Center for American Progress

The United States Should Prioritize Energy Cooperation With Taiwan

The United States Should Prioritize Energy Cooperation With Taiwan

Solving Taiwan’s energy problems is an opportunity for the United States to achieve multiple goals.

A worker drives past a factory in Linhai Industrial Park.
A worker drives past a factory in Linhai Industrial Park in Kaohsiung, Taiwan, February 2016. (Getty/Billy H.C. Kwok)

As the Biden administration works to deepen trade, diplomatic, and defense ties with Taiwan in the face of escalating aggression from Beijing, the U.S. government should prioritize energy cooperation with the island. Improving Taiwan’s energy system is a necessary prerequisite to defending the island’s security, resiliency, economy, international space, climate ambitions, and democracy. Moreover, American support for Taiwan’s energy security would help safeguard critical U.S. supply chains, such as Taiwan-sourced semiconductors, and could further America’s influence on Beijing’s climate agenda as well.

Gaps in Taiwan’s energy security pose a significant liability to the island’s resistance against Beijing’s long-term aim of reunification. Taiwan’s reliance on foreign energy imports and its troubled transition away from fossil fuels have emboldened the mainland Chinese government to undermine and delegitimize Taiwan’s democracy. Beijing is also using Taiwan’s energy deficiencies to justify increased interconnection with Taiwan’s outer islands. U.S. policymakers interested in safeguarding Taiwan’s de facto independence, as well as those focused on mitigating climate change, should prioritize Taiwan’s energy security and assist with the island’s transition to renewable energy sources. Not only will this bolster Taiwan’s national security more broadly, but it could also be a potent way to indirectly influence Beijing’s thinking about renewables integration, climate policy, coal-to-gas switching, and nuclear power.

Taiwan’s energy security and climate dilemma

Taiwan’s energy insecurity is a dire situation. Since 2016, the island has experienced frequent power rationing and blackouts due to insufficient power supply reserves and intense heat waves.1 Two major outages occurred within a week in May 2021 due to a spike in demand resulting from a heatwave and a drought that impacted hydropower sources.2 The blackouts affected millions of residents in major cities, including Taipei and Kaohsiung, and briefly shut down production at a major Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company facility.3 In August 2017, Taiwan had experienced similar wide-scale blackouts that also affected semiconductor manufacturing companies.4 Taiwan is a critical player in the global semiconductor supply chain and is home to 62 percent of global semiconductor foundry capacity.5 Disruptions—including from power supply instability—to Taiwan’s ability to produce semiconductors would have serious downstream effects on U.S. businesses and consumers.

Over the past five years, low power reserve margins—a precursor to potential blackouts—have become a perennial concern and an intense political issue between the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the opposing Kuomintang (KMT).6 The Taiwan government is also struggling to implement an energy transition plan that shuts down all nuclear power by 2025 (which accounts for 10 percent of the island’s electricity generation) while preserving commitments to decreasing carbon emissions.7 Upon assuming Taiwan’s presidency in 2016, Tsai Ing-wen announced an ambitious energy plan to transition away from nuclear energy using a “20-30-50” fuel mix. This plan called for 20 percent of the island’s electricity to be generated by renewable sources, 30 percent to be generated from coal, and 50 percent to be generated from natural gas by 2025.8 However, this transition has proven to be an extremely difficult task. In 2020, renewables comprised only 5.5 percent of electricity generation, coal comprised 45 percent, and liquified natural gas (LNG) made up 35.7 percent.9

Nuclear energy remains a contentious political issue in Taiwan, with the DPP traditionally opposing nuclear power and the KMT supporting it. On December 18, the public voted in a referendum not to open a mothballed nuclear power plant in New Taipei, aligning with Tsai’s policy.10 While the DPP is committed to mitigating Taiwan’s emissions, its multidecade history of agitating against nuclear waste and power plants has not changed.11

Taiwan’s struggle to achieve its near-term energy transition is exacerbating an already difficult carbon emissions reduction path. In April 2021, President Tsai announced that the government was working on a plan to achieve net-zero carbon emissions by 2050, but Taiwan’s current emissions-reduction commitments are less ambitious than those of other developed countries, and Taiwan lacks a near-term blueprint for reducing emissions. Taiwan’s Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Management Act of 201512 committed Taiwan to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 50 percent of 2005 levels by 2050, but Taiwan’s emissions have remained essentially unchanged since the law was enacted.13 While Taiwan’s emissions are certainly not as significant as mainland China’s, Taiwan is the 24th-largest global emitter, and its per capita emissions are higher than those of Singapore, Germany, and many other developed economies.14 Although Taiwan has put forth its own climate pledges, the government is not subject to the peer pressure or international support associated with the Paris Agreement pledges because China blocks Taiwan government officials from participating in the annual U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of Parties.15

Besides its troubles in the power generation sector, Taiwan relies almost exclusively on imports to meet its overall energy needs due to its lack of natural resources. In 2020, 98 percent of its domestic energy consumption came from abroad.16 A majority of Taiwan’s energy resources are imported from the Middle East.17 Taiwan’s reliance on foreign energy imports is a major strategic vulnerability, especially when considering a cross-strait crisis scenario in which Beijing employs a blockade or exerts diplomatic pressure on energy exporters to “strangle” Taiwan.18 LNG supplies from Qatar and Russia in particular would likely be susceptible to potential Beijing pressure campaigns.19 In these scenarios, Taiwan’s energy insecurity undermines the island’s resiliency and ability to hold out before the United States and its allies can meaningfully come to its aid.

Beijing’s role

Further complicating the situation for Taiwan, the Chinese government has used Taiwan’s energy insecurity as a justification for increased economic connections and integration with the island. In a January 2019 speech, Chinese President Xi Jinping offered to supply “water, electricity, gas, and construction of sea-crossing bridges from coastal areas in Fujian province to Kinmen and Matsu in Taiwan,” giving high-level support for the “small four links” strategy of peacefully integrating Kinmen, a strategically valuable island controlled by Taiwan that is about six kilometers away from the major Chinese coastal city of Xiamen, into the mainland economy.20

More recently, during a visit to Fujian province in March 2021, Xi urged local officials to “be bold in exploring new paths for integrated cross-strait development.”21 Nongovernment cross-strait climate and energy cooperation currently consists of trade fairs and the Cross-Strait Forum on Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Development, now entering its 17th year.22 The vice chairman of the Fujian Science and Technology Association—a Chinese Communist Party United Front23 organization that “promotes the reunification of the motherland”—has also seized this opportunity to advocate for “strengthening exchanges and cooperation in the fields of energy and power … providing people on both sides of the strait with cleaner, reliable, economical, and sustainable energy supplies.”24

Although no major politician from Taiwan has explicitly endorsed the argument that Taiwan will enjoy greater energy security by integrating further with China, KMT politicians have previously signaled openness to “connecting electricity” between Kinmen and the mainland.25 Some local Kinmen politicians are also solicitous of energy and transportation linkages offered by the mainland, perceiving their own Taiwan government—and particularly the DPP—as inattentive to the island’s development.26

State-run media on China’s mainland also use Taiwan’s energy difficulties to denigrate Taiwan and show that democracies fail to deliver on public goods. State-affiliated media outlets such as the People’s Daily and Xinhua News have published numerous articles highlighting Taiwan’s energy shortcomings. For example, one article published in the People’s Daily after Taiwan’s blackouts in May 2021 described the island as a “severe disaster area” where people are living in “dire straits.”27 These articles not only mock the island’s frequent blackouts as explicit policy failures of the DPP, but they also claim that the policies are unpopular, such that the people of Taiwan are feeling “hopelessness, resentment and dissatisfaction” with the government.28

In academic circles, Chinese scholars have also used Taiwan’s energy shortcomings to argue the inferiority of a democratic system of government and subtly support Beijing’s more technocratic authoritarianism. Two mainland Chinese scholars writing for the Taiwan Research Journal, an influential publication that has been praised by high-level Chinese government officials, asserted that “the general [Taiwanese] public often does not have the professional knowledge to view Taiwan’s energy issues from the perspectives of technology, economy and the environment.”29 As a result, the scholars note, Taiwan authorities are more inclined to come up with popular energy policies rather than the most effective ones. Moreover, these scholars stress that Taiwan’s electoral and party politics lead to fragmented policies formed by too many stakeholders in society.30

While some mainland scholars subtly denigrate Taiwan’s democratic political system, others squarely assign blame on Taiwan’s policy implementation. Namely, they assert that Taiwan’s ruling authorities “lack coherence and effectiveness.”31 Similar to the arguments made by state-run media, these arguments maintain that strengthening cross-strait interconnectivity will solve Taiwan’s energy shortcomings.

Addressing Taiwan’s energy insecurity is a low-cost strategy that would address multiple short- and long-term U.S. priorities.

Recommendations for the United States

U.S. assistance in stabilizing Taiwan’s energy security and easing Taiwan’s energy transition could further U.S. interests regarding Beijing. Evidence from established Chinese publications suggests that Beijing views energy policies in Taiwan as potential models to be applied on the mainland.32 Chinese energy scholars and experts reference and study Taiwan’s energy experiences and have sought to learn from both successes and failures. For example, scholars from the School of Economics at Xiamen University penned an article in 2013 for a sustainable energy journal in which they summarized the successful practices of Taiwan’s new energy development to provide reference for the mainland. The article concluded that “mainland China can learn the experience of the new energy industry from Taiwan, such as new energy policies, advancing technology, and raising the awareness of environmental protection of its citizens.”33

More recently, in an assessment of Taiwan’s electric grid failures, researchers from the Energy Research Institute of China Southern Power Grid published an article in May 2021 that made proposals to China’s own electric power development.34 The researchers asserted that Taiwan’s blackouts “are of warning significance for our power and energy security.”35 This article was notably prescient as mainland China is now experiencing its own power outages, which, like Taiwan’s, have resulted from high electricity demand, the impacts of climate change, and the complications of energy transition efforts.36 Should U.S.-China bilateral climate cooperation continue to remain stalled, the United States can still indirectly influence Chinese government thinking on its climate policies by assisting Taiwan’s energy transition.

Taiwan’s energy insecurity is a multifaceted threat to the island and to American defense, economic, and climate interests. In light of this, the U.S. government should bolster its energy partnership with Taiwan and build a foundation for long-term cooperation.

One way to build this foundation is for the United States to expand the U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue, a five-year undersecretary-level dialogue agreed to by the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office (TECRO) in November 2020.37 The dialogue covers an array of issues—including energy infrastructure cooperation, economic ties, science and technology exchanges, and supply chains—and is an ideal venue for addressing Taiwan’s energy insecurity and climate policies.38

The Biden administration should continue and expand this dialogue by bringing in undersecretaries from the U.S. Departments of Commerce and Energy to co-lead the process; and it should also designate a permanent representative from the Office of the Special Presidential Envoy on Climate (SPEC) to attend. The Department of Commerce should promote trade and bring trade associations and commercial actors into the discussion, while the Department of Energy should explore long-term energy system planning with the Taiwan government and bring technical insights into bilateral trade advocacy and diplomatic discussions. The Department of Energy could also provide unique insights from the U.S. government’s ongoing cooperation with Taiwan in nuclear power plant decommissioning and nuclear waste management.39 Additionally, the U.S. Trade Representative should be leveraged to help support bilateral trade advocacy.

Besides deepening mutual dialogue, the United States can also take direct action to assist Taiwan’s energy insecurity by beginning exploratory discussions with the Taiwan government to establish a Clean Energy Research Center (CERC), modeled on the U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center. The CERC model brings together government representatives, national labs, research and academic institutions, and industry into a joint research and development (R&D) consortium. The CERC model focuses on producing commercial and scalable intellectual property and best practices and policies that address shared needs. The U.S.-China version focused on advancing coal technology, building energy efficiency, and developing clean energy vehicles, among other issues.40 A U.S.-Taiwan CERC could explore shared needs such as microgrids, demand-side management, and battery storage. It could also capitalize on complementary strengths in areas like IT hardware, autonomous technology, and semiconductors.

The CERC model also creates a sustainable platform for building lasting government, research, and commercial ties, potentially recreating the U.S.-Taiwan industrial cooperation that led to breakthroughs in semiconductors in the ’80s and ’90s.41 Such a platform would help the United States address Taiwan’s immediate energy insecurity through shared research and build the foundation for a productive, long-term relationship on clean and renewable energy technologies.


The Chinese government appears set to increase pressure on Taiwan to unify over the next few years. The challenge for Taiwan and its allies, including the United States, will be to fortify Taiwan politically, economically, and militarily against a multipronged pressure campaign from China. Shoring up Taiwan’s energy security will be a key component of all three lines of effort.

Addressing Taiwan’s energy insecurity would also help further other critical American foreign policy goals. Helping Taiwan to successfully transition its energy system toward carbon neutrality would address the island’s high emissions trajectory and could affect Chinese government thinking and planning about the mainland’s energy transition process. U.S.-Taiwan science and technology cooperation around clean energy and the energy transition could also benefit America’s development path and that of other economies undergoing a dual transition (away from both nuclear and carbon-intensive power generation), such as Germany and Japan. Keeping the lights on in Taiwan is also of critical importance for American and allied supply chain security, which remains highly dependent on Taiwan-based semiconductor production.

As America re-engages with the world under the Biden administration, it must prioritize cost-effective strategies that meet multiple goals. Addressing Taiwan’s energy insecurity is a low-cost strategy that would address multiple short- and long-term U.S. priorities.

The author would like to thank Nina Palmer, senior fellow for China at the Center for American Progress; Jordan Link, China policy analyst at the Center; and Laura Edwards, China research and program associate at the Center, for their invaluable contributions to this report


  1. Reuters Staff, “More forced power outages in Taiwan as demand spikes amid heatwave, drought,” Reuters, May 17, 2021, available at
  2. Ibid.
  3. Amy Qin and Amy Chang Chien, “Rolling Blackouts Hit Taiwan After Accident at Power Plant,” The New York Times, September 17, 2021, available at; Reuters Staff, “Taiwan power resumes after outage, TSMC hit by brief dip,” Reuters, May 13, 2021, available at; Josh Horwitz, “Taiwan, at the heart of the world’s tech supply chain, has a serious electricity problem,” Quartz, August 17, 2017, available at
  4. Reuters Staff, “Taiwan power outage affected 151 companies, caused $3 million in damages,” Reuters, August 17, 2017, available at
  5. Yen Nee Lee, “2 charts show how much the world depends on Taiwan for semiconductors,” CNBC, March 15, 2021, available at
  6. Central News Agency, “Power reserve margin to stay above 6% before July: Taipower,” Taiwan News, June 18, 2018, available at
  7. World Nuclear Association, “Nuclear Power in Taiwan,” July 2021, available at
  8. Judy Lin, “Taiwan to generate 20% of power from renewables by 2025: Tsai,” Taiwan News, February 15, 2017, available at
  9. Bureau of Energy, “Structure of Electricity Generation (by Fuel),” available at (last accessed December 2021).
  10. Betty Hou, “Taiwan Voters Align With All Government Positions in Referendum,” Bloomberg, December 18, 2021, available at
  11. Focus Taiwan Staff, “Taiwan’s referendums binding, but may not be enforceable: experts,” CNA English News, October 20, 2018
  12. Laws and Regulations Database of the Republic of China, “Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Management Act,” July 1, 2015, available at
  13. Yi Ling Roy Ngerng, “Is Taiwan Doing Enough to Address Climate Change in The Hottest Summer Ever?”, Taiwan News, August 19, 2020, available at
  14. Thomas C. Frohlich and Liz Blossom, “These countries produce the most CO2 emissions,” USA Today, July 14, 2019, available at; George Liao, “Greenpeace urges Taiwan presidential candidates to address carbon emission issue,” Taiwan News, available at’s%20per%20capita%20CO2%20emissions,in%20the%20world%20in%202018.
  15. Ngerng, “Is Taiwan Doing Enough to Address Climate Change in The Hottest Summer Ever?”; James KJ Lee, “Taiwan Should Be Part of Global Fight Against Climate Change,” The Diplomat, November 4, 2016, available at
  16. Manuel Widmann, “Taiwan’s Energy Security: Liquefied Natural Gas, Renewables, and the EU,” EIAS, June 16, 2021, available at
  17. Ibid.
  18. Simon Leitch, “The Coming Blockade of Taiwan by China?”, The National Interest, April 26, 2021, available at
  19. Reuters Staff, “Taiwan’s CPC signs 15 year LNG deal with Qatar,” Reuters, July 7, 2021, available at
  20. Xi Jinping, “Working Together to Realize Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation and Advance China’s Peaceful Reunification,” Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, January 2, 2019, available at; “Liu jie yi:sha jin ‘xiao si tong’ he rong he fa zhan jiang wei liang [de di] min zhong mou li zao fu” ( Liu Jieyi: The “Small Four Links” and integrated development of Xiamen Jinan will benefit the people of the two places), Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, June 17, 2019, available at
  21. Laura Zhou, “Beijing prepares to build airport on reclaimed land near Taiwan amid rising tension across strait,” South China Morning Post, August 18, 2021, available at
  22. Qingdao University of Science and Technology, “Di shi liu jie hai xia liang an qi hou bian qian yu neng yuan ke chi xu fa zhan lun tan zai qing ke da ju xing” (The 16th Cross-Strait Forum on Climate Change and Sustainable Energy Development was held at Youth Science and Technology University), December 7, 2020, available at; Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, “2015 lu tai (de zhou) xian dai chan ye he zuo ken tan hui ji hai xia liang an xin neng yuan chan ye he zuo dui jie qia tan hui zai de zhou ju xing” (2015 Lutai (Dezhou) Modern Industry Cooperation Conference and Cross-Strait New Energy Industry Cooperation Matchmaking Conference was held in Texas), August 28, 2015, available at
  23. “The CCP advocates for its political interests through the use of what it calls “United Front” work, a strategy borrowed from the former Soviet Union … The United Front strategy uses a range of methods to influence overseas Chinese communities, foreign governments, and other actors to take actions or adopt positions supportive of Beijing’s preferred policies. A number of official and quasi-official entities conduct overseas activities guided or funded by the United Front including Chinese government and military organizations, cultural and “friendship” associations, and overseas academic groups such as Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs) and Confucius Institutes. The United Front Work Department also oversees influence operations targeting Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau that aim to suppress independence movements, undermine local identity, and promote support for Beijing’s political system. In all of these cases, United Front work serves to promote Beijing’s preferred global narrative, pressure individuals living in free and open societies to self-censor and avoid discussing issues unfavorable to the CCP, and harass or undermine groups critical of Beijing’s policies.” For further details, see Alexander Bowe, “China’s Overseas United Front Work” (Washington: U.S.- China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2018), available at’s%20Overseas%20United%20Front%20Work%20-%20Background%20and%20Implications%20for%20US_final_0.pdf.
  24. Xinhua, “Zhuan jia hu xu liang an jia kuai neng yuan rong he fa zhan zao fu min zhong” (Experts call on both sides of the strait to speed up the development of energy integration for the benefit of the people), June 17, 2019, available at; Fujian Association for Science and Technology, “Xie hui jian jie” (Association Introduction), available at; Fujian Association for Science and Technology, “2021 hai xia liang an neng yuan dian li fa zhan lun tan zai sha men ju xing” (2021 Cross-Strait Energy and Power Development Forum held in Xiamen), June 29, 2021, available at; William Hannas, James Mulvenon, and Anna Puglisi, Chinese Industrial Espionage, Routledge, 2013, pp 97–111; Bowe, “China’s Overseas United Front Work.”
  25. Chen Guanlin, “liang an tong shui xian zhang chen fu hai pan ‘jin men xin san tong’” (Cross-Strait Water Links County Magistrate Chen Fuhaipan “New Three Links” in Kinmen), Kinmen Daily News, August 6, 2018, available at
  26. Nick Aspinwall, “6 Km From China, Taiwan’s Kinmen Charts Its Own Path,” The Diplomat, September 4, 2018, available at
  27. People’s Daily, “Pin fan da ting dian! min jin dang zhi xia de tai wan ru ‘zhong zai qu’”(Frequent blackouts! Taiwan under the rule of the Democratic Progressive Party is like a ‘severe disaster area’), May 20, 2021, available at
  28. Ibid.
  29. Yang Fang and He Xiaoping, “Power Shortage in Taiwan——Base on the Analysis of Their Power Supply and Demand,” Taiwan Research Journal, March 2019, available at; Taiwan Research Journal, “Tai wan yan jiu ji kan,” Baidu, available at (last accessed January 2022).
  30. Ibid.
  31. Zhang Rui and Huang Wei-long, “The Predicament of Taiwan’s Energy Transformation,” Asia-Pacific Economic Review 5 (2021): 136–145, available at
  32. Chuanguo Zhang and Yi He, “Comparative Study of Cross-Strait New Energy Department,” Sustainable Energy 3 (2013): 106–109, available at; Tian Hong and Li Xiaoxiao, “Analysis of Taiwan’s Energy Policy from the Perspective of Policy Instruments,” Research on Fujian-Taiwan Relationship (3) (2021): 15–25, available at
  33. Ibid.
  34. China Power Network, “Tai wan da ting dian shi gu fen xi ji qi shi” (Analysis and Enlightenment of Taiwan’s Blackout), May 26, 2021, available at
  35. Ibid.
  36. Keith Bradsher, “Power Outages Hit China, Threatening the Economy and Christmas,” The New York Times, September 27, 2021, available at
  37. American Institute in Taiwan, “MOU between AIT and TECRO on establishing a U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue,” November 21, 2020, available at
  38. U.S. Department of State, “Inaugural U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue,” November 20, 2020, available at; American Institute in Taiwan, “Fact Sheet To be Released by AIT and TECRO on U.S.-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue,” November 21, 2020, available at; Riley Walters, “Building a Robust U.S.-Taiwan Economic Dialogue,” The Heritage Foundation, January 19, 2021, available at; Evan Feigenbaum and Barbara Weisel, “Deepening the U.S.-Taiwan Economic Partnership,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 4, 2021, available at
  39. Atomic Energy Council, “Taiwan-U.S.,” June 30, 2020, available at
  40. U.S. Department of Energy, “U.S.-China Clean Energy Research Center (CERC),” April 26, 2017, available at
  41. Evan Feigenbaum, “Assuring Taiwan’s Innovation Future,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 29, 2020, available at

The positions of American Progress, and our policy experts, are independent, and the findings and conclusions presented are those of American Progress alone. A full list of supporters is available here. American Progress would like to acknowledge the many generous supporters who make our work possible.


Patrick Yu

Former China Research Intern

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.