: Regulatory Capture: Preventing Pervasive Corruption of the Public Interest
From financial system collapses to coal mining disasters, the evidence is clear how special interests create substantial social costs by skewing the public regulatory process for their own profit. This outcome is not inevitable, however. Rather, new research from leading scholars highlights how smart policies and governance practices can prevent the power of narrow interests from capturing regulatory processes to improve market outcomes and the public good.
The Center for American Progress invites you to join policymakers, leading scholars, and authors of the new book Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It, a part of the Tobin Project’s initiative on Government and Markets, in a discussion of how government regulation can better prevent such market-distorting behavior and protect the public interest.
Copies of Preventing Regulatory Capture will be available for purchase.
Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse (D-RI)
Daniel Carpenter, Freed Professor of Government, Harvard University
Nolan McCarty, Susan Dod Brown Professor of Politics and Public Affairs, Princeton University
Shelley Metzenbaum, President, The Volcker Alliance
Brad Miller, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress
Pedro da Costa, The Wall Street Journal