Center for American Progress

1 Person, 1 Vote: The Path to a National Popular Vote for the Next President
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1 Person, 1 Vote: The Path to a National Popular Vote for the Next President

The 2026 midterm elections put a national popular vote for the president within reach, bringing the country closer than ever to a fairer democracy.

A boy points to Missouri on CSPAN's 2012 U.S. presidential election electoral map at the American Presidential Experience exhibit in Charlotte, North Carolina, on September 3, 2012. (Getty/Brendan Smialowski)

The political realignment across America after the midterm elections has opened a path to enacting a long-overdue reform to U.S. democracy: electing the president by a national popular vote like Americans do with other elected offices. New leadership in several states with controlling trifectas—Pennsylvania, Michigan, Arizona, Wisconsin, and Nevada—now provides the opportunity for those states to enter the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC), an agreement between states that would ultimately ensure the winner of the national popular vote also emerges with at least 270 electoral votes in a presidential election.

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As the Center for American Progress has previously explained, under existing law in nearly all states, Electoral College votes go to whichever presidential candidate wins the popular vote in that state. Ordinarily, a constitutional amendment would be required to do away with the Electoral College entirely. But under the compact, states pass legislation pledging their Electoral College votes to whichever presidential candidate wins the popular vote across the nation. Importantly, it does not take effect until the Electoral College votes of states that have passed the compact reach 270, the number needed to win a presidential election. In this way, rather than abolishing the Electoral College, the compact aligns the Electoral College results with the national popular vote without a constitutional amendment.

As of publication, 18 states and the District of Columbia have joined the compact, bringing the number of electoral votes up to 222. If the states with new Democratic trifectas pass legislation to agree to award their votes to the winner of the national popular vote, the compact would surpass the 270 electoral votes needed to activate the agreement. Moreover, the incoming governor of Wisconsin and newly reelected governor of Pennsylvania have each already expressed their support for a national popular vote.

How a national popular vote would uphold democratic principles

Moving to a popular vote for the president puts into practice the foundational principle of democracy that no one person’s vote should count more than another’s. In the current system, all states except Maine and Nebraska grant all of their electoral votes to the candidate who wins the popular vote in their state. This has resulted in a small, shifting list of states becoming battlegrounds for each presidential election, leaving the majority of states largely ignored by presidential campaigns.

In 2020, the major-party presidential and vice presidential candidates held 96 percent of their campaign events in just 12 states. Fifty-eight percent of those events were held in just four: Florida, Michigan, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. The president is the president of the whole nation, not just so-called swing states. Candidates should have to earn the votes of the entire country, and no one state should have such an outsize impact on the democratic process. Changing this status quo would mean that at the individual level, every American’s vote would count equally, too.

A national popular vote would ensure that issues that matter to every American get put on the agenda. Ending the disenfranchisement of minority-party voters in solid red or blue states could also help depolarize the nation. If every vote counts equally, the voices of Republicans in California or Democrats in Florida could finally be heard. The majority of Americans know this, too, with 63 percent favoring moving away from the Electoral College.

A national popular vote makes democracy more resilient

Two of the five presidential elections held between 2000 and 2016 were won by a candidate who failed to win the popular vote. When this happens, the incoming president faces an uphill battle to establish their legitimacy with the majority of Americans who voted against them, potentially tainting their actions for the remainder of their term and encouraging rhetorical or legislative pushback that further polarizes the nation. Even four years after George W. Bush lost the popular vote in 2000, only half of American voters believed he was elected legitimately. And back in 1876, when Rutherford B. Hayes lost the popular vote and won under a disputed electoral count, opponents continued to mockingly refer to him as “His Fraudulency.” Not only do these types of electoral inversions seed doubt in whether the new president has a legitimate mandate from the people, but they also fuel more incendiary rhetoric.

This system also means that the race for the presidency sometimes comes down to small margins in a handful of predictable swing states, making U.S. elections more vulnerable to interference and corruption. For instance, in 2024, Wisconsin was decided by 29,397 votes, Michigan by 80,103, and Pennsylvania by 120,266, and yet the national popular vote was decided by more than 2 million ballots. In 2020, the presidential elections in Arizona and Georgia had even narrower margins of fewer than 11,000 votes and 12,000 votes, respectively. That year, although Joe Biden won the popular vote by more than 7 million, his Electoral College victory was decided by fewer than 50,000 votes distributed among a handful of states.

When the presidency turns on such narrow margins in so few states, election officials in those states become a pressure point for interference or even false claims of interference. This can even result in threats of violence against these election officials. If those margins were in the millions rather than the thousands, and across all 50 states, it would be nearly impossible for nefarious actors to attempt to interfere in a way that would meaningfully affect the result. It would also stave off claims of interference or fraud for these same reasons.

One of the clearest examples of how the current winner-take-all system can concentrate elections on a single state’s processes is the 2000 presidential election in Florida. There, the presidency came down to only 537 votes statewide. And with Florida Secretary of State Katherine Harris—who also served as co-chair of then-candidate George W. Bush’s state presidential campaign—certifying the results, otherwise routine decisions by election officials became intense battles, affecting public trust in the outcome for years to come.

If the United States moved to a national popular vote method for electing the president instead, the combined impact of increased legitimacy and wider winning margins would build a more resilient, fairer democracy where every vote counts equally, helping restore Americans’ faith in the electoral process.

The NPVIC can withstand legal scrutiny

Still, even if the states with new trifectas pass legislation for a national popular vote, some suggest that the initiative’s viability could ultimately turn on whether the compact holds up in the courts. The legal debate surrounding the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact largely focuses on two clauses in the U.S. Constitution: the Electors Appointments Clause and the Compact Clause. A careful analysis suggests the compact stands on strong footing.

The Electors Appointments Clause grants states plenary power over electors

The Electors Appointments Clause allows each state to appoint its electors “in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct.” The U.S. Supreme Court has read this provision as granting broad, “plenary authority” to state legislatures over their electors. And as early as 1892, the court in McPherson v. Blacker described it as “conveying the broadest power of determination” over who becomes an elector. Subsequent decisions have further affirmed the plenary nature of this power of appointment and confirmed that it includes the power to condition that appointment. For instance, the court upheld a state law requiring that electors pledge their vote to the candidate who wins the popular vote in their state. Maine and Nebraska’s alternative systems in which two electors go to the winner of the statewide vote, and one goes to the winner of each congressional district, are similarly permissible.

The Supreme Court has upheld these types of provisions recently, too. In the 2020 decision, Chiafalo et al. v. Washington, the court unanimously upheld states’ power to enforce these types of requirements, affirming that the appointments power grants “States far-reaching authority over presidential electors,” only subject to “some other constitutional constraint.” There is no constitutional provision requiring electors to award their votes to the candidate who won the statewide popular vote and no explicit constitutional edict on how those electors vote. Therefore, so long as a state-imposed elector requirement is otherwise constitutionally sound, it should withstand legal scrutiny.

The NPVIC does not pose Compact Clause concerns under prevailing jurisprudence

Although there is no explicit constitutional provision that limits how electors award their votes, some scholars question the constitutionality of the NPVIC on the basis that it could violate the Constitution’s Compact Clause. That clause reads, “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress … enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State.” At face value, this provision would seem to pose a potential problem for the NPVIC. The effort is widely referred to as the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, and the clause prohibits compacts without Congress’ consent.

But contrary to its common name, the NPVIC may not be a compact at all, or at least not one that poses constitutional concerns under prevailing jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has, in fact, explicitly rejected a literal interpretation of the Compact Clause, stating that “[t]here are many matters upon which different States may agree that can in no respect concern the United States,” meaning that not all “compacts” in name are barred by the clause.

Rather, in Virginia v. Tennessee, the court concluded that “the prohibition is directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.” Key to this inquiry is whether the state actions at issue are explicitly permitted by law as was the case in Northeast Bancorp v. Governors, FRS, which concerned a law that explicitly contemplated state regulation in the area at issue. Applying this standard to the NPVIC, as stated above, the Constitution explicitly grants states plenary authority to determine the manner in which they appoint their electors, including state-created conditions such as how electors must award their votes. The NPVIC would therefore be unlikely to encroach on federal supremacy because it only utilizes the power already explicitly granted to the states.

The court further affirmed the narrow reach of the Compact Clause in U.S. Steel v. Multistate Tax Commission, instituting a second prong to the clause’s test. In addition to determining whether the compact encroaches on federal supremacy, the court looks to whether participating states encroach on the authority and power of noncompacting states. Specifically, the court stated that it is primarily concerned with whether interstate compacts are voluntary, with each state free to adopt, reject, or withdraw, and whether the compact authorizes states to exercise powers they could not otherwise.

Under this jurisprudence, the NPVIC is exactly the type of so-called compact that the court has concluded is of no concern. Although the NPVIC would only be effective if a sufficient number of states awarded their votes in the same way, the states would still only be acting on an individual basis and within their own plenary authority.

States can also withdraw at any time, subject to a delay until inauguration for the withdrawal to go into effect if states withdraw after July 20 in a presidential election year. Considering that another interstate compact with a withdrawal delay of two years has been enforced in the courts, and that states still only act within their own authority, this will likely still not pose a significant challenge to the NPVIC.

Some scholars, however, argue that even though the NPVIC only utilizes a state’s individual authority, it would constructively bind nonadopting states by nullifying their manner of allocating votes and pressuring them to join. But this is exactly how the current system works. States are already disincentivized to alter the conditions upon which their electors award their votes because of the existing statewide winner-take-all system. In this way, permitting states to fully exercise their constitutionally granted plenary power over electors is more aligned with principles of federalism by ensuring that state plenary power is indeed plenary.

Responding to other potential legal challenges: The NPVIC fits squarely into the Constitution’s vision of a republican form of government and should survive equal protection claims

The NPVIC’s alignment with federalist principles described above also cuts against Guarantee Clause concerns that claim that the NPVIC would deprive states of a republican form of government. That clause has never been construed to suggest that a state cannot legislate under its broad power over appointing electors. Rather, in Federalist Paper No. 39, James Madison defined a republic as “a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people” and is administered by those in office. State legislatures using their plenary power over electors to award their votes to the winner of the national popular vote fits squarely into this meaning of a republican government.

Other critics argue that the disparate election laws surrounding vote-by-mail or voting eligibility across the 50 states would potentially violate the Equal Protection Clause. But because that clause only provides that “[n]o State shall … deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” and the compact would not change the way states treat their own citizens, the NPVIC should survive an equal protection claim as well. Plus, if the NPVIC were ultimately enacted, Congress could use its powers to ensure these types of practical details are overseen thoughtfully.

Conclusion

Moving to a national popular vote for the president would give every American in every state a real and equal voice in who leads the nation. If enacted by a sufficient number of states, the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact would uphold foundational principles of democracy and would likely withstand legal scrutiny by affirming the federal structure of the American government. The November 2026 midterm elections granted several new states the opportunity to join the compact, and voters will choose the next president less than two years from now. These states should move forward in passing the compact so it can come into effect for the next presidential election. By 2028, the United States could be closer to a fairer, more resilient democracy where every American’s vote for the president counts equally.

The positions of American Progress, and our policy experts, are independent, and the findings and conclusions presented are those of American Progress alone. American Progress would like to acknowledge the many generous supporters who make our work possible.

Author

Jacqueline Lewis

Senior Policy Analyst, Democracy and Legal Policy

Team

Democracy

The Democracy team is advancing an agenda to win structural reforms that strengthen the U.S. system and give everyone an equal voice in the democratic process.

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