The electoral defeat of Viktor Orbán after 16 years in power marks an unmistakable turning point for the European Union. Across the bloc, most member states will welcome his departure, hoping that a new Hungarian government under Péter Magyar will adopt a more constructive and less obstructionist approach to EU policymaking. In the near term, this is likely to translate into smoother, less combative European Council summits and a more predictable decision-making environment.
It is important, however, to be clear-eyed about what Orbán’s loss does—and does not—mean. For much of his tenure, Orbán functioned not merely as Hungary’s prime minister but as the EU’s resident spoiler: the habitual dissenter, the reliable wielder of the veto, and, at times, the convenient antagonist. His presence shaped not only outcomes—often delaying or diluting EU decisions on issues such as Ukraine funding—but also the behavior of other member states.
This raises a fundamental question: Will his absence genuinely unblock the union, or will it simply redistribute the burden of dissent among governments accustomed to operating in his shadow? Answering that question requires looking in three directions—at the smaller states that may now step into Orbán’s role, at the larger powers that indirectly benefited from his overt obstruction, and at Hungary itself and how much it is likely to change.
There is a compelling case that at least some of Orbán’s obstructionism reflected a collective action problem masked by a single, highly visible actor. Orbán relished his role as contrarian—particularly on EU enlargement, Ukraine policy, and budgetary commitments—and, in doing so, allowed other governments, some of which shared elements of his skepticism, to avoid direct confrontation. His vetoes absorbed political costs that others may have been either unwilling to incur domestically or reluctant to shoulder themselves. Without him, those underlying disagreements do not disappear; they instead become more diffuse—and potentially more destabilizing.
1. The smaller states that may step into Orbán’s role
The first place to look is at a group of what can be termed “Orbán-adjacent” states. Slovakia under Prime Minister Robert Fico, Czechia under Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, a potentially Janez Janša-led coalition in Slovenia, and Bulgaria’s new government all reflect varying degrees of ideological proximity to Orbán’s far-right, populist positions—though none replicate Hungary’s model outright. The question is whether these governments will now assume a more assertive role. Will they articulate opposition more openly on issues such as Ukraine funding, sanctions on Russia, or EU enlargement? And if so, are they prepared to bear the political and financial costs that Orbán routinely absorbed?
The answer is not straightforward. These countries differ significantly in both their institutional resilience and their exposure to EU pressure. Slovakia and Bulgaria, in particular, remain more vulnerable to financial leverage from Brussels, including the withholding of critical EU “cohesion” and COVID relief funds tied to rule-of-law concerns; the EU commission has since released some of its withheld payments to Bratislava. Orbán’s Hungary demonstrated a sustained willingness to absorb such pressure, but it is far from clear that Bratislava or Sofia would tolerate similar costs over time. Czechia and Slovenia, by contrast, may be less economically exposed, yet their more fragmented domestic political landscapes could make prolonged confrontation with EU institutions harder to maintain.
Orbán’s political demise may have closed one chapter, but it has also removed a political buffer—forcing the EU to confront its internal divisions more directly than it has in years.
Coalition fragility is a critical variable. Orbán’s durability rested in large part on his consistent parliamentary supermajority, which insulated him from internal dissent. Most of the governments that may now inherit elements of his mantle lack that level of control. Slovakia, Slovenia, and Czechia all operate within more precarious coalition frameworks, where internal divisions could constrain their ability to pursue a sustained oppositional strategy at the EU level. Bulgaria may prove a partial exception, with recent elections appearing to deliver an outright majority to former President Rumen Radev’s Progressive Bulgaria. Even there, however, the durability of that stability will depend on progress in tackling corruption and strengthening a fragile economy—neither of which can be taken for granted.
2. The larger powers that benefited from Orbán’s obstructionism
A second, and perhaps more consequential, test lies with the EU’s largest member states—particularly France and Germany. For years, Orbán’s obstructionism served as an effective distraction. Paris and Berlin could publicly support enlargement or stronger commitments to Ukraine while knowing that implementation would be slowed or diluted. This allowed them to balance competing domestic pressures without fully committing to controversial policies.
Without Orbán, that equilibrium becomes harder to sustain. Enlargement, for instance, is not universally popular within either France or Germany. Domestic political dynamics—ranging from the strength of right-wing populist movements to broader concerns about economic strain and institutional capacity—create real constraints. In France, skepticism toward expansion aligns with the electoral strength of Marine Le Pen’s National Rally; in Germany, the rise of the Alternative für Deutschland reflects similar anxieties. Orbán’s vetoes, in effect, delayed difficult decisions. His absence accelerates the timeline.
This creates a paradox: The removal of a single, highly visible blocker may expose deeper divisions within the union. Instead of one government consistently opposing consensus, the EU may now face a more fragmented and less predictable pattern of resistance. This could complicate decision-making even further, as opposition becomes less centralized and therefore harder to negotiate around.
3. Hungary itself
The third factor is Hungary itself. Magyar, despite positioning himself as a reformist figure, emerged from within Orbán’s broader Fidesz party ecosystem. His political instincts are shaped by that background, even if his rhetoric signals a break from Orbán’s style. This raises the possibility that Hungary’s shift will be more tonal than substantive, marked by improvements in democratic governance but not necessarily by a wholesale realignment on key policy issues such as EU budgetary support for Ukraine and political backing for its EU accession.
Despite these concerns, these new internal dynamics have implications beyond the union itself—particularly in the trans-Atlantic context. While Orbán’s removal may expose underlying divisions more clearly within the EU, it also brings one important benefit: It removes the one leader consistently willing to advance positions aligned openly with both the more disruptive instincts of the Trump administration and Russia’s interests. Orbán repeatedly opposed or delayed EU aid to Ukraine, resisted sanctions pressure on Moscow, cultivated close political and economic ties with the Kremlin, and framed liberal EU institutions as adversaries to national sovereignty in ways that echoed Trump administration attacks on multilateralism and democratic constraints.
Other governments may share elements of that anti-EU skepticism, but they are less likely to do so as directly or as persistently. In the short term, then, Orbán’s defeat may result in a more internally consistent European posture toward the United States, even as broader disagreements on issues such as enlargement and Ukraine support remain unresolved.
Still, new Hungarian leadership, though a necessary precondition for meaningful change, may not fully resolve the underlying disagreements within the EU. Instead, it may redistribute them—across smaller states that may now step forward, larger powers that can no longer hang back, and a Hungary whose direction remains uncertain.
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Conclusion
The real test for the European Union will begin after the initial sense of relief fades. It lies in whether member states are willing to engage more transparently with their differences, rather than allowing that dissent to be concentrated in a single actor. Orbán’s political demise may have closed one chapter, but it has also removed a political buffer—forcing the EU to confront its internal divisions more directly than it has in years.