

CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS

EXPERT POLICY FORUM

“SAVING THE ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY.”

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LAWRENCE KORB: Good morning. My name is Larry Korb from the Center for American Progress. On behalf of my colleagues I'd like to welcome you here to this meeting. As a new presidential term and a new Congress begins, the Center for American Progress has launched what we call the Progressive Priorities project to provide policymakers and the public with a positive position – positive vision for progressive policymaking, supported by a series of new and we hope bold policy ideas in priority areas that we've identified. Today's meeting, or today's subject: "For Soldier and Country: Saving the All-Volunteer Army," is the fourth in approximately a dozen papers in this series that we'll issue over the course of the next two months.

In addition to providing more policy recommendations, each of the papers in this series proposes specific steps that policymakers can take to achieve the broader policy goals. Each of the papers is posted on our website as they are released at www.americanprogress.org, and all of the papers in the series will be compiled and published as a book early next year.

I'd like to thank particularly all my colleagues at the center for working on this paper, in particular Mirna Galic, without whose hard work this paper could never have come to fruition. Mirna has been a distinguished colleague of mine both at the Center and the Council on Foreign Relations and will soon be leaving us to go off to bigger and better things. We will miss you, Mirna, and as I say, you were really responsible as much as anybody for this paper.

Today to talk about this subject and to comment on the paper, we're joined by people from three of the other leading think tanks in the city. I'll mention them in alphabetical order: American Enterprise, Cato, and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Today's moderator for the panel will be Michele Flournoy from the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Those of you who know Michele know she's a senior advisor at the CSIS International Security Program, where she works on a broad range of defense policy and international security issues. She's previously worked at the National Defense University and in the Department of Defense, where she was dual-hatted as principal deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and threat reduction, and deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy. For her really distinguished work in the Pentagon during the '90s she was awarded the Secretary of Defense's Medal for Outstanding Public Service and the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service.

Michele, thank you for coming. Thank you for chairing the panel.

And in addition to all of her other distinguished accomplishments, it happens to be her birthday, as you may have learned if you listened to NPR this morning. (Laughter.)

MICHELE FLOURNOY: Thank you very much. It's really a pleasure to be here and to spend my birthday with you this morning. I appreciate you all coming, and this is really a critical discussion for us to be having on a vital issue at a very important time. And the whole topic of saving the all-volunteer Army is really one that will be front and center in the upcoming discussion on defense and national security issues for the second term of the Bush administration. Since the end of the draft and the institution of the all-volunteer Army in – the force in 1973, the United States has relied on an all-volunteer force, and over the three decades since then, the force has really come to be recognized as the most capable and the most professional military in the world. Why? Not just because of U.S. technological superiority, but because of the quality of the people that we have been able to recruit and retain in an all-volunteer force. But recent operations in Afghanistan and especially in Iraq have put tremendous strains on the force, particularly the U.S. Army.

Members have been experiencing very high – some would say unrelenting – both optempo and perstempo for people in the active duty force. It's coming to be almost common for members of the Army to have multiple tours in Afghanistan and Iraq with very little time in between.

In addition, we've seen unprecedented use of the Reserve component, particularly in Iraq, and putting enormous strains on both the Army Reserves and the Army National Guard. We've also seen the institution of stop-loss measures to extend people's tours of duty beyond their original commitments. And you see the Army undergoing major restructuring of its force, primarily so that it will be able to meet the outyear commitments in Iraq down the road.

Now, there's some early indications that these strains are having some very real and negative impacts on the force. We're starting to see the beginnings of difficulty in meeting recruitment goals. The Army National Guard has had some difficulty this quarter. The active duty Army, while it's met its goals, it's done so only by eating its seed corn, essentially: pulling forward recruits that were not supposed to enter the force until next year.

Now, this is all anecdotal. We don't have the data yet to have an absolutely clear picture here, but there is at least some indication also that we will have trouble on the reenlistment front – anecdotal information suggesting that a number of people coming back from Iraq will actually be leaving the force rather than reenlisting.

So it's too early to say whether we have a crisis here, but if you're trying to look over the horizon, I'd be worrying about the coming storm.

Now, this situation has raised a number of challenging and critically important questions for the Bush administration and for us as a nation: First, do we need a larger

army? Do we need to change, fundamentally rebalance, the mix of capabilities within the military to meet the challenges of the 21st century? Do we need to change the way we manage the force, both personnel, individuals, and units? Do we need to rethink the roles and missions of the Reserve component and the basic contract between the United States and its citizen soldiers? Can and should we maintain the all-volunteer force? Is that the right way ahead? If so, how do we continue to attract and retain the best and brightest that have set the U.S. military apart? Alternatively, do we need to think about reinstating a draft or some form of broader national service?

Now, these questions are not just academic; how we answer these questions translates into choices about how we accept or manage risk. And when you're dealing in things military, risk always translates into the lives of very real people – lives saved or lives lost in terms of American service men and women.

So this is, as I said, a very important set of questions at a critical time, and I think we have just the right set of people here to try to grapple with them.

Larry Korb, who introduced me – I'll introduce you, Larry – is, as you all know, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. He has also held very senior positions at both the Council on Foreign Relations, the Brookings Institution, and the University of Pittsburgh. In the Reagan administration he was assistant secretary of defense for manpower, Reserve affairs, installations and logistics, and all of us have read his prolific writings on a number of defense issues over the years. And this panel, in part, highlights the release of a paper that he has written on the all-volunteer Army.

And we'll hear from Larry first, but first let me then introduce our other panelists: Tom Donnelly, who is a resident fellow in defense and security policy at the American Enterprise Institute. He's author of a book that many of you have seen, *Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Strategic Assessment*, that came out this year, and also AEI's *National Security Outlook*. He also has had senior positions at Lockheed Martin in the private sector, was also deputy executive director for the Project for the New American Century. He has also served on the Hill as a professional staff member of the Committee on National Security, what is now the Armed Services Committee in the House of Representatives.

Dr. Chris Preble is director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. You've seen his work published in a number of major newspapers and probably seen him on some television and radio commentary. He is author of a book called *John F. Kennedy and the Missile Gap*, and prior to joining Cato he held a teaching position, a professorship at St. Cloud State University and Temple University. He is a veteran of the U.S. Navy and has his BA from George Washington University and a Ph.D. from Temple University.

So I think we have the right people here to discuss the issues, and, Larry, I'll turn to you to kick us off.

Thank you.

MR. KORB: Thank you very much. Last week in what's now become the famous town meeting that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had with the troops in Kuwait, he said, "You go to war with the army you have." We would differ with that. We would say, you should develop an army to support your national security strategy, and in fact, that has not occurred.

We take as a beginning of this something that – a phrase that Melvin Laird, the secretary of defense under Richard Nixon, who really developed – laid the foundation for the all-volunteer Army said that, "People, not hardware, must become our highest priority." Or to put it another way, the effectiveness of the U.S. military depends not just on smart bombs but primarily on smart people.

Now, Michele has, I think, laid out for you the problems that the Army faces these days, so I won't go over them, but what I will do is tell you the principles that guided us as we came up with our recommendations. First is that the all-volunteer model is the right one for the country. It gives you a much more effective military than a draft military, and I think that's why all of the leaders of the military services support it, which is rather ironic because they fought the creation of the volunteer military when it came into being but now they're the most enthusiastic supporters because they know it is a more effective military, more professional, than one that's a mix of draftees and volunteers.

The second principle is something Michele talked about, that the size and skills of the active Army must be equal to the new missions and duties that it faces. What basically has happened is when we created the volunteer Army back in 1973, we put a lot of skills into the Guard and Reserve that we did not think we would use very often – things like military police, civil affairs engineers – and what has happened, particularly since the horrible attacks of September 11th, we've had to use those so-called peacekeeping or stabilization forces quite a bit, and since they're mainly in the Guard and Reserve, you've had to use the Guard and Reserve more than at any time since during the Korean War.

The third – and it follows from that – is the Reserve component, which includes both the Guard and Reserves, is vital but should be a supplementary part of the total Army and should be treated as such. In other words, you do not want to just keep Guard and Reserve people on active duty for very long periods of time, and basically, as we see right now, to carry out the strategy of the administration, you have an active duty Army which is authorized at 480,000, but through some supplementary measures like stop-loss as well as Guard and Reserve, in effect you have an Army of about 650,000 people because the Guard and Reserve is not a supplement but sort of an essential part of the military.

And then finally, it should go without saying that soldiers and their families, all military people should be treated with care and respect. This is not only a matter of equity but it certainly contributes to personnel readiness.

Now, what do we recommend to deal with the situation that's in the paper, and I think Michele has outlined very, very, very well? First of all you've got to increase the size of the Army. We came up with a number of about 86,000 troops. What would this do? This would enable you to develop two new divisions that focus on peacekeeping and stabilization. As the secretary of defense's own transformations are – Admiral Cebrowski has pointed out we know how to win the war, but not to win the peace, and so you'd want to have divisions that can do that.

The next thing we want to do – we want to double the size of the special forces. From what we know in the public domain, the special forces are being used an awful lot. We also know that the 9/11 Commission said that they should take even responsibilities from the CIA's paramilitary operations. And then finally the active duty – we recommend adding about 10,000 military police, civil affairs experts, engineers, and medical personnel to the active force so that you will not have to use the Guard and Reserve as much as you should.

Second, we want – we think you ought to amend the backdoor draft policies. And first of all, I think the military service obligation in our view should either be four years of active duty or six years of total service, whichever comes first. You may know that it was increased from six to eight years. Actually, it was done while I was in office because we were trying to get more people at least on paper to counterbalance the big Soviet advantage in manpower. It was increased from six to eight years and we really think this needs to go back to six years or four years of active duty, whichever comes first.

Stop-loss should be used as little as possible and should be changed. It should not be used more than once. Over the weekend, I came across a quotation from Senator John McCain in which he calls the stop-loss program the single most damaging morale issue for the military and pointed the finger of blame at an ill-prepared Pentagon. It's rather – we never used stop-loss, for example, in Vietnam even though we had close to 600,000 people in the theater, and if you do invoke stop-loss we think you ought to increase the bonus for those people who are being kept in beyond their term that they agreed to.

And then finally that when you – we should adopt a new policy for the recall of the Selected Reserve that should be used no more than one year out of every five years, and the president ought to issue an executive order for that. This is the chief of the Army Reserve, General Helmley, and Helmley mentions this. If you use a Guard and Reserve, he says, more than nine to 12 months out of every five or six years, they're simply not going to stay.

Our next thing, and this has not received as much attention in our view as it should, is in terms of the Guard and Reserve, take another look at the critical billets. A lot of people in the Guard and Reserve are first responders in the communities, and if

those people are taken away from the communities, who is going to be there to deal with another terror – if there should be another terrorist attack on the homeland? And the idea that you can just allow the certain cities to call up a lot of their personnel – these first responders – and send them someplace else leaves a gap at home and in addition to that we recommend establishing a Homeland Security Corps in each state. Basically this would be people who would be a backup for the Guard and Reserve are away and the first responders, and it would also respond to something that I think we missed a tremendous opportunity after September 11th in getting people to do something to deal with the new security environment.

We also recommend repealing the don't ask, don't tell policy. If you've followed this debate, you know that a lot of people who in the Individual Ready Reserve who were called back, much to their surprise, a lot of people had skills that were needed because people were pushed out of the military because of the don't ask, don't tell policy. As John Hudson, who retired as Navy JAG in April, 2000, noted, don't ask, don't tell is virtually unworkable in the military, legally, administratively, and socially. Rather than preserving cohesiveness, it forces divisiveness.

And then finally we need to pay more attention to the quality-of-life issues. You're all familiar with the fact that the administration has proposed cutting family separation pay and combat pay and resisted providing TRICARE – the military's healthcare system, to the Guard and Reserve. We recommend that it be available to the Guard and Reserve at their choice even before they're mobilized so that when they're mobilized they don't have to do this horrible thing that all of us know is when you change healthcare providers it becomes very, very, very, very difficult.

Now, the question might be, well, how are we going to pay for all of this? And of course the Army has resisted this because they feel it comes out of their budget. We recommend taking a look at some of the other programs in the defense budget rather than just the Army budget and ought to pay for this – things like Rushing ahead with national missile defense, the F-22 fighter, the Virginia class submarine.

Thank you.

MS. FLOURNOY: Thank you very much.

Tom Donnelly?

THOMAS DONNELLY: Thank you. As Mary said and as Michele said, this is an important issue. I would say not only an important issue, but certainly in terms of our own ability to execute our stated national security strategy arguably the most important defense issue that we will face in the next year or so, and certainly in the quadrennial defense review that's to take place beginning early next year.

Larry and I spent a lot of time as traveling companions prior to the election doing a whole series of sort of town-hall debates and we found ourselves sort of creepily too

often in agreement. (Laughter.) So I am prepared today to agree generally with what Larry says, but offer a critique that suggests that Larry's recommendations don't really go far enough towards addressing the problems that he quite rightly underscores and outlines.

I'll begin simply first with the numbers issue – the size issue. Larry quite rightly observed that the active duty Army today is about 650,000. It's been at that number for getting on towards two years, which is depending on exactly how you count it and how much emergency authority Secretary Rumsfeld may be claiming at any particular moment something like 150 to 165,000 above the authorized end-strength of the U.S. Army.

Anybody who thinks that this is not the new baseline, rather than an exceptional case, I think is just simply denying reality, which again may qualify you to be defense secretary, but isn't really prudent defense planning. So my first sort of observation about Larry's conclusions is that 86,000 isn't enough. Even if we have near-term success in Iraq and things continue to go reasonably well in Afghanistan, there will be other kinds of conflicts like this. We are committed to essentially a revolutionary purpose in the Middle East. The nature of the conflict is such that despite the fact that what we've done so far has been too relatively conventional invasions, it's not so much that we don't know how to – I think Admiral Cebrowski has kind of got the characterization wrong. We're very good at winning the battle; we're less good at winning the war, because what's happening in Iraq and Afghanistan today is surely as much a part of the war as the initial invasions were.

Secondly, I would be a little bit skeptical about specialized peacekeeping or stability ops divisions. Again, what's happening today includes a really high proportion of the actual fighting or the threat thereof, and in fact regular conventional units are doing an outstanding job of executing not only their combat missions, but the stability ops missions or the missions that are farther down their task list.

Yesterday I had a session with both an artillery battalion commander who'd been in Afghanistan who hadn't gotten anywhere near a cannon since he left the United States and essentially was pulling security missions all over an area of operations the size of Texas, to use his words, and then an armored battalion commander from the 4th Infantry Division who had been – which had been the first unit to seriously go into Samarra in Iraq and he had ended up essentially commanding twice as many soldiers of different kinds of units and different capabilities than he went to war with, but it really was quite remarkable to me that nominally conventional commanders were really quite good at executing the mission that they had been given.

A couple of final quick points. I think Larry's right on target when he focuses on the question of how to use the Reserve components. I would take that issue a little bit differently. To me, the primary issue is how to rebalance the active force to be able to conduct the logistics and combat service support missions that are clearly essential to success in the sorts of mission that the Army has front and center. And too much of the

transformational thinking in the Army has been concentrated at the tactical level. There's nothing wrong with trying to create more mobile, more nimble brigade-sized units of action, but in the Middle East the more important missions are really those associated with the construction of what we used to call a theater army: a big thing that's supposed to conduct long wars, stay there for a long time, and provide the structure to facilitate wide-ranging tactical operations not only in Iraq and Afghanistan, but again I think we have to accept that this is kind of a region-wide phenomenon.

This is an inherent fault in the original all-volunteer force design – the Creighton Abrams design for the Army – to treat the National Guard and Reserve as an operational reserve is to fundamentally challenge the idea of the civilian soldier and there's a whole lot of, I think, downsides that we've been lucky to avoid thus far, but are still lurking out there. And I would also worry that translating those guys directly into a Homeland Security Corps would essentially run the same risk.

Finally, Larry touched lightly on the question of the cost of this. I also might agree with some of Larry's budgetary priorities, but I don't think the budget math is really – adds up properly. Even if we totally cancelled missile defense programs and F-22 procurement and things like that, you just simply couldn't harvest enough dollars to offset the costs. We are now spending – you know, it's almost hard to keep track of tens of billions if not close to \$100 billion in emergency supplementals on the Pentagon every year. Probably the lion's share of that cost is simply personnel costs to pay for the special pays for stop-loss, to activate National Guard and Reserve components.

And that's really the least effective way and least efficient way to spend our defense dollar, but by the same token that gives us an idea of the order of magnitude of the costs associated with expanding the Army because it's not just the field Army. The Army as an institution has been shortchanged and nicked and dimed simply to produce bodies and dollars to conduct current operations, not simply in the recent wars in the Middle East, but this is a trend that's been going on for 10 years and in my mind the institution of the service, including both active and Reserve components, has been too starved of needed capacity. Again, simply to harvest dollars in the name of business efficiencies, which have turned out to be maybe pennywise, but certainly in a time of war pound-foolish.

So with that rather bleak assessment, I'll turn the microphone back to Michele.

MS. FLOURNOY: Thank you very much.

Chris Preble?

CHRISTOPHER PREBLE: Thank you. Thanks to Larry and thanks to the Center for American Progress for hosting this event and thanks to them for inviting me to participate.

I'm grateful to Larry for writing this report because on top of all his many other responsibilities including traveling all over the country – I also accompanied Larry on a few of those trips – and I just want to very briefly outline what I think some of the greatest strengths of the paper are and why it does bear a careful read, but then also highlight some of my areas of disagreement, and they tend to be disagreements both with Larry and with Tom.

The greatest strength certainly is that it accurately conveys the seriousness of this problem, the pressures on the force, in terms of operational tempo, in terms of the way that the force is being used. There are many, many anecdotes of hardship, but we have to recognize the vast majority of these problems go unreported because our military men and women in the service generally kind of tend to salute smartly and go about their business, and yet we still have a few stories, the most shocking of which to me was one we cited with the Michigan National Guard unit. The Michigan National Guard Reserve – National Guard – received 48-hours notice before being activated. It's simply unconscionable. I don't understand how that could possibly happen in today's military.

There's also the issue of the low pay and benefits for our men and women in uniform, particularly enlisted people. The all-volunteer force demands adequate economic incentives for people to join the military. Those adequate economic incentives worked for me, I might point out. I served in the U.S. Navy courtesy of a Navy ROTC scholarship. It was a fair trade I like to say.

But it's useful to be reminded just how little pay and benefits our troops receive. One of the many benefits of this paper is a very handy terms and definition – a little glossary at the beginning. Imminent danger pay: currently \$225 a month. Family separation allowance: currently \$250 for service overseas in a very, very hostile environment. I find those numbers to be frankly shocking.

To propose cuts in any of these areas and others is even worse, so I commend Larry for documenting and really cataloging many of these problems and frankly I don't see how any reasonable person can conclude that all is okay. All is not okay.

So what is the answer? Well, the answer is not a draft, and again I commend Larry for reaffirming the importance of the all-volunteer force; in fact, for making the preservation of the all-volunteer force the very centerpiece of his paper. The point of all of this is to maintain the strength of our military, and it is so strong precisely because it is made up of men and women who choose to serve on their own free will. And frankly I would have expected no less. Larry was one of the champions of kind of extending the all-volunteer force and beating back some of the opponents in the early Reagan administration, so I commend him for that.

The answer is also not further mobilization of the Guard and Reserve. This is a pattern that even started prior to 9/11, but was certainly exacerbated after 9/11 where the Guard and Reserve component were increasingly used not as a reserve, but really as a

supplement to active duty forces being used abroad and therefore we need to recognize the Reserve as just that: a reserve.

So there's broad agreement between Larry and, I think, Tom and I on all of these points. The central disagreement, however, is over the presumption that current obligations must be maintained. That is, the current deployment of forces abroad as well as potentially new deployments in the future. Among other things, Larry says that our soldiers are needed to protect the homeland, but also to battle terrorism around the globe and to engage in peacekeeping stabilization and nation-building operations. Based on Larry's private correspondence with Pentagon officials, the Army currently has some 500,000 soldiers stationed or deployed in over 120 countries around the globe: 500,000 troops, 120 countries.

Now, we know of course that the vast, vast majority of those in terms of the numbers of people are in Iraq, are in some of our largest deployments in places like Germany and Japan, South Korea, and others, but 120 countries. To me, that's just really surprising and I think really points to the extent to which the United States is deployed truly globally and I think we have to ask the question, is this really necessary?

Later, he quotes from a Defense Science Board report from August of 2004. It says the military does not have sufficient personnel for the nation's current war and peacekeeping demands. He seems to assume these demands are immutable – that we as a nation have no other choice but to bear these burdens. He does, however, seem at least to consider, and I wish he would have developed this further, the question of if the United States hopes to be able to occupy and rebuild countries like Iraq essentially by itself while also meeting its other global commitments – if – if the United States intends to do all of those things, then he's right: the military must be expanded.

But I would suggest to you there is an alternative and the alternative is to revisit all of our military deployments, many of which are a carry-over from the Cold War that ended – depending on how you calculated it – 13 or 15 years ago, okay?

He mentions specifically, for example, the case of Korea. Korea is interesting because of course it is one of the most hostile borders; still to this day one of the true lingering effects of the Cold War and therefore you could argue on the Korean Peninsula the Cold War never really ended. And yet our forces in Korea are not the deterrent themselves. In other words, the actual presence of forces is not the deterrent to North Korean aggression against the South. It is the understanding that our forces there serve as a tripwire – that the presence of our forces there ensures that the full weight of the American military will be deployed in the event of a North Korean invasion of the South, and therefore that's the deterrent value of those forces. I don't believe that drawing those forces down substantially would make those forces, let alone the South, potentially vulnerable any more so than they are today.

An even better case for drawing down forces actually can be made in Europe, where for all that can be said about the Cold War and the nature of the threat during the

Cold War, again, the presence of 70,000 troops in Germany or 30,000 or so in Italy – all told over 100,000 troops in Europe – what exactly are they defending against? How exactly do these troops make us safer from terrorism? To be a bit cynical about it, it is ironic at least that the al Qaeda cell that planned the events of September 11th just happened to be stationed in the one country where the United States had the largest military presence prior to 9/11. So obviously the physical presence of a large military garrison is not a deterrent to terrorism and I think we have to recognize that.

Tom, in an earlier paper, specifically mentioned this and called the Bush administration's plan to redeploy forces in Europe and realign bases as an eminently sensible idea and I agree.

So I think that the paper makes a very, very compelling case for why the stresses on the force are so serious, why we must address this problem in a very serious way and soon, but I think it too often assumes that those commitments simply can and must be maintained and doesn't consider the alternative, which is a drawdown of certain commitments and reallocating forces to places where they truly make us more secure.

Thanks.

MS. FLOURNOY: Well, thank you all for these presentations that have put a lot of – you set the table very nicely for a rich discussion. I want to take the prerogative of the chair to pose two questions before we open it up to the audience.

A lot of our discussion has been sort of talking about what needs to happen based on the bottom-up demands of the strains on the force, what we're experiencing now. I want to come back to Chris's point that there seems to be a more fundamental disagreement, if you look top-down at this issue from the point of view of strategy. I'd like you, especially Larry and Tom, to be more explicit about what do you assume future demands will be, what do you think the strategy metric should be for sizing and shaping the U.S. military overall? Because that's really the broader context into which your recommendations fit. That's the first question.

And the second one is if we're really going to try to manage down the incredible demands we're placing on the Reserve component – you all have talked about a no more than one deployment in five years as a sort of standard – do you actually need to grow the size of the Reserves as well to meet that, or are you assuming you can shift things around within the Reserves and the National Guard to manage that to meet that goal?

So, Larry, why don't you start out?

MR. KORB: Chris has made a terrific point about the strategy. This is not a strategy paper. The Bush administration got reelected and so I was assuming that we would have to have the Army to carry out their particular strategy. And even if you, say for example in Germany, keep in mind that the two divisions in Germany have basically been to Iraq, so it's not that they're just there in Germany; they're being used in Iraq, so

even if you take them out, that's not going to lessen the strain. In fact, there was one of the divisions – I believe it was the 2nd Armored Division that actually had its tour extended over there. They were actually on their way out and then they had to send some of the forces back. And my concern about the announcement last summer when the president said, you know, we're going to bring them home is what message did it send to the troops over there?

I know when I was in Iraq and I wanted to ask the soldiers questions, they asked me the question, "Are we going back to Germany? You know, what's going on?" So I think – now, the other thing is it's hard to get, a lot of this is classified – I agree. I don't know what we're doing in 120 countries because we went back to the Pentagon and asked them if that's the figure and they said yes, and Ted Stroupe, who is the – works for AUSA – the Association of the U.S. Army – has used that figure in his testimony, but I – it's hard for me to look at the 120 countries.

But I don't think the answer is – you know, and we've taken what part of the troops in Korea and actually sent them over to Iraq already – the ground forces, which to me is not a good idea for two reasons. Number one, I don't know about the signal you want to send given the negotiations you have with Kim Jung Il. He may just think this is a sign that you're ready to back out, but more important a lot of these people are away from home. This is an unaccompanied tour – four, five, six, seven months and you go over to Iraq for a year and so that means you get away.

In terms – I don't think you really have to add to the Guard and Reserve. I think you can leave the strength the way it is and then add more of a lot of those skills that they have to the active force. Then you would not need those Guard and Reserve as much. I think it's time we need to change the Abrams doctrine, if you will, where, you know, you have to remember that the late General Abrams set up the Army basically so that it literally couldn't do anything without calling up the Guard and Reserve because he along with a lot of his colleagues were very concerned that Johnson didn't call them up during the war in Vietnam and it's rather ironic if you take a look at history.

The reason Johnson didn't call up the Guard and Reserve and instead relied on draftees to fight that war – he was concerned that if he called up the Guard and Reserve he would have a debate about Vietnam and the Great Society. He didn't want it. He just wanted, you know, to have these – the draftees, you know, serve the war. Now, of course, we have a situation where we call up the Guard and Reserve all of the time, but we're not having as much of a debate as we should because we don't have a draft anymore, so unless you volunteered for the Guard and Reserve or the active force, you know, this does not impact you.

So I think in terms of rebalancing I don't see a need to add significantly to the Army Guard and Reserve end-strength. I think you need to rebalance – put a lot more functions in the active force and as part of the increase that we recommend.

Now, in terms of the overall force structure, one of the great ironies of this debate is that while we're concerned about the size of the Army to carry out the administration's strategy, the Navy and the Air Force are actually downsizing. They're, you know, cutting people because they're so – as technology improves, they don't need as many people to carry out their missions.

MS. FLOURNOY: Thank you.

Tom?

MR. DONNELLY: Look, I'm, you know, as willing to discuss strategy as anybody, and certainly when I was out with Larry I tried to portray John Kerry as a cheese-eating surrender monkey, but I think that sort of goes against – I realize I was on thin analytical ground when I was doing that. The behavior of the United States through Republican and Democratic administrations not only since the end of the Cold War, but I would argue through the course of American history, has been to have an expansive strategy.

Michele, I don't need to preach to you about how uncertain the strategy-making process was during the Clinton years, but if you look at Clinton behavior in the Balkans and elsewhere it was broadly consistent with the tradition of American strategy-making and certainly very consistent with preserving America's position as the sole superpower, the hyperpower – however you want to say it. And so I think that is the thing that's consistent over time and when we all agree there's a sort of mismatch between our strategic ends and our military means, you know, I think Chris's argument is logically consistent; it just doesn't describe the way Americans act, so the question is how can you better align your military means to achieve the strategic ends that have – again I would say – been broadly consistent over time through administrations of both flavor?

And of course for the Army the part of American security strategy that's really important is what to do in the Middle East. You know, we still have concerns about China and Korea, but the big change over the past four years has been this commitment to political transformation in the greater Middle East, which again by the nature of – by its nature is much more demanding of land-power, so – and I would admit that we haven't gone beyond that initial hortatory step to say what is our actual strategy for accomplishing this goal. And I've got some suggestions and ideas, but I would certainly accept that not only has governmental thinking been lacking in that regard, but it's taken us a long time to really – and it's still debatable as to whether you really want to strap on that commitment.

I would sort of agree with Larry that the way to work our way out of our manpower problem is not to expand the Reserve component, but rather to expand and rebalance the active component. However, I would add one footnote. Again, over the past 10 or 15 years we've sort of inadvertently allowed ourselves to slip into a situation where civilian defense contractors are now an inseparable part of our power projection capabilities and the rules of the road on that have changed, or the reality on the ground

has changed. Maintaining or driving a truck in Iraq is not the same thing as doing it in Kosovo or Bosnia and with the result that there is a de facto security commitment on the part of actual soldiers to protect convoys that, again, may not have truck drivers who are wearing army green, but again this sort of best business practice model is breaking down when confronted with the realities of the wars that we face, so again I think that's an area that has been too little examined and before I would sort of want to fully commit to size, mission of the Reserve component in addition to expanding and adjusting the active structure, I would want to work through the issue of whether we really think that we can continue to offload particularly traditional combat service support jobs onto contractors and whether that's both, you know, fiscally prudent and strategically wise.

MS. FLOURNOY: Thank you very much. Let me now open it up to questions from the floor. When you state your question, please stand up, tell us your name and where you're from, and then state your question.

Yes, sir?

Q: Stan Crawford, *Business Week*. I'd like to refine this issue of the future. I mean, a lot of not known unknowables, as Secretary Rumsfeld might say, but if you take a look at potential – well, first of all you have to distinguish between how hot war in the Balkans (inaudible) versus Iraq in terms of level of intensity. It's a huge difference. Iraq potentially therefore is (an anomaly?). Whether you are talking about going into (inaudible) surgical strikes and things like that. So my question is, is there really – is Iraq potentially an (aberration?) and this is a snapshot as opposed to a movie and that once this particular problem is over, the level of intensity issue will evaporate?

MS. FLOURNOY: Why don't we start with Tom?

MR. DONNELLY: Yeah, well, I would dispute your description of the Balkans. I guess we just finally – or NATO finally handed over or is about to hand over wherever this NATO/EU handover process – like all things European, it's a process – you know, exactly is, but if you went back to December of 1965 and described the Balkans, it's been a long-running movie that in terms of manpower days has been a lot. I don't know exactly what it was.

The same is true of the No-Fly Zone missions post-Desert Storm. I think three times the number of sorties were flown in the No-Fly Zones than during the actual Gulf War I. I don't – you know, right: the future is a known unknown if I can, you know, stay within the Rumsfeld taxonomy, but if you're going to make – that's the nature of defense planning. Iraq has already defied the predictions of draw-downs and troop reductions, as has Afghanistan. We have just had more than 20,000 folks, I think, surging for the election there and a steady state is more like 12,000 to 14,000 in Afghanistan and we've got a long way to go there.

So I think the rebuttable proposition is that the future in the Middle East is more likely to be like the last couple of years than – and in fact it's not just the last couple of

years. I mean, again, No-Fly Zones – I can't tell you exactly what the war's going to be like, where else there might be fighting, but it seems to be far more likely that – and certainly as a matter of prudence and proper defense planning, you know, what would it hurt to have a few extra guys at the end of the day as opposed to the situation we're in now, where our greatest strategic vulnerability is not really at this point the willpower of the American people, but the ability of the Army as an institution, and the Marine Corps I might add too, to continue to conduct this mission.

If we fail, it's not for a want of martial spirit among the American people at this point. It's whether actual soldiers will continue to volunteer and enlist for essentially what's on offer under the current structure.

MS. FLOURNOY: Thank you.

Chris?

MR. PREBLE: I actually think that the support of the American people may be not a short-term concern, to Tom's point, but actually it is a slightly longer-term concern. And that gets back to the earlier point he made about the willingness on the part of the American people and their leadership to engage in an interventionist style foreign policy in a number of places. He's absolutely right. There's been a certain consistency, both Democratic and Republican, but the question is on how those costs are concealed from the American public, and I think that that's what this discussion is about. It's that we have concealed these costs from the American public for a long time by placing greater and greater burdens on the military – a military that we know is self-selected, is drawn from a certain rank – generally middle class – and is not necessarily widely representative of the American public as a whole.

The truth is that many Americans simply don't have any firsthand connection with people in the military and therefore they have long assumed that these costs were all part of the normal order of business. The good thing coming out of the Iraq war, if there is one good thing, is that it is no longer possible to say this is part of the normal order of business. This is a very, very serious problem.

And then on the question of what is the future likely to hold, well, it's interesting that Tom objected to the original premise of the question because if 86,000 troops is not enough in terms of the size of the military and if 150,000 troops in Iraq is not sufficient to truly pacify the country, we are talking about a truly massive requirement for many, many more forces, and I think frankly that if the political leadership went to the American people and said this is what this is going to cost, they would not support it in the same way that they seem to be supporting it in kind of a passive way right now.

MS. FLOURNOY: Larry?

MR. KORB: I guess I'm in between Chris and Tom here. I'm talking about an 86,000 increase. Where we're talking about taking the Army, which is authorized end-

strength right now of 480,000 to roughly 550. And in my view, that would basically give you some margin for error in the things that you're doing now. It would certainly lessen the dependence on the Reserves. It would allow you a better rotation schedule.

I mean, one of the things – the rules of thumb – what we used to use when I was, as they say, in the building trying to, you know, save the all-volunteer force was for every month or year you spend away from home, should be two months or two years at home – sort of one out of three. And then as Michele has mentioned and General Helmley has talked about with the Guard and Reserve, those were rules of thumb we felt were necessary to keep people in the service, and I think adding these would allow you to do this.

Again, I don't know – I don't see us leaving Afghanistan and Iraq anytime soon, however much we might want that to happen, and I just see us continuing that. And then the other thing about the skills – I disagree a little bit with Tom. I think in terms of the skills and the training there's a big difference between warfighting and peacekeeping. Now, it means I think everybody – certainly, as we know now that the support troops are in as much danger as the combat troops, you need to learn to fight, but I think that we've seen that people who don't have police skills – some of the problems we had over there in dealing with the situation in Iraq, and we knew in the – actually in the '90s that we needed to get more of these people into the active component because of what we do these days in terms of – so I think that the transformation up to now has focused on conventional warfighting rather than stabilization and irregular warfare and I think as a hedge you should really develop those skills.

MS. FLOURNOY: Great.

Yes?

Q: (Off mike.)

MS. FLOURNOY: What's your name and outfit?

Q: (Inaudible) Veterans Institute of Security and Democracy. I wonder if we could talk a little bit more about the problems we're having recruiting. Michele mentioned some of them. The Army has also lowered its standard for high school graduates by a couple of percent. They're recruiting people who are getting rejected from the Air Force and the Navy. Sort of like (inaudible) recruiting rejects (inaudible) I guess. (Laughter.)

The thing – there have been huge increases in reenlistment bonuses. (Inaudible) everything that's happening in the Individual Ready Reserve, et cetera, et cetera. We know that most of the people who go in the Guard and Reserve (inaudible) active duty forces. Well, if we're having trouble getting Guard and Reservists, if we're having trouble getting (inaudible) specifically about this in (inaudible) how on Earth – and I say

(inaudible). How are you going to get to a level of 86,000 or 150,000 volunteers given the circumstances I was mentioning?

And just one (inaudible) the impact of Vietnam on the Army was long after the war was over. We could pull everybody out of Iraq today and the impact of that war on the Army (inaudible) recruitment is going to go on for many, many years. And of course we're not going to get out today, so my question is, can you honestly see a larger all-volunteer Army given the indications that we have today of (inaudible)?

MS. FLOURNOY: Well, Larry and Tom, since you're advocating a larger Army, I'll let you both take a crack at this.

MR. DONNELLY: Yeah, I got it. Look, for –

(Cross talk.)

MR. DONNELLY: Again, nine years in the all-volunteer force we sustained an active duty army of 780,000 at a cost that the American people were willing to bear for 25 years, so I don't know exactly how to translate that precedent to the current situation, and I accept that the situation is dynamic, as you might say, but that's all the data that we have to go on that's such – you know, such a larger number and such a larger cost than where we are now, even if you factor in the emergency subs and the activation of Guardsmen and Reservists that, again, I don't see why we couldn't – we shouldn't think that we could buy back half of what we gave up over the past 10 years.

And particularly if you want this model to work, it's premised upon, you know, a contract between – there's a contract for active duty folks and there's a slightly different contract for Reserve folks, and if you're now in Reserve status but you're so frequently called to active duty you have to ask yourself, what's the exact difference between me and a guy who is an active duty soldier? Less than I would like.

So, you know, that's the best analogy I can give you to argue that it's possible to do this, that it's affordable, that it's sustainable, and it's certainly necessary to execute the strategy and the missions – to succeed in the missions that we've got ahead of us.

So, to me, if you really want to save the active – or the volunteer force model, you've got to get it back into something like the balance that it was during the years of its greatest success.

MR. KORB: Well, I think it's affordable. In fact, all the analysis shows that a volunteer military is actually cheaper in the long run because you have less training costs and less turnover, so I think it is affordable.

But I agree with you in the sense that you have done everything that you can. If somebody said, how do you want to mess things up here and make it hard, you know, a lot of the steps that have been taken would just make no sense.

Now, the idea is that if you can tell people when you come in, you know, the idea of no more than one out of three years deployed unless it's obviously a grave national emergency, the Guard and Reserve, the one out of every five or six years – I think a big thing is this military service obligation because if you talk to parents today and your youngster comes home and says, gee, I'd like to join the service to get money to go to college in three or four years, they're going to say, wait a second; you might not get out in three or four years, you know, or you could be called back; you've got the stop-loss. That's why I think you've got to modify those things.

You're right; this should have been done. I mean, when this administration knew it was going into Iraq, which if Bob Woodward is correct is late 2001, that's when they should have been expanding the force. And when they did the Quadrennial Defense Review, which came out right after September 11th, they should have looked at rebalancing the forces. They've talked about doing it but they haven't got as much as they should.

But I agree with Tom in a sense. We've done it before. I mean, we had a larger Army, a larger – I mean, it was a little over 2.1 million in the eighties with actually a smaller manpower pool, so you can do it but it's not going to be easy and I think you're going to have to ensure that you take the steps that are necessary to assure people, because if you don't, then I think you might have some real problems. And I don't know if we've gotten too far yet; we'll just have to see. But remember that the Congress has been urging this step for quite a while – to increase it – and the reason they haven't is because they did not want it to come out of the baseline defense budget because right now you're paying for these extra 200,000 people with a supplement, and nobody votes against a supplemental increase because it's to support our troops, and you've heard all of the stuff during the campaign, but that's – go back to Chris's point: that's why you're not having the debate because those supplementals go through and, quote, unquote, "they don't count," you see.

Well, I'd like to see them in the baseline budget so we would know what the cost is and then have to make some of the choices.

MS. FLOURNOY: Yes?

Q: David Bollinger (ph) (inaudible) Association. A couple of comments and a question. The first comment has to do with – these are all for Mr. Korb. You mentioned that soldiers and their families need to be treated with care and respect. Unfortunately, not very much attention was given to employers as far as care and respect when the only thing that employers get out of all of this is punishment if they don't follow the USERRA laws. Senator Landrieu attempted to have a change to the tax code to allow for tax credits for employers, but I would have to say that unless employers fit into the equation, they have a vote and they're as important as a spouse in some cases, and in some cases when you have a non-married soldier that is (inaudible) for time.

The question about a Homeland Security Corps in the state – my question there is are we talking about a volunteer group, a militia, an organization that would be a Title 32-type organization that would fall under the control of the governor and the adjutant general.

I want to comment – you mentioned that stop-loss wasn't needed in Vietnam. Of course, our active force was exponentially larger. We had over a million soldiers in Europe at that time; we had at least (inaudible) division in Korea at that time, and we also had a draft and a much larger Individual Ready Reserve that we could tap into, so I would say that stop-loss is unique to this (time?) and not necessarily something that we would have experienced in Vietnam. Actually, the comment would have been on the Corps.

MR. KORB: Okay, let me take that. Yes, the Homeland Security Corps would be volunteer basis and it would go under, you know, Title 32. And basically this would be a backup in case that the – particularly the Guard is not there.

People like Dave Abshire, Jack Marsh, and Shy Meyer have, you know, urged this and I think this is something we really need to do, not only because it would be a good backup but because it would tap into the spirit of people – you know, what can I do to deal with the new threats that we face?

In terms of the employers, the point I was trying to make is with TRICARE this would help the employers because then you would say, if you keep this man or woman's healthcare thing, we're going to give you some sort of a subsidy, or if you don't, then you don't have to be put in this horrible position of throwing someone into a new system they had no familiarity with. I mean, if you're in the Guard and Reserve and you're in some place where we don't have any military bases because they're mostly in the South and Southwest, now, what happens if you called up, you're wherever, and your family has got to get into a whole new health care? And I can tell you from personal experience, that's probably the most difficult thing when you change jobs, you know, so that's what I was emphasizing there.

My point about stop-loss is I don't think it would have been necessary if you had taken some of these steps earlier, okay? That's the point. And as Senator McCain says, that really can cause the problems that the previous question talked about, because if you start invoking – you know, you invoke stop-loss, basically what happens is that people are going to be less willing to join, and you've already seen – or the one thing Michele talked about – the beginning of, I think, a real problem – one of the things with the Guard and Reserve that are so good is you get people who serve like four or five years on active duty and then join. Well, they're not joining now because they know – I mean, we saw that one poor fellow that came in what he thought was an experimental one year to see if he would like it and then he ended up with a three-year commitment.

So I think that's my problem with stop-loss. I think if you had a better – you know, a bigger force and done some of the steps that we talked about you wouldn't have to invoke it as much.

But remember, I mean, in Vietnam, yes, you did have a bigger military and all that, but we started losing experienced people quite rapidly after a couple of rotations, and even with that we did not force the NCOs and people like that to stay in.

MS. FLOURNOY: Let me just add, there is a sort of chicken-and-egg problem here. I think one of the key issues that aids recruitment and retention is predictability, that people know that when they sign up what their commitment is going to be and it's not going to be more than that – it might be less than that but it's not going to be more. You can't get that predictability until you grow the force and yet you can't grow the force until you can get the predictability. So it is a very difficult problem.

Yes, sir?

Q: Scott Means (ph) with *Defense Today*. I was hoping that the panelists could sort of elaborate on a couple of points that were sort of briefly touched on, and one is paying for all this. You mentioned cutting F-22 and national missile defense and submarines. I'm just wondering – I mean, how much cuts would this require? Any further elaboration on just how much sort of in terms of cutting procurement or platforms and that kind of thing, and what the effects for contractors would be?

And then to follow up, another point that was briefly made is that the Air Force and the Navy, as mentioned, they're downsizing due to technology and are there any kind of new technologies that contractors or other (inaudible) could provide to similarly sort of offset for the Army?

MS. FLOURNOY: Larry, do you want to start?

MR. KORB: Well, I think Tom made a good point here, I mean, that even some of those reductions would not be enough – well, certainly the number he wants – it's a couple hundred thousand. My point is up to now what has happened is the Army has resisted adding people permanently because they're afraid they would have to make the tradeoffs in their budget between what they buy – and they're not buying too much. I mean, Comanche's gone, Crusader's gone.

So what I was saying, let's take a look at the whole defense budget and see what your priorities are, and if you need to increase the defense budget, do it, because if you don't, then you're going to endanger the volunteer military, and I don't care how good your weapons are; if you don't have good people, you're not going to be able to carry out your missions.

In terms of ground forces, I think what we've seen in Afghanistan and particularly in Iraq, that quantity is an end in itself, okay? In other words, yes, in terms of fighting the conventional warfighting, yes, technology can substitute for manpower, and I think we saw that in the drive up to Baghdad. The problem has been after that. And remember, go back to what General Shinseki said: based on his experiences in Vietnam

and Bosnia he was talking 3,000,000 to 400,000 troops there. You simply could not do that with the size force that you have. And we've seen that as good as your technology was, we just didn't have the forces on the ground when the regime fell to kind of get that security situation under control.

So I think that quantity is something we just can't ignore in this new era in which – for ground forces, that is.

MS. FLOURNOY: Tom.

MR. DONNELLY: Yeah, I'll try to be quick. On the budgetary front – I'm just going to guess here, but I think it's a reasonable guess, that the manpower bill alone in the emergency supps for the Army alone, I'm just guessing is \$20 billion-plus. That is a whole lot of dough. So it's not like we're not paying for this anyway, but we're doing it in really the dumbest way imaginable. If you simply migrated that emergency money, as Larry says, into the regular budget, you could, I bet, easily get Larry's 86K and probably get closer to a number that I would like.

Conversely, if you needed to raise that kind of capital in order to pay for manpower – and remember, manpower money spends much faster than procurement or R&D money, so for every outlay dollar you've got to harvest two to three investment dollars. So, yeah, I bet you could go through the entire certainly procurement and certainly the R&D budget and maybe still not meet annual outlay targets.

So migrating money from investment accounts to manpower accounts is kind of – and of course you pay the cost in foregone modernization. You remember five years ago we were all fretting over the procurement train wreck that we were supposedly heading for.

As to the question of technologies, look, transformation thus far has been about a very narrow slice of what modern battle might be. We find both in the images of fighting in Fallujah, both stuff that reflects technology investments. We use airpower in cities in ways that we never would think about doing before.

Conversely, I'm not sure that that was the right thing. It's still a lot harder and more difficult to get fire support from a fixed-wing aircraft than it is from a mortar and artillery tube, and both are equally precise, yet our investment trends have been away from artillery towards more mobile and more expensive forms of firepower.

So I would say, you know, let's sit down and really think through transformation, not from a – we've been doing too much self-referential building of the force based on how cool it is, how capable it might be rather than asking, well, what does the force actually have to do, and then designing some technologies to try to solve those problems.

MR. PREBLE: Well, actually I'll follow up immediately on that point. I mean, the question does need to be, what exactly is this force intending to do or what is this weapons systems intending to do or who is this weapons system intending to fight?

This is precisely the kinds of questions that it seems to me we didn't ask after the end of the Cold War, which is why I stressed so much the persistence of Cold War-era deployments plus the addition of a number of new deployments.

I mean, I think it's instructive and the earlier question about is Iraq an anomaly or is Iraq a model? I mean, I think we haven't resolved that question. But if it is the model to remain in the Middle East with a large – very large force – arguably it needs to be larger even than it is right now because it isn't having any great success stabilizing the country with just 150,000 troops. So if that is the model, what exactly – how exactly do those troops contribute to our broader ends; that is, promoting democracy in the Middle East? And ultimately, of course, the end is to make us safer here. How exactly does the Virginia-Class submarine make us safer here? How exactly does the F-22 make us safer here? Are these weapons systems that were designed to fight a Cold War adversary still needed for the kinds of fights that we're likely to have today?

And I think that's the kind of budgetary assessment that if I was responsible for these kinds of things, those are the kinds of questions I would ask in the same way that any other business asks where they are spending their money and asks exactly how or if the money they're spending contributes to their bottom line.

MS. FLOURNOY: Let me just add one footnote on the technology/manpower substitution question. CSIS recently co-hosted a conference with DARPA on the issue of how could technology work in stability operations? And I'd encourage you to look at the report – detailed report on the CSIS website. But the bottom line was technology can be a tremendous enabler in terms of getting the mission done but there weren't that many opportunities for actual substitutions for manpower. You still have a very manpower-intensive set of tasks, and technology can help but it's not really going to be the kind of substitution that we've seen in higher-end warfare.

Yes?

Q: (Inaudible) quick question about modularity. Obviously, you know, general Schoomaker's ideas for generating more capability out of the force. Yesterday there was a piece in the *Post* looking at producing enough equipment for the troops. Obviously we have a problem sustaining them. One of the officials, I think it was at the Red River Arsenal, was quoted as saying, "I could really do without modularity right now."

What are your thoughts about its usefulness and its timing?

MR. KORB: Well, I think one of the problems I have with it is that you're pretending by creating more brigades that you've got a larger force, but you don't have as many people there on the ground and I think that's where you have to be careful because

if you say, well, gee, you know, we're going to have – we're going to go from 26 to 33 brigades I think was the number or whatever it was, well, okay. No, it'd be 33 to 48 I guess or something was the number. But if you're going to do that with the same number of troops, then you're back to the problem Michele just mentioned and I mentioned in response to the question from the reporter from *Defense News*: you don't have the troops on the ground.

And I think at some point you need to face up to this. I think one thing we all agree on here is you need to come to grips with is this your strategy? Do you intend to do this? And if you do this, are you going to be honest about the bill? Because I think when you put it into the supplemental it masks the full costs. People say, well, the defense budget's \$420 billion. If you count all of the things we're doing, it's over \$500 billion. And do you want to spend that much money to carry out this strategy? And if you do, you've got to realize how you're going to pay for it. Do you want to cut other programs? Heaven forbid raise taxes, you know, in the middle of a war? That type of thing – I think that's what's really, really critical to ensure that the American people understand what's going on.

MS. FLOURNOY: Tom?

MR. DONNELLY: Yeah, look, I think unit of action thing makes a great brigade. The question is, you know, if we have 48 great brigades versus 33 great – can't even say great – brigades, is that going to win the war for us? These are, again – so we fetishize (ph) the tactical level so much.

And you raise a very good question about the timing of this. Actually, my understanding is that the process is kind of if not halted then really boxed up just by the need to feed the Iraq beast. And I would say, finally, that the whole premise of transformation as this administration has understood it has been kind of a cheap approach and particularly a manpower-saving approach. And if you look at the spaces, what happened to the bodies? You know, a lot of them are people who used to be air defenders or artillerymen who are now migrating into other MOS's and maybe some of that's good, but I would say that in an Iraq kind of conflict artillery might be a better and cheaper and more effective way to deliver fire support than a GPS-guided bomb from an F-16, so these are decisions that were made sort of pre-Iraq and we're living with the consequences of them now.

MS. FLOURNOY: Any more questions?

Yes? One more question back there. Adam?

Q: Thank you. Adam Mark, CSIS. My question deals with military strategy and I think you've all sort of inclusively addressed it, but assuming that we're going to have this interventionist, expansionist, national strategy. You know, from my view there's a lack of unanimity on Afghanistan and Iraq on what is the right force size for these operations.

Is it, to use a shorthand, a Rumsfeldian lethal, lighter, less of a footprint or the Shinseki or old Colin Powell view that you need boots – more boots on the ground and you need a larger force to do stability operations after major combat operations cease? And to bolster your argument for a (grown?) force, you need to grapple with this question of the military strategy and really once and for all come down on either side there because from what I see there's even a lack of unanimity about that basic question.

MR. KORB : Yeah, I think you're right. I mean, I think that the Pentagon's trying to have it both ways. They're talking about every time somebody raises some of the questions that have been raised here, well, we're transforming and we're going to be more efficient. I mean, as I followed this debate one of the things that I remember seeing about a year ago said, well, what we're going to do is we're going to take – we're going to reform the civilian personnel system and – because right now we're using military people in civilian jobs because those civilians with all the civil service rules are no good. Let me tell you – I'll tell you from my own experience over 40 years now both being in the service and in the building and outside, the defense civil servants are terrific. You know, I mean, I think they're excellent.

But then the idea was, okay, now – so since we now have reformed civil service, we're going to get people in there and then the military people can go and they can be out in the field. I mean, what that overlooks is what Chris and I can tell you from our Navy days is ship-shore rotation. You can't say, you know, you've enlisted. You know, here, you're going to be on the Eisenhower. We'll see you in 20 years. I mean, it just doesn't work that way. You've got to have a job for them when they come back.

So, I mean, we played all of these games that we're going to do it. And then the second thing is that – you know, the idea that the transforming the – remember, before September 11th they were going to eliminate two Army divisions. They were going to eliminate two and they were going to – which is okay if you're just going to fight conventional wars where you go in, topple a regime, and then go home. Well, that doesn't happen and so therefore you're going to need some quantity.

And I don't see any indication in what this administration says in terms of the way they view the threat and what they want to do that they're going to back off this. Okay? And so I think we know what the strategy is. Read the document that came out in November, I mean in September, 2002. That's it. Then you need to do this or else you risk breaking the volunteer Army, and if you do that – and I don't think you're going to break it in the sense that you're going to have to go to a draft, but what you're going to see is the quality of the people that you have will not be as good as it used to be. We've talked about some of the indications here. And if you have a less qualified military, then you've got a real problem in terms of carrying out whatever missions that you want.

MS. FLOURNOY: Well, I'd like to first of all thank the Center for American Progress for convening what I think has been a very provocative discussion. I'd like to

thank you for your excellent questions and I'd like you to join me in thanking our panel for their – (applause).

MR. KORB: Thanks, Michele, that was great. Happy birthday.

MR. : And so how did you know it was her birthday?

(END)