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How Congress Can Help Curb the UAE’s Role in Sudan’s Crisis
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How Congress Can Help Curb the UAE’s Role in Sudan’s Crisis

To see a peaceful end to the conflict, Congress must hold the UAE accountable for its role in fueling Sudan’s violent civil war and deepening its humanitarian crisis through the weapons and gold trade.

A man walks past a damaged building in Khartoum North, Sudan.
A man walks past a damaged building in Khartoum North, Sudan, on March 17, 2025. (Getty/Ebrahim Hamid)

Sudan—a nation buoyed by the promise of a democratic transition just five years ago—is now gripped by a violent civil war: a power struggle driving the worst displacement crisis and largest humanitarian crisis in the world today. Since April 2023, 150,000 people have died and 14.6 million have fled their homes. Today, more than half of Sudan’s population of 48 million faces acute hunger. A steady stream of weaponry and gold trade has fueled the conflict and prolonged the humanitarian crisis, financing the warring parties and enriching their foreign sponsors—chiefly among them, the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The continued flows of guns and gold have turned the Sudan conflict into a proxy war, complicating pathways to peaceful resolution. If the United States is to assist in bringing the war to a conclusion, Congress must play a stronger role in raising the costs for the foreign actors perpetuating the conflict and ensuring there is sufficient foreign aid to support the Sudanese people.

The UAE’s role in perpetuating the crisis

The UAE is fueling the ongoing Sudanese crisis by providing military support—including arms shipments, weapons, and other military technology—to the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti.” In March 2024, Sudan’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations accused the UAE of violating the United Nations’ arms embargo by supplying weapons, armored vehicles, and drones to the RSF. Despite the UAE’s denial, Amnesty International provided compelling proof that Emirati-made armored personnel carriers (APCs) and other military aid have entered Sudan. Furthermore, TheNew York Times cited evidence of an Emirati weapons smuggling operation under the guise of humanitarian aid. And another 2024 U.N. Security Council report detailed how the UAE established weapons channels to the RSF through its networks in Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Uganda—disguising the arms and supplies as humanitarian aid.

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Of course, the UAE is not the only actor that has supported Sudanese warring parties with weapons. Egypt has supplied weapons to the opposing force, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), though Sudanese officials allege that these transfers decreased in 2024 after the UAE promised to invest $35 billion in Egypt. Other countries—including China, Iran, Russia, Serbia, Turkey, and Yemen—have also sent large quantities of arms and ammunition to both the RSF and SAF. Despite the many countries supplying weapons to both sides of the conflict, the UAE stands out as it has been a critical hub for gold smuggling and a transshipment point for weapons and illicit goods. This additional support, which other countries do not provide at this level, makes the UAE the principal external playerdriving the supply of weapons in the conflict.

How the gold trade finances the crisis

In Sudan, the transfer of weapons is inextricably linked to trade in valuable minerals, primarily gold. The RSF controls the gold mines in South Darfur—including the Al Junaid mine—while the SAF controls gold mines in North Darfur. Together, these mines generate billions of dollars of gold using forced labor, including child labor, much of which flows out of Sudan to neighboring buyers.

While Egypt plays a role in the Sudanese gold trade, the UAE is a top destination for gold smuggled from Sudan. Official records show that the UAE imported $2.29 billion worth of Sudanese gold in 2022. However, the real numbers are likely much higher. Around 90 percent of Sudan’s gold production—roughly $13.4 billion in illicit trade—is smuggled out and transported through countries such as Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Uganda, and South Sudan before arriving in the UAE. While the Emirati government continues to claim it does not condone these activities, UAE-based entities and companies—including gold traders and refiners—actively participate in and profit from the trade without any meaningful sanction from the Emirati government.

The illicit gold trade via the UAE has made Hemedti one of the country’s wealthiest individuals, and has allowed the RSF to fund its military operations, acquire weapons, pay salaries, fund media campaigns, lobby, and buy the support of other political and armed groups. The smuggling of Sudanese gold—often through shell companies—has also allowed the RSF to bypass international sanctions.

The Wagner Group—a Russian paramilitary group that recently rebranded as Africa Corps on the continent—is also implicated in the mineral-for-weapons trade through profits gained from its ownership stakes in Sudan-based companies Meroe Gold and M-Invest. The flow of guns and gold between the Wagner group and the RSF has strengthened Russia’s influence in the region.

Recent U.S. policy on the war in Sudan

This January, the Biden administration issued a series of important policy actions to hold warring parties and their sponsors accountable for the conflict. On January 7, 2025, the administration determined that members of the RSF and allied Arab militias had committed genocide in Sudan. This declaration prompted sanctions on Hemedti, seven RSF-affiliated companies, and the owner of one of the sanctioned companies. All seven companies are based in the UAE. On January 16, 2025, the Biden administration also sanctioned Abdel Fattah al-Burhan—the leader of the SAF—and one additional company and individual affiliated with the SAF and involved in weapons procurement.

See also

Last week, Rep. Gregory Meeks (D-NY) and Rep. Sara Jacobs (D-CA) reintroduced H.R. 10268, the “U.S. Engagement in Sudanese Peace Act,” which would require sanctions on those perpetrating genocide; a report on any country that receives U.S. security assistance and is interfering with the delivery of humanitarian aid; and a comprehensive report on any U.S.-made weapons used in Sudan. This legislation would also authorize U.S. foreign assistance to agencies providing humanitarian aid to the Sudanese people—support that is desperately needed after the Trump administration’s recent decision to cut foreign assistance has taken a demonstrable toll on those suffering in Sudan. Without this aid, Sudan faces a worsening famine, which has been confirmed in at least 10 areas in the country, and the spread of cholera and other diseases that threaten millions of children.

Rep. Meeks, the top Democrat serving on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, has also blocked arms sales to the UAE due to its role in the conflict.

Recommendations for Congress

The longer the war continues, the greater the cost to the people of Sudan and to regional and global security. Congress should fully exercise its powers of authority on foreign policy matters, as granted in Article 1 of the Constitution, taking decisive actions to bring Sudan’s ongoing conflict to an end through the following steps:

  1. Block arms sales to the UAE. The United States should leverage its strategic partnership with the UAE to apply sustained pressure to end the gold and guns trade with Sudan. It is important that Congress insist that the Trump administration monitor how all external parties are providing arms support to the warring parties in Sudan. Consistent with Rep. Meeks’ hold, Congress should block arms sales to the UAE until it is able to verify that the UAE is no longer providing support to the RSF, using this leverage to prioritize honest discussions between Emirati officials and the Trump administration.
  2. Designate Sudanese gold as a “conflict mineral.” Classifying Sudanese gold as a “conflict mineral” would allow for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to create a multistep assessment and reporting process to regulate mineral trade in conflict zones. This classification would require new tracking and reporting requirements through the SEC, creating more transparency in the market and allowing U.S. government and industry to better understand how much they rely on Sudan for their minerals. Such a designation would allow for better country-sourcing and more effective supply chain traceability. A U.S. State Department advisory from 2023 warned U.S. companies about Sudanese gold from “conflict-affected areas,” a congressional designation would create more binding regulations that are necessary to ensure maximal transparency and accountability.
  3. Codify existing Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctions. To ensure their durability, Congress should codify the existing OFAC sanctions on individuals and companies profiting from the illicit arms and gold trade in Sudan. Congress should take additional steps to investigate and impose broader sanctions on other spoilers to sever the vital financial pipelines from the illicit trade of gold and weapons between Sudan and other countries.
  4. Protect foreign aid. Congress should use all tools available to oppose the president’s illegal impoundment of appropriated foreign assistance designated for Sudan and should ensure continued future funding for relief efforts until the humanitarian crisis has ended.

Conclusion

As Sudan’s civil war reaches its third year of devasting violence, continued displacement, and acute food insecurity, Congress should take these bold steps to end the war and create momentum within the international community that brings lasting resolution to the violent conflict and humanitarian crisis in Sudan.

The positions of American Progress, and our policy experts, are independent, and the findings and conclusions presented are those of American Progress alone. A full list of supporters is available here. American Progress would like to acknowledge the many generous supporters who make our work possible.

Authors

Allison McManus

Managing Director, National Security and International Policy

Anne Griffin

Former Senior Fellow

Sadhana Mandala

Research Assistant

Department

National Security and International Policy

Advancing progressive national security policies that are grounded in respect for democratic values: accountability, rule of law, and human rights.

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