuel Violence, Instability, and Abuse

On April 30, 2024, the U.S. Department of Commerce published policy reforms intended to reduce the risk that U.S. firearms would undermine U.S. foreign policy objectives or contribute to national security concerns overseas.¹ Rolled out in a new interim final rule (IFR) that went into effect on May 30, these reforms will increase scrutiny of firearm exports and restrict exports for commercial use in high-risk countries. The IFR comes four years after the Trump administration transferred firearm export oversight authority from the U.S. State Department to the Commerce Department.² This transition, intended to streamline processes and support domestic firearm industries, resulted in a more permissive export framework and led to increased U.S. firearms exports, including to countries with poor records of human rights abuses and violence.³ By the end of October 2023, the Commerce Department had paused some new export licenses while it reviewed and amended its policy.⁴

The move in oversight from the State Department, which has a mandate to protect U.S. national security and advance foreign policy interests, to the Commerce Department, which is responsible for promoting U.S. industry, raised new challenges in ensuring that firearms transfers do not contravene broader foreign policy objectives of advancing peace, security, and the protection of rights. Furthermore, while the State Department had in place experience, institutional knowledge, and established internal processes to review license applications, the Commerce Department’s vetting and oversight mechanisms had not been developed to the same level.

Ultimately, the State Department should oversee firearm exports, and lawmakers should restore this responsibility to the State Department by passing the Americas Regional Monitoring of Arms Sales (ARMAS) Act, which would facilitate this change. Until that time, the amendments proposed by the Commerce Department in its IFR are a positive step toward greater oversight and accountability for firearms transfers abroad, setting new requirements for documentation, reducing risk in commercial transfers, and allowing for more regular review of license applications. Still, it could be strengthened.

Specifically, this report calls for the Biden administration to:

• Implement a presumption of denial for applications seeking to export or re-export assault weapons to nongovernmental end users.
• Provide greater transparency around the composition of a new interagency working group responsible for reviewing license applications and include the risk assessment criteria this group will use in the rule.
• Increase transparency by regularly publishing more detailed data on firearms exports.
• Notify Congress of exports exceeding $1 million, aligning with reporting standards set by the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) for weapon exports.
• Apply the same scrutiny to license applications for government end users as nongovernmental ones.

Finally, while the IFR establishes a framework for license review, it will be incumbent on officials in relevant agencies to ensure that exports adhere to the set of standards and do not contribute to corruption, instability, rights abuse, or violence in the recipient country—and they must have the proper resources, training, and support to do so.

Prior to the 2020 transfer to the Commerce Department, the State Department maintained oversight authority over transfers of firearms categorized as defense articles in the U.S. Munitions List (USML),⁵ regardless of whether those weapons would be transferred to foreign governments or offered for commercial resale.⁶ Under this authority, the State Department determined whether transfers would “strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace.”⁷ Dating back to the Carter administration, transfers of such weapons were also guided by a series of U.S. conventional arms transfer policies that at least gave lip service to a concern for restraint. The United States widely promoted its policies as the gold standard of regulatory control, effective from “cradle to grave.”⁸ The Commerce Department maintained oversight authority over weapons that appeared in the Commerce Control List (CCL)⁹ and may have had uses other than military applications.

In 2009, the Obama administration launched the Export Control Reform Initiative (ECRI)¹⁰ to review the U.S. export control system and to streamline a complex framework for licenses by merging categories of items, thereby building “higher fences around fewer items.”¹¹ By 2013, the administration implemented the first segment of export control reforms, transferring numerous items from the USML, managed by the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, to the CCL, overseen by the Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).¹² But the ECRI stalled amid external factors and internal pressure. For one, the administration rolled out the initiative after the 2012 mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Connecticut and amid a focus on strengthening domestic gun control.¹³ Although White House officials had initially considered reclassifying firearms, the departments of Justice and Homeland Security both opposed the move, according to a memo obtained by The Wall Street Journal.¹⁴

Prior to the 2020 shift in authority, provisions in the AECA required the State Department to notify Congress of a proposed sale of firearms—regulated under USML Category I—that exceeded $1 million.¹⁵ At least twice, Congress used its oversight authority to halt controversial small arms deals: Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD) blocked the sale of 26,000 assault rifles to the Philippine National Police in 2016 due to concerns about human rights abuses amid the Philippines’ war on drugs.¹⁶ Similarly, in 2017, Sen. Cardin, alongside then-Rep. Edward Royce (R-CA), opposed a $1.2 million sale of Sig Sauer semiautomatic handguns to Turkey after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s bodyguards violently attacked protesters outside the White House.¹⁷ In both instances, Congress’ intervention led to the State Department canceling, at least temporarily, the respective sales.

By 2017, the Trump administration was signaling its intention to revive the Obama administration proposal to reclassify firearms, with one official telling Reuters that this would allow “more leeway to do arms sales.”¹⁸ In May 2018, the Trump administration filed a rule in the Federal Register to move the regulatory authority of certain firearm exports, ammunition, and data from the USML to the CCL.¹⁹ (see Appendix) The National Rifle Association (NRA) supported the move, claiming it would give American manufacturers “a larger footprint in international markets.”²⁰ In the final rule, the State Department determined that guns “do not provide a critical military or intelligence advantage to the United States and, in the case of firearms, do not have an inherently military function.”²¹ These changes also occurred against the backdrop of litigation from Defense Distributed, an online open-source organization that offers downloadable blueprints for 3D-printed guns.²² Defense Distributed’s lawsuit alleged that the State Department violated its First, Second, and Fifth Amendment rights in considering codes for 3D-printed guns as technical data and knowledge and regulating them under the USML.²³ While the government eventually settled the suit out of court in 2018,²⁴ it raised new concerns about regulating firearms under the USML.

The move from Commerce to State also came at a time when the State Department faced shortfalls in staffing and resources. The Office of Defense Trade Controls Licensing, charged with vetting firearms license applications, lost 28 percent of its staff by 2018 and shuttered its training program for agents, according to a 2019 audit by the Office of Inspector General (OIG).²⁵ Employees told the auditors they were struggling to keep up with their workload, and one official stated the staffing reductions had “affected both the quantity and quality” of their evaluations of export license applications.²⁶ The audit also found that 62 percent of firearms applications lacked crucial details on the end use or end user of the firearms in the purchase orders submitted.²⁷ The OIG reported that the office responsible for export licensing had not followed proper internal controls and that licensing personnel were not properly trained, which was attributed to staffing reductions.²⁸

On March 9, 2020, the Trump administration rule went into effect, moving firearms, close assault weapons, combat shotguns, and related ammunition from the USML, under State Department authority, to the CCL, under Commerce Department authority.²⁹ Assistant Secretary R. Clarke Cooper of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs said of the new firearms classification: “[I]t does free us up at State to focus on the larger significant systems and platforms that are inherently of a military function and do provide the United States a critical military edge or an intelligence advantage.”³⁰

U.S. firearm exports noticeably increased after the transfer of authority in 2020. Based on trade data available at the U.S. Census Bureau, the United States exported more than 2.7 million firearms—excluding military firearms—valued at approximately $1.4 billion in the four years from 2020 to the end of 2023, compared with about 2.4 million firearms valued at approximately $1 billion in the four years prior.³⁴ This marks an increase of 15 percent by volume and more than 33 percent in value. By comparison, exports decreased when comparing both value and volume from the four years before 2016 to the years after.³⁵ These increases are dramatic when it comes to the export of semiautomatic and automatic weapons. The United States exported 1.3 million semiautomatic pistols from 2020 to the end of 2023, a 49 percent increase over the previous four-year period.³⁶ Most staggering, the United States exported nearly 200,000 semiautomatic—or autoloading—rifles from 2020 to the end of 2023, a 217 percent increase over the previous four-year period.³⁷

The more permissive licensing framework saw an increase in the transfer of firearms later diverted to adversaries such as Russia,³⁸ as well as transfers to countries mired in violent conflict, human rights abuses, corruption, and other ills. For instance, U.S. Census Bureau data show the top five importers of U.S. semiautomatic pistols in 2023 were Israel (57,871), Saudi Arabia (24,613), Guatemala (21,557), the Philippines (14,309), and Thailand (11,794)³⁹ —all countries facing significant political violence or human rights abuse. In Thailand, a recently fired police officer armed with a machete and a Sig Sauer handgun killed 36 people, including 23 children and two teachers, in less than 30 minutes in October 2022, marking one of that nation’s deadliest mass shootings. The shooting came at a time when Sig Sauer had saturated the market with guns, taking advantage of Thai legislation that allowed police to purchase firearms at a discount.⁴⁰ The Commerce Department outlined other concerning examples:

In one case, a firearm that was licensed for export to one country was subsequently diverted to a bordering country and used in a political assassination. In another, a license exception was used to export parts for the unlawful assembly of firearms in Taiwan. BIS also identified instances of firearms and ammunition exports being diverted to Russia via commercial resellers in third countries; such firearms and ammunition may be used to support Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine.⁴¹

The cases of firearms exports to Ecuador, Israel, and the Philippines illustrate concerns around the ways in which U.S. firearms have undermined American national security and foreign policy objectives, fueled violence and instability, contributed to corruption, and facilitated rights abuses.

Ecuador

Ecuador, once a peaceful country in Latin America,⁴² now ranks among its most violent nations; the country’s homicide rate surged from 6.7 per 100,000 in 2019 to a staggering 45 per 100,000 in 2023.⁴³ Local and transnational criminal groups vie for dominance in drug trafficking, and gang clashes bring lethal confrontations.⁴⁴ Some of these criminal groups are violently manipulating Ecuador’s democratic systems and targeting public officials through coercion, attacks, bribes, and assassinations.⁴⁵ In August 2023, gunmen shot and killed presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio, a staunch anticorruption advocate, as he left a rally in Quito.⁴⁶ U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan condemned the assassination as a “brazen act of violence and assault on Ecuador’s democracy.”⁴⁷

U.S. officials have confirmed that the weapon used to kill Villavicencio was a U.S. firearm originating from Peru.⁴⁸ Many of the weapons fueling Ecuador’s violence originate from abroad due to the country’s historically stringent regulations on assault weapons and automatic firearms.⁴⁹ Specifically, many originate from the United States, with a notable portion diverted through Peru,⁵⁰ which acts as a transit hub, diverting U.S. manufactured firearms often designated for Peruvian security and police units.⁵¹ In 2023, the Ecuadorian Organized Crime Observatory reported that approximately 55 percent of the foreign firearms intercepted within Ecuadorian borders originated from the United States.⁵² The United States has exported more than 10,000 semiautomatic weapons to Peru since 2016 but only 207 to Ecuador in that same period. In 2023 alone, the United States exported more than $893,000 in firearms to Peru.⁵³

Israel

In 2023, U.S. gun sales to Israel surged: The United States exported more than 60,000 firearms to Israel in 2023, a 368 percent increase over the prior year, which had already seen the highest number of exports since 2016.⁵⁴ While the Commerce Department has not released data on whether these represent government or nongovernmental exports, the substantial rise in U.S. firearm exports to Israel accelerated after the Israeli government’s decision to ease its gun licensing regulations in October 2023.⁵⁵ In the weeks following Hamas’ October 7 attack, the Knesset loosened firearm license requirements, granting civilians easier access to guns by lowering age requirements, shortening military and combat service prerequisites, and simplifying the mandatory training process.⁵⁶ In October 2023 alone, the United States shipped 5,515 handguns to Israel, valued at nearly $2.4 million; in this one month, the export of handguns reached nearly half the total of the previous year and surpassed the annual volume and value of handgun exports to Israel from 2018 to 2021.⁵⁷ By early December 2023, two months after Hamas’ attack, Israel’s Ministry of National Security recorded more than 260,000 requests for firearm permits.⁵⁸

Israel’s far-right minister of national security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, has been public about his intention to ensure that Israeli settlers have access to these weapons; Ben-Gvir is a loud advocate for expanding Israel’s illegal settlements and arming “civilian defense squads,” hundreds of which formed after October 7.⁵⁹ In October 2023, Israeli political councils, in coordination with the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), distributed 300 assault rifles to civilian units in the West Bank;⁶⁰ and Ben-Gvir himself handed out rifles to civilians at political events.⁶¹ While these rifles were Israeli-made, the events sparked serious concerns among U.S. officials at the State Department, who halted the transfer of 20,000 M16 rifles—the licenses for which had previously been approved.⁶²

The pause in delivery also reflected concerns that U.S. weapons may be used in incidents of settler violence, which have reached an unprecedented scale in the West Bank.⁶³ According to the United Nations, firearms have been used in the West Bank to kill more than 436 Palestinians and injure more than 1,758 others since October 7,⁶⁴ though violence in the territory has been a growing concern for years.⁶⁵ This violence has caused grievous harm to Palestinian communities in the West Bank and threatens to undermine hopes for a future Palestinian state—a key foreign policy objective for the Biden administration.⁶⁶

The Philippines

From 2016 to 2022, President Rodrigo Duterte oversaw a particularly brutal period of state violence and repression in the Philippines. During Duterte’s administration, police officers and antidrug vigilantes carried out a brutal “war on drugs,” killing thousands, primarily among the urban poor.⁶⁷ Though Duterte’s term ended in 2022, his son, Sebastian Duterte, mayor of Davao, initiated a new “war against drugs” and has warned drug users of lethal consequences.⁶⁸ Furthermore, under current President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., the practice of “red tagging” activists, human rights advocates, and journalists persists.⁶⁹ Still, the Philippines ranks among the top five foreign destinations for U.S. firearms, with more than $24 million in firearms and ammunition exports to the Philippines in 2023, including more than 14,000 pistols and revolvers valued at $8.5 million.⁷⁰ From 2018 to 2022, the United States exported more than $57 million in firearms to the Philippines.⁷¹

In 2016, Sen. Ben Cardin blocked the sale of 26,000 Sig Sauer assault rifles to the Philippine National Police due to human rights concerns.⁷² But by 2019, the U.S. government had resumed transfers, providing the Philippines armed forces with weapons, including mortars and assault rifles, as part of a grant to combat Islamic State-aligned militants.⁷³

Concerns such as those outlined in the cases above led the Commerce Department to pause issuing new firearms export licenses for 90 days. While the pause did not apply to exports to European allies, Ukraine, or Israel, it provided the Commerce Department a period to review its export policies and to identify areas of improvement. This review included extensive consultation with other government agencies, civil society, and private industry, leading to the development of the IFR.

The IFR includes key policy changes:

• It reduces the validity of export licenses from four years to one year. Reviewing licenses on a more regular basis will allow the Commerce Department to improve oversight and accountability.
• It mandates that all firearms exports adhere strictly to the Crime Control List, meaning sales to government entities undergo rigorous case-by-case scrutiny, marking a departure from the previous presumption of automatic approval.⁷⁴
• It establishes a formalized interagency working group, chaired by a State Department official, to conduct comprehensive risk assessments on a country-by-country basis for transfers to commercial distributors, civilians, and other nongovernmental end users. Based on guidelines presented in a State Department memorandum, these risk assessments will consider terrorism risks, human rights considerations, state fragility, corruption levels, and the inherent nature and capabilities of the firearm in question, as well as historical instances of diversion and misuse.⁷⁵
• It adopts a presumption of denial for export licenses to nongovernmental end users identified by the State Department’s memorandum, including a specific list of 36 countries deemed of significant risk based on the assessment criteria described above.⁷⁶ The State Department will review and update the list annually.
• It creates more transparency and improves data tracking by creating new export classifications to distinguish between semiautomatic and non-semiautomatic weapons. The IFR mandates purchase orders and import certifications for export licenses destined for certain high-risk countries to improve transparency around end users and to better prevent diversion. It also requires passports or national ID cards for individuals who import firearms—outside of countries that are part of the Wassenaar Arrangement, a voluntary multilateral agreement for export controls.
• Following the urging of Caribbean government officials, the IFR also now prohibits the unlicensed temporary export of firearms by tourists and other travelers to countries that are part of the Caribbean Community.

The Trump administration’s shift of small arms firearms export authority from the State Department to the Commerce Department resulted in a more permissive framework for the sale and delivery of small arms worldwide. This permissive regime meant the United States increasingly sent countries weapons that were diverted, used in rights abuses, or used to facilitate violence. In turn, the shift has led U.S. firearms to cause more harm to more people worldwide, negatively affecting national security and foreign policy objectives.

Fundamentally, firearms and related parts and ammunition are defense articles and should be regulated as such. Thus, the State Department is best suited to oversee the sale of these weapons abroad, where officers reviewing license applications can consider each application in the context of U.S. foreign policy objectives and without concern for promotion of industry. Law and policymakers should seek avenues to return the authority to the State Department and to ensure proper resourcing for the agencies tasked with oversight.

Until that time, the amendments that the Commerce Department has put forward in its IFR are a step in the right direction toward ensuring U.S. firearms do not contribute to instability, violence, and rights abuse abroad. To further strengthen this new rule, the Biden administration should take the following steps:

• Include a presumption of denial to applications of export or re-export of any assault weapons. President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris have publicly declared their strong support for a domestic ban on assault weapons due to the disproportionate violence and harm that these weapons cause.⁷⁷ The Commerce Department, recognizing that use of an assault weapon with a high-capacity magazine increases the likelihood that a shooting will have a higher death count and that an assault weapon is the weapon of choice for international violent gangs, should limit its export.⁷⁸ The Commerce Department should strengthen the IFR by amending paragraph (b)(3)(ii) to include a presumption of denial to applications of export or re-export of any assault weapons—specifically, semiautomatic rifles, pistols, and shotguns now classified as ECCN OA506–8—for nongovernmental end users.
• Provide transparency on the methodology informing working group composition and risk assessments. The State Department’s Memorandum on Foreign Policy Guidance for Firearms Export Policy contains guidance for a new interagency working group to review license applications, including investigating specific and comprehensive details on risk factors to inform assessments.⁷⁹ To ensure the durability of this working group and transparency around its methodology, the Commerce Department should detail the agencies and personnel involved in the working group and include these risk factors in paragraph (b)(3)(ii) of the final rule.
• Provide greater detail for license review assessments for government end users. Paragraph (b)(3)(i) of the IFR mentions license review policies for government end users but lacks specifics, raising questions about how risk assessments will be conducted for firearm exports that could be misused in security roles. To maintain a consistent rigor of license review for government end users, the Commerce Department should include similar language to paragraph (b)(3)(ii), outlining the agencies and personnel composing the working group and clearly stating the risk factors used to inform assessments.
• Increase data transparency on firearm exports. The Commerce Department should commit to making more data available more regularly on firearms exports. New ECCNs provide an opportunity to share disaggregated monthly data, including destination country, purchaser, volume, value, and type of export.
• Enable enhanced congressional oversight. The Commerce Department should commit to providing notice to Congress of exports that exceed $1 million, in line with reporting requirements for weapons under the AECA.
• Provide clearer guidelines for in-country transfer of firearms. The Commerce Department must provide clearer guidelines regarding the in-country transfer of firearms exported from the United States, as well as their re-transfer beyond the originally licensed country jurisdiction.

Congress can also contribute to strengthening the firearms export licensing regime by taking the following steps:

• The gun manufacturing industry is advocating for lawmakers to advance legislation that would roll back the new regulations put forth in the IFR,⁸⁰ motivated by fears that it may lose millions of dollars annually as the Commerce Department is empowered to deny license applications that would undermine U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives. It is critical that lawmakers mobilize strong opposition to this legislation and protect the regulations.
• Lawmakers should advance legislation, such as the ARMAS Act,⁸¹ that would facilitate return to the State Department the authority for oversight of small arms licenses.
• Ultimately, whether the authority lies with the State Department or the Commerce Department, agencies charged with oversight of license applications require robust staffing, training programs, and funds to successfully discharge their duties. Congress should prioritize appropriating funds to fully staff agencies and train officers overseeing license applications.

U.S. guns often fuel instability in vulnerable regions, affecting local communities and, in turn, U.S. national security and foreign policy. The Commerce Department’s new policies on firearm exports ensure these exports do not contribute to political instability, human rights violations, or corruption.

The Commerce Department’s efforts over recent months are crucial in creating a firearm export regime that supports U.S. national security priorities, but it could still be strengthened to ensure assault rifles are not used abroad and to apply the same level of transparency to government users as nongovernmental ones. To ensure these policies are enduring, Congress must support the Commerce Department with the necessary resources and safeguard the robust regulations it has advanced. Additionally, Congress should pass the ARMAS Act to restore oversight to the State Department. Implementing more durable safeguards and considering the broader impact of U.S. gun sales is a prudent policy that will yield long-term benefits globally and for the United States.

The authors wish to express profound gratitude to the esteemed experts and colleagues whose support was instrumental in the development of this report. At the Center for American Progress, our heartfelt appreciation goes to Nick Wilson and Allison Jordan for their dedicated collaboration in shaping our research and recommendations. Special thanks to Ryan Mulholland for expert review and Michael Clark for research support.

We are also grateful for guidance and review from Professor Susan Waltz of Amnesty International USA, John Ramming Chappell of Center for Civilians in Conflict, and Jeff Abramson of the Forum on the Arms Trade.