The United States must push back against China’s growing and—often problematic—role in global affairs by drawing on the strength of our democratic system, offering real alternatives, and countering a model that makes people less free, drives up debt in the developing world, and undermines American interests.
Key assessments and recommendations
- The United States’ global network of alliances multiplies our influence and reduces the risk of conflict. As part of that effort, the United States must help our partners resist coercion and strengthen democratic institutions.
- Washington must offer a positive partnership that allies and partners can rely on, including when they face PRC economic coercion, cyberattacks or malicious influence efforts.
- You can’t beat something with nothing. The United States cannot just warn countries not to borrow from China; we have to offer real alternatives.
- If we want international organizations to reflect U.S. values and protect U.S. interests, Washington needs to offer real solutions to update and modernize them in a way that meets the needs of workers and the environment. We then have to invest the high-level attention, and in the people, needed to make those reforms happen.
Context: A picture of China’s growing global influence
China’s economic growth and increased assertiveness abroad under President Xi Jinping challenge U.S.—and global—security and prosperity. Beijing is expanding its global influence by courting the Global South and playing an increasingly active role in multilateral organizations. China has lent more than $1.3 trillion to developing countries since 2015, largely to finance infrastructure. In recent years, however, questionable loans and political blowback have led Beijing to scale back its ambitions. Meanwhile, the United States spends less than 0.2 percent of GDP and less than 1 percent of the federal budget on U.S. foreign assistance—far less than almost any other wealthy nation.
The role of Congress
No partner will have confidence in U.S. assurances in the face of autocracy if Congress does not sustain support for Ukraine. Less immediately, providing an alternative to PRC financing—and thus Beijing’s influence—requires continued congressional support for U.S. development entities such as the Development Finance Corporation and USAID. More generally, it is important that influential voices in Congress make the case for increased U.S. international diplomatic leadership, including a robust development finance and assistance strategy. Congress can also push to increase State Department funding to expand U.S. leadership in multilateral organizations, where China is waging a long-term strategy to change global norms and standards in line with its interests in such areas as telecommunications, law enforcement cooperation, and human rights.
The role of partners and allies
When the United States looks around, it sees partners, allies, and friends. However, for China, its neighbors are a collection of rivals, nervous hedgers, wobbly quasi-clients. The United States’ global network of alliances and partnerships is an extraordinary asset and the collective security they provide has made the world—and the United States—safer, more secure, and more prosperous. But these relationships need constant tending, particularly given efforts by isolationist Republicans to undermine them. The most urgent need is to support Ukraine. Partners, particularly in the Indo-Pacific, would see a Washington failure to help Kyiv as a sign they cannot rely on the United States and could embolden China, notably since Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin announced their “no limits partnership” on the eve of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.
China’s malign cyber operations
China is home to a cesspool of malicious cyber actors, including government agencies; hacker groups with government ties; as well as a purely criminal element that target U.S. critical infrastructure and support Chinese influence and misinformation efforts at home and abroad. The United States needs to harden its own infrastructure, work with the private sector to help it protect itself; and expand intelligence cooperation with other countries that have been targets of attacks emanating from China.
PRC economic coercion
The PRC frequently puts pressure on foreign governments with which it disagrees by restricting access to its market; manipulating supply chain vulnerabilities; and targeting private companies from the “offending” country that are operating in China. The United States must continue in earnest its work with partners to reduce supply chain dependencies on China; identify vulnerabilities; and address bottlenecks before they lead to economic disruption. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework Supply Chain Crisis Response Network demonstrates how the United States and its partners can communicate and respond faster to crises, including Chinese economic coercion.
U.S.-China competition on development assistance leadership
China has made massive infrastructure investments in the developing world, drawing on both expertise built over decades and a network of state-owned banks and construction companies. This Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has led to a host of problems: over-leveraging some countries, delivering substandard work with limited developmental impact, and nontransparent processes. Perhaps most pernicious, Beijing’s authoritarian surveillance model has found eager customers among aspiring dictators.
However, it is a mistake to dismiss the BRI as simply “debt trap diplomacy,” particularly since recipient country officials and citizens often note that Chinese money is the only game in town. With the world facing at least an $18 trillion infrastructure financing gap, warnings of Chinese commercial behavior are pointless—if not patronizing—until the United States and its partners can offer a competitive alternative. The Partnership for Global Infrastructure Investment (PGI)—which seeks to mobilize $200 billion for infrastructure investment in low- and middle-income countries by 2027—is a step in the right direction but will need sustained commitment; significantly higher funding levels; and continued senior-level attention to succeed.
China and the Global South
Beijing depicts itself as the defender of the developing world, standing up to a so-called U.S.-led club of former imperial powers. China’s leaders have convened and expanded groups of non-Western countries such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and, since October 7, worked to contrast U.S. policy toward Israel with what they characterize as China’s peaceful approach to foreign relations. Still, developing-world views of the United States have mainly improved under President Biden, despite widespread disapproval of the Netanyahu government’s military actions in Gaza and deep concerns about the possibility of a second Trump administration. Moreover, there are upper limits to China’s appeal, given—among other reasons—Beijing’s role in stymieing progress on developing world debt relief; its largely extractive approach to trade; and its track record of using economic coercion in political disputes.
The United Nations and other multilateral organizations
U.S. diplomatic resources have not kept pace with the growth of China’s ambitions to be the dominant player in multilateral organizations, particularly the U.N. For example, PRC nationals lead four of the 15 U.N. specialized agencies—including those responsible for agricultural policy, international telecommunications, and civil aviation—all of which are critical U.S. national-interest issue areas. In contrast, U.S. citizens lead three and the United States is a member of only 12 of the 15. At lower, working levels, the disparities are, if anything, even more stark. China’s delegations dwarf those of the United States and any other country at conferences and meetings that set myriad rules that guide how governments, business, scientists, and others routinely interact. The United States cannot compete if it is not in the room—and it cannot be in the room unless the State Department has funds to staff these roles and Congress presses to make it a priority.