

Center for American Progress



PANEL DISCUSSION:

“THE BIG PICTURE: A UNIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY BUDGET”

INTRODUCTION:

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FEATURING:

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IN DISCUSSION WITH:

**THOMAS DONNELLY, RESEARCH FELLOW,
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LAWRENCE KORB: My name is Larry Korb and I have a dual appointment. I am a senior fellow here at the Center for American Progress, and also a senior advisor to the Center for Defense Information, which is one of the co-sponsors today. And to say a few words about CDI, I'd like to ask Drew Portacerra to come up and tell you a little bit about them.

DREW PORTACERRA: Thanks, Larry. Good morning. I am Drew Portacerra, vice president for the Center for Defense Information, and we're pleased to have partnered with the Center for American Progress and Foreign Policy in Focus on this important and timely report.

The Center for Defense Information has a 30-year tradition of research and publication on issues that relate to U.S. and international security policy. It draws on experts from academia, former military officers, and former civilian policymakers in providing analysis and fostering thoughtful debate on issues such as nuclear weapons, space security, child soldiers, and the U.S. defense budget and reform, which is what we are here today about.

One example of our work to hold up is *Honing the Sword*, written by one of your co-presenters here today, Marcus Corbin. And I point it out as it is a strategy and forces after 9/11, and we have some copies right outside, too, if you're interested in picking that up on your way out.

CDI is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that accepts no government funding in its work. I'd like to join our partners in expressing our thanks to our core supporters on this project: the Proteus Fund and the Educational Foundation of America. And also thank additional sponsors: the Arca, the Columbia, the Ford, MacArthur, the Rubin, and the Town Creek Foundations.

Thanks very much. Thanks, Larry.

EMIRA WOODS: Thank you, Larry. Good morning, everyone. I am Emira Woods with Foreign Policy in Focus and I first want to thank CAP for welcoming us today and for having this session this morning and to thank all of you for joining us quite early on a Monday morning, so welcome.

Foreign Policy in Focus is a think tank without walls, we like to call it. Our brain trust is over 600 writers that present progressive analysis on U.S. foreign policy, so we do a range of research and action on issues like development in military policy. We do issues also on counterterrorism and on Iraq. We have a report on the mounting costs of the war in Iraq, which is available on our website www.fpif.org. We ask you especially

to join with us this week as we will be celebrating two new books on trade with the Institute for Policy Studies, and also our other partner organization, the International Relations Center is celebrating its 25th anniversary with the launch of a new framework document called *Global Good Neighbors*, which is a new framework on U.S. foreign policy. So, please look to our website and continue to join us and actually join with me right now in congratulating both Miriam and Marcus for the superb research that they have done not only this year, but in previous years as well – doing the number crunching, doing the analysis and actually doing the advocacy to bring change to U.S. foreign policy. So welcome, and thank you Larry.

MR. KORB: Thank you very much, Emira. As many of you know or if some of you have been here before, the Center for American Progress is a full-time think tank trying to promote progressive ideas that will enhance the security and wellbeing of the American people.

What we are going to talk about today is a unified national security budget. Ever since those horrible events of September 11th, we know that national security means more than just the offensive component of the Department of Defense. It also involves defense, which is primarily the province of the Department of Homeland Security, and prevention, which is primarily funded through the State Department budget. And here today we are going to talk about whether in fact we are spending enough in total on the unified national security budget, whether we have the right mix, the right balance. And as Emira just mentioned, this is the second year in a row in which this report has been put out and you have copies of it in your folder and I urge you if you haven't read it to please read it carefully and today you will hear different presentations and perspectives on it.

I've been – to show, as they would say, full disclosure, I have been a member of the taskforce that's worked on this for the last two years, as has been my colleague here at the center, P.J. Crowley. So with that background in mind, let me first ask Miriam Pemberton, who is a research fellow at Foreign Policy in Focus, and you have just heard about that and she and Marcus have co-chaired the taskforce for the last two years that has produced this budget. Miriam's writing has focused on federal budget priorities, military spending, and the economic cost of the war in Iraq. She holds a Ph.D. from the University of Michigan. So, Miriam, welcome.

MIRIAM PEMBERTON: Thanks very much, Larry, and thanks again to the Center for American Progress for organizing and hosting this event. So now we have a budget resolution this year laying out overall spending priorities up until – spending levels up until the year 2010. This is progress of a sort since we haven't had one of these for the last two years. The actual text, if you read it, gives you a lot of numbers plus a very odd grab bag of priorities tacked onto the end, spelled out in words: priorities like making sure that we have at least two shipyards to build the DDX destroyer.

What we don't get is any text laying out whatever agreements the conferees might have reached about what the overall security priorities should be. Should we spend more, for example, on the dream of building a missile shield over the United States or should

we spend more on strengthening security systems against what most experts believe is the far more likely delivery system that a terrorist group would use for a weapon of mass destruction onto American soil, like, for example the 90 to 95 percent of containers that come into our ports un-inspected every day? Should our forces be focusing more on maintaining the capability to wage another Iraq-style preventive war or should they be retraining and reconfiguring to strengthen their capacity for counterterrorism and peacekeeping operations? Should we be focusing more money on increasing what's called strategic depth by building the next generation of fighter jets and submarines not because somebody is challenging the one's we have, but because somebody someday might or should we be redoubling our efforts to secure the stockpiles of nuclear materials in Russia and elsewhere that every day remain vulnerable to theft by terrorists groups?

When does Congress look at the numbers from last year across the spectrum of military and non-military security programs and discuss how they might want to adjust the balance to make us more secure? We learned from this budget resolution that budget authority for the National Defense Account will be about \$411 billion in the year 2006 and that the budget for international affairs, which includes spending on diplomacy, nonproliferation, and foreign aid, among other things, will be about \$31 billion; that is less than a tenth as much.

By 2010, budget authority for the military will rise to \$513 billion, an increase of about 25 percent in nominal terms, while spending on international affairs will stay stuck at about \$34 billion through 2010. Are these the right priorities? Is this the right balance for our security dollars? Behind closed doors does Congress even consider such questions? Certainly the way the budget is constructed and the committees are structured doesn't lend itself to or encourage that conversation.

Last year Congress did commission others to have that conversation. The 9/11 Commission thought broadly and productively about increasing U.S. security and how to do it. One of their main contributions was to expand conventional notions of the tools necessary to do the job. They concluded that making Americans safer depends not only on military forces but also on increasing investments in such non-military tools as diplomacy and international economic development. Terrorism is not caused by poverty, the commissions report said, yet when people lose hope, when societies break down, when countries fragment, the breeding grounds for terrorism are created. Congress accepted the report and then went back to doing budgeting the way they have always done it: thinking about military spending in one committee and international affairs in another and homeland security somewhere else.

The administration could help matters. They could facilitate broader thinking on security by preparing a single security budget for Congress that pulls together in one place the funding levels for the military, international affairs, intelligence, homeland security, and a few other programs such as the nuclear and nuclear nonproliferation programs in the Energy Department. This might help the Congress to see the problem whole and to do it's budgeting accordingly.

With the idea of sort of encouraging all this to happen, Marcus and I assembled a team of security experts, as Larry mentioned, to work up a model for it in what we have called the Unified Security Budget. We found when we did it that the fiscal year 2006 budget request allocates seven times as many resources for military forces as for all non-military security tools including nonproliferation, diplomacy, economic development, as well as homeland security, put together. This exercise revealed some interesting things. Back in December at the president's first post-election address on foreign policy up in Ottawa an aide reported to the press of the gains made in the global war on terror by military force in Afghanistan and Iraq would now be secured by a greater emphasis on diplomacy in the second term. Secretary Rice has been declaring over and over that the time of diplomacy is now.

If you follow the money, though, you get a different picture. The president's budget for diplomacy actually gets less money this year – the year of diplomacy – than it got in 2004. In the foreign policy debate during the campaign, the president and his opponent agreed that the top U.S. foreign policy priority should be containing the spread of weapons of mass destruction around the world. Having spent upwards of \$200 billion seeking these weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that turned out not to exist, the president's budget proposes spending less than \$2 billion in 2006 in total on WMD nonproliferation. In a discretionary budget of \$800-plus billion about \$440 billion of which will go to the military, \$2 billion is hardly spending commensurate with the label “top priority.”

A budget process worthy of the name would begin by looking at the security task whole and deciding what the broad priorities should be. It would take to heart the 9/11 Commission's recommendation for increasing investment in non-military security tools. It would take a security budget that is militarized by a factor of seven to one and rebalance it.

So our unified security budget illustrates how this could be done. We identify and justify \$53 billion, about, in cuts to unnecessary military programs. These include savings on major weapon systems like the F-22 fighter jet, the Virginia class submarine, the DDX destroyer, the nuclear weapons complex, missile defense, and so on. Our budget redirects a little over 40 billion to such neglected non-military security tools as contributions to international peacekeeping, a new conflict response fund in the State Department, and key homeland security priorities like chemical plant security and public health infrastructure. \$50 billion is not a very deep cut in a roughly \$515 billion security budget, but this relatively modest shift would change a seven to one imbalance into a better balance of four to one. It seems worth doing.

Bill Clinton has a good line that he is using these days; I heard him say it just two weeks ago while visiting my daughter at her college in Rhode Island and he gave this speech and he said, “If you live in a world where you cannot kill, occupy, or imprison all your actual or potential adversaries, you have to try to build a world with more friends and fewer terrorists.” If you accept that, you would have to think that the current trajectory represented in the budget resolution – the defense budget climbing 25 percent

in nominal terms over the next 5 years and the international affairs budget sort of a leveling off and staying flat during that time less; than one-tenth the size – you would have to think that this trajectory is not headed in the right direction. It will make an already extremely militarized foreign policy even more so.

So we have made this effort to start a mostly missing conversation on what overall balance of security spending will do the most to keep us all safe. We see this as a sort of dry run for the conversation that we hope Congress will begin having on an annual basis. The year of the Quadrennial Defense Review would obviously be a great time to open up the discussion of security spending to include a range of non-military tools. It would be good for us all if the process included more attention to the big picture before getting down into the weeds.

Thanks.

MR. KORB: Thank you very much, Miriam.

Our next speaker is Marcus Corbin, who for the last five years has been on his second tour of the Center for Defense Information. I guess it's sort of like the military: you go out – (laughter). And in addition to that he has worked for the Federation of American Scientists, the Project on Government Oversight, the World Bank, and the National Security Archive. So Marcus, welcome.

MR. CORBIN: Thanks, Larry. Thanks for having us. Miriam has talked about the process inside the beltway. I think I'd like to mainly focus in these brief remarks on the picture outside the beltway and you all have the report. I'm sure in the Q&A we'll get into some of the details in there but I will step beyond it. We did call for a \$53 billion reduction in the defense budget. Strangely enough, the budget resolution didn't reflect this; it was just passed. (Laughs.)

This is an ambitious proposal and we recognize that, given the political scene in Washington, but I would argue this is only the Washington political scene. In February, the Program on International Policy Attitudes did an excellent poll: this was a budget exercise where they gave the president's budget request to the sample of citizens and asked them to develop their own budget proposal with specific changes, specific line items in various categories. This was a redistribution that the respondents were not allowed to add hundreds of billions of dollars for their pet project. And the result was a one-third cut in the defense budget – one third – \$134 billion. This was also – a cut was also the product of 65 percent of the respondents: two thirds of them. Defense was the top item and then separately there was a category for Iraq and Afghanistan that was cut also. The third item that was cut – third largest – was transportation at \$13 billion.

Now, this is just one poll, but this was a regular nationwide sample; the sample is representative of the demographics of the nation and in my view the program in International Policy Attitudes does some of the best polling on foreign affairs out there. They are in-depth. They don't just ask one question, they ask three questions. They see

where people – not just what they think now, but what makes their opinions move. They try to get behind some of the simple questions you see in the media polls all the time.

Most impressive to me was the average cut among Republican respondents was \$70 billion. So in comparison, we are being relatively cautious, I'd say, at only \$53 here. The respondents also on average increased funding, as we call for, on the international affairs side and homeland security side. The support for those increases was much softer and often it was a minority asking for a big increase, so that produced an average increase, but the support was much softer, but still they accepted the basic principle of a (shift?).

It was interesting – the poll didn't just ask for the overall military budget number, they got into what people thought should be – the money should be spent on within the budget, and I was pleased to see some reflection of the directions we go in. The respondents generally disfavored large numbers of conventional weapons and new versions of them and they were interested first and foremost among the respondents in preserving and increasing salaries and personnel accounts for the military, but also they supported preserving or increasing the number of troops, intelligence programs, special operations forces, peacekeeping operations, counterinsurgency type programs. Anyway, it's a fascinating poll and I really suggest that people look at it because it shows that if the numbers in this report are ambitious, I think they are only ambitious because Washington has a strange disconnect from the nation's political reality now.

Two thirds also felt in this poll that spending should be set at a level that defends the United States and only defends others in conjunction with allies and the UN, and I mention that because that brings up some of the broader issues about really realigning our national securities strategy, really going after the fundamentals of what our strategy is, re-examining them because we get into some of that in this report, but in our view this report is not really a bottom-up reexamination of U.S. military strategy particularly and how we fight.

The obvious issue there is the allies and the role of allies and how much we take advantage of their capabilities and we can get into that more, but I think there is more that can be looked at in here. I mean, we really looked at doing similar types of activities, what we were doing now, but trying to remove what we saw as some of the less relevant programs and freeing up resources for more relevant within the military budget as well as overall.

I think I will leave it at that right now. I welcome your questions later.

MR. KORB: Thank you very much, Marcus. Some 30 – more years ago than I care to remember when I first came to this town, I came to an organization called the American Enterprise Institute. I think they probably want me to forget that I was there, but I did run their defense policy studies and I am pleased to welcome Tom Donnelly, who is a resident fellow at AEI and a terrific author and writer. And I guess having been through graduate school and all that, I think if you – what we ought to do if we really

want to train people in Ph.D.s to get out and write so people will understand, we ought to have them serve some time on newspapers, which Tom has. He was the editor of the *Army Times* and deputy editor of *Defense News*. He has also been on the Hill. He was a professional staff member of the Committee for National Security and I would say a prolific writer. Every time I checked AEI's website or open my mail I get something else that Tom has written.

And his recent book is a terrific book: *Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Strategic Assessment*. I had to read it because Tom and I debated around the country this fall about whether we have been safer since after 9/11. I don't know who won the debates, but all the states we went to Kerry lost the election, so I guess Tom did a pretty good job.

Tom, welcome. We thank you for coming and look forward to your comments.

THOMAS DONNELLY: Thank you, Larry. We do want you to remember that you were once an AEI fellow, just to contemplate how far a man has fallen. (Laughter.) So thanks for inviting me to kibitz and comment on this report. I would argue, although I'm about to express a number of disagreements with it, is a spark to a debate that's in my mind very much required, not least among those on my end of the political spectrum who, if nothing else, tend to accept what this administration – the direction that it's headed in regard to the means of our defense and our security in ways that I find it a little bit disturbing.

I would begin with the observation that there is a huge gap between the kind of world actually which is a rather liberal, but traditionally American view of what the international order should be that the president has devoted a lot of effort to setting forth, but whether the governmental means or even the military means necessary to realize that set of goals or that vision of a decent international life is adequate is a very good question, so I certainly commend CDI for going right at the essential issue.

That having been said, I will now do my knuckle-dragger imitation and just hit off about a handful of things that I think are worthy of further debate. And I will begin at the top with this rather, it seems to me, promiscuous definition of what security is. This is a notion that there is this all-encompassing view of what our national security is that's sort of been part of our public dialogue since the end of the Cold War. The report asserts that the debate has shifted. I would say actually the debate has shifted, but exactly in the opposite direction from what the report recommends. It wasn't so long ago, and particularly during the 1990s we tried to stuff all kinds of programs from combating AIDS and other elements like economic development into a national security framework.

It didn't mean that these programs weren't worthy of funding or appropriate international commitments and priorities for the United States, but to try to make everything national security essentially at the end of the day totally devalues the definition of what security is. And I would argue very strenuously that what we mean by security is really physical security and that military force remains by far the dominant contributor to that. And while it's a useful exercise to lump these things all together, and

I certainly understand the political desire to increase spending for diplomacy and other-than-military forms of international programs, I think we do ourselves a disservice by and confuse ourselves by insisting that things like public health infrastructure or economic development are rightly understood as real national security issues. Again, that doesn't mean that they aren't wise investments, but we should be pretty clear and try to keep our columns straight or else we will get further confused than we are.

Secondly, I have to critique the proposal for what amounts to, even by Marcus's numbers, a cut in military spending at a time of war. Any way you look at it, take away 50 add 40 means net minus 13 and certainly in my judgment, and certainly if we read the newspapers on a daily basis, the force that we have is rather dangerously stretched by the missions that we've given them. Unless you presume that those commitments and those missions are going to end tomorrow or go away rapidly, I would argue quite strenuously that we are under-spending in time of war and further that trying to slip darn close to a \$100 billion within the emergency supplemental category so it doesn't count for deficit purposes is good if you are simply buying beans and bullets and resupplying the force that already exists, but a one-year budgetary horizon is no way to plan to realign, transform, or even simply expand the force to meet the missions that we have given it.

One other further sort of budget wonk question, and I will try to phrase it in the form of that question, but it strikes me that all the cuts that are outlined in the reports are procurement spending cuts; not really a surprise, but a dollar cut in procurement is not dollar saved in the unit that the cut is made. Procurement programs and research programs even more so tend to spread their spending out or their allocated spending or their budget authority over a number of years. So whether the numbers add up simply in a green eyeshade budgetary sense is some thing I would like to hear Marcus elaborate on. And so the question is whether measured in budgetary outlays, which is really what counts for deficit in budgetary terms, that the puts and takes even come close to canceling them out. I would be willing to wager a small bet for a beer, which is sort of, you know, the kind of the realm in my household, that in fact the savings could well outstrip – or pardon me, the spending could outstrip the savings.

A couple of quick points further about the military side of the report. In the section that addresses realigning or rebalancing the forces toward counterterrorism missions – two things, actually three things to remark about that. The variety of things that we ask our forces to do in a global sense is a far greater variety and far larger extent than simple counterterrorism. And I would argue actually if you sort of step back from the rhetoric and look what we have actually done in response to September 11th, what the global war on terrorism has actually been has been a number of defensive measures taken at home and two rather traditional wars – invade and occupy and reconstruct kind of wars – in Afghanistan and Iraq. And its not because everything that we look at – you know, we're not in this position of being a hammer where everything looks like a nail.

In fact, if you really want to deal with the problem as the 9/11 Commission described it of a terrorist sanctuary, you have to deal with the larger political problems in the Middle East and the regimes that form the larger framework for that problem. So

even the counterterrorism war as we understand it is really more like a conventional military operation than rhetoric and public imagination would allow.

And in terms of the report, to describe Afghanistan as a counterterrorism operation is quite incorrect. I was in Afghanistan about two months ago for the space of about a month and as the report notes, there are now about 20,000 U.S. soldiers there. That's far larger than the number necessary to invade or topple the Taliban or indeed to push the al Qaeda forces to the border lines between Afghanistan and Pakistan. But the overwhelming number of our forces there are involved in stability operations or a reconstruction operation – whatever term of that you want to use – and that's what accounts for the large number of forces, and there is simply no other way to accomplish that mission. It is inherently a manpower-intensive mission.

So, again, unless you – if you have this sort of Rumsfeldian idea that we're going to flit about the globe like Peter Pan from outer space zapping Osama bin Laden-like bad guys, that's the easy part, but if you really want to change the political culture in Afghanistan and Iraq, you've got to be there in large numbers for a long period of time.

A final sort of, again, green eyeshade kibitz, there is – naturally, no defense budget report can have a license unless that it addresses the alleged practice of waste in the Defense Department. I'm not trying to argue that there is no waste in the Defense Department; I am trying to say that it is there because it's a political process and not really a business process. The report quotes Secretary Rumsfeld as saying he estimates there's about 5 percent of waste in the Pentagon budget. Nobody can quantify this and nobody has been able to get rid of it. When you have the Congress mandating that there shall be two shipyards capable of building large surface combatants, that's totally legitimate politics, but there is a cost associated with that in the defense budget. So whether that's waste or just simply an ineradicable inefficiency I leave to people more savvy than me. I would just note that the attempts to eliminate waste from military spending has been going on longer than I've been alive and has defeated some of the most intelligent business minds, people like David Packard, that this country has ever produced.

Finally, I wanted to hit two points in regard to the recommended program of changes for nonmilitary security, to use the language of the report. First of all, the question of investment in international institutions and I think most obviously and centrally the United Nations, and I think quite rightly the report among other things singles out Sudan as a case of something that international community, so to speak, in kind of a generic sense, needs to address. But, again, whether the United Nations is an adequate tool to address the killing in Darfur, which we Americans have described as genocide, I think is quite difficult to argue. To get a UN Security Council resolution when the Peoples Republic of China remains a great-power sponsor of the regime in Khartoum has been a rather frustrating and – it is a prospect that is going nowhere.

And in fact what's really needed in Sudan is not so much peacekeeping, because there is no peace to keep because the central government is prosecuting a second

genocidal war in two decades – having just come to a conclusion with the conflict in the south of Sudan has sort of turned to Darfur in the west of Sudan. And the only way – if you are serious about stopping this slaughter in Sudan, the UN is not going to be an adequate tool to do that and the thing that is necessary, the only thing that this regime has shown itself really likely to respond to, is either military pressure or direct military force; so, again, good ambitions, but things that are not really relevant to actually accomplishing something in Sudan.

Finally, and I'm sorry for going on so long, but I did want to –

MR. KORB: You sound like a democrat, Tom, with all the –

(Cross talk, laughter.)

MR. DONNELLY: Well, somebody has to be the real liberal in this panel and – (laughter).

MR. KORB: No, I'm talking about all the “finally”s. (Laughter.)

MR. DONNELLY: Oh, okay. Okay. Well, again, so I'll just be real quick. These sort of proposals for a stabilization and reconstruction account that is allegedly not tied to regime change I think again sort of gets the priorities backwards. First of all, we are spending tens of billions of dollars in Iraq and Afghanistan for stabilizing and reconstructing and actually creating representative governments where they really haven't been very much. And the idea that conversely we would do such work in cases where, (a), we didn't have a serious security interest, and (b) without putting a political litmus test on the nature of the government to whom we are giving the money – I mean, I would not be real interested in stabilizing or reconstructing Robert Mugabe's regime, for example – again I think just sort of highest priority is backwards.

So I will conclude there and I appreciate the indulgence of the panel and the chair.

MR. KORB: Thank you very much, Tom. Miriam and Marcus, Tom has raised a number of significant points about the study. I'll give each of you a couple of minutes to respond to some of the points that he has raised before we put it on to the audience. Miriam?

MS. PEMBERTON: Okay, just a couple of things. With respect to the argument that we've really expanded our notion of security beyond its normal bounds and we've created this very loose definition that doesn't really bear much relationship to reality, I guess I'd come back with what I read in *Defense News* about a report that secretary Rumsfeld commissioned about 20 months ago. He was frustrated that he didn't have any what he called metrics for the war on terror, figuring out if we were winning or not, and so he commissioned a longtime consultant to come up with the metrics and figure out what we're – were we winning and what should we do to win. And although the report is still classified, the *Defense News* article reported some preliminary findings from – and

talked to the consultant and what they reported was that 17 months after this study was commissioned, Pentagon officials are still in the dark about how to measure this war, but they have come to see the war on terrorism as a war of ideas as much as one of kinetics in which changing minds and managing perceptions is as important as killing or capturing terrorists; and that U.S. strategy should incorporate not only conventional military force, but also military and police actions, political and economic reform, and winning hearts and minds.

Those of us who are old enough in this room will remember that phrase very well from Vietnam and I think the lesson of Vietnam as well as what we are going through now is that when you are bombing a country with one arm of policy, you are making an extreme challenge to win hearts and minds with the other.

One other thing that this consultant said was that the United States should be carefully using the term “global war on terrorism” because using the word war to describe the nation’s anti-terror campaign may prejudice the tactics toward more martial options. So I think he was saying terrorism is a serious problem, but it is not one that is primarily solvable by the use of military force. It does involve a whole range of military and nonmilitary tools and actions and we have seen what happens, I think very currently and recently, when the main focus of resources and energy is unilateral regime change by military force.

You know, the point on Sudan – I was wondering if Emira would care to comment. She has been working very directly on that issue and on the ways and means of stabilizing that situation. I don’t know, do you have anything to add?

MR. KORB: Why don’t you do it when we do the questions.

MS. WOODS: Okay.

MR. KORB: When we do the questions I will let – I will recognize you because I think that’s an important point.

MS. WOODS: Okay.

MR. KORB: Okay, Marcus, you used to be with the Project on Government Oversight. Do you have anything to say about Tom’s comment about waste?

MR. CORBIN: Well, and also I believe we have Eric Miller in the audience here somewhere who can chime in. I think, basically on waste that it’s gotten worse. That’s my take: that it is not just the same standard level of waste continuing over the years, but it is getting much worse and getting to crisis proportions. There was a story few weeks back about cost overruns, no surprise, but this wasn’t cost overruns on nuclear powered submarines or aircraft, the next design of aircraft carriers. This was on ammunition ships, which are pretty basic by military standards and General Dynamics was having tremendous trouble meeting the cost projections. And, you know, there is a rationale;

there's this, there's that. They can always give you a story, but one of the problems was they underestimated the amount of paint to go on the ship. They put paint on the ships in Nelson's navy, so that this could happen now is a testament to me that they're just isn't sufficient prioritization at the top to fix the problem.

Now, yeah, Congress is a big part of the problem we know, but it does take executive branch leadership to really make it a high enough priority. Now, obviously you're in a war: you don't have time for everything, so cut them a bit of slack. And we didn't ask for all the waste to be eliminated next year, but I think it does need more attention.

I think the broader point, which is good, about cutting in wartime – and I think we tried to free up funds more for the war and less for past or future wars, you could say. A lot of our cuts are procurement based and our pitch in there is that the weapons that we go after are specifically not too relevant now and that the funds may be better needed in other areas, particularly fighting the war we have right now. We usually don't include the \$100-odd billion a year we're spending for Iraq and Afghanistan in these numbers and next year is quite an unknown, but if you do cut the programs, you will free up more money sooner or later. The budget outlay – budget authority versus outlays issue is important if you are a defense comptroller. I think these are basically budget authority numbers, so what it basically means is in terms of outlays – what you actually spend during the fiscal year – you may not get that full level of savings in the first year, but you do get the savings in later years as the spending profile goes into future years.

We do – the point is well taken about counterterrorism and that military activities are not – should not just be counterterrorism, however you define that. And we do – we are supportive of more than just a strict counterterrorism. If you look at what really goes to strict counterterrorism operations like raids on terrorist cells somewhere around the world or bombing strikes on them, it's really a tiny share of the overall military budget. If you expand your definition of what counterterrorism is into perhaps regime change or going into a country in a big way, then you can start to pull in a whole lot more things, programs, into the counter – what you are calling counterterrorism, but in general we don't try to eliminate all activities in the military but counterterrorism. There is still a role for – we would argue, even strong role for peacekeeping-type activities.

And the case can be made that we perhaps go too far in not preparing for future major conventional war scenarios. You know, that's the thrust here: less spending on that; more on today's type of conflicts. I would mainly argue that with such a very large research and development budget and which has increased enormously under this administration and before September 11th without getting much attention – I would say that even with such a large R&D budget, we can still trim back some spending for preparing for the future and still have a very robust program.

I guess I'll leave it at that.

MR. KORB: Tom, any final comments before we go out to the audience?

MR. DONNELLY: Oh, no. I will pass.

MR. KORB: Well, then let me ask you one quick question here before – you said you shouldn't be cutting defense spending in time of war and – but isn't this the first war we have ever run where we've cut taxes? Does that concern you – the federal deficit?

MR. DONNELLY: Well, yes, but there's more reason among many others I'm in the think tank world and not in this administration. But to me these are sequential issues. You know, at the same time, the reason – I mean the initial reasons that United States took on a national debt was for the purposes of fighting a war. I mean, wars are sort of traditionally thought to be long-term investments, if you will, just strictly from a fiscal sense and I would hate to lose the war and kind of – you know, because the accountants say that we need to balance the budget. Further, even allowing for expanded military spending over the last couple of years to fight the war, it still only adds up about 4.5 percent of American GDP, which to me is not what I would call a massive sacrifice, even at sort of Cold War levels or Vietnam War levels or certainly World War II type levels.

So again, I would go back to my initial point that there is a gap between our ambitious rhetoric and our ambitious strategy and the resources which we're willing to devote to achieving those goals. And I would also allow that some of them are non-military, but again I don't want to sort of cut off my nose to spite my face in order to increase perhaps useful spending on diplomacy or other programs.

MR. KORB: Thank you. Thank you very much. Well, you have been a very patient audience. We would like now to turn the program over to you. If you have a question, please raise your hand and Antoine will bring in the microphone around and if you would be so kind as to identify yourself, we'd certainly appreciate that.

Our tradition here is to give first priority to the media, since you have a job to do and deadlines. Does anybody from the media have a question that you would like to raise before we go to the rest of the audience? Going once, twice. Okay, then we will go in in order. Go right here first.

Q: Yeah. Thank you. John Cavanagh from the Institute for Policy Studies. Another thing that Tom Donnelly said was that we need more military spending for the military to do what we asked to do, and I am curious – there is a table on page 10 of this report that you've all seen before, but always knocks me over, and it shows U.S. military spending – you know, about a quarter more than all of our allies put together. And you look down on the list to these are the other countries that are now becoming major economic challengers of the U.S. – China is on there – much, much less. And I notice India, which is also catching up economically, isn't even on there.

So my question is, in the context of a world in which in effect we are giving our major allies a huge economic advantage and they don't spend anywhere near on the military what we do, they are catching up. Our superpower status is being threatened. I

guess the question would be, how much longer can we afford to spend this much and I would throw it back to all of you too. I think the report tries to say that you can make cuts and still keep America more safe and secure and I like to throw that to you, Mr. Donnelly, as well. Where do you think we can cut in a short, medium, or long term and keep the United States as safe and secure as we need to?

MR. KORB: Okay. Well, there's two issues there I guess: the amount that we spend compared to other people and then – so, okay, Tom, you want to –

MR. DONNELLY: Yeah, this chart is a classic example of how – it's chartology at its highest form. It's interesting; they are interesting statistics – they tell as absolutely nothing. First of all, take the allies spending figure. You would think that if our allies were spending, I guess, close to \$300 billion a year, you know, what they have to show for that is an almost useless military force, and that includes Western European allies especially.

The German's Bundeswehr for example, the primary bulk of its spending goes to pay for conscript soldiers who serve about six months and to continue to subsidize the German aircraft and defense in history. So they are building things that are utterly useless in terms of power projection. They are still – I mean, if you want a snapshot of a Cold War military, the German army is a perfect example of it. You know, even if the Germans agreed with us that fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan were a good thing, they'd be utterly incapable of it, so they're spending a whole lot of money in getting zero useful value in return.

On the other end of the spectrum, the China figure needs to be deconstructed pretty heavily and considering these come from OMB numbers, I am not surprising – I mean, it's not really a problem of the report per se because (those statistics are?) an official number. Chinese numbers – budgetary numbers do not include personal spending; our number does. So what China, quote, unquote, "pays it's soldiers" is not reflected in this figure, nor does it – nor are these numbers adjusted for purchasing power. So when you come down to it, China at this point is darn close to about \$80 billion a year in terms of what its non-personnel military budgets are. But, you know, in other words the People's Liberation Army keeps its personnel budgets entirely off the books and essentially gets a force of about three and half million for free, or in accounting terms for free.

Final point, I mean – and China can focus all of that spending on a particular or a number of scenarios that China just does not have global obligations the way the U.S. military does, so before you get too excited about the chart, you've got to think through to the next level of what the real situation is.

MR. KORB: Marcus?

MR. CORBIN: This is a great issue for me because the allied issue is so important. I mean, if you want to really go out and address the problems in the world the

way the United States is doing, I think the allies are an enormous untapped resource. And what this chart does show is the potential – okay, so, they are spending \$300 million and they are spending it poorly. Okay. Let's get them to spend that a little better. And I think it calls for really – I mean, if you decided to follow a really strong multilateral approach to the world's problems, you would need a very large program to bring the Europeans, Japanese, other allies up to speed on ability to go places around the world and use their force.

It's not in this chart – I think it's in the text that they recently had a million and a half people in their active duty ground forces alone. That's our NATO allies. They have five million people in their services overall: active, reserve – all components. This is one of the greatest wastes of resources in human history. I mean, if they are just sitting there twiddling their thumbs and they can't go anywhere and they can't help out. So, you know, you don't need five million people to have a strong ability to go places around the world and intervene. You can cut a whole bunch and you can make those that remain better equipped. They need transport aircraft, they need communications, they need a lot of the things that U.S. does so well. But I think it is – there is a huge failure to seize the opportunity that our allies offer.

I would also say on China, it's too bad they don't spend more money on the military. This Christmas I digitized my household – network, cell phones, wireless routers, PDA. You know what: everything made in China. So –

MR. DONNELLY: So you'd like to see those profits plowed back into the military?

MR. CORBIN: Well, yeah, and then it will slow down the wrenching economic changes that we are going to face shortly. I mean, we just don't make it anymore. They do. They have got the technology and my little PDA – I am very impressed. I have dropped it twice, still runs, and of course there are military implications here, too, in terms of the technology, but the economic security issue is the one coming down the road and if you are worried about China the way a lot of people were before 9/11 – I'm worried about China, too, but in terms of its global economic role and the speed with which those changes may come down the road.

MR. KORB: Miriam?

MS. PEMBERTON: Just a couple of things. Back on the issue of deficit spending in a time of war, it's true that countries usually do spend into deficit when they're at war. They don't usually cut taxes at the same time. I mean, there's just no way around that.

And then on the issue of the U.S.'s portion of GDP that it spends on its military forces: I've just never understood that as a measure that means anything to me. Alan Greenspan has talked about military spending as analogous to a family's insurance policy. It staves off disaster, but for a family you only want to have as much insurance as

you absolutely need because it doesn't make your family stronger or smarter or happier. And so with the government you should only spend as much on the military as you need because it doesn't do anything to improve the productivity of your economy, or virtually nothing. And so spending as much as you might – as your economy might be able to handle on the military in Greenspan's terms does not make very much sense as an insurance policy.

MR. DONNELLY: Larry, can I get about 30 seconds on that –

MR. KORB: Certainly.

MR. DONNELLY: – just because I –

MR. KORB: Thirty seconds.

MR. DONNELLY: Okay, I would violently disagree. I mean, if security is not the classic example of a public good that allows and makes other trade and other forms of economy, (a) possible, but (b) more efficient, I don't know what else you would call it.

And the point about the percentage of GDP is that's the best measure of our willingness to sacrifice, if you will. The American economy is one and a half times larger than it was a decade ago, but – so the overall pie keeps growing faster and the quality of life that Americans enjoy because of overall economic growth is not a measure or – you know, even constant dollars are not a measure of sacrifice. And if you simply talk about what's necessary to achieve our security goals, I would say that the force we have today is – particularly the ground force that we have today to maintain a long term commitment in the Middle East is *prima fascia* inadequate.

MR. KORB: Okay good. Emira, you wanted to say something about Sudan?

MS. WOODS: Thank you, but maybe before going to Sudan, I'd like to also touch on this question of the public good and Mr. Donnelly's depiction of security because I think this limited vision of security is in physical security. Even if you take that view, you still, I would argue, have to also support the elements in this report that talk about non-military means of addressing the root causes of crises. So, again, looking at issues of development, if you were to take another big picture chart, you know, U.S., while very high in the list of those who – in terms of military spending – it is just the opposite in terms of development spending where the U.S. is the least generous of its allies in terms of development spending. So the areas where you can actually stem the crisis before it occurs, where you can prevent the chaos from occurring whether it's Darfur or elsewhere, this is I think one of the values of the report – trying to look at these nonmilitary means of engaging in the world.

On the question, though, of Darfur and the UN in particular, we at Foreign Policy in Focus have a worldview that says we are all connected: one global village, one global community. And in this worldview you need rules of the road, rules of engagement. It is

the United Nations, while not perfect, that is a body where we as a global community can come together to set our rules of engagement. And if you look at the question of Darfur, there have been tremendous problems without a doubt: problems in the Security Council, problems also in the U.S. and the lack of willingness for the U.S. after calling Darfur a genocide to actually take action. And I would argue that it is in fact the United Nations that is needed now to help provide the leadership that it has provided to resolve the crisis in southern Sudan, but to also extend that leadership to the crisis in Darfur, working with the African Union to provide security on the ground.

Without a doubt, 2,000 peacekeeping troops in a region the size of France is woefully inadequate. But beyond that, there is an element of other engagement in peacemaking that is needed. Peacemaking, first, to stop the flow of arms. Peacemaking, second, to stop the aerial bombardment, which the government has been engaged in. The United Nations has a role to play – can play a more active role with the U.S. support and leadership, but I have to also argue that, you know, the U.S. has been reluctant to do so, as has China, because of its economic engagements and would encourage Mr. Donnelly to think about other more proactive means of actually pressuring the U.S. to look more broadly at Sudan and conflicts beyond Sudan.

MR. KORB: Thank you. Two issues: one, obviously, the question of the role of the UN in Darfur, and, of course, the other one about spending more money on prevention. Tom, I guess you –

MR. DONNELLY: Yeah, I'll –

(Cross talk.)

MR. DONNELLY: Yeah, okay. I'll take them in the order that you laid them out, beginning with Sudan. Look, the arms that equip the Sudanese army come from China and the former Soviet Union, so – and they're paid for, particularly in the case of China, by oil revenues and oil shipments that go out of Sudan to the People's Republic, and they have a longtime association with China that is exactly the problem at the UN Security Council; and that is that China will veto any resolution that would take effective action in Sudan and Darfur.

And I would agree with your critique that that shouldn't be the end of the story. Look, if that is the dead end that the international rules of the road drive us to, that tells us that the rules are inadequate because whether the situation in Darfur is a genocide or meets that definition or not is really immaterial. And it behooves the United States to take effective action to end what is by any account a slaughter being primarily perpetrated by the central government. The Janjaweed militia only go into the camps and the villages after an aerial bombardment campaign conducted by attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft flown by Sudanese pilots. So if you want to solve the problem, that's the problem that you've got in front of you. It would be nice if the United Nations could take on a problem like that, but we don't have the luxury, and certainly the Sudanese don't have the luxury of waiting for the UN or the Chinese to change their minds about

what is essentially a sponsorship relationship with Khartoum.

Look, and I would also agree with your point about the need to spend additional money in other areas of international affairs; however, I don't think that I want to take a greater military risk in order to do that. We undervalue what the United States does for the world militarily. If we had not invaded Afghanistan, the Taliban would still be in power. There would be no prospect of economic development in Afghanistan. You can't have – people are not willing to and cannot develop their economy, and certainly private capital will never flow at reasonable rates into a country that isn't secure. So the first order of business, and this is the case – this is what Afghans will tell you, this is what Iraqis will tell you. When they – when Iraqis talk about security, they want to be able to have safe streets and the insurgency defeated so they can go about the business of developing not only their economy but their lives.

MR. KORB: Okay. Dick?

Q: Hi, Dick Klass, retired Air Force colonel. I find it very interesting, two points: one is we think that percent of GDP ought not to be – such an important measure of our defense spending, but the same people who sort of pooh-pooh GDP percentages for defense spending when asked about the percentage of GDP we spend on foreign assistance say, well, it's not the percent of GDP that matters, it's the absolute dollar amount. I think there's some lack of consistency there.

But what I really wanted to talk about was Tom's comment on security and sacrifice. It seems to me that the only people who are sacrificing in this war are not the people who are given tax cuts, but are the armed forces. It seems to me that war is by definition when a nation sacrifices to protect itself to defeat its enemies, and the nation isn't sacrificing. A very small number of people are. I would contend that this is not a war: no more than the war on drugs where we cut funding during that war, or the war on cancer where we cut funding during that war, or the war on crime where you've cut funding on that war. This is a long-term struggle, and to call it a war and to say you can't cut funding during a war means, since we believe that terrorism will go on for a long time, you're never going to cut defense spending. So I think that the vocabulary needs to be changed and the metrics need to be changed about who is sacrificing and who's paying the price of this.

MR. KORB: Why don't we let Miriam go, Tom? You've been on the hot seat here for a while.

MS. PEMBERTON: You know, I would just agree with you that this has been portrayed as a war without sacrifice. I think there have been, you know – the real sacrifices to the troops and to their families, but also to the rest of us, are beginning to be felt in cuts to domestic programs, and they're not being tied conceptually to the war, and certainly the administration is not presenting the case in that way. But that trajectory of military spending and then flat spending or declines for domestic programs is an effect of the war and of this policy of tax cuts at the same time that is going to be cutting deeply,

that is just not recognized by the American public.

MR. KORB: Marcus?

MR. CORBIN: Yeah. I'd add on the GDP debate. To me, the big issue right now is not the GDP percents, it's the deficit because small deficits – okay, a lot of economists argue no particular big problem, but right now we've got ourselves into this extremely precarious financial – international financial situation where it's not just the deficits, but it's the deficits that are funded by money from abroad that is the problem, and you start to get into the whole exchange rates. To me, a global international depression can be triggered tomorrow caused by our deficit. So we don't get into whether taxes or how you're going to fund the programs, whether or not you have a tax cut much, but that's the separate issue. It's the defense spending that is contributing to the deficit. Now, that doesn't mean you need to cut defense spending. You can raise taxes if you like; either way. But just that the current situation is extremely dangerous for our economic security for a while, and of course it's China that's loaning us the bulk of this money.

MR. KORB: Marcus, if there were no deficit, would you then recommend cutting defense spending if for whatever reason we had no deficit?

MR. CORBIN: Yeah. We make the case in here that for whatever reason, military reasons, our take on national security that even without a deficit. So our conclusions are not driven by that, but to the extent that reduced military spending can ease the pressure, I think I saw that the – one third of the deficit – well, I can't remember my numbers, but a good chunk of it can be attributed to increased defense spending in recent years, so that's not the issue. The issue is really stopping the potential for a major international economic setback.

MR. DONNELLY: Larry, I've got to have again 30 seconds.

MR. KORB: Let me – while you do that, I'll also – let me – if you would answer this, Tom. Does it concern you the vast amount of T-bills or whatever the Chinese are accumulating?

MR. DONNELLY: All right, I'll deal with both questions. But first of all, a little – you know, some facts about what the federal government actually spends its money on. About half of all – more than half of all federal spending goes for social entitlement programs. That is just a fact. And the numbers – you know, the slice of the pie has been steadily growing for decades and decades. I might be a year or two out of date, but essentially something in the low 50s represents the slice in the pie that is nondiscretionary; in other words, federal entitlement programs. And even allowing for the passing of a certain amount of the Medicare burden to the states, again, more than 50 cents on the federal dollar goes for those programs. Of the remaining slice of the pie, the remaining 50 cents or so, about a third of it goes for domestic discretionary, about a third of it or slightly more goes for defense, and about a third goes to service the federal debt.

So when you're – if your number one priority is getting our federal fiscal house in order, you ought to follow the Willy Sutton policy, go where the money is. And if you're worried about the long-term fiscal condition of the country, it's not military spending. And you can cut – you can take all of the cuts, which amount to a \$13 billion, even on the numbers presented in the program. If you think that's go to put our fiscal house in order, I would take issue with that.

As to the Chinese buying T-bills, I'd be a little bit more worried if they weren't buying the T-bills than if they are. (Laughter.) Plus, I mean, look, we're in kind of a symbiotic relationship with the Chinese economy. They need our consumer markets, and in fact a low – a cheap production economy is much more vulnerable than a more diversified, far larger consumption economy. We have – you know, over the long haul we would have potentially greater sources of PDAs and computers and other electronic stuff than the Chinese would have of people to buy them. So I would just say that the straight-line reading of the trade deficit figures is not the whole story.

MR. KORB: Someone – not me – but I forget where I heard it, but I don't want to be accused of plagiarism, said our relationship with China is MAD, like we used to have with the Soviet Union, but it doesn't mean mutual assured destruction; it means mutual assured depression.

Okay, what I'd like to do – everybody who's got a hand up please give us your question and then I'll ask the panel to answer them all in order because I want to get everybody involved. Let's – we got two over here and –

Q: I mean I guess I have a couple of comments and I'd like to –

MR. KORB: Okay. Please identify yourself.

Q: I'm sorry. I'm Amid Fundir (ph), Management Systems International. One is that as an ordinary citizen trying to raise children in some degree of security in the United States, the thing that I most want to see and find reassuring about your report is the attention to things like port and container security, public health infrastructure, and so forth, because when you sort of tell me about the beneficial consequences of garrisons in the Middle East and how we're going to effect a change in the political configuration of the Middle East, I'm a little bit sort of less persuaded on that because I'm not clear about whether in fact the particular scenario that you've described is the one that's actually going to transpire. So just as a sort of pragmatic American, I want to see much more attention to the things that affect my life here in the United States. That's one comment which I'd actually be interested in sort of hearing some comment back on.

The other comment is I wonder in some ways whether in fact this is a little bit – this report isn't a little bit like sort of changing deck chairs around on the Titanic. And it seems to me that one question that really has to be addressed if one is going to start thinking seriously about an integrated view of security is the philosophical policy question, which is the extent to which reliance on military power in fact makes us less

secure for a whole variety of reasons because of the way that it distorts policymaking, the extent to which it makes it too tempting to have a promiscuous reliance on the use of force rather than understanding a sort of more nuanced and integral view of international affairs in the kind of world that we're living in.

MR. KORB: Thank you. Right behind you.

Q: Richard Weitz, Hudson Institute. I wasn't sure whether there are any budget material information such as Pentagon black programs that were not included in your report that wouldn't necessarily change the findings, but perhaps might change the figures?

MR. KORB: Don't you guys at Hudson? You're supposed to have all the inside information. (Laughter.) Okay. Why don't we go and I'll give the panel a chance to respond to those questions and make any final remarks that they like.

Tom, we'll let you go first, then we'll come back and go in reverse order.

MR. DONNELLY: Okay. I'm not sure that black programs one way or the other would make that much difference in kind of the macroeconomic sense, so, yeah, it might marginally change it. And I'll leave it to the people who authored the report to – but I would just suggest that it's not that much of a difference one way or the other.

Apropos of the first question, look, I mean, there are just some tasks for which force is unfortunately necessary. Jesus Christ, we tried everything possible with, say, a guy like Saddam Hussein: from threatening him to sucking up to him to – you know, and likewise with the Taliban. You just have to accept in the world – I mean, this is a fundamental – this is a philosophical difference. There are some people for whom sweet reason is an ineffective means. And if you want to deal with them, if you want to protect yourself from them, alas, military force is sometimes required. This is kind of a pattern of human history and rather than waiting for a transformation in the human soul, if you're a practical American, defending yourself and particularly carrying the war to the foe, as opposed to only relying on defensive measures, has been a rather reliable strategy for 200-plus years.

MR. KORB: Marcus?

MR. CORBIN: On the secret spending, I'm not quite sure where you were going with that, so maybe you want to add something. But we didn't take much of a look at it. A lot of it, I think, is for hardware tucked away in the Air Force budgets and the R&D budget, and we certainly don't have access to what it's going on. We mentioned one particular program that was so egregious in terms of cost overruns and performance failures that senators were skirting the secrecy practices to bring attention to it, so in general one suspects the programs hidden away in the secret budget are more prone to cost overruns, but I don't know. But certainly we're talking about some tens of billions of dollars – 20, 30, 40 – somewhere there, so with changes in those programs you're

really not going to change the big picture, as Tom was saying.

On the use of the military, I think the specific problem that conduct – that the conduct of the Iraq war and what happened after the invasion has had a negative effect, you can see in the polls, on international opinion about the United States, and how strong that is – does that mean that actual new terrorists are recruited, and how many? Who knows. But I think we take the general perspective that this is something that more attention needs to be paid to: the second-order effects of how you use the military.

And it's a big beyond the scope, as you sort of said, of this report. I mean this report looks at – you know, you can misuse this military in here or the current military or whatever, so it's really – it's a bigger discussion about improving the performance of the military; and more than the military, the civilian leaders really. To the extent that the military itself is better trained, equipped, knows how to deal with peacekeeping operations or occupations like Iraq, that can solve a lot of those problems, I think. And the military, through no fault of its own particularly, was really not geared towards this kind of operation because they were told they didn't need to be ready. So to the extent that we free up resources from hardware that can be used to better prepare the military for these kinds of operations, I think that can help on the margins at least with the negative ramifications of troubled operations like we have in Iraq.

MR. KORB: Miriam, you get the first and last word.

MS. PEMBERTON: Yeah. Well, I agree with you that this highly militarized foreign policy does compromise our security. I mean, these security priorities are an expression of our posture toward the world. And as an illustration, if we wind up setting up permanent bases in Iraq, if I were an Iraqi I'd look at that and I'd say, okay, maybe they care about us having a democracy. Maybe they care if eventually we get electricity and clean water. But this is really what their interests are. I mean, that's a problem for us and for the effort to repair our very damaged relations with the rest of the world, which is a long-term project.

It's interesting to me that poll after poll consistently shows that Americans think Republicans are – they trust them more on issues of national security and they trust Democrats more on issues about repairing our relations with the rest of the world, and I just think there's a very easy case to make that our national security very much depends on repairing those relations. It's a very long-term project and it really can't be done, in my view, with the highly militarized foreign policy that we now have.

With respect to your point on what you see as important security spending for your children, I agree with you that my focus for me and my children has a lot more to do with kind of immediate concerns of homeland security. We all read a couple weeks ago an article in the *Post* about how, you know, if, God forbid, there's a radioactive – sorry, there's a dirty bomb around here, and I think we'd all probably in our heart of hearts agree that in this neighborhood we're pretty much at ground zero for that to happen. And the report said our first responders are just not trained to deal with that – to tell us where

we ought to go if there's this radioactive cloud bearing down on us. The budget request allocates zero dollars to the problem of a first responder network that is not interoperable, that the communication systems, they don't talk to each other. And I think, you know, I'd feel safer if we were working hard on that problem and if our first responder networks could talk to us and could talk to each other.

MR. KORB: Thank you very, very much. I want to thank our panelists for a terrific discussion. If you're interested more in the organizations, we have more material in your folders. I want to thank the audience. I think your questions were terrific. I didn't even have to say turn off your cells phone or pagers. Either you all did it or none of us are very important. (Laughter.)

Another thing, I'd like to also thank all the people here. These are tough things to put together, and this young man back here, Antoine Morris with the microphone, deserves a round of applause for doing it. (Applause.)

And I'd also like to thank Rebecca Schultz, who works with me on this and worked with Antoine to put it together. Those of you that have not been here before, we hope you come back again. And if you want to come back next week, on the 24th we're going to have a discussion of national security strategy with Peter Beinart of *New Republic*, Peter Brookes of Heritage, and myself and my colleague, Bob Boorstin.

So thank you all very much, and we look forward to seeing you again.

(Applause.)

(END)