Does a Politically Directed Department of Justice Merit the Presumption of Regularity?

In the first six months of the second Trump administration, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) has significantly eroded the exemplary reputation it has enjoyed in the federal courts for generations. Beyond losing the goodwill of the courts, the DOJ’s presumption of regularity—the standard assumption that the government has followed normal procedures and is being truthful with the courts—is now frequently called into question by the courts themselves, though not always using those specific words. The landscape has shifted from one where judges generally treated the assertions DOJ lawyers offered as, if not correct, at least made in good faith, to one where “judges openly doubt [the] government” because DOJ prosecutors are misleading them and the government is defying their orders.¹

This shift was, perhaps, to be expected in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. U.S.—the presidential immunity case—which explicitly permitted the president to direct DOJ prosecutions.² That case effectively destroyed the apolitical independence deliberately institutionalized at DOJ in response to President Richard Nixon’s attempt to strongarm the department into doing his dirty work and end investigations of his conduct during the Watergate scandal.³

Federal judges have begun to take notice of the DOJ’s lack of candor and improper actions.  Some have ordered additional discovery, some have refused to grant the DOJ’s requests for dismissals without prejudice, and some have issued show cause orders as to why contempt proceedings should not commence.⁴ So far, judicial skepticism of the DOJ is occurring on a case-by-case basis, and the majority of judges still accept the DOJ’s assertions at face value. The question that federal judges should consider in all cases involving the DOJ, in light of mounting evidence of leadership-driven improprieties, is whether a no-longer-independent DOJ merits the presumption of regularity in any case.

Courts have been able to rely on the candor and good-faith actions of DOJ attorneys, in part, due to their independence from political pressure and generally impeccable ethical standards. The first in the DOJ’s list of core values is: “Independence and Impartiality. We work each day to earn the public’s trust by following the facts and the law wherever they may lead, without prejudice or improper influence.”⁵ However, following Trump v. U.S. and under U.S. Attorney General (AG) Pam Bondi, even the appearance of the DOJ’s independence from political pressure has been erased.⁶

During AG Bondi’s short tenure, the DOJ has purged career officials, especially those who were involved in investigations related to then former-President Trump.⁷ AG Bondi also fired the DOJ’s top career ethics official, responsible for advising the entire department about conflicts of interest, recusals, and financial disclosures.⁸ Career attorneys who refuse to do the DOJ leadership’s political bidding have been fired or have resigned in protest rather than do things they believed were not legally justifiable.⁹ Furthermore, despite Trump administration assertions that “partisanship” and “weaponization” of the DOJ “will be gone,” the opposite appears to be true. In fact, the DOJ has created the aptly named “Weaponization Working Group,” headed by Ed Martin, who declared when serving as acting U.S. attorney for the District of Columbia that DOJ attorneys are “President Trump’s (sic) lawyers.”¹⁰

In that vein, the DOJ has dropped investigations and prosecutions of the president’s allies and those individuals who could benefit the Trump administration, such as New York City Mayor Eric Adams, Trump’s codefendants in the classified documents case, and even Rep. Andy Ogles (R-TN), who was facing campaign finance allegations.¹¹ Conversely, the DOJ has initiated investigations or received prosecution referrals from other agencies against Trump’s perceived enemies—many of whom he has publicly asserted should be investigated or prosecuted—including Sen. Adam Schiff (D-CA), former FBI Director James Comey, former CIA Director John Brennan,¹² New York Attorney General Letitia James, and Federal Reserve Board Governor Lisa Cook.¹³ The prosecution referrals against Sen. Schiff, Attorney General James, and Cook stem from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and allege mortgage fraud related to primary residence loan rates. Conversely, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton (R), a staunch Trump ally, reportedly owns three homes in Austin, Texas, all of which he has claimed as a primary residence for mortgage purposes, yet there appears to be no investigation into his conduct.¹⁴ It is further reported that three members of Trump’s cabinet have mortgages on more than one property they report as their primary residence—the same issue being asserted against Trump’s political opponents.¹⁵ Indeed, the father of the FHFA Director Bill Pulte has claimed to have primary residences in both Michigan and Florida at the same time, which is similar to the basis for the criminal referral made against Cook.¹⁶

In an apparent symptom of the rapid politicization of the DOJ, political appointees—rather than career attorneys—are increasingly submitting briefs before the courts.¹⁷ This suggests that career attorneys may be refusing to file those briefs, despite AG Bondi’s announcement that attorneys who decline to sign briefs “or otherwise delay or impede the Department’s mission will be subject to discipline and potential termination.”¹⁸ That policy was enforced against former DOJ attorney Erez Reuveni, who was fired after admitting before a federal judge that an immigrant had been deported in error.¹⁹ After his firing, Reuveni filed a whistleblower complaint asserting that, among other things, then-Deputy Attorney General Emil Bove—who was President Trump’s criminal defense attorney and whom Trump has now placed on the U.S Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit—told DOJ attorneys that they “may need to consider telling judges ‘f[***] you’ and ignore possible court orders.”²⁰

There is a growing body of evidence of the DOJ’s irregular conduct. Courts will always be required to consider the import of such evidence on a case-by-case basis. Still, litigants should present, and courts should take notice of, the litany of irregularities occurring before courts nationwide and the lack of political independence now inherent at the DOJ.

During a recent discussion panel regarding the loss of DOJ independence, scholars and court watchers noted that judges may “come to believe that they are—and this is an amazing fact—the first independent lawyer to review the government’s action or policy who is actually allowed to raise legal questions. No presumption of regularity or good faith can possibly attach when that is a judge’s belief. Indeed, when a judge believes that, a litigant needs to expect the closest of close look legal review.”²¹ (emphasis in the original)

The presumption of regularity—or simply, the presumption—is not a formal rule of evidence or procedure. It is a judicially created working doctrine founded upon separation of powers principles, intergovernmental comity, and respect for the constitutional oath that executive officers take.²² Courts and scholars have explained the presumption as the “notion that government officials tell the truth about why [they have] taken specific actions; have properly discharged their official duties; have acted with proper motives; and are generally truthful, ethical, and professional.”²³ As one judge on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals explained in his dissent, the courts’ overarching concern is reliability. The presumption is afforded to “actions taken or documents produced within a process that is generally reliable because it is . . . transparent, accessible, and often familiar.”²⁴

In the early days of the republic, the courts applied the presumption not just to governmental actors, but also to private citizens and corporations.²⁵ However, the presumption was applied narrowly, using it to “fill minor evidentiary gaps, usually relating to procedural or formal technicalities.”²⁶ It was not originally used to prevent courts from questioning or reviewing the government’s actions, but rather to serve a “modest role.”²⁷

Over time, application of the presumption has expanded, and the burden to rebut it has remained relatively elastic, as neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has clearly articulated the presumption’s parameters. Federal courts have considered as many as 14 variations of the presumption, which the Supreme Court has not reconciled.²⁸ For example, some courts have interpreted the presumption of regularity to mean only a presumption that a public official followed all of the required procedures, as opposed to a presumption of good faith, meaning a presumption that a public official acted with lawful motivation.²⁹ Other courts have not distinguished between regularity of conduct and regularity of intent. Both procedural and motivational regularity can be tied to the reasons underpinning the presumption, and litigants in particular cases may have cause to challenge either or both.

The presumption can be invoked by the government on its behalf or by private entities when relying upon government records or actions. Essentially, courts start by presuming executive branch officers and employees have performed their duties lawfully and consistently, but that presumption, like any presumption, can be overcome by evidence to the contrary.

What is required to rebut the presumption of regularity has been the subject of much discussion. In United States v. Chemical Foundation, the Supreme Court stated that the presumption of regularity applies absent “clear evidence” to the contrary.³⁰ Some courts have held that “clear evidence” is akin to “clear and convincing evidence.”³¹ Thus, the burden of overcoming the presumptions seems to reside somewhere in the broad space between minor discrepancies and clear and convincing evidence.

In Tecom, Inc. v. United States, the Court of Federal Claims reasoned that the “clear evidence” language in Chemical Foundation should not be interpreted to require an elevated level of proof.³² The Tecom court pointed out that before Chemical Foundation, “the burden placed on the party seeking to rebut the presumption was nothing special,” and the Supreme Court did not express an intent to impose a heightened standard in Chemical Foundation. Indeed, this understanding may be bolstered by the Supreme Court’s increasing skepticism regarding executive agency decision-making in a number of contexts.³³ Importantly, moreover, after a review of both pre- and post-Chemical Foundation decisions, the Tecom court suggested that even the “clear evidence” standard may be appropriate only “when the good faith of certain very official acts of the legislative (such as lawmaking) or executive (such as prosecuting or rule-making) branch is called into question.” In other words, in cases involving questions of procedural regularity, under Tecom, the standard may be lower than “clear evidence.”

Whatever the “clear evidence” burden is deemed to mean in a given case, the party challenging the presumption may require special discovery into the government’s motives and processes, which is difficult to obtain because of the presumption. The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Armstrong offers guidance for challengers seeking discovery in such circumstances.³⁴ The respondents in Armstrong moved for discovery or dismissal of the indictments against them, alleging they were prosecuted because they were Black. Citing Chemical Foundation, the court held that “[i]n order to dispel the presumption that a prosecutor has not violated equal protection, a criminal defendant must present ‘clear evidence’ to the contrary.”³⁵ Although the court ultimately did not find the presumption was rebutted, it did discuss the showing required to obtain discovery in support of the respondents’ effort to rebut the presumption, describing that threshold as “a credible showing” or “some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements of the claim.” Thus, under Armstrong, even if a challenger is required to present clear evidence to ultimately overcome the presumption of regularity normally afforded the DOJ, only “some evidence” or a “credible showing” should suffice for the court to authorize discovery in support of a challenge to the presumption.

Courts have held that the presumption should not be afforded when the government’s rationale for its decision was pretextual,³⁶ or when there is evidence of an “actual irregularity in the President’s factfinding process or activity.”³⁷ In a series of recent cases, judges have, in effect, questioned the presumption of regularity without referring to it by name, in light of significant evidence that the government was misleading the courts or otherwise acting improperly. The following are a few of the 57 recent cases in which the government has appeared to defy or act improperly before the courts.³⁸

U.S. v. Adams

In U.S. v. Adams, then-Acting Deputy Attorney General Emil Bove sought to dismiss several federal felony charges against New York City Mayor Eric Adams not because of a lack of evidence or concerns about the government’s ability to obtain a conviction, but because continuing the prosecution would prevent Mayor Adams from aiding “federal immigration initiatives and policies.”³⁹ In fact, the acting U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, Danielle Sassoon, resigned over the decision, and the line prosecutors handling the case were removed (and subsequently resigned), because they could not in good conscience file the dismissal. In a letter to AG Bondi, Sasson stated that she could not defend the decision in good faith after attending a meeting between Bove and Adams’ attorneys, who “repeatedly urged what amounted to a quid pro quo, indicating that Adams would be in a position to assist with the DOJ’s enforcement priorities only if the case was dismissed.”⁴⁰ Bove also reportedly demanded that the meeting notes be collected and taken away from Sassoon’s staff. The career prosecutor handling the case, who resigned rather than file the motion to dismiss, similarly complained to top DOJ officials that the “justification for the motion … was so weak as to be pretextual.”⁴¹

Ultimately, DOJ political appointees appeared at the hearing, during which the court observed, “Everything here smacks of a bargain: dismissal of the Indictment in exchange for immigration policy concessions.” Rejecting the government’s request for a dismissal without prejudice, the court dismissed the case with prejudice, warning:

If it is true that DOJ sought to extract a public official’s cooperation with the administration’s agenda in exchange for dropping a prosecution, that would be ‘clearly contrary to the public interest’ and a grave betrayal of the public trust, because it would violate the norms against using prosecutorial power for political ends.⁴²

Abrego Garcia v. Noem

The well-publicized Abrego Garcia v. Noem case involved Kilmar Abrego Garcia’s wrongful deported to the notorious CECOT prison in El Salvador. The DOJ acted irregularly throughout the case, starting with firing Erez Reuveni, the deputy attorney general for the Office of Immigration Litigation assigned to defend the case, for admitting that Abrego Garcia was mistakenly deported to CECOT.⁴³ Reuveni later reported in a whistleblower complaint that Deputy AG Emil Bove stated in a meeting with DOJ attorneys “that it might become necessary to tell a court ‘f[***] you’ and ignore court orders.”⁴⁴ After Reuveni’s removal, Drew Ensign, a Trump political appointee, took over the case. In subsequent proceedings, the court grew increasingly frustrated with the prosecution, stating on the record and in several orders that the DOJ was acting in bad faith. For example, in just one order, the court found:

• The government engaged in “continued mischaracterization” of the Supreme Court’s order.
• The “[d]efendant’s objection reflects a willful and bad faith refusal to comply with discovery obligations.”
• Regarding privilege assertions, an offer to meet and confer “was not made in good faith.”
• With regard to discovery requests related to individuals with knowledge related to the order or authorization for the removal of Abrego Garcia to El Salvador, and his confinement in CECOT, the government’s inadequate response “reflects a deliberate evasion of their fundamental discovery obligations”; they have “failed to respond in good faith, and their refusal to do so must be viewed as willful and intentional noncompliance.”⁴⁵

Though Abrego Garcia has been returned to the United States, the court has refused the government’s efforts to dismiss his deportation challenge, concerned that the government will again remove Abrego Garcia without providing constitutionally required due process. Indeed, the court explicitly stated that the DOJ will no longer be afforded the presumption of regularity, declaring at a recent hearing,⁴⁶ “You have taken the presumption of regularity and you’ve destroyed it in my view.” Indeed, the government threatened to deport Abrego Garcia to Uganda, a country with which he has no ties, has never visited, and which has a Level Three Travel Advisory issued by the U.S. Department of State due to risks of crime and terrorism, as well as the nation of Eswatini (formerly Swaziland).⁴⁷

National Treasury Employees Union v. Vought

In National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) v. Vought, employees of the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau sought to prevent the wholesale dismantling of the agency and the firing of more than 1,400 employees by the Trump administration.⁴⁸ In that case also, the court found that the government and the DOJ were neither being truthful with the court nor acting in good faith. In the temporary restraining order (TRO) prohibiting mass firings, the court found that “omissions from the [government’s] first declaration rendered it to be highly misleading, if not intentionally false,” and that the government was being “so disingenuous that the Court is left with little confidence that the defense can be trusted to tell the truth about anything.”⁴⁹ (emphasis added)

After the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals partially stayed the TRO, the government resumed the mass firings, prompting the lower court to order additional hearings to determine whether the government was violating its order. Again, the court found that the government was not acting in good faith, stating, “[T]here is reason to believe that the defendants simply spent the days immediately following the Circuit’s relaxation of the Order dressing their RIF in new clothes, and that they are thumbing their nose at both this Court and the Court of Appeals.” (emphasis added)

Although the district court did not explicitly mention the presumption of regularity, considering the court’s repeated findings that the government acted in bad faith, it appears the government has lost the benefit of the presumption in that case also.

U.S. v. Arevalo-Chavez

In U.S. v. Arevalo-Chavez, the DOJ sought to dismiss without prejudice serious charges—including narco-terrorism—against Vladimir Antonio Arevalo-Chavez, an alleged senior leader of the El Salvadoran gang MS-13.⁵⁰  The government filed the notice of dismissal under seal, intending to keep it secret until Arevalo-Chavez was returned to El Salvador. Arevalo-Chavez’s opposition to the government’s motion resulted in a hearing, after which the government’s motion was unsealed.

In its unsealing order, the court explained that the “[g]overnment appears to be making inconsistent representations and the public has the right to know about this motion before its resolution.”⁵¹ The court highlighted evidence that El Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele requested the return of specific senior MS-13 leaders and promised to “provide [the U.S.] government a 50% discount for Year 2” of the imprisonment of any individuals the United States removes to the CECOT prison.⁵²

Public safety may be a secondary impetus for the return of MS-13 gang leaders to El Salvador. It is broadly reported that MS-13 entered into political deals with El Salvadoran government officials to trade a reduction in murders and violent crime for benefits directly aiding MS-13 members within the country and in their jails.⁵³ Arevalo-Chavez may publicly expose information that could damage President Bukele. Indeed, the first MS-13 leader against whom the Trump administration dropped charges and removed to El Salvador’s torturous CECOT prison, Cesar Lopez-Larios, reportedly knew about the arrangement and could have testified about such deals between the gang and President Bukele’s government.⁵⁴ Instead of a move to protect the American people, the dismissal rather appears to serve as a political boon to President Bukele by silencing a potential witness against him and by providing a small financial discount (around $3 million) to the United States.⁵⁵

If the government’s motion is granted, this will be the second time the Trump DOJ has dropped charges against the leader of a gang that Trump himself designated as a foreign terrorist organization. Though the extradition of criminals to their home countries is certainly not unheard of, rarely does the United States⁵⁶ do so when the individual has been indicted for narco-terrorism or is likely to be tortured upon return, in derogation of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of Punishment, to which the United States is a signatory.⁵⁷ By sending someone abroad to be tortured, the United States is contravening principles of international justice it has upheld for decades.

The court has yet to grant the dismissal, and though it has not directly referenced the presumption of regularity, that appears to be top of mind. Rather than immediately dismiss the charges against Arevalo-Chavez, the court has ordered additional briefing and permitted Arevalo-Chavez to request that it grant additional discovery into whether the DOJ’s motion to dismiss was made in good faith.⁵⁸

National Treasury Employees’ Union v. Trump 

This case involves a challenge to President Trump’s executive order (EO) permitting federal agencies to end collective bargaining agreements under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (FSLMRS). This EO would—and has—ended union rights for more than 1 million federal employees.⁵⁹ In a TRO enjoining the government from cancelling collective bargaining union agreements, the court looked directly into whether the government acted with regularity in the issuance of the EO and determined that it did not. The court found that the unions presented clear evidence rebutting the presumption and that in issuing the EO, “the President was indifferent to the purposes and requirements of the Act or acted deliberately in contravention of them.”⁶⁰ Specifically, the EO and the administration’s statements contravened Congress’ findings in establishing the FSLMRS, “the White House Fact Sheet reflects retaliatory motive,” and the administration’s guidance “was in furtherance of unrelated policy goals rather than based on the statutory criteria.”⁶¹

Though the D.C. Circuit stayed the injunction pending litigation, it did not address the lower court’s ruling regarding the presumption of regularity. The circuit court reasoned that a stay was appropriate, finding that the unions’ harms were speculative because the “government directed agencies to refrain from terminating collective-bargaining agreements or decertifying bargaining units until after the litigation concludes.”⁶² The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit also issued a decision staying a separate lower court order that paused ending collective bargaining agreements. Since these decisions have been handed down—and despite the D.C. Circuit’s presumption that the government will continue to act in good faith—the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs has cancelled union contracts, affecting nearly 400,000 federal employees, as has the Environmental Protection Agency.⁶³

Kirk v. U.S.

Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Deputy Trevor Kirk faced federal charges for using excessive force when he assaulted and pepper sprayed a woman outside a supermarket in 2023.⁶⁴ The woman livestreamed the incident on her cellphone.⁶⁵ A jury found Kirk guilty on two counts, including a felony of causing bodily injury under deprivation rights under color of law, 18 U.S.C. §242.⁶⁶ After Kirk’s 2025 conviction, a new acting U.S. attorney under AG Bondi’s DOJ took over the case and filed a motion to reduce Kirk’s case from a felony to a misdemeanor and entered a post-trial plea agreement that would result in probation rather than prison.⁶⁷ Three federal prosecutors resigned due to disagreements with the plea.⁶⁸ The court granted the government’s motion to reduce the charges to a misdemeanor but rejected the plea agreement because Kirk “committed the offense” as a police officer “willfully using unreasonable force against” the victim. Kirk was instead sentenced to four months in jail. Subsequently, the DOJ moved to dismiss the case against Kirk entirely, over the objection of the victim.⁶⁹ The court rejected the dismissal because a “motion aimed at undermining the Judiciary’s sentencing authority violates separation of powers principles, and for that reason, is contrary to the public interest.”⁷⁰ Kirk is appealing the decision and asserts he should remain out of jail while it is pending.⁷¹

U.S. v. Smirnov

Alexander Smirnov was prosecuted as part of the special counsel investigation of Hunter Biden.⁷² Hunter Biden was ultimately convicted on felony tax and gun-related charges, while Smirnov pled guilty to charges of lying to the FBI about Hunter Biden and former President Joe Biden’s ties to Ukrainian energy company Burisma.⁷³ Although Smirnov was sentenced to six years in prison for his crimes, the DOJ is now reviewing his case and has asked that he be released from his imprisonment pending appeal.⁷⁴ The presiding judge in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California denied the request, noting that it previously found by a preponderance of evidence that Smirnov was likely to flee the country.⁷⁵ Furthermore, nothing submitted to the court undermined that decision because Smirnov still appears to have access to millions of dollars he could use to flee.

U.S. v. Maxwell

This matter deals with the government’s recent efforts to unseal grand jury documents in the Ghislane Maxwell case.⁷⁶ Maxwell was prosecuted as a result of the investigation into notorious pedophile Jeffrey Epstein. Maxwell was convicted of five felonies involving the sexual abuse of young girls between 1994 and 2004 and sentenced to 20 years in prison.⁷⁷ Given recent public  interest in the underlying Epstein case, the DOJ and AG Bondi insisted that they would be transparent in disclosing information related to the case. However, after a first tranche of documents was released, the DOJ simply issued a two-page memorandum stating that no additional materials would be released.⁷⁸ Rather, the DOJ moved to unseal the Maxwell grand jury documents, citing special circumstances warranting disclosure. The court disagreed, stating:

The Government’s invocation of special circumstances, however, fails at the threshold. Its entire premise—that the Maxwell grand jury materials would bring to light meaningful new information about Epstein’s and Maxwell’s crimes, or the Government’s investigation into them—is demonstrably false.⁷⁹

It again appears that the government was not being forthright in its arguments before the court. Indeed, the grand jury information is already largely “a matter of public record” and primarily “consists of garden-variety summary testimony by two law enforcement agents.” Though not directly related to the court findings, in a highly unusual move, the second ranking official at the DOJ, Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche—another of Trump’s former personal attorneys—interviewed Maxwell regarding this case.⁸⁰ Subsequently, Maxwell was moved from a low-security federal prison in Tallahassee, Florida, to a minimum-security prison camp in Texas against U.S. Bureau of Prisons policies requiring that sex offenders “be housed in at least a low-security facility unless [the] public safety factor has been waived.”⁸¹

Courts and litigants still have ways to pressure the DOJ and the government to act in good faith, and to do so with regularity. Courts can and should take a harder look at the government’s assertions and actions. And litigants, in support of motions for discovery into the regularity of the government’s conduct in challenged actions, can request that courts take judicial notice of other courts’ findings that DOJ attorneys are bending to political pressure and are presenting information that is either misleading or untruthful.

Courts should be more willing to look beyond the face of governmental pleadings when there are any indicia that the government is not acting in good faith or being truthful. Courts may permit additional discovery as to the government’s actions and motivations, they may require the DOJ to submit their filings to the court as sworn declarations subject to a penalty of perjury, and they may be more poised to issue orders to show cause that the government prove that it should be given the presumption of regularity. That is not to say courts should immediately jump to contempt proceedings or that garden variety cases—those not affecting national policy or that do not appear to be politically charged prosecutions—should be viewed as inherently suspect. Still, courts should be less deferential to DOJ attorneys in the face of blatant court defiance and a seemingly systemic loss of independence.

Courts already have clear guidance under Armstrong allowing additional discovery with a providing of “some evidence” or a “credible showing” of irregularity. Certainly, taking notice of the extent of the DOJ’s irregularity would be the first step to reaching the Armstrong threshold of making the government show its work and not have its assertions taken at face value.

As instances of irregular conduct continue to mount, both the courts and Congress should take steps to outline the parameters of the presumption of regularity. Looking to the presumption’s origins and historical precedent, courts should clarify that the “clear evidence” burden set forth in Chemical Foundation means simply a preponderance of the evidence. The scope of the presumption’s application should also be clarified, also with an eye on the rationale for the doctrine. The presumption itself should not be entirely discarded; rather, there should be a framework under which the DOJ could, in appropriate circumstances, be entitled to benefit from it.

It is disheartening to see the Department of Justice, once the standard bearer for American—and even global—justice, laid low by the loss of independence under the Trump administration. Simply put, the Trump/Bondi DOJ should no longer be trusted by the courts. As one magistrate judge stated in a recent criminal case when responding to the government’s assertion that he must be “highly deferential” to their requests: “Blind deference to the government? That is no longer a thing. Trust that has been earned over generations has been lost in weeks.” The starting point for rebuilding that trust is for the president and the attorney general to restore the DOJ’s independence and commitment to follow the facts and the law, not political masters.

But trust once lost is sorely regained. If AG Bondi does not act swiftly to reestablish the DOJ’s independence, candor, and good faith before the courts, through transparent actions—not just words—it will be the duty of future administrations and attorneys general to restore the department’s stature in making the DOJ a crown jewel of American justice.