As the U.N. General Assembly convenes on its 80th anniversary, the United States finds itself at a crossroads. For decades, the United States has cultivated a dense network of partners that share its values and are willing to work together to uphold global rules. At the heart of this network are European allies. China cannot replicate this advantage, but the Trump administration has systematically undermined it.
The irony is stark. Few American policymakers, regardless of party affiliation, dispute that competition with China should be a priority. From economic power to technological leadership and military balance, the stakes are clear. President Donald Trump himself filled his administration with officials who branded themselves “China hawks” who seek to “win” the competition. Yet in practice, the Trump administration has chosen to weaken the very partnerships that would give the United States leverage in this competition. The result is a more isolated America and a valuable strategic asset squandered in the name of “America First.”
Shared challenges, squandered alignment
Europe and the United States confront many of the same challenges from Beijing. Chinese industrial overcapacity continues to distort global markets. Dependencies in critical supply chains—from rare earths to clean-energy technologies—pose risks on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Nonmarket trade practices, intellectual property theft, and forced technology transfers disadvantage American and European firms alike. Concerns over cyberthreats and espionage, threats to freedom of navigation, and potential conflict in the Taiwan Strait also touch both.
These are shared problems. They are precisely the issues where Washington and Brussels should be working in lockstep. Yet instead of nurturing this natural alignment, the Trump administration has relentlessly driven wedges into the transatlantic relationship, eroding trust and making coordination nearly impossible.
The Trump administration’s ‘America First’ alliance-destroying toolkit
The Trump administration’s tariff blitz, kicked off by the April “Liberation Day” order applying a baseline 10 percent duty on virtually all imports, has treated the European Union (EU) like any other target, not a longtime ally: President Trump even threatened 35 percent tariffs on the EU—a rate higher than those imposed on China under his current term. Through trade negotiations, he has pressed Europe to weaken its supply-chain due-diligence law and coerced the EU to include language in the August U.S.-EU trade negotiations framework deal designed to undercut the EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism, which President Trump brands as green protectionism. Even after striking this lopsided trade deal, the Trump administration has kept up the coercive pressure on Europe to fall in line, including considering sanctions on European officials who enforce the Digital Services Act, which the Trump administration believes silences conservatives. The Trump administration repeatedly attempts to interfere with other countries’ enforcement of their own laws, purely because the administration doesn’t like them. Instead of joining together in a united front, Washington and Brussels are locked in a trade war of Washington’s own making—one that leaves American consumers paying higher prices and European trust in the United States in tatters.
But tariffs are only one tool in the Trump administration’s toolkit. In February 2025, President Trump humiliated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on the international stage and flip-flopped on American support for Kyiv. Vice President JD Vance used the high-profile Munich Security Conference not to reaffirm partnership, but to berate European allies. The Trump administration’s bizarre bid to buy or annex Greenland underscores the dismissive, transactional way the administration approaches European partners. The administration has also treated NATO’s collective defense as a bargaining chip, threatening to withdraw commitment to defend European allies if they do not pay more for their defense and repeatedly threatening to withdraw troops and military aid from Europe, which would leave Europe more vulnerable to Russian aggression. President Trump told Europe that the United States is ending its participation in joint efforts to combat disinformation and malign foreign influence, further cutting crucial transatlantic ties that keep both sides safer. Finally, the Trump administration’s unpredictability creates confusion and leaves allies unclear on the long-term direction of U.S. policy—toward both them and China. According to a February 2025 YouGov poll, 73 percent of Europeans view President Trump as a threat to peace and security in Europe—only 9 percentage points below Russian President Vladimir Putin—and more than half of Europeans consider President Trump to be an enemy of Europe.
Why this matters: Lost leverage, increased Chinese influence
The cost of the Trump administration’s approach is not abstract. Trust is the currency of alliances, and the Trump administration has spent it recklessly. Without trust, coordination becomes nearly impossible. A divided United States and Europe cannot effectively push back against Chinese overcapacity, safeguard critical technologies, or guard against cyberthreats. Beijing understands this dynamic well. Its “charm offensive” in Europe is not about convincing European leaders that China is a benevolent partner—most EU stakeholders remain skeptical. It is about exploiting the vacuum left by America’s unreliability. When Washington punishes Brussels, China quietly benefits. The EU-China summit on July 24, 2025, may have yielded few breakthroughs, but it nevertheless underscored how Beijing sees opportunity in European frustration with the United States.
When Washington punishes Brussels, China quietly benefits.
Europe, for its part, is hedging. Given China’s lead in green technologies and the increasing urgency of the climate crisis, Europe is highly dependent on Chinese solar panels, and, despite tariffs, Chinese electric vehicles are increasingly present in the EU market. Partnerships are not limited to these sectors: Spain has adopted Huawei technology for its telecom infrastructure, and Germany and Britain plan to adopt Chinese autonomous driving technology. Europe’s adoption and integration of Chinese infrastructure will affect future U.S.-EU partnership and coordination in these sectors and make it difficult to reduce common dependencies on China that threaten national or economic security.
However, Europe is not pivoting decisively toward Beijing; rather, it is diversifying its relationships. Commitments to pursue stronger trade ties with other U.S. allies such as South Korea, Mexico, Indonesia, and Canada reflect a Europe that is building options beyond Washington. A deal in the works with the South American trading bloc Mercosur would likely be unsuccessful without the Trump administration’s alienation and unpredictability. It is not in America’s interest to be cut out. Every new deal without Washington means less coordination, weaker intelligence and defense ties, and fewer export opportunities for American manufacturers and farmers.
Every new deal without Washington means less coordination, weaker intelligence and defense ties, and fewer export opportunities for American manufacturers and farmers.
Europeans have even taken it upon themselves to boycott U.S. goods—a significant consequence of the Trump administration’s assault on the transatlantic alliance. Boycotting calls are gaining traction globally in large markets such as India and with other U.S. allies such as Canada. In some European countries, more than half of consumers say they will avoid American products. European tourism to the United States has plummeted, further exacerbated by tighter border rules and increasing fees to enter the United States. It may not matter how many countries agree to purchase U.S. goods or reduce trade barriers as a concession to the Trump administration if consumers themselves refuse to purchase American goods. Facing a recession, Europe is even less likely to fulfill its hefty purchase commitments. The Trump administration’s actions are causing real economic pain as American businesses and manufacturers stand to lose billions of dollars and millions of jobs as demand free-falls.
China, meanwhile, has wasted no time filling the space left by American inconsistency. In only the first half of 2025, its Belt and Road Initiative saw construction contracts and investment exceed $123 billion, surpassing all of 2024’s totals in just six months—commercial opportunities that could have gone to U.S. firms. The United States is also losing international influence: China’s leadership roles in the organizations BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) provide alternative platforms for countries dissatisfied with Washington. The SCO summit at the end of August 2025 saw dozens of leaders, notably Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Putin, gather for the economic and security conference in a symbolic display of anti-Western and anti-American alignment. At the summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the fourth initiative in a series that lays out China’s vision for global order, presenting China as a paragon for multilateralism and stability. For the first time in seven years, Modi traveled to China to thaw relations with Xi—after the Trump administration increased tariffs on India to 50 percent as a punishment for buying Russian oil. Developing countries such as Malaysia and Laos continue to express interest in joining BRICS, which already has 10 member states and 10 partner countries, representing 56 percent of the global population and 44 percent of global GDP. Turkey, a European NATO member, showed renewed interest in joining BRICS at the July summit in Brazil. In early September, the BRICS nations held a virtual meeting to voice concerns over the Trump administration’s tariffs, highlighting how its unilateral approach is driving shifts in global alliances away from and against the United States.
The United States is left increasingly isolated as the Trump administration pushes allies away and others toward Beijing. This fracture feeds directly into Beijing’s narratives that liberal democracy is failing, that American leadership is unreliable, and that China offers a steadier hand. Countries are increasingly tempted by China’s alternative groupings that seek to reform the international order in its vision, which constitutes a threat to American values and interests.
It may already be too late
The tragedy of this moment is that the United States still has, in principle, the advantage: China has no alliance network and few real friends. But the Trump administration has undermined this advantage to such a degree that Europe no longer trusts Washington, and trust once lost is not easily rebuilt. The truth is stark: If America’s objective is to compete confidently with China, then the Trump administration’s actions have made that task far harder. In humiliating allies, in turning Europe from partner to target, and in treating transatlantic trust as expendable, the administration has undercut a key strategic advantage. The United States today confronts China with less leverage, fewer friends, and a fractured front. That is not “putting America First.” It is leaving America weaker, poorer, and more isolated.