As the president and his administration contemplate a second intervention in Iran, they have suggested a series of unrelated missions, beginning with supporting Iranian demonstrators—who were ruthlessly suppressed a month ago—to dismantling Tehran’s nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and regional proxy network. Trump has even explicitly embraced regime change in Iran, saying, “It is the best thing that could happen.” Though each goal has its own unique characteristics, what unites these discrete objectives is they will be difficult to achieve through the use of force, particularly absent the deployment of ground forces.
Most of the administration’s public focus has been on Iran’s nuclear program, with Trump’s chief negotiators—Special Envoy Steven Witkoff and son-in-law Jared Kushner—holding several rounds of talks with Iran. Given the president’s insistence that U.S. strikes last June had “obliterated” Iran’s nuclear program, this is the clearest evidence that Trump’s remarks were either mendacious or ill-informed. At the same time, there is little evidence that Iran has resumed production at the three nuclear sites targeted in June, which raises the question of why follow-on strikes are suddenly necessary now.
Air power alone did not and will not eliminate Iran’s nuclear program—nor its proxy network
Many experts, including the author, questioned Trump’s decision to join Israel’s June 2025 12-Day War against Iran, but the U.S. objectives vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclear program were at least fairly clear. Unfortunately, the outcome of the 12-Day War confirmed the argument that air power alone cannot eliminate a nuclear program that has reached Iran’s level of development. At the very least, more than 900 pounds of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity—enough for 10 or 11 bombs—remains intact, whether buried or secreted away. It is also possible that Iran retains enrichment capacity in undisclosed facilities throughout the country, potentially in mountainous locations less vulnerable to airstrikes. The U.S. and Israeli air forces already eliminated the low-hanging fruit at Natanz and Isfahan as well as the more difficult target at Fordow. What is left—especially the highly enriched uranium—is highly unlikely to be destroyed from the air. Accomplishing more would require boots on the ground, probably for an extended period. This would expose U.S. service members to greater risk, fueling the already volatile escalatory dynamics.
Iran’s ballistic missile program poses a serious regional threat to U.S. facilities and allies and partners. During the 12-Day War, Iran’s ballistic missile launchers, stockpiles, and manufacturing plants were among Israel’s primary targets. Israeli government officials claimed substantial success, particularly against launchers and manufacturing facilities. However, it now appears that Israel either misjudged the extent of the damage it inflicted or underestimated Iran’s capacity to replenish expended missiles and destroyed launchers. In hindsight, this does not come as a surprise. With the setback to its nuclear program and the degradation of its proxies, Iran’s ballistic missiles are one of the few ways the country can impose costs on its adversaries, creating a strong incentive to prioritize the development or redevelopment of this category of weapons.
Iran’s ballistic missiles are not an easy target to eliminate from the air. They are widely dispersed throughout the country, stored in bunkers that afford some degree of protection from airstrikes. Though still expensive, the lower costs of producing nonnuclear ballistic missiles as compared to a nuclear program mean Iran can develop more spare capacity to tap should other parts of the network be destroyed. Both substantially degrading Iran’s ballistic missiles and preventing expeditious reconstitution would likely require a longer air campaign than Israel conducted last year and, in some instances, the use of special forces to destroy bunkers inaccessible from the air. If the Trump administration is serious about addressing Iran’s ballistic missiles, it will need to be prepared to commit to a weeks-long—if not months-long—campaign, far exceeding the previous strikes, which took place over just one day and were launched from Missouri.
Iran’s regional proxy network, and most importantly Hezbollah, has already been severely degraded by Israeli military actions over the past two years. As with Iran’s nuclear program, however, additional progress will likely prove more difficult. Both the United States and Israel have tried unsuccessfully to deal a similar blow to Yemen’s Houthis, while many Shia militias in Iraq are integrated into the state to one degree or another, creating political dilemmas for any U.S. decision to strike. A U.S. military campaign against Iran, even one that decapitates multiple Iranian leaders, could weaken these groups further—but only indirectly and temporarily. As such, the United States, perhaps with Israeli support, would need to conduct sustained campaigns in multiple countries, expending resources and taxing U.S. forces, to register a meaningful impact.
Even leadership decapitation will not automatically translate into regime change
Finally, U.S. support for demonstrators and a regime change campaign are intertwined, residing on a spectrum rather than constituting two easily separable objectives. Whether the intent or not, protection for protests, if successful, would increase the probability of political change. Tragically, there is no practical way for the United States to offer defensive cover to demonstrators from the air. Aerial overwatch is as likely to injure or kill those protesting as the regime’s enforcers. Even if large numbers of ground forces were deployed, the wise course of action for protesters would be to seek shelter lest they get caught in the crossfire.
While the U.S. and Israeli air forces are probably capable of killing virtually any Iranian leader, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, leadership decapitation will not automatically translate into regime change. News reporting suggests that Khamenei has named several potential successors and ordered other senior and even mid-level officials to do the same. Preestablished succession procedures would minimize the disruption caused by the loss of entire leadership cadres across the Iranian regime. Moreover, Iranian leadership can likely still count on the corrupt but ideologically committed and ruthless Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which comprises at least 150,000 soldiers. Regime change is possible, but it is unlikely to unfold quickly and may necessitate the deployment of a large ground force in Iran. Most importantly, even if the United States succeeded, there is no guarantee a successor regime would be better overall or on specific issues, such as the Iranian nuclear program.
Military action is unlikely to be “limited,” raising risks and costs
In addition to the challenges in achieving the Trump administration’s varied objectives in Iran, U.S. military intervention would come with real—and potentially serious—risk. The most obvious is the physical danger to American service members and other citizens in the region. With air superiority over Iran, a U.S. campaign limited to airstrikes is unlikely to entail major casualties to pilots and crew. Should the operation eventually involve ground forces, whether special operators or infantry, there is a much higher probability that Americans in combat roles will be killed. And, with any deployment of boots on the ground, the ability of the United States to manage escalation would deteriorate markedly. It is certainly conceivable that even the introduction of a small number of ground troops could lead to a much larger force; the prolonged occupation of parts of Iran; and another quagmire on the Persian Gulf. It is worth remembering that the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, which began with an air campaign and special forces, reached over 20,000 troops within three years and ultimately exceeded 100,000.
Though the United States has overseen effective defenses against prior Iranian ballistic missile salvos, Iran still inflicted damage on its targets. During the June 2025 12-Day War, Iran launched over 550 ballistic missiles, killing at least 33, injuring over 3,000, and causing $1.5 billion in property destruction. Both U.S. and Israeli defensive munition inventories are depleted, so the two militaries may not be able to replicate the same standard of success in intercepting Iranian missiles. Of particular concern, it may be more difficult to defend against mass volleys of ballistic missiles fired against U.S. bases in the Gulf, which are considerably closer to Iran than Israel. Therefore, there would be less time to intercept these munitions. With 30,000 to 40,000 American service members and another 130,000 American citizens residing in the Gulf, the risk of American casualties cannot be discounted.
A U.S. military attack on Iran would also hurt the American people economically. Despite years of sanctions, Iran is the fourth-largest oil producer in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the third-largest natural dry gas producer. Coupled with Iran’s strategic position abutting the Strait of Hormuz—through which 20 percent of the world’s petroleum liquids flow daily—Tehran has a disproportionate impact on the global energy system. The mere threat of military action in recent weeks has already caused oil prices to spike to their highest levels since last summer.
If the United States blockaded Iran’s oil shipments, it is projected that the price of a barrel of oil would jump $10 to $12 from the $65 to $66 range it was trading the week of February 16. It is estimated that an Iranian attempt to disrupt the flow of shipments through the Strait of Hormuz, though unlikely to succeed, would send the price of oil above $90 per barrel, which would confront American consumers with gasoline prices over $3 per gallon at the pump. In the most extreme scenario, in which Iran conducts attacks on oil infrastructure in Arab Gulf countries—such as wells and export terminals—analysts believe there would be a “historic” spike in oil prices to $130 per barrel.
Even relatively limited airstrikes, which Trump and his advisors argue could increase U.S. bargaining leverage at the negotiating table, are unlikely to pay off and would court the same risks as a more ambitious military campaign. The primary rationale for such a show of force would be to convince skeptics in the Iranian regime that the United States is serious about striking Iran and they, therefore, should offer greater concessions. After last summer’s U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear program, however, Iranian leaders surely do not doubt the credibility of the president’s threats. Their negotiating posture almost certainly reflects a perception that the Trump administration is highly likely to act.
The regime is just as likely to confuse limited airstrikes for a larger military campaign aimed at toppling the Islamic Republic. In prior exchanges, Iran has appeared to calibrate its responses to Israeli and U.S. actions to deny a pretext for the latter to pursue regime change. If Iran struggles to distinguish a limited U.S. operation from one with more expansive objectives, there will be less incentive to moderate its response. And, given the ambiguity over the Trump administration’s actual goals and casual talk about regime change, it would not necessarily be irrational for Iran to view all U.S. actions through an existential lens.
In short, the Trump administration’s war with Iran promises poor returns and high risks. The administration’s impetuous and ill-conceived decisions have made a difficult situation far worse. By militarizing the dispute and threatening the regime’s existence, the Trump administration has made Iran’s leadership—like Saddam Hussein in 2002–2003—more likely to view any concession to the United States as a demonstration of its weakness to its public and internationally. The administration’s rush to military action last summer and saber rattling this year have not only failed to change the military equation but will also hamper future diplomatic efforts.
Military action will fall short where diplomacy may be more likely to succeed
To be clear, it was never going to be easy to resolve U.S. disputes with Iran, and a grand bargain is probably a bridge too far. The United States may nevertheless still be able to make progress on Iran through steady diplomacy, backed by military and nonmilitary leverage. Beginning with Iran’s nuclear program, the Trump administration should seek to secure the return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors with unfettered access to any suspected Iranian facilities in exchange for a pledge to refrain from the use of force for a specified period. This would allow the IAEA to establish a fuller picture of Iran’s nuclear assets, including its highly enriched uranium, and increase the probability any renewed nuclear activity would be detected.
In the meantime, Trump and his negotiators should continue to pursue a new agreement that would limit Iran’s nuclear program. If Iran will agree to IAEA Director-General Rafael Grossi’s proposal to confine enrichment to medical purposes or to a regional enrichment consortium, the president should not hesitate to proceed on that basis. Should Iran continue to insist on a more extensive internal enrichment capacity, the administration should shift its focus from zero enrichment to extending the duration of enrichment constraints. The difference between zero enrichment and enrichment to 3.67 percent—as under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—diminishes the longer the latter cap remains in force. In return, the United States should offer sanctions relief in sectors that, on balance, will provide the greatest benefit to the Iranian people, such as oil, shipping, and banking. The goal should be to minimize the degree to which the regime profits from the agreement.
The Trump administration can and should try to include limitations on the number and range of ballistic missiles as part of a new nuclear agreement. Iran is unlikely to agree, but the Trump administration should refrain from scuttling a deal that addresses Iran’s greatest threat to international peace and security over ballistic missiles. In this contingency, the United States should focus on the further development of a regional missile defense architecture. The political obstacles to success are formidable, but such a system would offer the best protection for U.S. facilities and partners. Additionally, the United States should communicate to Iran that it would view the importation or construction of advanced air defense systems as a red line. The introduction of such defenses could challenge the air supremacy over Iranian airspace that would facilitate in extremis military action against Iran’s nuclear program.
Regional proxies, particularly those embedded in their home countries, will remain a challenge to the United States and its partners. While sanctions relief for Iran could translate into increased support for at least some proxies, the country’s severe economic crisis and the public’s burning grievances would make substantial transfers to these groups politically costly. Ultimately, Iran’s proxies tend to gain traction in countries rife with conflict and poor governance. Absent internecine violence and instability, it is harder for these groups to justify their extralegal actions and retain local support. In this vein, the Trump administration should elevate the priority of resolving conflicts in Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen, while supporting the consolidation of independent governments in Iraq and Syria.
The Trump administration also has an obligation to support the Iranian people’s demands for a more responsive, rights-respecting, and democratic regime. This judgment may prove premature, but at this point, the Islamic Republic does not have an obvious pathway to survive the coming years—even if it receives substantial sanctions relief. The more pertinent questions may be when will it fall and what will replace it? If the United States cannot protect future Iranian protesters from the air, the administration may be able to alter the calculus of the regime’s enforcers. Given the controversial U.S. role vis-à-vis the International Criminal Court, President Trump should urge a partner country to pursue the creation of a special United Nations tribunal on Iran. This body should have the power to prosecute all Iranian security personnel responsible for violations of international law. The rank-and-file security personnel who are sent out to confront protesters have the fewest means to escape justice. Should protests resume and the police or other law enforcement opt to avoid violence, the outcome may turn out very different next time.
The United States is, once again, on the verge of a war in the Middle East with no clear rationale, poor prospects of success, and high risks. What is more, there appear to be credible diplomatic alternatives to addressing the ambiguous war aims President Trump and his administration have presented to the public. Should the Trump administration proceed with attacking Iran, this will be the very definition of a war of choice. The tragedy of such wars is that it is average Americans who pay the price, with their pocketbooks and their lives, while their voices are ignored by a runaway executive flouting Congress’ role in war. Each branch of government has a role to play in correcting this dangerous imbalance in power. Presidents of both parties must recognize that tying their own hands is sometimes in the best interests of the Republic. Congress needs to step up and aggressively defend its constitutional prerogatives, which should not fluctuate based on who occupies the Oval Office. And the Supreme Court should not play the role of the president’s lawyer, demonstrating the independence it flashed in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump. In the Iran crisis, democracy and tyranny have joined war and peace on the foreign policy agenda.