Introduction and summary
Across Washington, D.C., local government and community leaders are working together to reduce crime and violence and make the nation’s capital safer for all who live, visit, and work in it. Like most cities in the United States, the District of Columbia saw an increase in gun violence at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic that continued in the following years, ultimately peaking in December 2023.1 Since then, the city has undertaken significant efforts to address residents’ concerns about crime by focusing on holding people who commit serious crimes accountable while seeking to increase investments in crime prevention and resources such as housing and education and employment supports. Those efforts are paying off: Rates of all crime in D.C., including violent crime, declined throughout 2024 to a 30-year low.2
Federal interference in D.C.’s public safety efforts at this critical time could threaten local legitimacy, trust, and ongoing progress while making it harder for the city to bring forward solutions that can disrupt cycles of violence. Instead, federal officials should note that D.C.’s leaders have continued to make important strides in recent years to improve the safety of the city’s residents and should allow those efforts to continue and grow. Genuine solutions for making D.C. safer will come from its communities and the leaders they elect to represent them. D.C.’s local elected officials should be the ones making public safety decisions, because they are the only ones who D.C. residents can hold directly responsible for those decisions and the ones best positioned to deploy local resources to implement real solutions to meaningfully improve public safety. Federal officials, whose political agendas may or may not align with the safety priorities of D.C.’s communities, risk making the city less safe and less accountable to its residents regarding one of the most important tasks local government performs.
Genuine solutions for making D.C. safer will come from its communities and the leaders they elect to represent them.
Recent years have seen many attempts by federal policymakers to overstep and interfere with local governance in Washington, D.C. In 2025, President Donald Trump has threatened increasing federal control of D.C.,3 and Congress has introduced legislation that would reverse D.C. home rule.4 Rather than providing D.C. with the resources it needs to improve public safety, congressional and presidential fear-mongering, desire to consolidate power, and interference with D.C.’s self-governance have obscured the significant local progress to make the city safer and reduce harm to its residents.
Reducing crime in D.C. depends on the knowledge of local officials and requires local accountability to those who have elected them. It is critical that D.C.—like every other city in the nation—maintains the power to enact changes that are responsive to local needs, that most effectively use resources to target local issues with a knowledge of local context, and that reflect residents’ vision of safety.
Available data on D.C. public safety
It’s impossible to understand the public safety challenges and opportunities that Washington, D.C., faces today without taking into account how the COVID-19 pandemic has reshaped communities over the past five years. Between March 2020 and June 2021, murders in the largest U.S. cities increased by more than 41 percent.5 Since the U.S. murder rate peaked in summer 2021, cities have made enormous investments in public safety to bring down their murder rates—and have made real strides. Even so, the Real-Time Crime Index (RTCI) shows that the national 12-month rolling sum of murders in January 2025—the most recent available data—is still 3.7 percent higher than it was at the same point in 2020.6
Homicides in Washington went down 32 percent from 2023 to 2024, accounting for one of the largest declines among major U.S. cities.
Unfortunately, D.C. was not immune to what the rest of the nation faced. Homicides in Washington had been rising steadily before the COVID-19 pandemic, increasing 89 percent between 2012 and 2019—from 88 homicides to 166 homicides.7 Yet between March 2020 and June 2021, D.C.’s 12-month rolling average of murders increased by 27 percent, before coming down slightly in 2022 and then peaking in December of 2023.8 Like almost all major U.S. cities, D.C. responded to these difficult and unprecedented circumstances by doubling down on improving public safety through community-backed solutions.9
The good news is that D.C.’s commitment to improving safety and collaborating with community partners is already leading to welcomed progress and improvement in the city’s crime rates. According to year-end data from D.C.’s Metropolitan Police Department (MPD),10 homicides in Washington went down 32 percent from 2023 to 2024, accounting for one of the largest declines among major U.S. cities.11 Even more encouraging, homicides in 2024 were down compared with every year since 2019. While it is still too early in 2025 to predict full-year trends, compared with the first three months in 2023, homicides are down 37 percent, assaults with a dangerous weapon are down 39 percent, all violent crime is down 40 percent, and property crime is down 19 percent.12 A similar drop in D.C.’s 2025 homicide rate would bring the city below its pre-pandemic levels after it experienced more homicides in 2023, during the pandemic-era spike, than it had in the previous 20 years.13
Violent crime in Washington was lower in 2024 than in any year with available data.
And it’s not just homicides that were down in 2024. Last year, all crime reported to the MPD was down 14 percent from 2023,14 with all reported property crime down 11 percent15 and all reported violent crime down 35 percent.16 Similarly, while D.C. experienced a surge in carjackings in 2023, MPD data show carjackings were down almost 50 percent in 2024, going down in every police district.17 Importantly, these public safety gains were experienced throughout the city. Center for American Progress analysis of MPD data shows that violent crime in Washington was down in all eight wards in 2024 compared with 2023.18 In fact, violent crime in Washington was lower in 2024 than in any year with available data, going back to 2010.
Public safety is not a one-size-fits-all solution. The fact that these public safety gains are being experienced everywhere despite the diverse needs of each community is a testament to how well a comprehensive approach to public safety, driven by the needs of the community, can work.
Compared with other similarly sized U.S. cities,19 Washington had one of the lowest crime rates across most crime categories in 2024. Center for American Progress analysis of RTCI data shows, for example,20 that Washington had the second-lowest violent crime rate per 100,000 residents and the sixth-lowest property crime rate, compared with 15 similarly sized U.S. cities.21
While the data provide reason to be optimistic that local efforts to improve public safety are helping make D.C. safer, every life lost to violence or affected by crime is one too many. Until no resident is in danger of becoming a statistic, the work is not done. Still, the progress made in 2024 should give officials confidence to invest more in the solutions that are already working.
Local and federal governments share power in D.C.’s criminal legal system
As a federal district without the full sovereignty afforded to states, Washington, D.C.’s public safety system operates under a shared jurisdiction between local and federal government,22 creating obstacles to true local accountability. While the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) answers to the mayor and city council,23 agencies like the Pretrial Services Agency, Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency (CSOSA), and D.C. Superior Court fall under federal control.24 Even legislation passed by the D.C. Council—such as public safety bills—can be reviewed by Congress,25 enabling outsiders with ideological agendas and those with limited knowledge of local conditions to override city residents’ choices. Unlike other cities, where locally elected or appointed prosecutors answer to voters, most crimes committed by adults under D.C. law are prosecuted by the U.S. attorney,26 a federal official who is not directly accountable to D.C. residents. This hybrid system, by design, can undermine efforts to implement community-driven public safety solutions and weaken the direct line of responsibility between D.C. residents and the leaders they elect.
While D.C., like all states, has a national guard that can be deployed in times of emergency,27 D.C.’s guard is always under federal, rather than local, control,28 which adds bureaucracy and delays the mayor’s ability to deliver critical law enforcement services in some cases.29 It also creates a loophole that the federal government—often backed by self-serving political motives—can use to unilaterally deploy the guard to carry out the functions of local law enforcement without the training or experience to do so effectively.30 In 2020, for example, the National Guard used low-flying helicopters to intimidate peaceful protesters speaking out against police violence in the wake of the murder of George Floyd, creating “wind speeds equivalent to a tropical storm.”31
Across the country, the president has broad authority over federal law enforcement activities. In D.C., the footprint of federal law enforcement is large given that there are federal lands, agencies, and institutions where federal authorities have jurisdiction.32 Due to their poor response to and use of force during the George Floyd protests in D.C., the training and accountability of the U.S. Park Police were called into question.33 Local leaders said these actions by federal law enforcement threatened the MPD’s longstanding efforts to build trust with the community and, therefore, their future ability to keep D.C. safe.34 The federal government also has the authority to assume control of local law enforcement and other government functions in certain circumstances.
Federal legislation that allows for federal control of local D.C. functions
The 1997 National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act shifted crucial powers away from local D.C. officials.35 While the law provided financial relief to D.C.,36 it also granted federal authorities control over typically local functions, such as the incarceration of people convicted under local law37 as well as key components of pretrial38 and parole services.39 As a result of having a bifurcated system with shared federal and local power, the D.C. system is less “unified,” with agencies having different goals and priorities, making it more complicated for those trying to navigate it.40
Under the District of Columbia Home Rule Act, the president has the unilateral power to take control of the MPD for 48 hours if the president finds that there are “special conditions of an emergency nature.”41 After 48 hours, the president must notify the chairmen and ranking minority members of the congressional committees on the District of Columbia in order to maintain control of the MPD for up to 30 days. The statute grants the president the authority to use the MPD for any purpose he deems “necessary and appropriate,”42 although the specific parameters of this authority are vague. Though no previous president has used this authority,43 Trump threatened to during his past administration.44
The District of Columbia Financial Responsibility and Management Assistance Act of 199545 provides for a Financial Control Board that would consolidate power over essential local government functions in an unelected, federally sanctioned entity.46 In the event that one of seven financial events occurs, a control period is initiated allowing for the reinstatement of the five-person, presidentially appointed board to manage the financial functions of the city. While the mayor would still have the power to develop a budget, the board would ultimately be given the power to approve or disapprove the budget as well as broad powers to fulfill what are traditionally local government functions without the control or oversight of the mayor or city council.47 Such measures could allow federal priorities to overshadow the city’s own strategies, undercutting D.C.’s ability to create effective policies that genuinely reflect local realities.
In D.C.’s unique system where there is shared federal and local authority over public safety functions, the need for meaningful collaboration is even more necessary to ensure that the city can administer justice and provide services in the most effective way. One such example of this collaboration is the Criminal Justice Coordinating Council (CJCC), which acts as a “central agency” that brings together federal and local agencies and leaders to develop and implement solutions to improve safety.48 Some of the core functions of this office include facilitating information-sharing and encouraging collaboration across agencies and departments, collecting and analyzing data related to the criminal legal system, and providing technical assistance and training.49
See also
Recent attacks on D.C.’s local governance
Despite already having disproportionate control over what are typically local government responsibilities, Congress has tried to exert even more power over D.C. governance in recent years.
In 2022, the D.C. Council unanimously passed a bill to rewrite the city’s 120 year-old criminal code, a process that took 16 years to complete50 and engaged numerous D.C. stakeholders and experts.51 Far from a radical move, the suggested changes to the code, such as eliminating mandatory minimums and ensuring the right to a jury trial, reflect an understanding of best practices that are widely supported by D.C. voters.52 Yet Congress blocked the bill’s implementation.53 Also in 2022, the D.C. Council passed the Comprehensive Policing and Justice Reform Amendment Act,54 a permanent extension of temporary changes from a 2020 bill that improved accountability for police misconduct by restricting the use of neck restraints and consent searches while also improving public transparency of disciplinary records in certain cases.55 Congress acted to block the implementation of this law as well,56 though President Joe Biden ultimately vetoed the resolution to block the implementation of the police reform bill, allowing for important accountability measures to go into effect.57
“Home rule,” which was granted in 1973 through the D.C. Home Rule Act, allows D.C. residents to elect local leaders, such as the mayor, city council, and advisory neighborhood commissioners, who are in charge of local governance.58 Yet in its last session, Congress introduced numerous amendments, disapproval resolutions, and bills that would undermine D.C. home rule, specifically in the area of crime and law enforcement. For example, in H.R. 8773, the House’s fiscal year 2025 appropriations bill, legislators attempted to roll back many wins for D.C,59 including the Youth Rehabilitation Amendment Act of 2018 provision that increased the maximum age to be charged as a youth to 24.60
Ongoing threats from Congress and the Trump administration
Because of D.C.’s status as a federal district, the city is vulnerable to overreach by both the president and Congress. Since President Trump assumed office in January 2025, he and Congress have threatened to interfere with D.C.’s local public safety functions.61 On March 28, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order titled “Making the District of Columbia Safe and Beautiful.”62 Among other things, this order calls for the creation of the D.C. Safe and Beautiful Task Force, which is comprised of federal officials with no representation from local D.C. leadership, to pursue policies that would, in reality, make D.C. less safe, such as making it easier and cheaper to get a concealed carry permit for a gun.63
There are also significant active threats in Congress. On February 6, 2025, Rep. Andy Ogles (R-TN) and Sen. Mike Lee (R-UT) introduced the Bringing Oversight to Washington and Safety to Every Resident (BOWSER) Act.64 If passed, this would overturn D.C.’s decades-old Home Rule Act, which allows district residents to elect a mayor and city council, among other things.65 Additionally, Congress has proposed lowering D.C.’s Medicaid reimbursement rate from 70 percent to 50 percent,66 which would reduce program funding by $800 million each year.67 D.C. would be forced to either reduce the number of people covered by the program—a move that has contributed to increases in crime in other jurisdictions68—or make cuts to other critical programs to make up the difference.
Additionally, earlier this year, Congress passed a spending package that would have required D.C. to cut $1.1 billion from its budget.69 Unless the House passes the Senate’s District of Columbia Local Funds Act of 2025, which would restore this critical funding, it will be even more difficult for D.C. to invest in proven solutions that improve safety. Federal lawmakers should stand united in opposition to any proposal that unjustly limits local leaders’ ability to govern and impedes efforts to make D.C. safer for all who live, work, and visit there.
D.C. statehood is critical to ensuring public safety
For years, D.C. residents, advocates, and policymakers have called for the District of Columbia to become the 51st U.S. state. Beyond the injustice of denying more than 700,000 people the right to be represented in Congress,70 D.C.’s lack of statehood creates significant barriers to implementing changes that would improve safety across the district and, in fact, subjects D.C. residents to policies and practices that make them less safe.
D.C. statehood, which 86 percent of city voters supported in a 2016 referendum,71 would bring the full responsibility of public safety back to the local level, where it belongs. Statehood would also ensure that D.C. residents have the opportunity to elect leaders who represent them and their life experiences. Current elected D.C. leaders are representative of the D.C. population. For example, Black people make up the largest share of D.C. residents,72 and the demographic makeup of D.C. local governance includes a Black mayor and multiple Black council members. This is more reflective of the city itself than is the current Congress, whose members are overwhelmingly white.73
Statehood would also give D.C. greater power to select and hold accountable the people in charge of administering the public safety system, including the heads of pretrial services, parole, and probation agencies. D.C. could select judges and prosecutors whose policies embrace best practices and center the safety priorities of the community. Rather than having a system that changes with the political winds of Capitol Hill, D.C. policies and reforms could better reflect the wants and needs of residents. Without statehood, D.C. is denied the opportunity—all other states have—to do everything it can to keep its residents safe.
Local efforts to improve safety
Like the people of every other city in the United States, D.C.’s residents deserve the freedom to shape their city’s public safety agenda and hold local elected officials directly responsible for setting it in motion. Despite congressional claims that D.C. is failing to address crime,74 the city’s government and community leaders work diligently to create real, data-driven improvements.
Across the country, cities are taking steps to ensure the safety of their residents and implementing innovative solutions within local government and in collaboration with the community. In D.C., an example of this is the 2016 passage of the Neighborhood Engagement Achieves Results Act, which established the Office of Neighborhood Safety and Engagement (ONSE).75 Like similar offices of violence prevention that have been created across the country,76 ONSE aims to take a public health approach to responding to violence by helping coordinate citywide violence prevention efforts.77 ONSE offers different programs to support victims and reduce violence in the most impacted D.C. neighborhoods.78
Recently, D.C. passed the Secure DC Omnibus Emergency Amendment Act, which ushered in a variety of changes to the way that the city approaches crime and violence.79 Importantly, Secure DC launched new standards for data collection,80 allowing officials to better identify public safety challenges and target solutions based on local priorities. Secure DC also calls for the development and publication of results from a crime victimization survey, which will collect information on victim demographics and their experiences receiving services.81 It also established a Prearrest Diversion Task Force tasked with reviewing best practices and making recommendations for how the district’s system can be improved to ensure safety and equity.82 Meanwhile, D.C.’s Sentencing Commission is being expanded to include additional representation from locals, increasing the voice of D.C. residents in this important body. For example, the commission will now include a member who has experience in criminal defense in D.C. as well as someone who has lived experience with violent crime and someone returning to the community.83
On March 24, Council Member Brooke Pinto introduced her “Peace DC” plan, which consisted of a number of bills that, among other things, would increase investments in programs to support youth and people reentering the community after incarceration.84
These sorts of reforms, guided by leaders who know the city and answer to its residents, are directed toward meeting the city’s public safety needs. Should these efforts insufficiently address public safety or have unintended and undesired impacts, D.C. residents should be able to call on their local leaders to redirect efforts, funding, and approaches. However, without full representation and autonomy and with persistent federal interference, D.C. leaders’ jobs may be more challenging.
Four case studies of D.C. public safety programs
In an effort to reduce crime and violence, community-based programs are working on the ground in neighborhoods across Washington, D.C., to de-escalate conflict, reduce violence, and provide support to people who are closest to violence in their communities. While these programs are already doing incredible work, increasing investments in these and other community-based solutions would improve safety, unlike misguided efforts to interfere with local self-governance.
Below are some examples of community-based public safety programs in D.C.
1. True Reasons I Grabbed the Gun Evolved from Risks (T.R.I.G.G.E.R.) Project
Rooted in a public health approach that treats gun violence like a disease that spreads throughout communities, the T.R.I.G.G.E.R. Project aims to “denormalize and destigmatize gun violence in communities of color” in D.C.85 It offers six different types of programs aimed at spreading awareness about gun violence and prevention efforts and providing opportunities for young people to choose programs that meet their goals and needs.86 Since its inception, the T.R.I.G.G.E.R. Project has reached more than 50,000 D.C. youth across its programs, including by providing more than 100 youth with paid summer jobs each year and 600 youth with tailored resources and referral services. It has also engaged more than a thousand participants through its citywide gun violence conference.87
2. National Association for the Advancement of Returning Citizens (NAARC)
NAARC strives to provide resources and services to meet the social and economic needs and improve the quality of life of individuals returning to the community after incarceration.88 The organization aims to ensure that regardless of people’s past mistakes, they have the chance to “rebuild their lives” after incarceration.89 Relying on partnerships with community organizations and local system stakeholders, NAARC implements programs such as the Community Assisted Reentry Program (CARP), which helps refer people to needed services, including health, housing, and employment supports.90
3. Cure the Streets
Run by the Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia and modeled after Cure Violence Global, Cure the Streets is a violence intervention program aimed at reducing gun violence across the city.91 Like other projects modeled after Cure Violence Global,92 Cure the Streets uses a network of credible messengers to interrupt cycles of violence in communities, with a particular focus on 10 communities with the highest rates of gun violence.93 In 2024 alone, Cure the Streets engaged 344 participants, provided 752 mediations, and responded to 23 shooting incidents.94 Recognizing the essential role that community violence intervention (CVI) staff and credible messengers with deep roots in their community play in reducing gun violence, Peace For DC offers training and resources to support the Cure the Streets workforce through the DC Peace Academy.95
4. Project CHANGE
Project CHANGE96 is a hospital-based violence intervention program (HVIP)97 that operates under D.C.’s Office of Victim Services and Justice Grants.98 Project CHANGE operates in six local hospitals, providing gun violence survivors and their families with connections to crisis intervention, mental health, employment, and other support services as well as case management support.99 These important resources help ensure that people are supported after experiencing a traumatic event and decrease the likelihood of retaliatory violence. Project CHANGE has engaged thousands of people since starting in October 2017 and has provided services to more than 4,900 people.100
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Conclusion
Like most major U.S. cities, Washington, D.C., is getting safer and is working hard to overcome recent public safety challenges by building momentum for even more. D.C.’s elected officials, chosen by and accountable to the city’s residents, are best suited to respond to and address public safety concerns. Experience shows that the greatest strides in public safety are typically the result of coordinated community-based approaches and robust local leadership. By strengthening coordination among local leaders, nongovernment organizations that are providing resources, and communities themselves, the District of Columbia can build on its progress and remain on the path toward a safer future for its residents and visitors.
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Tom Moore of the Center for American Progress for his contributions to the development of this report.