Gen Z Men at Work: 10 Facts About Young Men’s Employment Trends

From January 2025 to July 2025, young men’s unemployment grew while their labor force participation declined and stagnated. But how do Gen Z men’s labor market experiences compare with those of prior generations? Original Center for American Progress analysis using nearly 50 years of monthly Current Population Survey (CPS) data from January 1976 to June 2025—to examine Baby Boomers’ early labor market experiences¹—and the October CPS educational supplement helps explain labor market dynamics for men today.

The facts presented in this issue brief show that young men’s unemployment is rising but still below historical nonrecessionary averages and that of prior generations. Young men’s labor force participation rates have fallen, but a portion of that shift may be due to more young men treating college as a full-time commitment; in addition, though still small, young men’s enrollment in less traditional postsecondary pathways, such as vocational programs, increased in the latest data. Even so, more exploration of the paths of young men who are not in education, employment, or training is necessary. Lastly, the analysis found that men still outperform women across most labor market measures, regardless of age, and policies aimed at broadly addressing labor force participation should consider the fact that the margins for increased growth among men may be limited as compared with women, given that male nonparticipation is still relatively low and driven by disability in post-educational years.

While further research is required to ascertain the causal mechanisms for these changes, the trends paint a nuanced picture of how young men are navigating the economy today.

Men under age 25, primarily teens, have experienced an uptick in unemployment over the past year.² Yet unemployment for men of “prime working age” (25 to 54) has remained relatively flat in recent months but did see an increase in July. Some have speculated that the reason for this trend is related to the majors and occupations of post-college-age men.³ This is a reasonable assumption given that women accounted for 52 percent of total nonfarm job growth from July 2024 to July 2025, and they accounted for 72 percent of growth in sectors predicted to have some of the most new jobs, such as “private education and health services.”⁴ Additionally, in the past year, the labor market has tightened and slowed to below pre-pandemic levels, and perhaps young men are feeling that to a greater extent.⁵ Even so, young men have relatively low unemployment rates (10.6 percent in July) compared with the nonrecessionary historical average of 12.7 percent. (see Figure 1)

Population aging has been the primary driver of the decline in labor force participation, a trend that is expected to continue as the Baby Boomer generation ages into retirement. Across most groups of men, labor force participation has been on the decline for some time, whereas women’s labor force participation has climbed since major legal changes in the 1960s and 1970s allowed them to participate in the labor force and have greater control over their bodies and personal finances.⁶

Recent research estimates that after controlling for population aging, there is little to no difference in men’s propensity to participate in the labor market in 2025 compared with before the pandemic, meaning the bulk of the decline in recent years has been driven by aging.⁷ Younger women of prime working age (25 to 54), however, have seen dramatic increases even after population adjustment.⁸

Another analysis examining changing participation rates from 2000 to 2022—controlling for both age, education, and gender—found that declines in propensity to participate were dominated by those without a college degree under age 54.⁹ Young men ages 16 to 24 with less than a bachelor’s degree contributed the most substantially to the overall declines in labor force participation.¹⁰

Unemployment, though up in recent months for young men, is still far lower for Gen Z than it was for prior generations at similar ages. Across nearly every group considered in CAP’s analysis, unemployment was higher for men than for women in the typical post-college years (ages 22 to 27). Gaps between men and women are marginal in the younger age groups, except for Millennials. Millennial men experienced markedly higher unemployment then Millennial women during their early working years. This is largely attributable to the gender dynamics of the Great Recession, where men lost more jobs and took significantly longer to recover than women.¹¹

Another interesting finding from CAP’s analysis (though not pictured in Figure 3) is that Gen Z men’s employment as a percentage of their overall population was slightly higher than that of Millennials at similar ages in their post-college years—another positive economic outcome even if Gen Z men slightly lag behind their Gen X and Baby Boomer counterparts. This is puzzling, as it seems to indicate that young men are more likely to find job opportunities than similarly aged past cohorts, but they are still participating in the labor force at lower rates.

The labor force participation of young men has declined, but examining how it compares with that of earlier cohorts of the same age offers some clues as to how male attachment to the labor market has evolved over the decades. Younger cohorts have always had lower participation until about age 25, when they hit “prime age.” For Gen Z and Millennial men, entry into the labor market has trailed Gen X and Baby Boomers, but women have raced beyond the labor force participation of their predecessors once they hit the critical age marker of 25. Even so, women’s labor force participation still falls far behind that of men. The extent to which Gen Z men’s labor force participation will lag behind that of earlier generations remains to be seen, but the reasons for their nonparticipation are important, helping determine if they are simply in school or facing other obstacles that may prevent or delay their labor market entry. (see Figure 6)

Similarly educated Gen Z and Millennial men’s labor force participation has tracked closely as they age. However, both groups’ labor participation has paled in comparison to that of Gen X and Baby Boomers at similar ages. Strikingly, Gen Z men with bachelor’s degrees have near-equivalent or lower participation rates than noncollege Gen X and Baby Boomer men. (see Figure 5) Gen Z women, however, surpass their mothers and grandmothers across both education groups by the time they reach their late 20s, with a clear delineation between the college- and noncollege-educated cohorts. Some factors influencing the drastic differences across gender may include the decline in manufacturing and goods-producing sectors and a shift toward service provision, high growth in care-providing occupations that have historically been dominated by women, declining unionization rates, and automation and trade policy.¹²

In 1994, the CPS began asking more detailed questions about reasons for nonparticipation in the labor market. The reasons of men in their post-college years are primarily disability related, while women’s reasons are primarily related to caregiving responsibilities. Young women have gradually become less likely to report caregiving as a primary reason, likely due to their increased school enrollment (see Figure 7) and trends in women delaying the birth of their first child later into their 20s and 30s.¹³ The overall rise in disability over time is likely attributable to improvements in medical diagnostics, an aging population wherein men have lower life expectancies, and long COVID. In addition, men in particular are more likely to work in environments prone to potentially disabling workplace injury.¹⁴

Women and men ages 18 to 25 are both more likely to go to college than prior generations. Beginning in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a reversal in a decades-long trend began to appear: Women’s college enrollment shares were growing faster than those of men, eventually surpassing them. Some of this is attributable to the landmark Title IX law passed in 1972, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex in education.¹⁵ Additionally, men are more likely than women to report not having attended college because they preferred not to and didn’t need to do so to enter their chosen field, whereas women are more likely to report financial and family considerations as barriers.¹⁶

The COVID-19 recession uniquely affected college enrollment trends, resulting in an enrollment drop-off. This is unlike other recessions, such as the Great Recession, in which a weak labor market led to a jump in college enrollment. CAP analysis of the same CPS data finds that a rising share of students are doing school full time and pursuing four-year degrees as opposed to two-year options over the same period. These findings indicate that students are enrolled for more years because lower shares of students opt into two-year programs, and with more students enrolled full time in school, the average student now spends more hours per week in class. These trends may help explain some of the labor market trade-offs for this younger cohort.

Combining the college enrollment data with labor market statistics in Figure 8, the trend of students taking on school as their “full-time job” becomes more apparent. Members of Generation X were the most likely to work while enrolled in college, but that trajectory has trended downward for Millennials and Gen Z. As a growing majority of students pursue four-year degrees and are enrolled full time, fewer students—particularly male students—have decided to seek out jobs while in school. This has large labor market implications, given that about 1 in 3 men ages 18 to 25 are currently in school, compared with roughly 1 in 5 men in earlier cohorts. The Gen Z men that do seek out employment while in college are notably more likely to find a job than generations past.

Postsecondary vocational school enrollment for 18- to 25-year-olds has remained consistently low since data collection began in 1987. Postsecondary technical school enrollment trends were already on a slight decline leading up to the late 1980s and early 1990s, with women representing a greater share of enrollees.¹⁷ Since then, women and men have tracked more closely, with relatively flat enrollment. However, young men saw a large uptick in their postsecondary technical school enrollment rate, amounting to a 38 percent change from 2022 to 2023—the latest year for which data are available. (see Figure 9) This growth from 3.2 percent to 4.4 percent for all 18- to 25-year-old men is the highest share of male enrollment since data collection began. Even so, one year of data is not sufficient to determine if this is a trend or a temporary result of COVID-19, during which students were more likely to delay postsecondary education, possibly leading them to pursue other options.¹⁸

Registered apprenticeships have grown more sluggishly in recent years compared with the mid-2010s. During COVID-19, hands-on apprenticeships had to be adjusted to meet health recommendations, and the pace of growth remained flat for men until fiscal year 2022. This slower but still apparent growth in registered apprenticeships corresponded with the Biden administration’s workforce investments via the American Rescue Plan Act and slowed again when those grants reached their obligation deadline in late 2024.¹⁹ Even though men continue to account for a vast majority of registered apprentices, allowing them to learn on the job while earning an average of more than $20 per hour in FY 2025, this career pathway represents a small share of working-age adults. Indeed, registered apprentices accounted for about 0.3 percent of the population ages 15 to 64 in FY 2021.²⁰

This research offers some paths for further investigation when it comes to young men. First, educational policy that helps young men pursue either college or a skilled trade would help strengthen their position in the labor market. Vocational schooling and registered apprenticeships should be a part of that solution; however, this will not look like the training of generations past and should better align men with the high-growth jobs of the future.²¹ These should include jobs in the health care industry that have historically been dominated by women and are projected to grow rapidly over the next decade. Other areas that are ripe for research and policy solutions include topics related to disability, a key factor driving labor force nonparticipation among men beyond college age. Policymakers could also explore ways to grow the pool of potential participants overall by fixing problems with workforce reentry from the carceral system, in which men are overrepresented.²² Lastly, and in the same vein, immigration reform could expand the number of potential workers in the U.S. economy.²³

Participation in the labor market and postsecondary training and education are important avenues to increase economic stability among young people. Further research, analysis, and policy development can help ensure that all young people are able to find their footing in the economy.

The authors would like to thank Natalie Baker for her contributions to this issue brief; Casey Doherty, Lily Roberts, Sara Partridge, and Jared Bass for their review; Kennedy Andara and Aurelia Glass for providing research assistance; Bill Rapp and Anh Nguyen for building the visualizations; and Steve Bonitatibus, Beatrice Aronson, and Meghan Miller for their editorial support.