

Center for American Progress



THE HENRY L.
STIMSON CENTER

PRESENT:

**“SECURING RUSSIA’S LOOSE NUKES:
PROGRESS SINCE 9/11”**

FEATURING:

**GRAHAM ALLISON, DOUGLAS DILLON PROFESSOR
OF GOVERNMENT AND DIRECTOR, BELFER
CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY**

**JOSEPH CIRINCIONE, DIRECTOR FOR NON-PROLIFERATION,
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE**

**ALTON FRYE, MEMBER OF BOARD OF DIRECTORS, THE
HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER; PRESIDENTIAL SENIOR
FELLOW EMERITUS, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS**

ALONG WITH:

**ROBERT O. BOORSTIN, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS**

**BRIAN D. FINLAY, SENIOR ASSOCIATE,
HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER**

**ANDREW J. GROTTA, NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
ANALYST, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS**

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ROBERT BOORSTIN: Good afternoon. I'm Bob Boorstin. I'm senior vice president for national security here at the Center for American Progress. I want to welcome you all here today for the release of what we think is a really important report: "The Race to Secure Russia's Loose Nukes: Progress Since 9/11." This is a joint project between the Henry Stimson Center and our center, so if you hear "center" bandied about, you can ask us which one we're referring to. And I first want to thank Ellen Laipson, who runs Stimson but could not be here today, for her help in making this happen. And of course, Brian Finlay is one of the co-authors of the report who has worked with us all along. This was a very successful partnership and we really appreciate Stimson's help.

We have, to say the least, a first rate panel here to discuss what we believe is a tier-one challenge for the United States of America four years after 9/11. To my immediate left, Graham Allison is Douglas Dillon professor of government and director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. He is the author, most recently, of the somewhat terrifying but excellent book, *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*, which concludes that unless we significantly accelerate our efforts to lock down fissile materials, there's a better than 50/50 chance that terrorists will successfully carry out a nuclear strike against the United States. Perhaps most relevant for today's discussion, Graham was a member of the original Baker-Cutler Task Force and so, we're thrilled that he's here in order to be able to give us that perspective.

To his left, Joe Cirincione, is the director for nonproliferation programs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Joe has, I suppose you could say, literally written the book on weapons of mass destruction of all kinds and he is the guiding force behind what we believe is an extremely important program that Carnegie runs. And he is also a very good friend of the center, he has traveled with us to various places including Stockholm I believe, and we thank you for being here.

And finally, Alton Frye, who is a member of the board of directors of the Stimson Center, and among many, many hats that he has worn over the years, he is currently the director of the Council on Foreign Relations Program on Congress and U.S. Foreign Policy. Alton is going to say a word about Stimson Center before we go on.

ALTON FRYE: Thank you very much, Bob. I am happy to add my welcome to both the participants in the program and to the fine authors who produced the study we come together to discuss. Stimson, as you know, is an independent, nonpartisan policy analysis center founded more than 15 years ago, and it has had a long tradition of focusing on problems of weapons of mass destruction, including issues regarding the loose nukes problem in Russia, but broadly in the context of the nuclear proliferation issues generally.

We have had a long tradition of collaboration within the Stimson Center, and we're happy that it extends to collaboration between institutions with similar missions and concerns, so I was especially happy to see the fine study that Brian Finlay and

Andrew Grotto have produced. It's a model for that kind of institutional collaboration and it displays, in a sobering way, how far short we have fallen in Russia and the United States collaboration to deal with the loose nukes problem. We are transforming a problem that the Baker-Cutler Commission hoped could be addressed systematically and perhaps definitively within a decade into a problem that now appears to be a two-decade or even three-decade-long process. I think most analysts in the field would say that's not acceptable, and so this is a very welcome additional warning about the need to get on with this terribly important mission.

It meshes very well with the crucial work that Graham Allison has done over many years to highlight the fact that the control of fissile material from the Russian inventory is essential if we are to overcome the risk of a potential leakage into an actual act of nuclear terrorism. It's not the only problem associated with loose nukes, but that one remains high on our agenda. So I'm very pleased to have a chance to participate in the panel and to see that both centers have been able to work together on this terribly important issue.

Thank you, Bob.

MR. BOORSTIN: Thank you, Alton.

Let me actually introduce the authors of this report. First, Brian Finlay. Stand up, Brian. When Brian stands up, you really see him, too – who is senior associate at the Stimson Center, and he was formerly the director of the Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign, and he is co-editor of a book called *Ultimate Security: Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction*.

Andrew Grotto of the Center for American Progress, he's our analyst on nonproliferation, and among many things he's written for us his most recent product, which is on radiological weapons and the possibility of radiological attack, is one that I recommend to you.

What I'm going to do is do a quick summary of what the report says because I'm sure that most people haven't had a chance to get through it, to say the least, because it's quite an extensive report, and then ask some questions of the panel and we'll have a discussion. After that, we'll open it up to questions from the audience.

As Alton said, we're here really to mark the release of this report, which is about U.S. efforts to lock down what one might call the Russian nuclear hangover from the Cold War. And by that we mean, of course, the weapons, the nuclear materials, and the nuclear expertise that were commanded, produced, and owned by the Soviet Union. And as we approached the fourth anniversary of 9/11, Brian came to us and we thought about what might be the best way to measure our progress in combating what is generally agreed to be the most catastrophic threat facing the American people, and that is a terrorist armed with a nuclear weapon. You all recall, of course, in the – I think it was the second debate of the presidential election when President Bush and John Kerry

actually agreed on something, and that was the thing that they could agree on, that this was the greatest threat.

Certainly, there were any number of ways that we could measure our progress, but I think that Brian and Andy were really wise in their choice of trying to prepare a follow-up report to what is called the Baker-Cutler Commission. By way of background, in January, 2001, a bipartisan task force led by former Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker and the late Lloyd Cutler came together under the auspices of the Energy Department to outline a strategic plan for dealing with Russia's loose nukes.

The report really represents the best of what you could call Washington's blue ribbon commissions. It's a report that is unvarnished, it is a consensus, it's bipartisan. And it was finalized, I should say, long before the really, really ugly partisanship that marks a lot of our dealings today started to rise here in Washington.

We focus on Russia today as the Baker-Cutler report did because no other country has nearly as many vulnerable weapons or materials to order such uneven and precarious security conditions. Russia has the world's largest stockpile of highly enriched uranium, and that's the material that terrorists would find most readily usable in a bomb, and the world's second largest stockpile of plutonium, just behind you know who, and the world's largest arsenal of nuclear warheads.

A little less than a decade after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Baker-Cutler Task Force concluded that "[t]he most urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation-states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home." Clearly, their finding stands the test of time.

Now, to counter that threat, the task force recommended a rapid increase in the pace of programs to secure Russian weapons material and expertise. And according to the task force, this was vital to prevent terrorists or extreme regimes – rogue regimes, if you like – from acquiring these nuclear weapons. It also recommended the appointment of a senior official in the White House or National Security Council to oversee these efforts. It said that a great deal more money needed to be spent in the area, and it made a number of other recommendations which are included in our report in the front.

Brian and Andy's report essentially finds that the United States government has made discrete progress in securing Russia's loose nukes in certain areas, but that overall the Baker-Cutler called for accelerating the pace for securing loose nukes has gone unanswered. Where there should be urgency in this case, the report finds incrementalism. At the current rate of securing these materials, as Alton said, we may not reach the objectives that Baker-Cutler put forward until 2020 or even 2030, which is a good 10 to 20 years later than the commission wanted. Of the 19 policy measures that were identified by the task force to counter the threat, Brian and Andy have found that only five has seen meaningful progress towards full implementation. For the remaining 14,

we have minimal progress. An example: the task force called for dramatic acceleration of efforts to secure hundreds of tons of Russia's weapons-grade fissile materials located in buildings all around Russia, but at the current pace that we are trying to meet that goal, it could be another 25 years before those materials are secured.

Our report finds that the primary reasons for the failure to accelerate progress are similar to the obstacles identified by the task force in 2001. First, intransigence on the part of the Russian government; second, a lack of clear senior level leadership in the United States which would be responsible for coordinating and advancing American nuclear threat reduction objectives; third, insufficient and inconsistent budgetary support; and fourth, a seemingly persistent resistance on the part of the Bush administration to address Russian sensitivities on things like which party would bear liability in an event that accident or sabotage would take place during threat reduction work.

The report also, of course, as we like to do here at the Center, offers a score of recommendations for how we can put what Baker-Cutler wanted back on track. And some highlights of those recommendations include that the president should appoint a high level coordinator with budgetary authority within the White House to coordinate U.S.-Russian nonproliferation programs; that the administration settle immediately the dispute over legal liability by accepting rigorous, but more balanced provisions in bilateral threat reduction agreements, and that can be discussed by either Brian or Andy in the question period; that the U.S. and Russian presidents jointly develop comprehensive inventories of continued threats from the former Soviet arsenal including inventories of weapons, materials, and expertise; and that the president and the Congress dramatically increase funding for Russian threat reduction work consistent with the elimination of obstacles that would put a ceiling on the pace of how we could get that work done and the scope of existing cooperation.

When I read the report, I come away pretty depressed because this is a story about one of the greatest threats that we face, and a threat that almost everybody agrees is indeed the biggest threat that could happen to the American people. It is also the story of programs that have been proven to work, and yet we have not accelerated these programs and let them do their job. And I think if you come to the conclusions of this report, you have to say that our government, and by that I mean both the White House and Congress, have dropped the ball on this.

That's where I'll stop, and I'm going to open up our discussion among the panel with a question to Graham. You know, Graham, as a member of the panel, we just want your perspective on how we're doing and what you think of the report and whether you think it accurately brings us up to date. Also, if you agree with the conclusion that we've been rather slow here. why you think U.S. government has been so slow to act and what can be done?

GRAHAM ALLISON: Well, three big questions. Let me start by saying I think the – I would commend the authors, Brian and Andrew, for an excellent report. I haven't read the published version, but I read the draft version that I got earlier this week and I

think it's a fair and balanced assessment of a very serious problem. I think it starts correctly from the report of the Baker-Cutler Commission as a base point, and I think it tries to assess what's happened in the period since, and it expresses, I think effectively, the bewilderment that Bob has already offered about how can this be conceivable that for a problem so serious with an agenda so clear, the progress is so little. So, I think that – a good job with respect to that.

Let me say first with respect to the Baker-Cutler Task Force, because I think Bob said it just right, this was an unusual case. I was very honored to be a member of this group in which a Republican and Democrat, both wise – two are the wiser heads in Washington for many, many years, neither of whom had anything to do with this issue. I mean, Howard Baker was Senate majority leader and chief of staff for Reagan, but nuclear was not his topic, and Lloyd Cutler was a great counsel to many presidents and a wise lawyer, but it wasn't his subject either. So they were enlisted to just take a look at what sensible people would conclude about this.

And the commission consisted of a good mix of Republicans and Democrats, Alan Simpson and Sam Nunn and other usual suspects, some of whom had had some responsibility, but most of whom hadn't, in this domain. And they were genuinely amazed by what they found because the commission took testimony, classified and unclassified, from people within the government. We made a couple of trips to Russia. I remember Howard Baker visiting a facility for Russian nuclear weapons in Murmansk and he said, "This can't possibly be, you know, real. I mean, there must be something wrong with this picture. This could be – I mean they can't be – these can't be nuclear weapons stored in these facilities with this level of security. Just this can't be happening." And we went around, you know, round and round; no, absolutely this was the site, these were weapons, this was the circumstances.

And he – Baker was so moved by this – I think he was really courageous about this – that the report says exactly – at the time the report's written, this is January of 2001, we don't know who it's going to be – a Democrat or Republican administration. Baker testified to Congress while he was awaiting confirmation to be ambassador to Japan, which is a unique, unprecedented event, and he said, first I never testified to Congress, you know, I sat on the other side of the table, and two, I've been told while you're awaiting confirmation, you are not supposed to say anything. So, nonetheless, I feel so strongly about this issue, and he says – I quote this in my nuclear terrorism book, he says, "If we really took account of this, we would be terrified." He said we'd really be terrified; the fact that there could be thousands of nuclear weapons and potential nuclear weapons left in conditions in which they might be stolen and given to terrorists and used to destroy an American city or several American cities.

And I think that's a good starting place. So I'd say the right starting place, and I think the report does a good job with respect to this, is to say, were Bush and Kerry correct in the debate that Bob referenced when asked the question, what is the single most serious threat to American national security? And they both said it's terrorists with a nuclear bomb exploding in one of our cities. Now, that's either right or wrong, okay?

If it's right, there follows from that a huge amount. If it's wrong or if it's just rhetoric, that's a different subject. And I would say it's correct.

I believe that if you try to get your head around the notion of just one nuclear bomb exploding in one city – with the tragedy of Katrina, you know, comparisons don't work exactly right, but if just one small nuclear bomb of the sort that would fit in the back of an SUV, which was actually thought to be in New York City right after 9/11 in a story I tell in the nuclear terrorism book, but if just one small nuclear bomb had gone off in New Orleans, we would be talking about hundreds of thousands of people who would have instantly perished, not a thousand. And you'd be talking about – you wouldn't be talking about rebuilding New Orleans. And we would also be thinking, why does this need to happen only once? What about Washington? What about Boston? What about Los Angeles or Houston?

So I would say Bush and Kerry got it exactly right with respect to what's the threat. The question then, which you rightly say, is, well, what about the – what have we done with respect to this? And I have a little report card that I made just to try to keep track of it under three categories: no loose nukes, that's all nuclear weapons so secure that they can't be stolen; and then no new nascent nukes, which is new production of highly enriched uranium or plutonium from which people could make a bomb; and thirdly, no new nuclear weapons states. And I grade the Clinton II; that is, the Clinton second term, and Bush I, the Bush first term, I would say you get about a C minus in Clinton II and about a D minus in Bush I. I don't know if that fits.

And what would be my sort of just comment on each of those? I'd say no loose nukes – it's hard to believe, but I think Andy – the report is pretty clear as is Matt Bunn's report that's done out of the Belfer Center at Harvard, the pace at which weapons have been secured in Russia in the years – the four years now after 9/11 is as slow as it was in the period before – the four years before 9/11.

So you say, wait a minute: we get a wake up call, terrorists want to do massive destruction, they can have a nuclear weapon, and the rate at which it's securing weapons that are vulnerable to death by terrorists doesn't increase? There's something wrong with that picture.

Secondly, nascent nukes; that is, new national production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium. The Iranian story in both Clinton and Bush went from being way, way, way away to being quite close to the goal line for Iran to be able to nationally produce highly enriched uranium, from which it can also make bombs. That's happened in both of the administrations, and indeed accelerated in the last four years so that we're now getting to crisis phase.

And thirdly, no new nuclear weapon states. North Korea has, in the period since January of 2003, gone from an arsenal of two nuclear bombs' worth of plutonium to eight. That's CIA's estimate. And they've got a nuclear weapons material production line running. So I would say poor grades on all scores.

Final point: I'd say the second term of the Bush administration I am much more encouraged about, and I'm in a hopeful mode right now. The president at Bratislava in February with his meeting with Putin took some ownership for the issue – the two presidents – and actually laid out a kind of a conception that this is our problem and we need to be doing something about it. They set up a couple of serious working groups that are run by Sam Bodman and Romyantsev, the head of Rosatom, and they've been working. The liability issue – the folks at the State Department, Secretary Rice and that team had basically gone through what should have been done, you know, five years ago, but any case, they've done it and now it's back to the Russian side, which is a mess, but which I am hoping – Bush is supposed to meet Putin, I think – what's today? Tuesday? – Thursday maybe, and I am hoping they're going to say this problem has finally got solved. So you've got at least people working on the problem.

And on Iran and North Korea, whereas in the first term I would say the Bush administration policy was not in the reality zone. It was like, as Vice President Cheney said, "We don't negotiate with evil, we defeat it," but we then offered no carrots and no sticks, and lo and behold the progress in both cases continued. I'd say that now the administration has got the – both issues in the reality zone. They are both hugely more difficult today than they would have been four years ago, but in any case it's trying to work them, so I'll try to be hopeful about that and stop.

MR. BOORSTIN: Thanks very much. I would just note as a personal aside that one of the main differences between the first Bush term and the new Bush term, of course, is that the Undersecretary of State for Arms control is now doing a job at the United Nations instead.

MR. ALLISON: At least with respect to this issue, he can do less damage there.

MR. BOORSTIN: Joe, you've examined nonproliferation programs across a wide range of programs that the U.S. has, that other people have; you've looked at nuclear weapon states, how we keep them under control, how we'd keep from getting more nuclear weapon states. My question to you, really, is how does threat reduction fit into the universe of nonproliferation programs? How important is it and how do people elsewhere view our efforts and what do they want us to be doing?

JOSEPH CIRINCIONE: Great. Thank you, Bob. My pleasure. Thank you for having me here and for having me on this esteemed panel. Alton and Graham have been working these vineyards longer than I have and hoeing their rows much deeper than I have, so it's a pleasure and honor to be here with the two. I think my role is to provide some comic relief, so let me add my fertilizer to the mix here and first compliment the authors of this study on the Stimson Center and the Center for doing this. You've provided a valuable history and a comprehensive assessment of the budgets, the accomplishments, and the failures of one of our most important national security programs. There's a rich collection of material in here. The budgetary figures alone are something that I find myself always searching for and it's a pleasure to have not just

the data, but a very nice graph showing it for me, so I can quickly grab this next time someone calls on the phone for a sound bite.

On the threat reduction issue, you have to see these programs, the efforts towards reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world, the efforts towards preventing the number of new nations who are getting these programs and the efforts to reduce the risks from the existing arsenals as all part of an integrated whole. It's like playing three-dimensional chess, you know. You have to move pieces on these boards at the same time and the movement on one level affects the movements on the other level. So this – one effect of the impact is this is a measure of our seriousness. How committed are we as a nation to reducing the dangers from nuclear weapons? When other countries see us spending \$1 billion a year on it and that's all, they judge that we are not serious about these programs, and I think that has an impact, therefore, on our efforts to enlist other countries in the fight.

The G8 partnership is an extremely important initiative and you document that and report on it here in the study, but both the pledges that the president hoped to secure for aid from the G8 partners are lagging and the fulfillment of those pledges are lagging, so the other countries aren't anteing up the money that we had hoped and this has a drag on the overall program.

Way back in the 1950s, it was recognized in some of the earliest national intelligence estimates on the proliferation danger that there was a link between disarmament and proliferation, so that we – these NIEs are now available, thanks to the work of the National Security Archive, and you can go to their website and get the 1958 assessment, for example, which talked about the danger that some 16 nations might acquire nuclear weapons. So in 1958, we are worried that not just the Soviet Union and the U.S. and Great Britain, which then had the weapons, would have them, but that there might be 16 other nations, including some of the major industrialized countries of Europe.

And in efforts to convince them not to, the NIE recognized that it was important that these nations perceive a credible move towards disarmament, including the signing of a comprehensive test ban treaty – they were discussing that even then – and measures to reduce or constrain the existing arsenals. And absent that movement, they feared these countries would be more inclined to get some of these weapons for themselves. They recognize that link. It's somewhat controversial now and many people deny that that link exists, but it was clearly recognized in the '50s and it was clearly recognized in the '60s, when President Kennedy in his move to correct this problem moved on both fronts. He started negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty. He couldn't get it, but he got the Limited Test Ban Treaty that ended atmosphere tests and he started the negotiations on the Nonproliferation Treaty. He couldn't finish the job; Johnson did. Johnson couldn't sign it; Richard Nixon did. We had a decade of strong bipartisan cooperation – liberals and conservatives working together on both these problems and that effort worked; not completely, not fully, but it built a diplomatic dam that stopped most of these countries – most of the ones we worried about in the '50s and '60s – from going ahead with their

programs. And as a result we now have eight, nine if you count North Korea, nations we are worried about today, but we're at a critical point again.

We are at this critical decision point where if we mishandle Iran and North Korea, we could set off a new cascade of proliferation. If we don't secure these materials, we could allow other groups – the main concern – or even other nations to acquire some of this fissile material and accelerate their efforts to get a nuclear bomb, the results of which would then again possibly result in an acceleration of proliferation of other countries or other groups trying to get this material themselves. So I see all these as intimately connected, both symbolically, politically, and operationally. You've got to move faster on this effort if you hope to have success on your other efforts of reducing the dangers from existing arsenals and convincing other countries not to have it.

Let me just close with this: what this report lays out so clearly, and it's one of the great tragedies of the story, is that we know how to do this. We know how to do this. The programs are in place. They work. What's lacking is the political will to push these programs, to accelerate these programs as the Cutler-Baker report recommended and get the job done. As the report concludes, and I agree, we are in a race. We are in a race. We are trying to beat the terrorists to these stockpiles, and right now we just simply aren't running fast enough.

MR. BOORSTIN: Let me turn to Alton and switch gears for a minute here. While I know that we in Washington never play the blame game, I wanted to raise the question of both the president's role and the congressional role in these programs, and how do you think the system is working currently in terms of who is doing the job the best, and whether or not there are ways that we could improve the relationship between the executive branch and the legislative branch to move faster on these programs?

ALTON FRYE: Bob, it is a very complicated political situation, as we all understand. When I heard Graham offer his grades for Clinton II and Bush I, C minus and then D minus, I thought to myself maybe grade inflation has arrived at Harvard. (Laughter.) I think, in fact, there is enough blame to go around, so we don't have to parse this too finely.

For example, in terms of building a constructive congressional base for moving on a very important aspect of this, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban, I believe that the Clinton administration did us all a great, great disservice by forcing a premature vote in the Senate. I think it was fundamentally mishandled and so I count that as one of the squandered opportunities of those years. Similarly, I think the president's rhetoric before he arrived at the campaign formulation that paralleled Senator Kerry's position last year – both of them saying that the nuclear proliferation problem in its terrorist garb or otherwise is our number one national security threat – before that, I think the whole axis-of-evil formulation, the personal rhetoric attacking Kim Jong-Il, all of that line of rhetorical excess created a climate internationally and domestically. It adversely affected the congressional possibility for dealing with this on a sensible bipartisan manner.

I would have to point out that probably the single most important positive initiative in this entire arena, the Nunn-Lugar program, was a congressional initiative, and so neither administration deserves credit for creating it. We miss him not in the Senate, I think, very much. Thank God we've had Senator Lugar to carry on, and he's had some important allies. Senator Domenici has played an increasingly important role on aspects of this, and in the House there are people not always in identical postures, but in both parties recognizing that there has to be congressional support for initiatives in this arena. Still, the performance has fallen well short.

I would say the congress deserves a fair grade for having roughly sustained the level of funding – sustained, not increased, the level of funding for Nunn-Lugar and related programs. I, in personal terms, would say that it deserves perhaps a somewhat higher mark for exercising restraint on some of the provocative programs like the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator, where Congressman Hobson has played an important role in highlighting the difficulty of sustaining a nuclear nonproliferation emphasis, at the same time we are innovating, I would say, gratuitously with new nuclear programs of our own. So it's a very mixed picture.

I think that the bottom line is Congress is full of fears and hostilities with regard to some of the key countries. Russia remains a target of wariness on the part of many members, not to mention North Korea and Iran, both of which are the target of not only prior congressional action – Iran will be a Sanctions Act, as an example – but there is a continued sense that these are such bad guys that we cannot expect to deal with them in a constructive manner. That's abroad on the Hill. It's a very important part of the psychological context and to break out of it, we're going to need a great deal more congressional willingness to depart from the prior rhetoric and recognize realistically that some of the new thrusts that are potentially emerging in the second Bush administration have to be intensified, built upon, and implemented, not simply talked about. And there I think Graham has it right: there are some important shifts in tone as well as shifts in program, which we can talk about a bit, in the second Bush administration which can give one some hope that we can get a presidential-congressional collaboration to accelerate programs in this area.

MR. BOORSTIN: Let me ask you first, Alton, and then ask the other panelists for their reaction, in the Baker-Cutler Report they recommended a high-level coordinator for these programs. Our report also recommends that. Do you think that that kind of bureaucratic change could really have an impact that would – that if you put somebody in the NSC who was responsible for a nuclear threat reduction, that that would focus the government and get us moving faster?

ALTON FRYE: Well, I am open-minded on that, Bob, rather than being either an advocate or an opponent. I think the bureaucratic reality that we face now is that there are some very tough players inside the administration who have a handle on parts of this problem and it would take a formidable figure to be able to overcome the existing bureaucratic claims. They were perhaps especially intense in the prior Bush term, but they are still there and some of the players in the prior Bush term would be difficult to

persuade to yield control, influence, guidance to a new player. Nonetheless, precisely because it's not clear we yet have the willingness to innovate and move forward briskly, I would be somewhat sympathetic to running the experiment of a high-level coordinator.

MR. BOORSTIN: Provided he wasn't called a Czar in this case, I assume.

MR. FRYE: Well, I avoided the term. I am somewhat sorry that you introduced the word.

MR. BOORSTIN: Joe?

MR. CIRINCIONE: I am in favor of a central coordinator and I've testified on this issue before Congress. I've gone back and forth in my own mind about this, but I'm convinced that there has to be a central authority with budgetary authority to move these programs forward and that's the key. The problems are formidable, as Alton has outlined. I think it's akin to reorganizing our intelligence agencies. You would have to break down some bureaucratic walls, departmental walls, but I think this mission is so urgent that you need somebody at the highest level that is in the White House coordinating this, somebody who has the president's ear. So many of these problems can be solved by the president weighing in; for example, the liability issue that you highlight in this report. This is a soluble problem; it just requires the president to turn to his staff and say, "Get it done," and then it gets done. A high-level coordinator can give you that – can give the president the kind of information he needs to make those kinds of critical decisions.

MR. ALLISON: I agree very strongly with the need for some point of responsibility and accountability. I think this was initially a part of the Nunn-Lugar legislation and certainly in the successor legislation by Senator Lugar, who has been one of the key advocates of it. And for those of us who have worked within the system, it can try to make – give this some plausibility. There are few – what is the task in – just take the U.S.-Russian cooperation in securing nuclear weapons? I mean, what is this psychologically? Okay, so psychologically it's Americans, most of whom are old cold warriors, like myself, who are going to Russians, who are defeated old cold warriors, and telling them we are here to help you secure the things that you think are the most valuable to you. Now, if you imagine somebody coming to your house and saying, you know, we're just coming to help you secure whatever is the most valuable thing you have in your house and we'll provide you a little assistance for it, and you're thinking, is this guy going to come back at night and steal my jewels or, you know, what's going on here? So psychologically one is trying to deal with a hugely difficult problem, that's point one.

Point two, the number of obstacles. The real obstacles are low, substantially. Let's take the liability issue, this one. This is – it's technical, but basically a liability agreement on who would be at fault if an accident happened when Americans were helping Russians secure nuclear weapons material was agreed right after the Soviet Union disappeared, when the Russians were so confused they would agree to almost anything, particularly if somebody said they were coming providing funds. Well, then

for five years after it was agreed that the Russians would destroy 8,000 nuclear bombs' worth of plutonium – for five years nothing happened – nothing, zero – because the Russians kept saying, “Suppose the contractor who comes to the facility deliberately sabotages it” – the American contract – “and there is an accident. You want us to bear that liability.” Well, no business deal would ever be done on those terms.

I mean, Russia had developed somewhat, no longer prepared to just take whatever you say goes. That obstacle was not addressed at all – never, not at all – through the whole first term of the Bush administration. I mean, I give the quote – an event that occurred in – I give the – in this nuclear terrorism book, there's Senate testimony where Colin Powell is up testifying and Senator Lugar asks him about this issue and he clearly is unaware of what the problem is. This is now four years on after 8,000 bombs have been potential – you know, sitting there.

So, fortunately, the beginning of the Bush II, Secretary Rice said, “Hey, this makes no sense. We need to solve this problem.” It took her probably two, three hours and it took somebody at the next level 20 or 30 hours. So this took real serious lifting by somebody, but not something that the ambassador could ever do by himself. Not something that Assistant Secretary Schmoie could ever do by himself. So there's a lot of people trying to work in it, but unless you've got some drive that says, you either solve this problem or you tell me why you can't solve it and who can solve it.

We have hardly ever, in this story, cases in which the president or the vice president are exercising their influence, or even the secretary or the secretary of defense, so the job of the person in the White House should not be to imagine he or she is a czar, but should be the kind of – I don't know – the driveshaft connecting presidential and vice-presidential authority to the overcoming of or undermining of obstacles, which will inevitably be occurring and where you need some more oomph than I have at my level. And then that means that there is a schedule and there's benchmarks and there is accountability and somebody asks every week or two, “Excuse me, how are we doing, you know, with respect to this?” And then if you are not solving the problem, I'll go try to work on it. If I can't solve it, I give it to Joe; he can't solve it, he gives it to Alton.

So I would say this is a crucial thing. What my hope had been in the case of the Baker-Cutler task force, and I've told Howard Baker this many times, I thought what a waste for him to go to Japan to be ambassador. This would be a perfect job for Baker, would've been in the first term, as the person – real, real weight who, if he were dealing with the problems with presidential authority, would be able to deal with other barons in a complicated situation. I think it's still a very good idea now. In fact, I'd still be for Baker to do it.

MR. BOORSTIN: Okay. Let me actually give the first questions to our authors, if they want to ask anything of the panelists at the moment.

Guys?

MR. FINLAY: I will ask just a very quick question, if I may, to Dr. Allison. The dynamic is interesting, I think, that the politics at the end of the Clinton administration when the original Baker-Cutler commission was struck versus the politics today, and I wonder if you could talk sort of on a broad national security level, sort of what the different dynamics not only on Capital Hill, but also internationally, on how that is affecting United States' ability to effectively implement these programs?

MR. ALLISON: Oh, a big, a big question and a complicated one, and I'd say two or three points on this just in glancing. First, even at the time of Baker-Cutler, Baker-Cutler was conceived in an environment in which the bipartisanship which we romanticize about in foreign policy from the past was already deteriorating. But the point that Bob has made, it's gotten hugely worse – hugely worse. So the taskforce, the notion of who was a Republican and who was a Democrat or – had nothing to – there was no element of that and you had a very good cross section of folks, but I'd say that's one biggie.

Secondly, Russia is no longer a supplicant. In fact, if I were to say what are some things that I sort of think that the report didn't quite get right from my view, I think that thinking of Russia as a supplicant and that we have to secure their weapons and we have to have access to their facilities in order to assure that our taxpayer dollars are appropriate – all of that was, I think, part of Nunn-Lugar and Nunn-Lugar-Domenici, and I think that plateaued a couple of years ago and there's not a place to make – I don't think we can do that anymore.

I think it's got – this program is ripe for reconception in which unless Putin feels like – he feels himself in his own gut that the nuclear bomb that Chechens get, whether they get it from Russia or Pakistan or wherever, is not coming first to Washington, you know, but is coming where he lives, he is not going to be moved to do the things he needs to do. And so that it needs to be reconceived. It starts from – this is as big a threat to you as it is to me. You're not doing me a favor and I'm not paying you to do something that you shouldn't be doing anyhow. So I think we need to get – I'd say that's the big, biggest point I would make about where we are now relative to where we ought to be.

I'd say one more footnote point, and this will sound like a partisan, but it's not meant to be, per se. I think that the Iraq is the elephant in the corner. Iraq we went to war with, we said, because of fears of their weapons of mass destruction and the possibility those would be handed off to terrorists. The fact that it didn't turn out that way, which I don't think was – I don't think this – it was a subterfuge; I think we were mistaken. I think President Bush was mistaken as everybody else. But in any case, we've already called wolf or cried wolf and so our credibility with respect to this issue in Iran and North Korea is now diminished. And our consumption of our high-priced help and our energy and our focus by Iraq has allowed the Iranian and North Korean problems to get hugely worse. Now, that wasn't the case at the time of the Baker-Cutler Commission, but I think that's where we are today.

MR. BOORSTIN: Alton, did you have something to add on this?

MR. FRYE: Well, I find myself in agreement with Graham. It seems the me that we have not yet recovered from the profound distraction the war in Iraq has created; distraction from valid and urgent priorities to address the problem Iraq was supposed to represent: a threat of weapons of mass destruction. And I am not here to argue a specific policy on disengagement from Iraq, but I do think it's appropriate to say that the president himself needs to think very hard about the priorities he has proclaimed as relate to the priorities he has pursued, and I don't think the burden rests only with the president.

I do think that the Congress can help lead an administration through inducements, through policy suggestions, recommendations and some policy entrepreneurship in some of these areas, but at the end of the day we are not going to be able to get the priorities right on the nuclear proliferation problem generally – Korea and Iran as specific cases – or on the loose nukes problem in Russia specifically. We're not going to get that right until we can get the president following through with an engagement with his congressional counterparts to do things concretely rather than merely rhetorically.

I don't want to make this a religious occasion, but the other day at my church the minister told that one day at the end of the service, a woman walking out of the church said to him, "Reverend Smith, each of your sermons is better than the next." (Laughter.) I think of it in this context because we've got to realize that each of the proliferation problems we're dealing with now – as bad as they are, each is better than the next one; that is, less bad than the ones we're likely to encounter

MR. BOORSTIN: Joe, did you have a comment?

MR. CIRINCIONE: Just 30 seconds. We have described this and we all think about this as a race between securing these materials and the terrorists getting them, but there is another limiting factor that may be here and that is how long we can count on Russian cooperation. How long is this window going to stay open? This, after all, is an historically unprecedented situation where a country that has not been defeated in war is allowing its main former opponent to come in and dismantle and eliminate the weapons we most fear. How long are the Russians going to let us do that? I don't think we know what the future of Russia is. We're much less comfortable this year than we were last year; much less comfortable last year than the year before. When you look at these graphs and you see some of these programs going into the next decade, I don't think we can be at all certain that line is actually going to get there.

MR. BOORSTIN: Okay. We'll take questions from the audience. Now, I would ask you to identify yourself and actually ask a question.

Back there. There is a microphone coming to you.

Q: Hi, Jason Gross with U.S. Global Leadership Campaign. The political necessities and budget realities over the last few years have really dictated that a great share of funding for Nunn-Lugar has flowed to Department of Defense and Energy and

not to the international affairs budget under State Department oversight. And – but following on what the panel’s discussed, what the report finds, they’re obviously moving ahead a lot of the policy imperatives involving sensitive high-level bilateral negotiations on sensitive political and legal questions are going to really be in the fore for Nunn-Lugar in the future.

So my question is twofold. Following on Dr. Allison’s recent comments, what were the political costs, the policy costs of not fully investing in the State Department role and programs in the past, and what would the policy implications be of ramping up both the investment resources and policy and time for the State Department in this program in the future?

MR. ALLISON: Well, that’s a good question, and I think the fundamental point was made by Joe earlier that if you ask – if this is the single largest threat to American national security, as President Bush said, or a category I threat, and then you say, well, what level of effort are we putting against this in combating it? I think the report does a good job reminding us, wait a minute, it’s about \$1 billion. How much is the defense budget? Well, it’s about \$450 (billion), okay, and that doesn’t account supplementals for fighting wars. And how big is the federal budget? Well, it’s getting close to \$2 trillion. How much is a trillion? It’s a 1,000 billion.

So, excuse me, the most important thing in my life is my dog or something, okay, and of course I don’t have money to pay for it to go to the vet and say, but also I have a house, I have a car, you know, and I go do dinner and I have a cup of coffee – doesn’t make sense. So money has not been the only problem, but this problem has been from the beginning done on the cheap. And I think that if you said, and where has it been – the cheapest component of it? I would say it’s in the international affairs component in State where when states have wanted to do something that could be encouraged or greased even by a little bit of money, a few tens of millions of dollars, the money and the authorities have not been there. And I could give you chapter and verse for half a dozen examples, but I’d just say we haven’t got this in mind.

In the Baker-Cutler Task Force, I think that was the first time anybody tried to estimate what would it cost to finish the job. One of the conceptual advances in Baker-Cutler was to try to get from just let’s keep doing more to how much would be enough, when would you be done, and there the proposition was – and this is back in 2001 – that if you were prepared to do this in 10 years, you would need to go from \$1 to \$3 billion a years, so \$30 (billion) was the number for getting the job done as a rough estimate at that time. And there were a number of the members of the commission, including myself, who thought that 10 years was much too long; you know, fours years or five years would be better, in which case you’re ramping up. But in terms of the overall national security budget – I mean, \$1 billion is a lot of money, but it is less than a percent, less than a tenth of a percent of the national security budget. So I think that we’ve nicked and dined it in a way that we shouldn’t do, even though if we had the money, that’s not the only problem.

MR. BOORSTIN: Joe or Alton?

MR. CIRINCIONE: Just one quick comment. This – the title of Graham’s book is *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe*. We can see this catastrophe coming. The weather reports are crystal clear on this. Just as the officials in New Orleans understood the risks that they faced and in late ‘90s devised a plan for how to shore up the dams and levees at New Orleans. It was going to cost about \$14 billion. They were unsuccessful in getting that money and pushing that plan. \$14 billion seems a drop in the bucket now for what it’s going to cost us after Hurricane Katrina. The Baker-Cutler report estimates that it will cost about \$30 billion to solve this problem. I think this is a minor defense investment. We have spent \$50 billion since the Baker-Cutler report on efforts to erect an anti-missile system and we have got to zero to show for it.

It’s a question of getting your priorities right, of understating what the real threats are, and I believe that our number one objective in our Defense Department should be preventing a nuclear New Orleans, and that the kind of investment we need to do that is minor compared to some other national security concerns.

MR. BOORSTIN: Now you know why Joe is a frequently called upon guest on television.

I would just refer people to figure for in the report on page 19, which does show you the bureaucratic diffusion and responsibility for these programs and it’s quite shocking if you haven’t taken a look at the number of departments that are involved in the different programs and that does, of course, have budgetary implications.

Yeah?

Q: Richard White, Hudson Institute. Question about the liability issue. If – that’s the Plutonium Disposition Agreement. If you resolve the liability issue in that regard, which is what seems to be the text on negotiation, how smoothly will be the flow to deal with the broader CTRM umbrella agreement and then respect to the Plutonium Disposition Agreement itself, if you are to – if the liability issue were to be resolved, how easy is that going to be to progress to the MOX fuel stage and actually get rid of the plutonium?

MR. ALLISON: I think Richard, both excellent questions, and they may be a little down in the weeds for most people. Let me try to do it at the general level and I’ll be happy to chat after. I think you rightly remind us that the liability problem is not the only thing standing between us and the elimination of 8,000 nuclear weapons’ worth of plutonium in Russia, and there’s been a debate about the mousing process, there’s the intra-agency debates within Rosatom now about where do they would like to be mousing or doing otherwise, so you’ve got several other obstacles there.

But if – which is what I’m hoping will happen when Bush and Putin meet two days from now, if they say we’ve resolved this problem and we’ve determined that these

weapons equivalents are going to be eliminated, and this is going to happen in four years, and the person who's responsible for this is this one and this one, and we're going to have them report to us every six months on whether they reach their milestone, and in between we're going to ask them how they're doing, this issue can be resolved, I think.

With respect to the umbrella agreement, I would say the very same thing. Actually, this is a good precedent for that and they ought to simply say, "Tell me what is the problem. Tell me what are – you know, what are the alternatives?" And they ought to choose a solution, and they ought to announce that this one is resolved this well because I think these are problems where, to go back to the comment I made earlier, any of us here who've worked in government know that Assistant Secretary Smith can work as hard as possible or Ambassador Jones as hard as possible on an issue in which the people on the other side, if they don't want to agree, or the people in another agency in Washington, if they don't want to agree, can make something not happen. The number of places to say no are a thousand and the number of places to say yes are a few, so that then you need somebody at higher levels of authority, which I think gets back to the logic of the problem that this needs to be driven with impulses from presidential authority.

MR. BOORSTIN: Ed? And wait for the mike, if you would, Ed.

Q: Ed Scott with the Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign. If this were a congressman's town hall meeting today instead of this distinguished panel with expertise on this issue, how many questions do you think really would be posed by the members of the audience about nuclear nonproliferation and threat reduction? I know a congressman who says he never gets asked a question about this and he is in one of the key leadership positions on the Hill. Do you have to motivate the American people on this issue or does some person on the elite ranks have to pick it up and push it all by himself or herself?

MR. BOORSTIN: I'm going to ask Alton to take the first shot at that.

MR. FRYE: It's always a question of whether initiatives on complex issues must arise from the grassroots or whether that is the burden of the representatives in representative government who have an opportunity to be more educated, to recognize that some issues may not arise in town hall meetings, but still arise as issues of policy that must be addressed.

I think you're quite right in characterizing the improbability of large numbers of questions flowing to congressmen or other officials in grassroots meetings around the country on this subject, but I think there is among a cluster of leaders in the House and Senate enough awareness so that one must look to them to shape policy and to energize policy. When we talk about someone to take an executive branch, focal leadership role, we are really talking about energizing action on an issue that is broadly understood to be grave and perilous.

In the Congress, I think we also have the Domenicis and the Lugars and the Bidens and the Levins, to cite just a few, who well understand that unless we do something soon and steadily this problem will become graver and graver and finally the probability will increase toward one that we will have this catastrophic event beyond the scale of history.

And so I think, for my part, I hope that the efforts of interested organizations and interested individuals in the private sector will continue to focus on discussions of the nature we're having here today and orient very much toward those in Congress who are in a position to catalyze wider congressional understanding and, over time, broader public understanding of the necessity to invest resources and find the leadership capable of addressing this problem.

MR. ALLISON: Let me just add one thing. I think it's a very good question and I think most of us who are policy wonks like to imagine we whisper in the ear of the king and he does it and does it and move on. I think the reality is that for most problems, especially ones that need to be addressed and the effort needs to be sustained, there's got to be some level of public understanding and support and that's actually in theory how a democracy is supposed to work.

So people – when I talk to – I was talking to a member of Congress this past week and I said, “You know, I can't understand why people get so excited about a base closing in their district and they don't get excited about a nuclear bomb going off, you know, in their neighborhood. Well, he said, yes, it's because you're not a politician,” and we went through the various discussions. I think that we as citizens need to say to our members and our representatives and to our fellows citizens, if this is a single most serious threat when you talk to your congressman, you should get him as excited about this as he is about a base that's happening. And just to quote Vice President Cheney, as I do in the afterward of this thing, Cheney in the campaign – the last month of the campaign made this part of his stump speech and here is the quote. He says – here he says, in a small town in Ohio, “The biggest threat we face now as a nation is the possibility of terrorists ending up in the middle of one of our cities with deadlier weapons that have ever been used against us, nuclear weapons able to threaten the lives of hundreds of thousands of Americans.” True.

Now, the conclusion he draws: “That's the ultimate threat. For us to have a strategy that's capable of defeating that threat, you've got to get your mind around that concept.” Well, I'm afraid that as – unless and until Americans – unless we get our mind around the concept of a single nuclear bomb going off in a single city, we're not likely to see the level of congressional and executive branch action that's required.

MR. FRYE: Bob, may I add one side comment on this? Part of the difficulty in the public education arena is, in my opinion, the misguided rhetoric that has appeared in the last several years, including the axis of evil, to which I referred earlier. We are violating something that Scoop Jackson set as the standard. He used to say that a great power must never shake its fist and then point its finger. Now, we've done a lot of fist

shaking, a lot of references to regime change and now, wisely I think, the administration is trying to walk back from that and diminish the implication that there might be regime change not only in a Iraq, but in North Korea or Iran under the pressure of public resistance here after the war in Iraq and among our allies, especially who are not prepared to go into military action in either of those theaters. The president has tempered his rhetoric. We are at the stage where we've been walking back to the finger pointing stage and we've now got to get to a stage where it can be an open-handed embrace or at least a handshake to get the diplomacy up and effective.

MR. BOORSTIN: Let me make one comment from another perspective, from my many sins in life and I was a pollster, once upon a time. And I was – one of my clients was a nuclear threat initiative and we did some extensive work for them on how you talk to people about the nuclear threat and how you make people relate to this. I don't believe it's impossible to get people's attention. I think a lot of it has to do with the language that's used, the fact that the policy wonks, as Graham said it, are using language that's way beyond anything that even folks who are paying attention to the news on a daily basis can comprehend. Something as simple as the expression "weapons of mass destruction," people don't get it. When you say to them, "nuclear and biological and chemical weapons," they get it. I mean, there're very basic things that need to be done in order to do this.

I would also say that NTI has developed, I think, a cultural approach to this that's really interesting. I don't know. You've probably seen the film that they've done. I think Greg Thompson is in it, if I'm not mistaken.

MR. FRYE: It's called *Last Best Chance*.

MR. BOORSTIN: There's your advertisement. And I think that it's that kind of approach that could make a difference here. We have to get original. We have to be able to see new ways to talk about these issues and to bring them into broader public discourse.

Here in the front.

Q: Thank you. Mark Fitzpatrick soon to be at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. Interesting panel. I look forward to reading the report. It strikes me that the report is focused on the physical manifestation of the proliferation problem – the what: the fissile material, the nuclear weapons that are inadequately secured, the highly enriched uranium, the HEU-based reactors, but that's not the only manifestation of the proliferation problem. And maybe the bad grades being assigned to the administration are because they expanded the focus to address more the who, the actors who might use the weapons, shut down the A. Q. Khan network, address the regimes that are most problematic. And addressed as well the migration mechanisms, the way the what gets to the who: the stopping of the ship bound for Libya with the centrifuges; the putting in place of a mechanism to replicate that success through the Proliferation Security Initiative; the addressing the financial means by which proliferators

can succeed through new executive orders, all of which might be reasons – maybe this question is to Dr. Allison, why the second Bush administration made you to have more hope for? I wonder if anybody would wish to comment on that.

MR. ALLISON: Excuse me, a good question. And I think that in the – if the objective is to prevent a nuclear bomb going off in our cities, you've got to think about the whos and you got to think about the what and you got to think about how they get it from one place to the other. And I think the Bush administration, for example, in taking down al Qaeda's sanctuaries in Afghanistan did exactly the right thing; something that the Clinton administration should have done before in my view, so allowing terrorists to have sanctuaries for training camps for doing things like 9/11 makes no sense. And I think actually the Bush doctrine that he enunciated after Afghanistan that says, set up a sanctuary and we will be there. Good idea, in my view. And trying to build a global coalition in the global war on terrorism to in effect outlaw terrorism or make it an international crime, in effect, which states and – which the international community have an objective to address.

So working on the perps is an important part of this, but with respect to nuclear – and that's relevant where nukes and bio and chem and hijacking airplanes. So you get the whos and you do well, but what's the likelihood that both by getting the bad guys and by not doing things to generate more bad guys, we're going to get to zero? I'd say not very good, okay. Whereas the very good news piece of the nuclear terrorism issue, I believe, is that this is a finite problem subject to a finite response; a huge response, but a finite response because the happy syllogism with respect to the nuclear terrorism is no fissile material, no fission explosion – that's the mushroom cloud – no nuclear terrorism.

So, unless the perp can get a bomb or highly enriched uranium or plutonium from which a bomb could be made, whatever they want to do, they can't conduct a nuclear terrorist attack. And fortunately, highly enriched uranium and plutonium don't occur in nature, so you can't go dig them up somewhere. They're too hard to make for the terrorist group. They require the resources of a state to make. There's a lot of it now, but we as human beings know how to lock down things we don't want people to steal.

I, in the nuclear terrorism book, propose a gold standard in which I say, we don't lose any gold from Fort Knox, Russia doesn't lose any treasures from the Kremlin armory, what reason should icons be more secure than nuclear weapons – explosives, okay? So lock up everything that exists, clean it out of places where you can't lock it up, and prevent production of new. That's a huge undertaking, but at least it's a finite undertaking. So I would say the reason why the – at least for myself, there's more emphasis on the means component of nuclear, not exclusively because it needs to be, as the report says, all azimuth and multilayered, but the means component is a – there's a chokepoint which if choked tightly enough gets you to nearly zero with respect to nuclear. And that doesn't mean that the same perp wouldn't then become interested in bio. So it's not a solution to all the problems of megaterrorism, but it is with respect to the problem that I think is the most dangerous and the only one that kills hundreds of thousands of people in a single blow.

MR. BOORSTIN: Andy, do you want to comment?

ANDREW GROTTO: (Off mike) on page 50 we do discuss efforts to identify and intercept illicit shipment of weapons. It is an important part of a layered strategy, so on page 50 you can read that.

MR. BOORSTIN: Alton?

MR. FRYE: This question I think is very important because it leads us to make sure we have this balance sheet drawn fairly. In the nature of discussing the shortfall in our performance in this area, we have been pretty critical. And I think it's important at least to know that there are some very positive things that have been done. In the Clinton administration, the great credit was earned by persuading Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to return the nuclear resources they controlled after the breakup of the Soviet Union. And similarly, in the Bush administration I think we certainly can say that the choice of the Six-Party venue for engaging the North Koreans is superior as a diplomatic modality. I think we can say that the good effort to deal with the Libyan issue is a very big positive. Similarly, I think the broad commitment by the administration even while opposing the Comprehensive Test Ban to maintain the moratorium on testing is a big positive, and the adjustment in the rhetoric – attempting to get away from the threat of multiple regime changes into a set of assurances that we don't contemplate military action against North Korea, that gets us off a track that was quite counterproductive.

A couple of other things that I think are positive on the record, we at least ought to put into this ledger, the president has gone farther in his overall commitment to reducing the operationally deployed strategic force. Now, there are a lot of problems in that with regard to the agreement with the Russians on cutting back on deployed nuclear warheads, the size of the reserve forces, how many will be kept in ready reserve for early activation, but the basic idea that we can reduce the American strategic arsenal substantially is an advance, and the administration deserves credit for that just as it deserves credit for the Proliferation Security Initiative. That is not a comprehensive solution, but it has engaged a significant number of partners and governments on some activities that have been exercised and a series of activities designed to increase our capacity to control or reach or intercept fissile materials or other nuclear products if they are put into circulation. Breaking up the Khan nuclear network – all of those are positives and I think just a quick listing of them needs to be in our discussion today.

MR. BOORSTIN: And is in the report, I might add.

MR. FRYE: Yes. Yes.

MR. BOORSTIN: We can take one more question. Sir?

Q: Yes, my name is Joe Keyar (ph). I'm from (Lehrman?) Corporation. Obviously, this is very urgent and important issue, and I'm wondering who benefits from it not being solved, both in this country and in Russia?

MR. BOORSTIN: Who wants to take that one?

MR. CIRINCIONE: Benefits from its not being solved.

MR. BOORSTIN: Joe?

MR. CIRINCIONE: There are some opponents to these programs basically from an ideological perspective who think that it's not a good idea to give funds to Russia for something they should be doing anyway, but I don't think even they would see it as a benefit that these programs don't be solved. The argument is over who should solve them, who should pay for the solution. I don't think there is anyone. I can't think of a single actor who would somehow benefit from these not being solved, but with the possible exception of very hardliners in Russia –

MR. BOORSTIN: Or al Qaeda.

MR. CIRINCIONE: – who don't want any diminution of their nuclear crown jewels.

MR. ALLISON: I think Bob said al Qaeda. Osama Bin Laden; this is good for him. I would say the Chechen terrorists who did Beslan, this is good for them, but I don't think of any Americans for whom it's good.

MR. BOORSTIN: The last I heard, they haven't opened up an office on K Street quite yet.

Alton, did you want to add anything to it?

MR. FRYE: Well, let me – first of all, in closing here congratulate Brian and Andy on what I think is a terrific report. Again, thank you to the Stimson Center for the cooperation with the Center for American Progress. It was a really good partnership. And let me thank our panelists: Graham, Joe, Alton, we really appreciate you being here today to discuss this very important problem, and we look forward to having you back. And thank you all for coming.

(Applause.)

(END)