Article

Global Ballistic Missile Arsenals, 2007

Key

Status
D: in development           
E: in process of elimination
O: operational
P: in production
R: retired
S: in storage
T: tested
U: used

Range
SLBM: submarine-launched ballistic missile
SRBM: short-range ballistic missile (<1,000 km)
MRBM: medium-range ballistic missile (1,000-3,000 km)
IRBM: intermediate-range ballistic missile (3,000-5,500 km)
ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile (> 5,500 km)

Origin
I: indigenous
INF Treaty: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
SAM: surface-to-air missile


Footnotes

1. In 1997 it was confirmed by an investigatory committee that Russia shipped 8 Scud launchers and 24 missiles to Armenia between 1992 and 1996. See Nikolai Novichkov, “Russia Details Illegal Deliveries to Armenia,” Janes Defense Weekly, April 16,1997, p. 15.

2. Belarus announced that they will acquire the Iskander-E from Russia by 2010. “Belarus to Acquire Russian Multi-Warhead Missiles by 2010,” Financial Times, 12 November 2004.

3. In December 2003, Libya privately pledged to the United States that it would eliminate all Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)- class missiles, that is, missiles that can travel over 300 kilometers with a payload of at least 500 kilograms. It was agreed, at the time, that the Scud-B missiles would be modified and kept for defensive purposes. See Paul Kerr, “Libya to Keep Limited Missile Force,” Arms Control Today, may 2004, p. 28. However, in September 2004, Paula DeSutter, assistant secretary of state for verification and compliance, testified before the House Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, saying, “Libya…has agreed to destroy its Scud-B missiles.” See “Completion of Verification Work in Libya,” Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, September 22, 2004. There have also been unconfirmed reports that Libya attempted to purchase No Dongs from North Korea prior to its December 2003 decisions to cease its pursuit of unconventional weapons. See www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/Missile/3834_html.

4. In December 2003, Libya privately pledged to the United States that it would eliminate all missiles covered by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), that is, missiles that can travel over 300 kilometers with a payload of at least 500 kilograms. It was agreed, at the time, that the Scud-B missiles would be modified and kept for defensive purposes. See Paul Kerr, “Libya to Keep Limited Missile Force,” Arms Control Today, may 2004, p. 28. However, in September 2004, Paula DeSutter, assistant secretary of state for verification and compliance, testified before the House Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, saying, “Libya…has agreed to destroy its Scud-B missiles.” See “Completion of Verification Work in Libya,” Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, September 22, 2004. There have also been unconfirmed reports that Libya attempted to purchase No Dongs from North Korea prior to its December 2003 decisions to cease its pursuit of unconventional weapons. See www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/Missile/3834_html.

5. An unidentified missile traveled 62 kilometers in a test firing on November 22, 2001. See Don Kirk, South Korea Launches Missile In Its First Test Since Las Year,” The New York Times, November 23, 2001.

6. The Jerusalem Post reported the development of an advanced Syrian modification of the Scud-C (which could possibly be the Scud-D tested in September of 2000), but this report has not been confirmed by Western sources. See Arieh O’Sullivan, “Syrian Super Scud Ready Soon—Source,” Jerusalem Post, September 16, 1999.

7. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Syria: Missile Capabilities.” Available at www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/syria/missile/print/4126_4127.prt.

8. Ibid.

9. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2007, p.373.

10. This program was reportedly initiated in autumn 1995 and is based on the Sky Bow II SAM.

11. Jane’s Defense Weekly reported March 26, 2001, that Taiwan had deployed up to 50 Tien Chi missiles on Tungyin Island and at an undisclosed second location.

13. In 1989, the United Arab Emirates reportedly attempted to purchase 25 Hwasong-5 (Scud-B variant) missiles from North Korea. According to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the UAE was not happy with the missiles and they were never operationalized. There is no publicly available evidence to confirm these reports, however. See the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies “A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK.” Available http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op2/fbmsl.htm.

Footnotes

1. See “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat” March 2006, Page 20. See also, “Dhanush Missile Test-Fired,” The Hindu, 31 March 2007. Available: http://www.hindu.com/2007/03/31/stories/2007033103761300.htm

2. “Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat.” National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC), Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. March 2006. Page 20. The Indian government first acknowledged the existence of the Sagrika in October 1998, identifying it as a 250-350-kilometer sea-launched cruise missile derived from the Pithvi. Other sources maintained that the Sagrika program also contained a ballistic missile division. US reports have classified it as an SLBM.

3. Pres Information Bureau, Government of India. Available: http://pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=2250

4. See Siddharth Srivastava, “India Has China in its Range.” Asia Times Online, 14 April 2007. Available: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ID14Df01.html. The Agni III is cited as having payload capacity of 1.5 tons, which converts to 1,361 kg.

5. See “Surya” at Global Security.org. Available: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/india/surya.htm. See also, “India to Develop Intercontinental Ballistic Missile.” Deccan Herald, 25 August 2005. Available: http://www.deccanherald.com/deccanherald/Aug252005/index2032552005824.asp

6. DOD reported that Iran also produces a 200-kilometer “Zezal” missile and a 150 kilometer “Nazeat” missile, which may be variations of its “Mushak” series. Iran has also tried to acquire a complete North Korean No Dong system and the Chinese M-9 and M-11 missiles.

7. Ali Akbar Dareni, “Iran Successfully Test-Fires Missile,” Associated Press, 6 September 2002. See also http://www.missilethreat.com/missilesoftheworld/id.177/missile_detail.asp.

8. “Iran Test-Fires Long Range Missile.” Associated Press, reproduced in The Jerusalem Post. 23 May 2006. Available: http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1148287850178.Reports on later Shahab III tests are conflicting, possible Shahab-III test in November 2006. See Nasser Karimi, “Iran Test-Fires Longer Range Missile.”Associated Press, 2 November 2006. Available: http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D8L58JJ00&show_article=1.

9. See the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies “Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East: Israel” web page, at http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/israel.htm.

10. See “North Korea Tests Long Range Missile.” BBC News. Available http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5148648.stm.

11. See “Pakistan tests Hatf-II missile.” The Hindu, 4 March 2007. Available http://www.hindu.com/2007/03/04/stories/2007030406400100.htm

12. See “Pakistan Tests Short-Range Hatf III.” Reported by BBC and reproduced on Claremont Institute’s Missile Threat.com. Available http://www.missilethreat.com/archives/id.4131/detail.asp.

13. Agence France-Press, “Pakistan Test-Fires Nuclear-Capable Missile.” Available http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Pakistan_Test_Fires_Nuclear_Capable_Missile_999.html. Pakistan announced “serial production” of this missile in October 2000

14. Associated Press, “Pakistan test-fires medium-range missile.” Posted on MSNBC website, 16 Nov 2006. Available http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15753362/.

15. Seiff, Martin, “Pakistan Tests Shaheen Missile.” United Press International, 10 May 2006. The Shaheen II was tested two weeks prior to the May launch, on April 29 2006. See “Pakistan Stages New Missile Test.” BBC News, 29 April 2007. Available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4957218.stm.

16. Missiles were purchased from China in 1987. The Missiles were operationally deployed only once, and are likely no longer operational as the arsenal is aging and would take substantial efforts to maintain.

Footnotes

1. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Chinese Nuclear Forces, 2006.” Prepared by the Natural Resources Defense Council.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid. See also Jim Manion, “China Ballistic Missile Submarine Force Growing.” AFP, 2 March 2007. Available: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/China_Ballistic_Missile_Submarine_Force_Growing_999.html

5. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “French Nuclear Forces, 2005.” Prepared by the Natural Resources Defense Council.

6. Ibid.

7. “Russia’s Missile Forces Successfully Launch SS-18 ICBM Satan.” RIA Novosti. 21 December 2006. Available http://en.rian.ru/russia/20061221/57488612.html.

8. “Nuclear Missile Testing Galore,” Federation of Atomic Scientists. 30 January 2007. Available http://www.gather.com/viewArticle.jsp?articleId=281474976893500

9. Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2007.” Prepared by the Natural Resources Defense Council.

10. “Nuclear Missile Testing Galore,” FAS, 30 January 2007.

11. Ibid.

12. Recent tests of the Bulava have been failures, and the deployment date has been pushed back several times. The Bulava failed in tests on September 7, 2006, October 25, 2006, and again on December 24, 2006. See Richard Weitz, “Russian Missile Test failure Increases Fears of Nuclear ‘Hair-Trigger.'” World Politics Watch, 10 November 2006. Available http://www.worldpoliticswatch.com/article.aspx?id=329. See also “Nuclear Missile Testing Galore,” FAS. Available http://www.gather.com/viewArticle.jsp?articleId=281474976893500.

13. Hans M. Kristensen, “Britain’s Next Nuclear Era,” Strategic Security Blog, 7 December 2006. Available http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2006/12/britains_next_nuclear_era_1.php

14. The Minute Man III missile may have a range of up to 13,000 kilometers, but the U.S. Strategic Command officially lists its range at “greater than” 9,650 kilometers. See www.stratcom.mil/factsheetshtml/submarines.htm.

15. See “Nuclear Missile Testing Galore,” FAS. Available http://www.gather.com/viewArticle.jsp?articleId=281474976893500.

16. Ibid. The Trident II D-5 may have a range greater than 7,400 kilometers, but this is the U.S. Strategic Command’s officially listed range. Available www.stratcom.mil/factsheetshtml/submarines.htm.

The positions of American Progress, and our policy experts, are independent, and the findings and conclusions presented are those of American Progress alone. A full list of supporters is available here. American Progress would like to acknowledge the many generous supporters who make our work possible.