Building an Anti-Corruption Agenda To Restore Faith in American Government

Public trust in democracy relies on the belief that those in government are working for the benefit of the public and not their own financial interests. Indeed, Americans view government corruption and the attendant weakening of democracy in the United States as a critical threat to the nation’s vital interests, far outstripping international terrorism, Iran’s nuclear program, the rise of China as a global power, and climate change.¹ One recent poll shows that 89 percent of U.S. adults believe government corruption is widespread, a 10 percentage-point jump from last year.² More than 6 in 10 Americans believe that government corruption is a systemic problem embedded in our institutions through incentives and structures that enable public officials to abuse their power.³ Americans’ views of corruption extend beyond elected officials to include Cabinet members, agency leaders, and other high-ranking officials.⁴

This is not a partisan issue; 73 percent of Americans polled deem U.S. government corruption a critical threat, including 61 percent of Republicans.⁵ More than 90 percent of Americans of every political stripe—Democrats, Republicans, and independents—believe that government officials using their positions for personal gain or putting the interests of corporations and billionaires above everyday Americans constitutes corruption.⁶ Majorities of Americans of every political identity view corruption as stemming from a desire for financial gain or more power, being beholden to special interests and campaign contributions from billionaires and corporations, and, importantly, a lack of consequences for corrupt acts.⁷

However, the second Trump administration has exposed and exploited every gap in America’s ethics laws infrastructure. The president’s family has made billions of dollars in its ownership of cryptofinance businesses and the issuance of meme coins, while investors have lost billions.⁸ Elon Musk, who spent $250 million supporting President Donald Trump’s reelection⁹ and holds $38 billion in government contracts through his companies,¹⁰ became a special government employee (SGE) tasked with running an agency that oversees his own regulators.¹¹ The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) created a $1.776 billion slush fund in the settlement of a lawsuit brought by the president¹² and precluded tax investigations against the president, his family, and his business interests for potential past offenses.¹³ The president’s family owns or has some form of financial ties to businesses receiving tens of millions of dollars in federal benefits and loans and untold millions from foreign nations, entities, and sovereign wealth funds.¹⁴

This administration has proven that existing laws designed to address government corruption, ethics, conflicts of interest, and self-dealing by government officials cannot stand up to the challenges they currently face. Rather, America’s anti-corruption laws were based on the assumption that government officials would act within established ethical norms, exercise self-restraint, and comply in good faith. But these laws—in combination with the Supreme Court’s winnowing of what constitutes public corruption—are structurally incapable of keeping in check a president-elect who launches meme coins,¹⁵ a billionaire who dismantles agencies that investigate his companies,¹⁶ a president’s son-in-law who collects billions from Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds while negotiating Middle East peace,¹⁷ or a Justice Department repurposed to prosecute the president’s enemies and pay his allies.¹⁸ The American people are fed up, and a new legal regime is necessary to address corruption flowing through the government.

This report sets forth a new anti-corruption agenda that identifies the classes of ethical problems that must be addressed, delineates their legal failures, and sets forth novel policy proposals that can hinder corruption, provide enforcement mechanisms that avoid capture, and reinforce governmental integrity. In doing so, it provides a menu of options and alternatives to address the following categorical areas of corruption:

• Presidential self-enrichment
• Official self-dealing and insider enrichment—below presidential levels
• Lack of anti-corruption enforcement
• Abuses by special government employees
• Foreign entanglement in presidential business
• Corrupting the pardon process

These proposals would not just affect President Trump but set new restrictions on all future presidents. They differ from past efforts to build anti-corruption laws in five distinct ways:

1. They shift away from simple financial disclosures to prohibitions that have real consequences.
2. They account for new forms of corruption that current law does not presently address.
3. They create enforcement mechanisms that cannot be wholly controlled by a corrupt executive branch.
4. They close presidential exemptions that weaken all other ethics laws.
5. They match the scale of the problem to the scale of the solution as incremental tweaks are insufficient.

If bad actors in government can be held accountable for self-dealing, it will help reestablish Americans’ trust that government officials are working for them, not in their own self-interests or on behalf of billionaire benefactors.

The problem

Throughout American history, presidents have made efforts to avoid the appearance of corruption through personal enrichment during their terms in office. Although presidents have gained some wealth through typical, passive holdings—such as increased valuation of investments, generally held in blind trusts, or increases in property values in real estate owned before taking office—they have not affirmatively pursued self-enrichment. That is no longer the case, as President Trump’s national policies have become inextricably intertwined with the pursuit of personal and familial wealth.

President Trump’s wealth has grown exponentially during his second term, primarily through cryptocurrency and digital finance ventures related to his meme coin—$TRUMP—and World Liberty Financial (WLFI) at the same time his administration is reducing securities law enforcement against the industry.¹⁹ Other clear areas of concern stemming from WLFI include the 49 percent ownership in the company held by the United Arab Emirates national security adviser as well as the lenient civil enforcement and criminal treatment given to crypto billionaires who have supported the company.²⁰

Likewise, Congress and the American people should be wary of instances where a president is able to enrich himself and his family through personal litigation against companies with business before a government he controls—especially when those companies receive preferential treatment by regulators upon settling those lawsuits.²¹ The president’s family has also seemingly leveraged his power for personal financial gain by taking paid roles with companies facing government regulation and ownership interests in entities receiving massive government contracts.²²

Why current law fails

Federal laws have failed to constrain self-enrichment by President Trump and his family, despite past presidencies abiding by the spirit and norms inherent to the laws to prevent an appearance of corruption. Specifically, the laws come up short in several ways:

• The foreign and domestic emoluments clauses of the Constitution, intended to prevent the enrichment of presidents and federal officials, have no statutory enforcement mechanism. Thus, lawsuits seeking to enforce these provisions during the first Trump administration were prolonged by a series of dismissals on standing grounds that were later reversed, before ultimately being dismissed by the Supreme Court as moot without reaching the question of the merits.²³
• Federal conflict-of-interest statutes—18 U.S.C. §§ 202, 203, 205, and 207–209—explicitly exempt the president, vice president, members of Congress, and federal judges. Furthermore, the president’s nondependent children and their spouses are generally not covered by restrictions.
• The STOCK Act is insufficient to address modern financial trading realities, especially when a president refuses to divest or put his assets into a true blind trust and the penalties are minimal.
• In February 2025, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) determined that meme coins are not securities, stripping them of disclosure requirements and anti-fraud protections.²⁴ Moreover, federal financial disclosure forms have no specific requirements for cryptocurrencies, allowing anonymous blockchain transactions to create untraceable enrichment.
• A 2017 DOJ Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinion held that the prohibition on nepotism in 5 U.S.C. § 3110 did not apply to the White House.²⁵

Proposed reforms

Enact presidential “no self-enrichment” disgorgement laws

Congress has the explicit constitutional authority to levy and collect taxes.²⁶ As such, it should consider enacting a surtax on the president, and potentially his immediate family, to prevent unjust or corrupt enrichment during his term of service. Such a surtax would need to be prospective and drawn with a legitimate regulatory purpose—that is, deterring self-dealing and preventing the appearance of corruption. This strategy rests at the apex of Congress’ authority through its taxing powers and avoids concerns stemming from potentially placing unconstitutional conditions on the role of the presidency.

Such a surtax should only touch presidential self-enrichment while in office not coming from the president’s government salary, returns from assets already held in a certified blind trust, and income from real estate owned before inauguration. All other income, including funds from other trusts or entities, would be subject to the surtax. Additional triggers might include profits from certain assets in a dedicated time period around an official presidential act that benefits the holding. To navigate thorny constitutional questions and disincentivize official acts designed to self-enrich, the surtax would have three components:

• Realized income: All realized income should be taxed at 100 percent, except for legal income from the government, such as their salary; returns on assets held in certified blind trusts; and rents or sale of real estate owned before inauguration. Additional anti-abuse and anti-churn rules could guard against routing income through controlled entities or trusts—or gaming the system by selling and repurchasing assets to reset basis.
• Realization by statute at defined events: Since a president could try to avoid the surtax by holding assets instead of selling them, three events should be treated as realization: 1) a deemed sale of all covered assets at the moment the president leaves office, similar to the expatriation “exit tax,” 2) borrowing against covered assets, and 3) transferring assets to the president’s family or controlled trusts.
• Corrupt act surtax: When a specific asset—not in a certified blind trust—rises in value in a narrow window of time around an official act, that increased value would be taxable at 100 percent.

Likewise, Congress could create a narrower surtax for nondependent adult family members and their spouses who receive income connected to their parent’s or in-law’s office or receive something of value from foreign sovereigns or governments, sovereign wealth funds, federal contractors, or third-party entities with regulatory, investigative, or enforcement matters pending before the government. The impacts on their preexisting careers, investments, and real estate holdings would be exempt from the surtax.

This proposal also recommends a post-service compliance certification by the president and his family members to provide additional teeth to the anti-self-enrichment statutes. The president, his immediate adult family members, and their spouses would be required to certify—in writing, under penalty of perjury, to the DOJ and IRS within 30 days following the expiration of the term—their compliance with applicable ethics, conflict, emoluments, disclosure, and tax obligation laws. Failing to file would trigger a significant per-day civil penalty, and knowingly filing a false certification would be a felony based on the existing false-statements statute. The timing of this component is critical, as it would occur after leaving office and not be subject to self-pardons or pardons of family members. In order to avoid weaponization of this statute, it should provide safe harbors for harmless or inadvertent errors.

Enact digital assets anti-corruption legislation

President Trump, his family, and members of his administration have profited extensively from owning and operating cryptofinance entities and issuing meme and stablecoins,²⁷ all while they hold the levers of power regulating the industry. Furthermore, the anonymity of crypto wallets allows these assets to be bought, sold, and traded while evading transparency and disclosure requirements. Congress should put a stop to this by establishing a comprehensive prohibition on any covered official—including the president, Cabinet members, special government employees, elected officials, and their immediate family members—from creating, issuing, sponsoring, endorsing, marketing, or holding meme coins, stablecoins, governance tokens, nonfungible tokens, or interests in digital finance platforms while in office. It should require all preexisting cryptocurrency holdings to be disclosed, valued at market price, and either divested or placed in a certified blind trust. All officials holding more than $1,000 in cryptocurrency, except the president, should be required to recuse themselves from any policy decision affecting digital asset regulation. Congress can look to the Curbing Officials’ Income and Nondisclosure (COIN) Act as a strong starting point, as it also defines certain violations as falling outside the scope of official acts in an attempt to abrogate the presidential immunity bar established in Trump v. United States.²⁸

Furthermore, Congress could follow Oklahoma’s ethics standards that broadly define material financial interest to encompass digital assets, requiring recusal from decisions that would have a direct and predictable effect on their financial interests or that of their family members.²⁹ Congress could also make it a federal felony for any official to use policy authority to benefit personal digital asset holdings, with penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment and forfeiture of all crypto holdings.

Congress should also step in where the SEC has refused to act and require that any digital asset created, endorsed, or promoted by a federal official be classified as a security, automatically triggering all securities law protections, disclosure requirements, and anti-fraud provisions. Doing so by statute takes the issue out of the discretionary hands of a potentially politicized SEC. This closes the critical regulatory gap the SEC created by determining that meme coins are not securities, reestablishing a baseline for enforcement of securities regulations in the meme coin arena.

Close the president and vice president loophole in ethics laws

Congress should consider extending all federal conflict-of-interest criminal statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 203, 205, 207–209) to the president and vice president, eliminating their exemption in 18 U.S.C. § 202(c) where possible. This may be the most aggressive and tenuous recommendation, as the recusal requirements inherent to the statutes could implicate separation of powers, unconstitutional conditions, and Article II authorities, as there is no substitute for presidential authority to conduct the duties of the office. However, the constitutional basis is plausible, as Congress has broad authority to regulate the conduct of federal officers, and the emoluments clauses already demonstrate the founders’ intent to prevent presidential self-dealing. Doing so would advance this report’s recommended efforts requiring the president and vice president to divest from all business interests and place assets in a certified blind trust managed by an independent, court-appointed trustee within 30 days of inauguration.

Going further, Congress should take steps to prohibit the president, vice president, and all first-degree family members—spouses, children, children’s spouses, and parents—from launching, owning, or profiting from any new business venture during the term of office and for a period of time, up to four years, after leaving office. Congress needs to create a cause of action allowing either chamber of Congress, any state attorney general, or a panel of retired federal judges to enforce these provisions in federal court, solving the standing problem that killed all first-term emoluments litigation.³⁰ Penalties for violating these provisions could include a criminal referral to a special counsel appointed by a three-judge panel rather than the U.S. attorney general; civil forfeiture of profits; and the potential referral for impeachment. Though such a proposal would likely face litigation, providing a clear statute that is easy to explain—such as “the president should not profit from being president”—as well as a defined cause of action and standing requirements would make it harder for courts to dismiss cases on standing alone.

Codify constitutional emoluments clauses and establish enforcement mechanisms

This proposal is straightforward and would solve the three problems that killed all first-term emoluments cases: 1) definition of emoluments, 2) investigative enforcement authority, and 3) standing to sue. It simply requires Congress to codify the foreign and domestic emoluments clauses into statute with clear definitions and enforcement mechanisms to apply to this and all future presidents. Within those statutes, “emolument” could be defined as any profit, gain, advantage, compensation, or thing of value—including cryptocurrency, digital assets, intellectual property royalties, licensing fees, real estate profits, or any benefit conferred to the president or any entities from which he or his family profits. In the domestic emoluments realm, it would prohibit any federal or state funds from flowing to the president, any entities or subsidiaries thereof in which he holds greater than a 0.5 percent ownership interest, or any entities that a direct family member or that family member’s spouse whose profits are imputed to an entity in which the president owns a substantial interest—to allow a president to own stocks in a limited amount without running afoul of emoluments laws.

For investigation and enforcement, Congress could create an independent Emoluments Review Board of five retired federal judges—appointed by the chief justice—empowered to investigate potential violations, issue subpoenas, and refer cases of violations for enforcement through penalties, disgorgement, or prosecution, as appropriate. Congress could also grant standing to sue any member of Congress, any state attorney general, or any taxpayer who can demonstrate economic injury.

The problem

Americans’ concerns around self-dealing and enrichment extend beyond the current president to include other elected officials, political appointees, and government officials. Polling reflects that “profiting personally from government decisions” was the second-most concerning form of government corruption among all political identities and the most concerning among Republicans.³¹ Indeed, upon entering office the second time, President Trump rescinded the ethics pledge President Joe Biden required his appointees to abide by—and issued no similar ethics pledge of his own.³²

As noted above, the president and his family have benefited immensely from their ongoing business dealings, but their use of insider knowledge for profit appears to extend beyond the scope of the businesses they control to retail investments as well. From the beginning of his term through September 19, 2026, President Trump made more than 28,700 stock trades—roughly 80 trades every day the market is open—outpacing the total of all 535 members of Congress combined.³³ The value of the trades made by Trump or on his behalf exceeds $1 billion and includes a number of companies that do business with the government.³⁴

The problem is not just presidential in nature. During a 55-day period following Trump’s February 2025 tariff announcement against China, Mexico, and Canada, more than 50 members of Congress made at least 2,200 trades combined across 700 companies valued between $35 million and $140 million as President Trump was rolling out—and intermittently pausing—his 2025 tariff regime.³⁵ Commercial equities traders have noted the ability of members of Congress to outperform the S&P 500 by such an extent—17.5 percent in 2022.³⁶ They have monetized this perceived corruption by creating exchange-traded funds (ETFs) that track congressional trades: “NANC” for Democratic trades and “GOP” for Republican trades.

Lastly, prediction markets like Polymarket and Kalshi that permit anonymous crypto wallets to participate in trading give government officials the opportunity to significantly profit off of insider knowledge while eluding any potential oversight. It also poses a national security threat. One member of the U.S. military allegedly made more than $400,000 through wagers on Polymarket contracts around the capture of Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro.³⁷ Six additional anonymous accounts made $1 million betting on U.S. military strikes against Iran, and 50 anonymous accounts were created to bet on a U.S.-Iran ceasefire the day it was announced.³⁸

Why current law fails

The Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act of 2012 is not sufficiently robust or timely to hinder potential insider trading or self-enrichment schemes enacted by government officials. It does not prohibit stock ownership, only requires poorly enforced disclosure of trades over $1,000 within 30 to 45 days without mandating exact amounts, and imposes just $200 fines for violations. The Office of Government Ethics (OGE) has interpreted that fine only applies to late reports—not individual stock purchases or sales—and all of the trades that could have been included on those individual reports.³⁹ Under this interpretation, any government official who files a late report is fined just $200 regardless of how many individual trades in that report would be considered a late disclosure. Likewise, OGE financial disclosure forms report assets only in broad ranges, rather than precise values, while containing no category for digital assets. Though federal conflict-of-interest statutes carry serious penalties, the president, vice president, and members of Congress are excluded from prosecution. Regarding the STOCK Act, no member of Congress has ever been prosecuted, though 1 in 7 members violated reporting requirements between 2019 and 2021.

There is also presently no law that prohibits federal officials, employees, or contractors from participating in prediction markets, whose anonymous nature permits avoidance of oversight.

Proposed reforms

Mandate universal divestiture—with teeth

Congress has proposed a ban on individual stock trading by elected officials, but it should go further. Congress should take efforts to require all senior federal officials—the president, vice president, Cabinet members, agency heads, members of Congress, senior White House staff, SGEs, and Supreme Court justices—to divest from all individual financial holdings (e.g., stocks, bonds, crypto, real estate investments, and business interests) into a certified blind trust or approved index fund within 30 days of taking office. It should require the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to certify that the trusts are indeed blind, conduct compliance audits, and impose automatic penalties for failure to comply with the law. The penalty for failing to do so would be forfeiting any resulting profits plus treble—or triple—damages.

This stands in strong contrast to the STOCK Act’s much more meager $200 fine, and it would ensure that a windfall in the hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of dollars would be met with a proportionally large penalty. Limitations should extend to spouses and dependent children of the officials to prevent workarounds to self-enrichment. Though this would surely face litigation—especially the spousal extension—Congress’ power to set qualifications for federal service under the necessary and proper clause, and existing precedent for financial conditions on government employment, form a constitutional basis for enacting such prohibitions. This would ensure that the most senior and powerful federal officials face similar or stronger financial restrictions than the ones their employees already face.

Institute an “excess gains” tax

An alternative approach would be to look at investment performance instead of individual trades. This could take the form of an automatic 90 percent “excess gains” tax if a covered official’s investment portfolio outperforms a blended market index by more than 5 percentage points over the course of their term. Because it is unlikely that any covered individual’s portfolio should outperform the market by more than 5 percentage points, this provision seeks to claw back any excess gains that may have arisen from officials using their insider knowledge without having to prove use of such insider knowledge.

Require real-time digital disclosure

Perhaps a more palatable alternative to divestment or stock trading bans for many covered officials would be to require them to carry out their financial transactions through monitored accounts that automatically report trades to a searchable public database almost in real time. Such a system would be modeled on the SEC’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system but with a consumer-friendly interface to allow the public and watchdogs to monitor, in real time, potential issues related to trading on insider knowledge. This should apply to all asset classes, including cryptocurrency wallets, which must be registered and linked to the identity of the holder in interest. Any transaction not conducted through a designated account becomes presumptively illegal and subject to forfeiture of profit and treble damage penalties. Such an approach would also close the loophole under the STOCK Act that gives members 30 to 45 days to disclose trades, which, in most cases, undermines the disclosure’s effectiveness. This would be particularly helpful for tracking trades in digital asset markets that move especially quickly.

Ban participation in prediction markets

This proposal is based on CAP’s recent report recommending that federal employees across all levels should be barred from participating in prediction markets.⁴⁰ Congress should enact legislation prohibiting elected officials, political appointees, executive branch employees, judicial employees, congressional staff, the military, and employees of contractors involved in military, intelligence, and national security matters from participating in prediction markets of any kind. It should also require prediction markets to verify and maintain basic identifying information of individuals using the platforms to prevent workarounds and their use by other criminal elements to prevent anonymous crypto wallets from illegally profiting off insider information or money laundering. Penalties should be enacted against platforms that permit government personnel to use their services.

The president could act through several means to limit the use of prediction markets, including through an executive order barring executive branch employees from using the markets and a general order to military personnel. He could also amend existing executive orders to ban such participation or make participation a disqualifier for obtaining a security clearance.

Codify past administrations’ ethics pledges

Congress should codify the strongest elements of every prior administration’s ethics pledge into permanent statute so they cannot be rescinded by future presidents. Such a law should include a two-year ban on working on issues related to former lobbying clients, a ban on gifts from lobbyists, a four-year post-government lobbying ban, a lifetime ban on lobbying for foreign governments, and a two-year prohibition on any appointee participating in matters involving former employers.

Enact a binding code of ethics for the Supreme Court

Congress should enact legislation specifically mandating that the Supreme Court abide by a binding and enforceable code of ethics. There are numerous proposals recommending means of doing so—including from CAP—which this report will not expand on.⁴¹

The problem and why current law fails

The nation’s current ethics law regime has a singular point of failure that needs to be addressed: Enforcement depends on institutions that can be captured, defunded, or decapitated by the very officials they oversee. At the outset of this administration, President Trump fired 17 inspectors general (IGs) in two-sentence emails that ignored the Inspector General Act’s notice requirements.⁴² A court found the firings unlawful but declined to reinstate them, reasoning the president could simply re-fire the IGs after the notice period lapsed. Trump also removed the OGE director weeks into a five-year term.⁴³ At the end of 2025, more than half of IG positions remained vacant, and the OGE remains without a Senate-confirmed director. Likewise, the president fired the special counsel from the U.S. Office of Special Counsel, a Democratic commissioner of the Federal Election Commission, and members of the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), National Labor Relations Board, and Federal Trade Commission.⁴⁴ He has also attempted to remove a governor of the Federal Reserve. In Trump v. Slaughter, the Supreme Court has permitted the firings of members of bipartisan commissions who had congressionally instituted removal protections on grounds that such statutes violate the separation of powers, overturning 90 years of precedent and stability.⁴⁵

As it stands, agency inspectors general and heads can be removed at will by the president, and the OGE is effectively toothless: It has no subpoena power or independent investigative authority and must refer criminal matters to the DOJ, which is fully controlled by the president. As civil service complaints must be routed through the MSPB, and its members can be summarily fired, it could block routes to hearings in federal courts. There are also limited enforcement mechanisms within the Hatch Act—which has a maximum penalty of $1,000 and exempts the president and vice president. Moreover, the Presidential Records Act has no enforcement mechanism, criminal penalties, or cause of action for the National Archives to sue. As such, enforcement against government corruption—self-dealing, illegal contracting or procurement, and more—is limited, as the enforcement mechanisms are themselves corrupted. The onus is thus to move enforcement out of the hands of the executive branch and toward the legislative branch, the courts, Congress’ taxing power, and private litigants.

Proposed reforms

Create and enhance anti-corruption causes of action

Congress should take concrete steps to create a cause of action and give courts the authority to overturn agency actions when an official with concrete financial conflicts of interest participates in, directs, or materially influences them. This could be one of the most powerful enforcement engines—albeit complex in enactment—for the anti-corruption reform agenda. Every rule above ultimately needs someone to enforce it, and in a captured executive branch, that person can be fired, defunded, or simply told to stand down.

At the outset, Congress could require all political appointees to execute an ethics pledge—so as not to rely on an executive order requiring such—that their decisions will not be influenced by their own financial interests. Beyond this, the proposal is more substantive and would require 1) enhancing or creating causes of action for affected parties with the strongest incentive to act, such as regulated entities, competitors, affected states, members of Congress, and organizations; 2) working within the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to enhance conflict and material influence standards to challenge conflicted actions by federal officials; and 3) altering the standards by which adjudicating bodies, including the GAO, Court of Federal Claims, and Article III courts, consider challenges to corrupt federal action. In doing so, such a requirement would be a strong step in reversing the enforcement paradigm by giving injured parties enforcement mechanisms to prevent government corruption.

By statute, any final agency action—whether a rule, adjudication, contract, grant, permit, or guidance—could be deemed unlawful under the APA if a conflicted official participated in, directed, or materially influenced the action while holding a disqualifying financial interest. This would require amending 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 705, and 706 to provide standing and a cause of action alleging a conflict of interest resulting in an illegal action, as well as setting forth appropriate definitions for doing so. Standing to sue would be broadened to the categories noted above to enhance enforcement capability.

At the outset, “material influence” could be reached through a showing of public statements or a consistent pattern of action by an individual or agency, opening the door to discoverable communications that should not be barred by privilege. If a court were to find that a financial conflict of interest was implicated in the agency action, it could deem the action void and unenforceable, with an option to grant attorneys’ fees. For systemic cases, the law could go further and suspend a conflicted official’s delegated authority—which reverts to a nonconflicted career deputy—without removing the official from office, keeping the mechanism clear of the removal-power question entirely.

This could extend so far as to government procurement and contracting; though again, it would require significant safeguards to prevent chaos and gridlock. Under existing law, individuals challenging procurement or government contracting decisions may do so under the Federal Acquisition Regulation in alleging organizational conflicts of interest or personal conflicts of interest.⁴⁶ These actions generally proceed to the GAO or Court of Federal Claims when appropriate for adjudication; they are not tried before Article III courts. Furthermore, the GAO provides a deferential standard in conflict-of-interest claims, reviewing for reasonableness, and “where an agency has given meaningful consideration to whether a significant conflict of interest exists, [GAO] will not substitute [its] judgment for the agency’s absent clear evidence that the agency’s conclusion is unreasonable.”⁴⁷ As such, Congress should require the GAO to provide greater authority to findings of a direct financial conflict of interest and raise the standard by which it upholds an agency decision.

By necessity, to avoid abuse or a deluge of improper litigation, significant guardrails would need to be built into this system. Specifically, such a proposal should include a heightened pleading standard, accurate disclosure and divestiture as a safe harbor, de minimis involvement safeguards, expedited 90-day adjudication, Rule 11 sanctions, a materiality floor, and prospective-only vacatur with transition stays to prevent weaponization and chaos. Getting the balance right will be critical to avoid de minimis conflicts or even a single bad apple taking down major rules that an individual had little hand in or giving new weapons to opponents of good-governance initiatives.

Require sealed-screen disgorgement of presidential enrichment via private action

This proposal would create a cause of action to recover unlawful presidential self-enrichment, with a remedy of full and immediate disgorgement plus treble damages. Such a suit could be brought by a coalition of at least 10 states acting on behalf of their citizens. However, a private taxpayer “relator” would also be able to bring a suit on a qui tam model, just as a whistleblower can bring a suit under the False Claims Act (FCA).

As with the other proposal in this section, safeguards are necessary to prevent abuse and weaponization. One such provision would ensure that no suit could be served or made public until the plaintiff first presents the claim and its evidence, sealed and ex parte, to a federal three-judge panel that finds a likelihood of success on the merits. The court’s makeup would be akin to that of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, drawn from judges across the country who would serve a one-year assignment and be appointed by the chief justice. A failed claim would remain sealed and be dismissed. Should a captured DOJ seek to dismiss a claim that survived the screen, Congress should require the agency to file its reasons publicly with the same judicial panel, which would have discretion to deny the dismissal and let the case proceed.

A reasonable concern with allowing citizen suits is that they could easily be abused for a number of reasons, including partisan attacks. Medical malpractice tort reform offers some interesting parallels that could help mitigate any such risk. For example, plaintiffs whose claims fail the screen could be required to pay all costs; bonds could be required for thin showings; a one-filing-per-claim rule could be imposed; and lawyers bringing multiple frivolous complaints could be referred for disciplinary action. These public enforcement suits could also be extended to other senior political appointees for violation of a limited set of anti-enrichment and corruption statutes.

Both of these proposals would likely face litigation headwinds. While the 11th Circuit recently remanded a lower-court decision finding the qui tam provision of the FCA unconstitutional under the appointments clause, the matter could still reach the Supreme Court on other grounds—including that qui tam is unconstitutional on take care and vesting clause grounds. Also, Justices Clarence Thomas, Brett Kavanaugh, and Amy Coney Barrett have expressed openness to arguments on the unconstitutionality of the FCA.⁴⁸

Enact an appropriations integrity rider

Though the above proposals would be strongest in creating an outcome reining in corruption, they are complex and would face litigation challenges. A separate, congressionally powerful mechanism could be achieved through the appropriations process. Specifically, Congress could attach to every appropriation a standing condition that funds may not be obligated, awarded, or directed by an official with a disqualifying financial interest in the outcome and that any obligation made in violation is void and recoverable as a debt to the United States. Congress would further empower the GAO to ensure that disbursements of appropriations are free of conflicts of financial interest by decision-makers and direct its operations and reviews. Findings of conflicts could be pursued through, and collectible by, the disbursing agency’s career chief financial officer, by GAO certification, or through a state or taxpayer suit.

This proposal is aimed at the money rather than potentially corrupt actors, but it strongly rests on Congress’ spending power and needs no executive enforcer because voidability operates by statute and is vindicated in court. It also could survive a pardon.

The problem

Special government employees (SGEs) are a class of federal employee who are brought in for temporary terms—not to exceed 130 days in a year—and are not subject to all restrictions applicable to permanent employees.⁴⁹ These individuals are typically designated to serve as temporary advisers, consultants, or experts who can assist and provide perspectives and insights outside the expertise of an agency’s regular employees.⁵⁰ They are not intended to have unfettered power over agencies, such as by mandating operational directives or structural reorganizations. However, under the second Trump administration, the use of SGEs expanded beyond the scope of their typical use and gave rise to serious concerns around ethics violations and self-dealing.⁵¹

The foremost example of this abuse is Elon Musk’s role leading the newly created Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). As an SGE, Musk maintained his business empire, which held $38 billion in government contracts across SpaceX, Tesla, Starlink, xAI, and other companies.⁵² Despite the massive conflicts of interest, Musk was given access to Treasury payment systems, agency databases, and procurement information—including on his companies’ competitors—across the federal government.⁵³ Indeed, there is no evidence Musk ever filed required ethics forms, but if he has, they remain confidential.⁵⁴ He then appears to have used that access to cut staff, oversight, and budgets across multiple agencies, some of which were investigating his companies or held contracts with them.⁵⁵ Many of the investigations and actions against Musk’s companies were then stymied by agency actions and layoffs, all while Musk continued to receive government contracts and support from the highest levels of government.

Why current law fails

The SGE designation was designed for part-time advisers needed for their technical expertise, not billionaire industrialists running quasi-governmental reorganization efforts. Under the new paradigm established by the Musk appointment, laws governing SGEs fail to meet the moment. For instance, financial disclosure requirements for SGEs are weaker than they are for normal employees; there are fewer post-employment restrictions on SGEs serving fewer than 60 days; and the White House instituted a self-policing mechanism with no enforcement provisions by allowing Musk to decide when he needed to recuse. Though several nongovernmental watchdogs sued to obtain information about DOGE and its decision-making processes in violation of various laws—including the Federal Advisory Committee Act, Privacy Act, and Freedom of Information Act—the administration restructured the agency to place it within the Executive Office of the President to avoid those very same transparency laws.⁵⁶

Proposed reforms

Create a government contractor firewall

Any individual who holds a direct or indirect ownership stake exceeding 1 percent in any entity that has received more than $10 million in federal contracts, grants, loans, or subsidies in the prior five years should be categorically barred from serving in any government role—whether it be in a full-time, part-time, advisory, SGE, or volunteer capacity—if it involves oversight, funding, regulation, or contracting decisions affecting the contractor’s sector. This will not bar corporate executives from taking roles in government, but it will bar those with the most to gain financially from participating in self-enrichment schemes through the government. If such individuals are appointed to Senate-confirmed positions, they would be required to undergo ethics vetting as required by law, with the added onus that they divest their ownership of such entities and affirm that they will recuse from participating in any regulatory actions that affect those companies. Such a law should be structured to include family members and deter self-dealing through indirect channels.

Notably, prior to starting their service, any SGE, appointee, or contractor whose remit includes government procurement, regulation, or enforcement must divest all firm-specific assets, such as stocks, bonds, stakes, or options, thereby avoiding any need to recuse. Any firm-specific assets would be required to go into a certified blind trust beyond these individuals’ control. Unlike for the president, Congress is free to set qualifications for SGEs and most other federal employees.

Violations of the law would trigger immediate termination of that individual from their position, the forfeiture of all compensation, the return of funds granted to any relevant entities after the role was taken, and a five-year debarment of the individual and their companies from federal contracting. Furthermore, to prevent a situation in which the SGE secretly provides direction or tries to steer decisions under cover of executive or other privilege, the law should explicitly state that the involvement of any SGE in a matter in which the government attempts to assert privilege must: 1) require full disclosure to be reviewed in camera by a judge; and 2) automatically moot the decision if the SGE engages in illegal activity.

Enact financial transparency and SGE regime reforms

The Musk-DOGE rubric shows how a lack of financial transparency of SGEs can result in significant conflicts of interest that should be fully barred under federal law. As such, any SGE with access to sensitive nonpublic information or decision-making authority over procurement, regulation, grantmaking, loan approval, or employment should be subject to the same financial disclosure as Senate-confirmed appointees. Additionally, because of their time-limited government service, SGEs should enter into mandatory recusal agreements on any matter where they would be conflicted prior to joining the government. All agreements would be reviewed by the OGE and published online. Any SGE who fails to recuse could be subject to criminal prosecution.

To prevent future scenarios where billionaires exert undue authority within the government, any individual whose net worth exceeds $100 million should be barred from being designated an SGE. The potential conflicts of interest arising from such vast wealth are too complex for the SGE framework to regulate. They must instead go through a normal Schedule C appointment or full Senate confirmation with the attendant financial disclosure requirements. The length of SGE service should be reduced to a total of 90 days over the term of any single administration, which closes the loophole allowing reappointment of an individual on an annual basis.

Require a megadonor cooling-off period

Government is rife with capture by special interests, and the SGE regime is an open invitation for further corruption. Congress should be especially cognizant of the need to limit the loophole posed by the SGE construct. This is an aggressive proposal that could be subject to litigation under unconstitutional conditions or First Amendment concerns, but it is worth considering as a simply understood reform based on the notion that wealthy special interests should not be directly in charge of government. The reforms would prohibit any individual who has donated more than $1 million to any super PAC or party committee, or $5 million in aggregate during any election cycle, from becoming an SGE for five years following their last qualifying donation. This should likewise extend to full federal employment outside the scope of Senate-confirmed appointments.

Such legislation would optimally include a robust congressional finding of fact directly challenging Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission and SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission as well as Justice Anthony Kennedy’s holding that independent expenditures “do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.”⁵⁷ It should include a single exception clause to combat unconstitutional conditions concerns, allowing the individual to accept federal employment, an advisory role, or special government employee status if and only if they agree to resign all board positions and divest their corporate equities and private financial holdings into diversified funds, treasuries, or a certified blind trust.

The problem

During the second Trump administration, the Trump family’s business entanglements with foreign sovereigns, with sovereign wealth funds, and in other countries have been unprecedented in their breadth and depth. There is serious concern that these entanglements and reliance on foreign powers and finance will have a deleterious impact on American policies, placing the needs and wants of the beneficiaries and benefactors over those of the nation.

Presently, there are at least 22 overseas Trump Organization developments in progress, with at least five announced since the 2025 inauguration.⁵⁸ These include multiple real estate development deals across the Middle East worth hundreds of millions of dollars while Trump is prosecuting a war against Iran.⁵⁹ At the same time, Jared Kushner’s Affinity Partners has received billions in investments from Middle Eastern sovereign wealth funds, and recent reporting reflects that he has influenced American foreign policy decisions preferred by his funders while serving in government roles and as a civilian.⁶⁰

Why current law fails

The foreign emoluments clause bars foreign gifts without congressional consent but has no enforcement mechanism and no judicial interpretation of its scope, which has resulted in lawsuits seeking enforcement being dismissed on standing. As noted above, Trump’s first Office of Legal Counsel held that anti-nepotism prohibitions did not apply to the White House. Though the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) requires disclosure of foreign-agent relationships, it is narrowly construed and rarely enforced. And while Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) referred Kushner to the DOJ for possible FARA violations, no action was taken. Lastly, post-employment restrictions under 18 U.S.C. § 207 focus on lobbying communications, not investment relationships with foreign entities, and have no “cooling in” restrictions for those entering government from foreign-funded enterprises.

Proposed reforms

Build a foreign influence firewall

Beyond the codification of the foreign emoluments clause proposed above, Congress should take steps to prohibit presidential and familial enrichment from foreign government or government-controlled entities. This would prohibit the president, vice president, Cabinet members, senior White House staff, and all first-degree family members and their spouses from receiving any financial benefit, direct or indirect, from a foreign government, sovereign wealth fund, state-owned enterprise, or entity in which a foreign government holds more than a 5 percent ownership interest.

Given the breadth of foreign interests with which the Trump business empire engages, “financial benefit” should be broadly defined to include investments, licensing fees, real estate transactions, management fees, loan guarantees, gifts, copyright and patent receipts, and any form of cryptocurrency or digital asset transaction. Such a prohibition should include preventing family members from engaging in government activity for two years following their last covered engagement with such a foreign entity. Likewise, the prohibition from receiving such benefits should be extended to a four-year period, beyond the current one- and two-year prohibitions. Any transaction violating this prohibition would be void, and all proceeds would be subject to civil forfeiture.

These restrictions, including the four-year cooling-off period, are warranted. They are needed to address the examples illustrated by Jared Kushner’s post-service sovereign wealth fund deals and business deals between the Trump Organization and foreign governments while President Trump has been in office. Post-service restrictions are not new; for some with security clearances, for example, mandatory pre-publication reviews continue well after leaving the government. Adult family members of the president who hold no public office are the trickiest to cover as private citizens, even as they may be effectively cashing in on the president’s position with implicit or explicit promises of access or favorable official actions. These immediate family members of the president would be required to disclose all transactions with foreign governments and government-linked entities—and would also be subject to a punitive excise tax on income from these transactions.

Mandate sovereign wealth fund transparency requirements

If Congress is unable to enact the above prohibitions, it should instead enhance transparency requirements for any covered person receiving benefits from these foreign sovereigns or entities. The proposal would require any current or former senior government official—within four years of service—to obtain preapproval from the OGE before entering into any financial relationship with a foreign sovereign wealth fund, state-owned enterprise, or entity in which a foreign government holds more than 5 percent ownership—as well as require robust public disclosure of the terms of the relationship. The office should also be empowered to stop any transaction that could even create the appearance of impropriety or could threaten our nation’s national security.

Lastly, the intelligence community should be required to provide a counterintelligence assessment for any proposed relationship involving countries designated as strategic competitors. This proposal goes beyond mere disclosure requirements to create an active gatekeeping function that would prevent former officials and their families from benefiting from foreign sovereigns as a means of recompense for actions they may have taken during the officials’ times in office.

The problem

President Trump has issued more than 1,800 acts of clemency—pardons and sentence commutations—during his second term, many of which appear transactional in nature.⁶¹ Former DOJ pardon attorney Elizabeth Oyer, who was fired allegedly for refusing to recommend restoring a celebrity’s gun rights, asserts that pardons have become “transactional,” while lobbying firms reported a roughly eightfold jump in revenue from individuals seeking clemency from Trump.⁶² A number of individuals who have received pardons have been tied to Trump’s business entities or have either themselves or their families donated to his political vehicles.⁶³ While there is no direct evidence that these business entanglements or contributions resulted in granted clemency, the appearance of corruption remains highly concerning.

Why current law fails

Pardon power is among the broadest presidential authorities under Article II of the Constitution, as there is no statutory limitation except that it cannot apply to impeachment. Courts have consistently held that pardon power is virtually unreviewable, and there are no transparency requirements to the process. However, it has typically been understood that a president cannot pardon an act that has not yet occurred.

Proposed reforms

Create transparency and bribery statutes around pardons

While Congress cannot prohibit the president from granting pardons or clemency absent a constitutional amendment, it can take steps to require transparency around the process. Congress could require the president to submit a written certification for every pardon or commutation, published in the Federal Register within 48 hours, disclosing: a) the identity of every person who advocated for the pardon; b) any financial relationship between the pardon recipient and the president, the president’s family, the president’s businesses or organizations, or any campaign donor who contributed more than $10,000 to the president or a controlled political committee; c) whether the pardon recipient or any associate made any payment, gift, or commitment of value to any person connected to the president; and d) the specific public-interest justification for the pardon. While this would not prohibit pardons from occurring, it could make presidents hesitate to issue seemingly corrupt pardons.

Likewise, Congress could consider enacting bribery-related laws that would apply to payments made in exchange for presidential pardons. It could enact a statute stating that while a pardon cannot be contested, the conveyance of anything of value to the president or his immediate family, or businesses he has a substantial stake in, to induce such a pardon would constitute an illegal bribe for which the pardon recipient and the president would be criminally liable as an unofficial act. It could also amend the criminal code to find that a presidential pardon could be considered an ongoing act in a criminal conspiracy if it were the result of the conveyance of anything of value to the president. Lastly, Congress could place the transparency onus outlined above on the pardon recipient, creating a rebuttable presumption that undisclosed financial relationships are evidence of criminal wrongdoing, allowing for ongoing congressional and criminal investigation.

The second Trump administration has brought to light the glaring deficiencies in federal ethics and conflict-of-interest laws, which were lying dormant through the normative practices of past administrations—including the first Trump administration. The proposals in this report would help fill in these gaps, but Congress must keep in mind the need for innovative enforcement mechanisms, as the executive branch has shown that it is subject to manipulation and capture. Moving forward, it is imperative that Congress—and a president willing to fight corruption—take strong action to meet the American people’s demands to root out misconduct within the ranks of government and restore faith in the system.