Trump v. United States: Revisiting the Presidential Immunity Ruling 1 Year Later

Just more than one year ago, on July 1, 2024, the Supreme Court handed down a decision that shocked the nation: Trump v. United States. A right-wing 6-3 majority held that presidents hold broad criminal immunity for acts committed under presidential authority, even if those acts would be otherwise illegal under U.S. statutes. This extreme decision also held that there is a presumption that official acts that supported unofficial criminal activities could not be used as evidence of those crimes in court. This immunity—found nowhere in the U.S. Constitution—is a dangerously vague principle created out of whole cloth by Chief Justice John Roberts’ court, flouting the core tenets of America’s foundational fight for independence against a tyrannical monarch.

Even more alarming, the majority held that the president has “‘exclusive authority and absolute discretion’ to decide which crimes to investigate and prosecute.” Chief Justice Roberts explained that the president may discuss and, impliedly, direct the U.S. attorney general regarding potential investigations and prosecutions to help carry out the president’s duties to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” and to “preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.”

This raises reasonable concerns that a president and a compromised Department of Justice (DOJ) could engage in politically motivated prosecutions. The other side of that coin that the chief justice either did not consider—or ignored—is what would occur if a future president were to direct the DOJ to not investigate certain potentially criminal acts— including those of the president, either public or private—leaving the law unexecuted and the Constitution unprotected. In effect, Trump v. United States permits a sitting president to direct the DOJ to ignore crimes committed by himself or his allies and to target his opponents. This, in and of itself, is a direct threat to the rule of law and reflective of an adage attributed to South American dictators: “For my friends, everything; for my enemies, the law.”

Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s dissent distilled the majority’s Trump v. United States decision:

Let the President violate the law, let him exploit the trappings of his office for personal gain, let him use his official power for evil ends. Because if he knew that he may one day face liability for breaking the law, he might not be as bold and fearless as we would like him to be.

Six months into Donald Trump’s second term, Justice Sotomayor’s warning has proved prescient. The actions of the president and his administration have made it abundantly clear that federal law and judicial rulings will not act as restraints.

This administration is pushing the limits of executive authority to their breaking point. On June 7, 2025, President Trump issued a memorandum federalizing the California National Guard—over the objection of a governor for the first time in more than 60 years—to respond to small pockets of immigration protests in Los Angeles that local law enforcement was dealing with appropriately. Though a panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled this was permissible in the case of California, the order issued for the deployment placed no geographic or time limits on the deployment of the National Guard anywhere in the United States and declared, “To the extent that protests or acts of violence directly inhibit the execution of the laws, they constitute a form of rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States.” This potentially means that Trump could deploy the National Guard anywhere in the country without having to provide any further justification.

Although a panel of the 9th Circuit upheld this particular deployment, it is important to understand how Trump v. United States—and the high court’s continued appeasement of President Trump—has led to a series of actions by this administration that, in any other time, would be scandalous and appear to be worthy of, at a minimum, federal investigation. Indeed, the breadth of Trump v. United States may well have supercharged President Trump’s actions as he pushes the boundaries of presidential authority in his attempts to encroach on congressional and judicial authority to bring the entirety of government under the control of the presidency.

One recent, chilling example of Trump’s ongoing efforts to undermine the judiciary: The Department of Justice sued every district court judge in Maryland, rather than appeal a standing order that migrants who petition relief under the writ of habeas corpus cannot be moved or have their status changed for 48 hours while the court considers their habeas corpus petitions. This is not just a matter of “working the refs”; it is an effort to have the refs removed from the game entirely because they are enforcing the rules—in this case, the Constitution and federal law. This lawsuit is a novel effort to shut down judicial oversight in a manner that has never been done in the United States’ history.

This report does not address the Trump administration’s efforts—seemingly against federal statutes—to dismantle federal agencies, to impound appropriated funds from critical infrastructure and research projects, to attempt to take over congressional entities such as the Library of Congress, and to assert that the courts do not have the authority to check its actions. While those actions appear often to violate civil laws, they deal with institutional issues involving a vast array of players, the complexity of which is beyond the scope of this analysis. Rather, this report focuses on the more direct actions of President Trump and his allies that, in times past, would likely have warranted potential criminal investigations by an independent DOJ or other agencies with jurisdiction.

Some of these actions, including those the president is taking in his personal capacity— such as rewarding investors in $TRUMP coin with special access to himself—have the appearance of political corruption under the common understanding of the term. Other actions, such as taking direct control of the DOJ and limiting investigations, seem to facilitate public corruption and limit any form of governmental oversight. Other actions, such as the government’s acceptance of a jet worth $400 million from a foreign sovereign and its reported subsequent transfer to the Trump Presidential Library, could be violations of the Constitution’s emoluments clause and potentially other federal laws.

Compounding the immunity decision in Trump v. United States are recent rulings by the high court that have narrowed the definition of public corruption and bribery to effectively require a direct quid pro quo exchange of something of value for a defined official act. That is, the court held that evidence of someone providing financial benefits to an elected official who then intercedes with other officials on their behalf but does not provide them a direct benefit through their own official actions is not enough to bring bribery charges. Furthermore, in recent terms, the court has dismissed two emoluments cases—by which the Constitution prohibits presidents from accepting gifts from foreign governments—brought against President Trump during his first term.

In conjunction with the these cases, Justice Sotomayor noted in dissent that the majority’s decision in Trump v. United States “effectively creates a law-free zone” that will empower “any President that wishes to place his own interests, his own political survival, or his own financial gain, above the interests of the Nation.” Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson’s dissent built on that premise, noting the decision eliminates the self-regulation of the “Rule of Law”: “[U]ltimately, this Court itself will decide whether the law will be any barrier to whatever course of criminality emanates from the Oval Office in the future. The potential for great harm to American institutions and Americans themselves is obvious.”

The court’s immunity opinion explicitly allows President Trump to direct the actions of the DOJ, which presumably extends to potentially directing investigations and shielding himself from any criminal investigations. If that is the case, it could call into question the extent that the presumption of regularity—”the courts’ baseline assumption that government officials act lawfully and in good faith”—continues to hold in cases where the DOJ is representing the government.

Among Pam Bondi’s first acts as attorney general was to disband the DOJ’s anti-foreign corruption Kleptocracy Initiative, KleptoCapture Task Force, Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative, and the domestic corruption-focused Foreign Influence Task Force. This DOJ has also slashed the size of its Public Integrity Section, disbanded the FBI team that conducts investigations into members of Congress and fraud by federal employees, and fired the career attorney who led the DOJ’s ethics division.

Furthermore, President Trump issued an executive order (EO) pausing enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act against American entities and corporations acting illegally, with Bondi tasked with implementing this EO. Bondi also shifted enforcement of the Foreign Agents Registration Act—under which she previously had to register as a lobbyist for Qatar—to focus on alleged conduct more akin to “espionage by foreign government actions,” which will likely reduce DOJ scrutiny of lobbyists and corporate actors working on behalf of foreign interests. As a result, it is unclear whether the DOJ will enforce foreign corruption laws, enforce the Foreign Agent Registration Act beyond instances of espionage, or even investigate instances where it appears that foreign individuals are attempting to influence American policy through potentially corrupt acts.

If the DOJ and other agencies tasked with policing foreign influence and public corruption are sidelined, there will be little to stop a president, his family, and his allies from using the trappings of the executive office and their roles in government to create opportunities for personal enrichment. It is worth noting that recent Supreme Court decisions have significantly narrowed the federal bribery statute in such a way that it is difficult to prosecute public corruption outside of directly provable quid pro quo exchanges of political favor for something of value. However, as discussed below, a number of actions that have already been taken through official and unofficial channels could be viewed as corrupt motives at the very least under the common understanding of the term, in that their actions could result in the personal enrichment of these players.

Acceptance of a $400 million private jet

The Constitution’s foreign emoluments clause explicitly provides that no federal office holder “shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.” A $400 million Boeing 747 aircraft is being given to the Department of Defense (DOD) by the nation of Qatar for President Trump’s use during his presidency. Reporting suggests that post-presidency, the aircraft will be donated to the Trump Presidential Library. If this holds true, or if President Trump continues to use it after he leaves office, this gift would at worst appear to run afoul of the foreign emoluments clause, as it would be for his personal benefit, and at best, would be a technical end run around the Constitution.

Under 10 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2), department secretaries are permitted to accept unconditional gifts from foreign governments but only if the gift is not designated for a specific individual. If reporting is accurate, only President Trump will get to use this plane as Air Force One, as it subsequently will be donated to his presidential library, with costs related to its transfer incurred by the Air Force. Furthermore, at least an additional $400 million in taxpayer money is being shifted from the DOD’s intercontinental ballistic missile program to upgrade and retrofit the jet’s security and communications. All of this is being done despite President Trump having access to two fully functional planes that serve as Air Force One.

Though President Trump stated that he will not use the aircraft after leaving office, if it does not stay in possession of the federal government and is transferred to his presidential library, that would appear to violate ethics laws (10 U.S.C. Sec. 2601(b)(2)), though not be a direct violation by the president himself. If the jet is not decommissioned and President Trump retains the ability to use it, it would arguably appear to violate the foreign emoluments clause. Notably, Attorney General Bondi, who was previously a lobbyist for Qatar, signed off on the legality of the gift. Though she stopped representing Qatar more than two years ago—outside the limit prohibiting engagement in matters involving foreign clients—strong arguments can be made that she should have recused herself from the decision to avoid the appearance of conflicts of interest. To that end, there is no public indication that Bondi sought or received a waiver to participate in the decision-making process around the acceptance of the aircraft.

Furthermore, federal law prohibits the acceptance of gifts or payments of any kind from outside sources by federal employees. Though Title 18 of the U.S. criminal code does not mention receipt of gifts by the president, the Foreign Gifts and Decorations Act (FGDA) of 1966 requires disclosure and disposal of gifts valued at more than $100. Indeed, past presidents have always been required to either reject gifts from foreign nations, donate them to the National Archives, or pay the fair-market value of the gift if they wish to keep it. It begs credulity that an airplane donated by a foreign nation for use by a single president, then transferred to the ownership of his presidential library, falls within any exception to the Constitution or federal law. If President Trump or his library intend to keep the plane after he leaves office, the fair market value that should be required to pay under the FGDA would be in the neighborhood of $800 million—$400 million in value at the time of receipt, plus the $400 million for security retrofitting—less depreciation.

Although Qatar is a long-standing U.S. ally, any foreign policy benefits that President Trump or his administration bestow upon Qatar now or in the future will be in the shadow of this $400 million aircraft. This could be viewed through a lens of how the administration treats other U.S. allies and partners. For instance, President Trump has imposed only 10 percent tariffs on Qatar, compared with a threatened 35 percent on Canada and 50 percent on Brazil, the latter of which appears to be largely in retribution for the country’s prosecution of former Brazilian president and Trump ally Jair Bolsonaro.

Though reasonable people may perceive this gift as a form of bribery or influence peddling, Attorney General Bondi signed off on a legal memo—that has not been made public—averring that its acceptance does not violate the Constitution or ethics laws. Even if the president were to come out and directly say that he is preferencing Qatar in foreign policy deals because of the gift, it may not be possible to hold him accountable because of the holding in Trump v. United States, which provides immunity for illegal actions taken within his constitutional authority and that is broadest in the conduct of foreign affairs. As Justice Sotomayor stated in her dissent, under Trump v. United States, when the president “uses his official powers in any way, under the majority’s reasoning, he now will be insulated from criminal prosecution.”

Creation of $TRUMP and $MELANIA crypto meme coins

Donald and Melania Trump launched crypto “meme coins” in the days before his inauguration. Reporting reflects that “Trump’s team controls at least 80% of TRUMP’s token supply, granting them disproportionate influence over its price.” Trump will profit from fees charged for trades in the meme coins, raising concerns that this could open the door for billionaires, corporations, and foreign countries to have undue influence, with many people raising concerns that this is effectively “pay[ing] off the president for favors.”

Furthermore, the SEC recently decided that meme coins like $TRUMP “do not fall under the agency’s jurisdiction.” This announcement came mere days after reports that $TRUMP investors had lost $2 billion since his inauguration while $TRUMP’s controlling entities made more than $100 million in trading fees. Concurrently, the SEC dropped several crypto-finance investigations and lawsuits. It is hard to imagine that a DOJ or Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) where President Trump is permitted to direct investigations would ever scrutinize any issues regarding $TRUMP. Even if a future administration wanted to investigate, for example, whether meme coin price manipulation or any corrupt quid pro quo exchanges had occurred related to $TRUMP coins traded in unregulated meme coin markets, Trump v. United States likely would bar evidence of official acts being used to prove illegal private actions—those taken outside his official role.

Foreign influence and World Liberty Financial

World Liberty Financial (WLF) is a cryptocurrency exchange in which the Trump family originally had a 60 percent controlling stake (now standing at 40 percent) while also receiving 75 percent of net revenue from future token purchases. Like $TRUMP, the Trump family profits from fees charged on cryptocurrency trades made through WLF. In fact, it was recently reported that an Emirati-backed firm will purchase $2 billion in stablecoin from WLF. While WLF has touted this as the “single largest-ever investment in a crypto company,” the White House dismissed media inquiries on the investment with a curt response: “report on something people actually care about.” Indeed, the Trump family has likely received nearly $400 million in income from their sales through WLF. A recent SEC disclosure reflects that WLF sold an additional $52.1 million worth of tokens, which could see the Trump family receive upward of $20 million.

Under 18 U.S.C. 208 and Office of Government Ethics guidance, a federal employee is prohibited from influencing federal policy that affects the financial interest of “[himself], his spouse, minor child, general partner, [or] organization in which he is serving as officer, director, trustee, general partner or employee”—in this case, digital crypto assets and issuers like WFL—which appears potentially applicable here through Trump’s continued interests in The Trump Organization and its subsidiaries. However, the statute references “officers” of the executive branch, which some scholars argue does not include presidents. However, if courts found that this statute did apply to presidents, or if Trump v. United States did not grant immunity for official actions, President Trump would likely be barred from either holding ownership in WFL or from influencing federal cryptocurrency policy through his executive order on digital financial assets or his involvement in negotiating the GENIUS Act; he could do one or the other but not both.

A report by Accountable.US has found that at least 14 of WLF’s top 50 holders, who combined own $355 million in WLF-issued tokens, used crypto platforms that are restricted against U.S.-based users, suggesting that they are either foreign nationals or attempting to evade U.S. crypto restrictions. The Trump Organization appears to be profiting from foreign nationals through opaque means, and these individuals or entities are using these purchases to obtain favorable treatment from the U.S. government, as some have admitted and which is explained in more detail below.

Rewarding financial supporters with access to Trump, and potentially more

On May 21, 2025, President Trump held a private, “exclusive” dinner at one of his golf clubs for 220 people who had paid the most money to purchase $TRUMP coin. There was also a promise of a “Special V.I.P. White House tour” for the top 25 $TRUMP coin holders, but the location of the tour has since been removed from the Trump-affiliated “Fight, Fight, Fight” website. The individuals who attended the gala purchased nearly $400 million in $TRUMP coin combined, averaging more than $1 million per person, and attendees included multiple foreign nationals who communicated that they explicitly sought to influence President Trump. Election experts have said:

World Liberty Financial and $Trump appear to allow foreign governments, corporate interests and wealthy private donors who want something from Trump to secretly add to his wealth. This is a roadmap for corruption.

It is generally understood that the financial backing of political candidates or political action committees is a means to influence policy outcomes. However, federal law prohibits foreign nationals and corporations from donating to political candidates and related political action committees, requires registration of their lobbyists under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), and prohibits direct payments to government officials under the FDGA and emoluments clause as a means to prevent foreign influence on domestic political actors. The investments by foreign nationals being made through WFL and $TRUMP may well be a loophole in the law that is being exploited on all sides.

Indeed, some individuals who purchased $TRUMP coin have made it clear that they expect preferential treatment from President Trump due to their investments. One South Korean crypto executive in attendance referred to the private dinner as “kind of a fund-raiser” and that Trump will “always be good to his sponsors.” Another attendee, Chinese crypto-billionaire Justin Sun, saw the Trump administration drop an SEC crypto-fraud investigation into his companies after he purchased $30 million in tokens from WLF in December 2024. Meanwhile, a Taiwanese executive—whose company profits from high-frequency crypto-trading around the world but not in the United States—said he will “not hesitate to share my perspective” with President Trump. Notably, Justin Sun has since announced an intent to purchase an additional $100 million in $TRUMP coin.

Even if the Trump administration had not unwound the DOJ public corruption and foreign corrupt influences units, it is questionable whether Trump’s $TRUMP coin-related actions could be investigated or prosecuted under Trump v. United States. If meetings such as this gala—at which foreign nationals gain access to President Trump and attempt to influence U.S. policies because they have personally enriched him and his family through their $TRUMP investments—actually result in changes to U.S. policy that preference his financial benefactors, the president’s decisions could be considered official acts that receive full immunity under Trump v. United States. And if there were ever a prosecution related to President Trump’s unofficial acts related to $TRUMP coin investors, there would be a presumption that his official acts could not be used as evidence of corruption.

Illegal use of the presidential seal

President Trump appeared before the presidential seal at the $TRUMP coin gala. The White House stated that the $TRUMP coin event was private and that the president was “attending it in his personal time.” This was clearly an event intended to bolster President Trump’s business interests and not part of his official duties.

Federal law prohibits use of the presidential seal to convey a “false impression of sponsorship or approval by the Government of the United States,” an offense punishable by fine, six months in prison, or both. Trump has also previously used the presidential seal as golf markers at several of his golf clubs, again in violation of the statute. Nothing appears to have come of those illegal uses of the seal, and a similar outcome is likely here.

Pardoning supporters

President Trump has previously shown no compunction in pardoning his allies, as evidenced by his first-term pardons of advisers Paul Manafort and Steve Bannon. However, the concern that Trump could monetize his constitutional prerogative to issue pardons during his second term was raised in Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Trump v. United States: “Takes a bribe in exchange for a pardon? Immune. Immune, immune, immune.”

This term, Trump again has shown his willingness to pardon political allies and supporters. He issued full pardons and commutations to more than 1,500 people charged with or convicted of crimes committed during the January 6 insurrection at the U.S. Capitol. He has pardoned elected officials convicted of public corruption, crypto fraudsters accused of money laundering, and financial felons who advanced his political interests.

While all these pardons undermine the rule of law, it is the recent pardon of Paul Walczak that stands apart. Walczak was a nursing home executive who pleaded guilty to tax crimes after withholding $7.5 million in taxes from his workers and not paying it to the IRS, instead using some of the funds to purchase a $2 million yacht. He was ordered to pay $4.4 million in restitution before serving an 18-month prison sentence. As the sentencing judge noted, being rich “is not a get-out-of-jail-free card.” Walczak submitted a pardon application on President Trump’s inauguration day that reportedly relied in part on his mother’s significant financial support, as she had “raised millions of dollars for Mr. Trump’s campaigns and those of other Republicans.” Subsequently, in April 2025, his mother attended a $1 million per person fundraiser at Mar-a-Lago. Walczak received a full pardon three weeks later. While there is no direct evidence of quid pro quo payment for pardon, the appearance of impropriety in this scenario is damning.

Since pardons are explicitly within a president’s core constitutional powers, the ability to criminally prosecute a president, even with direct evidence, for accepting a bribe in exchange for a pardon would be questionable under Trump v. United States, as Justice Sotomayor noted in her dissent. Indeed, the only remedy for this type of corruption is impeachment and conviction by 67 senators. However, that would require the political will to do so, and Trump’s congressional allies have routinely turned a blind eye to his actions.

Profiteering through foreign policy directives and tariffs

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) makes it illegal for Americans to offer anything of value to any foreign official for the purpose of influencing them to act in violation of their lawful duties or “securing any improper advantage.” It also prohibits “inducing” foreign officials to “assist such person in obtaining or retaining business” in that country.

Yet it is arguable that The Trump Organization, which directly profits President Trump, may be benefiting from the administration’s purportedly official dealings with foreign countries. For example, the government of Vietnam is reportedly fast-tracking a $1.5 billion golf course and resort being built by The Trump Organization near Hanoi. Vietnam approved breaking ground on this development mere months after the application was submitted to the Vietnamese government, leapfrogging a process that usually takes at least two years.

The approval comes at a time when the Vietnamese government is negotiating trade concerns with the United States after President Trump unilaterally and unexpectedly imposed (then paused) in excess of 46 percent tariffs on all Vietnamese exports to the United States. It is conceivable that the Vietnamese government anticipated that providing this expedited approval—which will seize hundreds of residences and farms from local residents for far below fair-market value—would result in favorable treatment by the administration in tariff negotiations. The White House has denied conflicts, stating that “trade discussions are totally unrelated to the Trump Organization,” yet Vietnamese officials have noted that this project is “receiving special attention from the Trump administration and President Donald Trump personally.” Notably, the administration ultimately reduced the originally imposed tariffs on Vietnam from 46 percent to 20 percent.

In conjunction with all of these actions, President Trump issued an EO directing the DOJ to freeze initiation of “any new FCPA investigations or enforcement actions, unless the Attorney General determines that an individual exception should be made [for 180 days],” with the option to extend an additional 180 days. In setting out new FCPA enforcement standards, the DOJ is now stating that it will focus on transnational criminal organizations, cartels, and foreign entities that may limit economic opportunities for U.S.-based enterprises. In other words, the DOJ will focus on cases when there is evidence of “alleged misconduct that bears strong indicia of corrupt intent tied to particular individuals” but not necessarily corporate interests that engage in “routine business practices in other nations,” even if they would traditionally run afoul of the FCPA.

More to the point in the case of the Trump family’s business practices, even if DOJ personnel wanted to initiate an investigation into the appearance of corruption in using U.S. tariff policy to influence the approval of a personally beneficial real estate project in a foreign country, that initiation would need to be approved by Attorney General Bondi. And again, under Trump v. United States, it is questionable whether Trump’s imposition of tariffs and subsequent negotiations could be used as evidence in a criminal investigation into potential FCPA violations by The Trump Organization.

Did executive orders targeting law firms and subsequent settlements violate the Hobbs Act?

The Hobbs Act, the federal extortion statute, makes illegal the “obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced … under color of official right.” In layman’s terms, this means it is illegal for a public official to “[obtain] a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts.” In fact, courts have held that a Hobbs Act violation may occur when the “recipient of the benefit of the extortion” is a third party, not the public official himself. However, when the “corrupt payment inures to the benefit of a person or entity other than the public official most courts have also required proof of a quid pro quo understanding between the private corrupter and the public official.”

At the outset of his second term, President Trump issued EOs against several major law firms that represented clients who brought lawsuits against him during his first term; that had ties to attorneys who investigated Trump and his first administration through their government work; or that hired attorneys who were his so-called enemies, including those who prosecuted January 6 insurrectionists (who were subsequently pardoned by Trump) or worked for the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol. The EOs portended stripping the security clearances of all attorneys at the targeted firms, canceling government contracts with the firms, and prohibiting access to government buildings by attorneys working at the firms.

Several firms struck preemptive deals with the Trump administration to avoid being targeted by EOs with similar sanctions. The firms entering into the deals reportedly committed nearly $1 billion combined in pro bono legal services for “largely unspecified initiatives supported by the Trump administration.” Conversely, four firms challenged the EOs, and they have been universally successful—in front of four different judges—in stopping the EOs from going into effect. In these cases, the courts have found that the EOs were ultra vires—done beyond the president’s legal power or authority—and a violation of some combination of the First, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution.

As such, here are multiple instances of President Trump attempting to use his powers against multiple private law firms to obtain benefits of some sort from parties seeking to avoid the governmental sanctions imposed by the EOs. Indeed, agreements from law firms that struck deals with the administration to provide up to $1 billion of free legal work inured benefits to the federal government—a third party. President Trump withdrew the EO targeting one firm, Paul Weiss, less than a week after striking a deal with it.

Dismissing charges against Eric Adams without prejudice

In April 2025, the DOJ sought to dismiss public corruption charges against Democratic New York City Mayor Eric Adams without prejudice. In attempting to dismiss the charges, the DOJ argued that Mayor Adams could not assist with Trump’s aggressive immigration enforcement agenda. Trump’s former criminal defense attorney—then the acting deputy attorney general—Emil Bove, who has since been confirmed to a judgeship on the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeals, reportedly met with Adams’ attorneys to hammer out a deal to drop federal corruption charges against Adams. Indeed, the now-former U.S. attorney for the Southern District of New York, Danielle Sassoon, confirmed in a letter to Attorney General Bondi that the charges were to be dismissed without prejudice in part “in return for his assistance in enforcing the federal immigration laws.”

In requesting that Judge Dale Ho dismiss the charges without prejudice, the DOJ would have been able to continue to hold the power of prosecution over Adams to ensure he met its demands. In fact, Acting Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Tom Homan stated on live television, “If he doesn’t come through, I’ll be back in New York City … saying, ‘Where the hell is the agreement we came to?’” These actions resulted in the resignation of several career U.S. attorneys—including Sassoon, a Federalist Society member who clerked for Justice Antonin Scalia. Another of the attorneys who resigned—a former Marine who clerked for Chief Justice John Roberts—stated in his resignation letter, “[O]ur laws and traditions do not allow using the prosecutorial power to influence other citizens, much less elected officials.”

Though the public corruption in this matter may not reach directly to President Trump, it certainly implicates the highest echelons of the DOJ and DHS. Indeed, in his order, Judge Ho stated, “Everything here smacks of a bargain: dismissal of the Indictment in exchange for immigration policy concessions.”

Again, however, there is little likelihood that the DOJ would begin to investigate potential wrongdoing in this case. The federal judge overseeing the case did have some authority to staunch the worst aspects of this matter. The court recognized the unique and publicly important nature of the dismissal and assigned a former Republican U.S. solicitor general to submit a brief to the court on whether the charges should be dismissed with prejudice. Ultimately, the court did dismiss the charges with prejudice, preventing the possibility of the administration from holding the threat of prosecution over the mayor’s head.

This analysis does not take into account the actions taken by President Trump and his administration that have been temporarily frozen by the lower courts as likely illegal or unconstitutional. Those actions include removing independent agency heads, firing federal employees en masse, impounding congressionally appropriated funds for infrastructure projects and other contracts within the United States, and denying immigrants constitutional due-process rights, that would not fall under the auspices of Trump v. United States.

However, the Supreme Court has appeased the administration in large part by permitting many of these actions to proceed through unsigned and unreasoned shadow docket opinions that do not address the underlying substantive legal merits of the cases. Because these rulings were not made on the merits, many of the actions continue in the lower courts while the administration is ostensibly permitted to act outside the scope of statutory or decisional common law. These procedural or technical wins that the right-wing justices on the court are providing Trump are effectively—for now—an extension of their finding in Trump v. United States that a president’s power is nearly unbounded.

The result of these decisions, along with the high court’s ruling in Trump v. United States, appears to be that President Trump is effectively immune from prosecution for criminal acts now or in the future. At any other time in modern American history, independent agencies and the Justice Department would be attempting to halt or investigate any of the above seemingly corrupt actions undertaken by Trump or his allies. However, Trump v. United States has significantly weakened bulwarks within government that would traditionally investigate claims of public corruption, permitting the presidency more authority than America has seen in generations. As Justice Elena Kagan stated in a recent dissent in Trump v. Wilcox—allowing the president to remove independent agency heads—the Supreme Court has “hand[ed] the President the most unitary, meaning also the most subservient, administration since Herbert Hoover (and maybe ever).”

More detrimentally, when Trump leaves office, any future administration will be hindered from investigating his actions undertaken with the powers of the president and will likely be prohibited from using his official acts as evidence of potential criminality. Furthermore, the expansive authority of the presidential pardon allows Trump to direct his underlings to engage in criminal conduct, which he could pardon at any time until the second he leaves office—a clear corruption of constitutional authority.

To quote again from Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Trump v. United States:

This new official-acts immunity now “lies about like a loaded weapon” for any President that wishes to place his own interests, his own political survival, or his own financial gain, above the interests of the Nation.

We are already seeing this loaded weapon being used against the nation. One remedy to right the ship is for the court to step back from its bias in favor of presidential authority to recognize the harm being inflicted on the country by a president with near limitless authority and reinstate guardrails around executive power that have served the country well for 250 years. Justice Jackson has been ringing this alarm in recent decisions that seemingly expand presidential power even beyond that permitted by Trump v. United States. In Trump v. CASA Inc.—prohibiting courts from issuing nationwide injunctions against unconstitutional governmental acts—Justice Jackson wrote in dissent that the court is “giv[ing] the Executive the go-ahead to sometimes wield the kind of unchecked, arbitrary power the Founders crafted our Constitution to eradicate.” She went on to state:

I have no doubt that, if judges must allow the Executive to act unlawfully in some circumstances, as the Court concludes today, executive lawlessness will flourish, and from there, it is not difficult to predict how this all ends. Eventually, executive power will become completely uncontainable, and our beloved constitutional Republic will be no more.

The court will likely soon see additional challenges to Trump under which he claims statutory authority to take extreme actions against the American people. When the challenge to the Trump administration’s proclamation that protests “constitute a form of rebellion against the authority of the Government of the United States,” arises, the court must recognize that appeasement through procedural or technical acquiescence to the Trump administration will only further the growing authoritarian nature of the government’s actions.

This could well be the end result of Trump v. United States, whereby presidents may be held fully above the law. The court must recognize its role as the protector—not destroyer—of the U.S. Constitution. They must refrain from presidential appeasement and empowerment beyond anything considered acceptable by the founders, who adopted the constitution as a constraint on the executive. Unless the court decides to stand up for the originalist constitutional intentions of creating an executive whose role is to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” not act as one that gets to decide what the law is and to whom it applies, the only other governmental remedy to check unrestrained corrupt practices is impeachment. As such, it is imperative for the future of the United States that this Supreme Court, and Chief Justice John Roberts in particular, recognize the extreme error of Trump v. United States and begin walking that decision back. The court must stand up for the Constitution and the history and tradition of the United States.