

CENTER for AMERICAN PROGRESS



Iraq

A Strategy for Progress

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The war in Iraq is far from a mission accomplished. Today we face a crisis with grave implications for our national security and the future of the Iraqi people. The Bush Administration's mismanagement of post-war Iraq has left the United States unprepared for the instability that continues to grow. America is standing virtually alone in confronting a counter-insurgency struggle with no clear end in sight. The United States can still succeed in Iraq and fulfill its commitments to the Iraqi people, but it will require a plan – one that provides for new international arrangements to manage the political, security and economic aspects of Iraq's transition.

Iraq: A Strategy for Progress aims to achieve five principal objectives:

- To position the United States to meet the challenges we face in Iraq;
- To establish a clear path for a political transition until Iraqi elections;
- To secure our significant military and financial investments to date;
- To build a strong international coalition; and
- To enlist sustainable and popular support here at home for ongoing operations in Iraq.

There are five major elements of the Center for American Progress plan:

First, President Bush should immediately convene an emergency International Summit on Iraq to enlist support for a strategic shift in direction and to strike concrete agreements with other key nations. The Summit would provide an opportunity for the President to confer with other heads of state and to develop consensus on the

international architecture for political, security and economic arrangements in Iraq. The Summit's goal should be to establish an Iraq Contact Group which would assume an international oversight role until free and fair elections can be held in Iraq.

Second, building on the blueprint of U.N. Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi, the Bush Administration should work with the Security Council to authorize the creation of an international High Representative for Iraq to work under the authority of the Contact Group. The Representative would be charged with enforcing and ensuring the transition from the proposed Iraqi caretaker government to an elected government, making a clean break from the U.S. pattern of insisting on total control and building credibility among the Iraqi people. At the same time, to support this transition, the United States should open the new American embassy in Baghdad as quickly as possible.

Third, the Administration should request that NATO assume command of the military stabilization operation in Iraq and increase the current coalition troop level to adequately meet the security challenge. The plan calls for increasing the total military force, including American and international troops, to *at least 200,000*. To better manage security during the critical transition to elections of a permanent government, the United States should increase troop levels to 150,000 by moving up the deployment of troops. The Administration must also make a concerted effort to double non-American military participation in the NATO-led force to at least 50,000 troops, with a special emphasis on recruiting units from moderate Muslim countries.

Fourth, the Administration should promote the creation of a new Iraqi Transition and

Reconstruction Fund to build and sustain Iraqi capacity, and develop a detailed proposal for an Oil Trust Fund. The new Fund would take over responsibility from the fund now administered by the Coalition Provisional Authority that distributes Iraqi oil revenues, repatriated assets, and remaining oil-for-food funds into the Iraqi budget.

Finally, President Bush and the Congress should work together to fund military operations and reconstruction from the regular budget. President Bush must also level with the American people and work in a bipartisan manner with their representatives in Congress.

INTRODUCTION

The war in Iraq is far from a mission accomplished. Today we face a crisis with grave implications for our national security and the future of the Iraqi people. The Bush Administration's mismanagement of post-war Iraq has left the United States unprepared for the instability that continues to grow.

America is standing virtually alone in confronting a counter-insurgency struggle with no clear end in sight. The United States can still succeed in Iraq and fulfill its commitments to the Iraqi people, but it will require a plan – one that provides for new international arrangements to manage the political, security and economic aspects of Iraq's transition.

The record is all too clear. The Bush Administration's intolerance of dissent has left America without enough allies to share the burden of funds and forces. The White House and the Pentagon willfully ignored the recent history of post-conflict experience

and the specific warnings of the State Department. The Administration invested authority in a group of exiles and gave American companies a monopoly on contracts to rebuild Iraq. And it has insisted on absolute control, leaving the United States unaided by the wisdom, insights and engagement of the Iraqi people and the international community.

By focusing almost exclusively on military force as the primary means of social transformation and on Baghdad as the geographical engine of political change, the United States failed to wage a parallel campaign to win the consent of the Iraqi people. The Bush Administration also failed to use America's economic and diplomatic resources to generate widespread popular support for and engagement in the process of moving Iraq from its autocratic past and towards a democratic future.

The net result is that America is unable to guarantee security for the Iraqi people. Coalition forces have little control of major urban centers such as Fallujah and Najaf.

Insurgents, terrorists and criminals have significantly slowed major elements of the reconstruction effort. One year after the invasion, too many Iraqis have yet to see a material improvement in their lives.

LIMITED OPTIONS

Getting out of the mess created by the Bush Administration will certainly prove more difficult than getting into it. We have four options.

The first option is to maintain the current course, and essentially keep going it alone

The United States can still succeed in Iraq, but it will require a comprehensive, political, security and economic plan.

without a real strategy, continuing to ignore the facts on the ground. This inevitably means dispatching more American troops and further burdening American taxpayers – without an exit strategy. Absent either political credibility or a plan, the United States would be forced to rely increasingly on the military, alienating the now fractured “Coalition of the Willing.” This is the option preferred by President Bush, who continues to see the current difficulties in Iraq as a speed bump on the road to democracy.

The second option is to withdraw U.S. troops following the June 30 handover to a yet-to-be-named Iraqi institution. This course of action would ease the burden on the budget and our overstretched military. But it would likely bring about one of three unpalatable scenarios: the ascendance of a hard-line government hostile to the United States; the rise of sub-regional warlordism within Iraq; or the opening of Iraqi borders to the free movement of terrorists and criminals. It would also devastate America’s reputation around the world as a nation that makes good on its commitments.

A third option – and one that is gaining increasing currency in Washington – is to “internationalize” the Iraq operation by bringing in the United Nations, NATO and more troop-contributing nations. Clearly, it would be desirable to reduce the burden on the United States while at the same time showing an international face to an Iraqi populace grown wary of the American occupation. But there are several daunting obstacles. Current trends are running against internationalization – Spain, Honduras and the Dominican Republic have

pulled out of the coalition and others have indicated they may depart shortly.¹ The Administration – having dismissed the concerns of other nations and excluded non-coalition members from the reconstruction effort – has already drained its capital with the international community.

Our plan relies on a strategic vision, the strength to concede mistakes and make mid-course corrections, and an ability to recognize stark reality.

The horrific pictures of abuse and humiliation at the Abu Ghraib prison have only made things worse.

This leads us to a fourth option, one that contains several items unfamiliar to or rejected by the current White House. Our plan relies on a strategic vision, the strength to concede mistakes and make mid-course corrections, and an ability to recognize stark reality. Our *Strategy for Progress* is based on providing the assurances our allies need about security and the overall management of Iraq’s transition in order to overcome their reluctance to participate.

MAKING SMART CHOICES

At this stage of the game, it is not possible to lay out a strategy that will guarantee a stable, secure, and prosperous Iraq, or even win and sustain the peace. The Bush Administration’s gross mismanagement of post-war Iraq leaves us without the option of choosing good policies over bad, or safe options over calculated risks. Instead, the only option is to balance the trade-offs and determine which course of action poses the greatest chance of achieving a level of stability that will allow for a transition from

¹ Poland, Norway, New Zealand, and Kazakhstan have all indicated that they likely will not extend their current military commitments beyond June 30. India, Bangladesh, and Turkey announced last month that they will not send troops to Iraq anytime in the near future.

the handover on June 30 to elections in January 2005. We must make difficult choices.

The first choice is between handing over responsibility for security exclusively and entirely to the Iraqis or, alternatively, striking an arrangement that allows the international community to compensate for the fragility of Iraq's nascent security forces. We believe the latter is the only and best option, not only to protect the Iraqi people but also to advance reconstruction.

The second choice focuses on sovereignty. It is at best inaccurate and at worst disingenuous for the Bush Administration to suggest that Iraqis will control their destinies after June 30. The massive U.S. and international troop presence in Iraq will continue to wield far greater power and authority than any interim caretaker government. There is no such thing as "partial sovereignty," however, and the most realistic option is to consider the period from July to elections next January as a transition from occupation to sovereignty – a concept already validated by U.N. Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi.²

We believe the only viable option is to cede America's exclusive monopoly on Iraq in exchange for the engagement of our allies, Iraq's neighbors, the United Nations, and NATO.

While some elements in Iraq may perceive this as an attempt by international powers to meddle in their internal affairs, the Bush Administration's failure to develop a responsible alternative to spiraling political chaos leaves no other realistic choice.

Third and last, the United States must make a fundamental choice between maintaining exclusive control over Iraq's future – and bearing the entire resource, troop and political burden – or opening up the challenge to the advice and support of the international community. We believe the only viable option is to cede America's exclusive monopoly on Iraq in exchange for the engagement of our allies, Iraq's neighbors, the United Nations, and NATO.

Given the current context, there are few ideal policy options. With so much at stake, we have no option but to think creatively, understanding that at the end of the day what is possible is primarily a function of political will.

² As a legal matter, International Crisis Group points out that formal sovereignty is already vested in the Iraqi state through U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511. All that remains is the practical transfer of sovereign power.

A STRATEGY FOR PROGRESS

Iraq: Strategy for Progress aims to achieve five principal objectives:

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- To build a strong international coalition; and
- To enlist sustainable and popular support here at home for ongoing operations in Iraq.

As a first and necessary step, President Bush should immediately convene an emergency International Summit on Iraq to enlist support for a strategic shift and to strike concrete agreements with our partners. The Summit would provide an opportunity for the President to confer with other heads of state and to develop consensus on the international architecture for political, security, and economic arrangements in Iraq. The meeting, held outside of the United States, should include representatives from the Arab League, countries currently serving on the United Nations Security Council, major NATO allies, and core coalition partners. The Summit's goal should be to establish an Iraq Contact Group to which authorities in Iraq will report.

The United States must go in with a plan that provides for new international arrangements to manage the political, security and economic aspects of Iraq's transitions, and includes reorienting American policy to reflect those new international arrangements.

The recommendations below constitute a plan of action for dramatically shifting strategic direction. The primary recommendations provide the foundation for specific actions in the areas of political transition, security, and reconstruction. The secondary recommendations spell out targeted policy changes necessary to restore our credibility with international partners and, in turn, to empower the Iraqi people and advance reconstruction.

POLITICAL TRANSITION

Primary recommendation

Authorize the creation of an international High Representative for Iraq. The United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII authority of the U.N. Charter, should authorize an international High Representative to take responsibility for enforcing and ensuring the transition from the Iraqi caretaker government proposed by U.N. Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimi. A highly respected diplomat credible in the region, the High Representative should work with Iraqi civil society to facilitate the convening of a national conference and establishment of an Iraqi Consultative Assembly.³ While the Iraqi caretaker government would assume significant authority over the state of affairs in Iraq, the High Representative would possess emergency powers to veto controversial laws, policies, budgetary items, and government appointments. On a

³ See "Iraq's Transition: On a Knife Edge," International Crisis Group, April 27, 2004. The report calls for turning political responsibility for the transition over to the United Nations through an appropriately empowered Special Representative. It also calls for widening political participation through convening a National Conference of Iraqis, which would elect a Consultative Assembly. The report can be found at www.crisisweb.org.

day to day basis, a Governing Authority – consisting of the Prime Minister of the Iraqi caretaker government, the High Representative, and the military commander in charge of security operations – would be responsible for strategic decisions. As an independent international official, the High Representative would report to the Contact Group, not the United Nations.

Secondary recommendations

The United States should formally open the American Embassy in Baghdad prior to June 30. Ambassador John Negroponte should be dispatched immediately to Iraq to begin the process of transferring U.S. authority from the Pentagon to the State Department. The complete transition from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the new embassy should be accomplished by the June 30 deadline rather than initiated at that time. This approach would reduce the risk of critical issues falling through the cracks of the inter-agency transition, and ensure that he is fully operational as the lead U.S. representative on July 1.

The White House should immediately nominate a new U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. At this critical juncture, the United States needs a new Ambassador to the United Nations to lead efforts to secure a Security Council resolution on Iraq. Replacing Ambassador Negroponte in New York should be addressed with the same urgency as was his Senate confirmation. The appointment of a highly respected and effective diplomat would bolster the Administration's credibility at the United Nations.

The Pentagon should terminate monthly payments to the Iraqi National Congress and its special relationship with Ahmed Chalabi. With the formation of a new

caretaker government, there is no credible rationale for direct U.S. support to the Iraqi National Congress (currently \$340,000 a month). Continued support for Chalabi fuels Iraqi suspicions and lends credence to allegations of an American political agenda within Iraq.

The new Iraqi caretaker government should repeal the decree on Iraqi press censorship. A vibrant free press is critical for a democratic Iraq and the United States should support open public dialogue, transparency in operations, and accountability at all levels. Any decision to address what might be considered illegal press activity should be undertaken by the Iraqi caretaker government in consultation with the High Representative.

The new Iraqi caretaker government should amend the statute for the current Iraqi Special Tribunal to allow greater U.N. involvement and funding. Following the models of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Extraordinary Chambers in Cambodia, through an agreement with the U.N. Secretariat, a reconstituted Tribunal would carve out an explicit role for U.N.-endorsed judicial and administrative appointees, generate the necessary funding, and ensure adherence to international standards. Rather than having the U.S. bear the costs alone (estimated at over \$75 million) the funding for the tribunal should come from assessments from U.N. member-states, as was the case with the ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

The Pentagon should take immediate steps to reassure Iraqi citizens and the world that U.S.-controlled prisons in Iraq are in compliance with international standards and treaty obligations. Reports of abuse and humiliation of Iraqi detainees have done great damage in Iraq and

throughout the region. Opening up the U.S.-administered prison system in Iraq to international inspection is the only way to restore lost credibility. The Pentagon's internal report on Abu Ghraib should be made public, to the extent possible, to demonstrate that immediate steps were taken to sanction criminal activity. A Permanent Committee for Monitoring Prison Conditions should be established with representatives from the international security force, the Iraqi caretaker government, Iraqi civil society, the International Committee of the Red Crescent and the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights. The new Iraqi Ministry of Interior should establish a citizen's liaison to compile and keep a centralized database of all detainees in Iraqi prisons.

SECURITY

Primary recommendation

Give NATO command of security operations in Iraq. The Administration should request that NATO assume command of security and stabilization operations in Iraq.⁴ The core of an adequate NATO force in Iraq already exists. Establishing a formal mission would make larger and more sustainable contributions by both NATO and non-NATO countries possible. Over time, better training of Iraqi forces and broader international participation would allow the United States to reduce its troop presence as the security situation improves.

To meet security needs, the total number of military forces, including American and international troops, should be increased to *at least 200,000*. This will not only provide

greater security in Iraq, but will also allow the borders to be more effectively guarded. Non-member states, particularly from Muslim countries, should be actively encouraged to participate in the operation, as they did in the Balkans. The mission's security mandate should include the following components: countering the insurgency; improving security and controlling borders; and protecting humanitarian and reconstruction efforts. Expanded security forces will also ensure an atmosphere in which U.N. and Iraqi officials can safely administer the upcoming electoral process, and candidates, party activists and voters can freely participate.

General Abizaid should be given provisional NATO command authority as Supreme Allied Commander Middle East with overall responsibility for NATO operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Political guidance should be provided through the North Atlantic Council (NAC). NATO should also consider using this opportunity to develop better political and military relationships in the Middle East. Iraq, for example, could ultimately be offered partnership status through NATO's Mediterranean Initiative.

Secondary recommendations

The United States should increase troop levels to 150,000. The recent U.S. increase to 135,000 was made possible by temporarily delaying the return of selected units for up to three months. For improved security, in the short-term, as Iraq prepares for elections and insurgents can be expected to challenge such progress, the United States must assume greater responsibility. To meet the troop level required, the redeployment of the Third Infantry Division should be moved up from its planned November date, and elements of the Third Marine Expeditionary Force based in Okinawa and the First

⁴ NATO already has an out-of-area mission with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

Brigade of the 25th Infantry Division should be sent ahead of schedule. Force levels can be adjusted downwards only as overall security improves, transition milestones are achieved, greater international troop contributions are realized and Iraqi forces demonstrate an ability to assume greater responsibility.

The United States should work to double international troop participation to at least 50,000. Non-American forces, primarily the British, add roughly 24,000 troops to the current coalition, but this component has shrunk with the recent departure of Spanish and Honduran forces. The United States must work with NATO allies and regional partners to increase long-term international involvement in the multinational force, with particular emphasis on contributions from Muslim countries. In addition to ensuring a troop presence capable of providing security, increased international troop contributions would reduce the need for private security forces, reduce the security and legal complications created by the presence of a large number of private contractors, and free up additional funds for reconstruction.

The NATO mission should establish a dedicated force to protect and operate in and around sacred cities and sites. Comprised of troops from moderate Muslim countries and working under the NATO mission, this small force would advise and participate in security operations in the most culturally sensitive sites. Morocco, Pakistan, and Tunisia are three possible candidates.

The NATO mission should devise a long-term strategy for developing and sustaining professional Iraqi security forces. The existing timetable for training the police and military should be extended

to between two and three years to ensure that new Iraqi forces are adequately trained, vetted and able to assume responsibility for Iraq's security. Iraqi forces currently on duty should be re-vetted to avoid potential security problems.

The NATO mission should conditionally allow individual members of militias to participate in new Iraqi security forces. The CPA's decision to bar selected militia from serving in the new Iraqi security forces ostracized them and thus provided them with an incentive to support the insurgency. Instead of polarizing a volatile and hostile segment of Iraqi society, transitional authorities should weaken and co-opt militias by disbanding units and absorbing vetted and separated individuals into programs closely monitored by U.S. authorities. There should be no wholesale incorporation of fixed units.

The United States should conclude the Iraqi Survey Group review and transfer those responsibilities to U.N. weapons inspectors by June 30. Further accounting for Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs should be transitioned back to the U.N. mission (UNMOVIC), consistent with existing U.N. Security Council resolutions. This would send a strong signal to the international community that the United States is ready to share responsibility in Iraq. The U.S. government's work should be completed prior to June 30.

RECONSTRUCTION

Primary Recommendation

Create the Iraqi Transition and Reconstruction Fund. The activities of the Transition and Reconstruction Fund should have a triple mandate: first, to build and sustain Iraqi capacity in preparation for the

ascendance of an elected government; second, to develop, for consideration by the elected Iraqi government, a detailed proposal for an Oil Trust Fund; and third, to ensure that there is no gap in payment of civil service salaries, through the Iraqi national budget, during the transition period. The activities of the Transition and Reconstruction Fund would be closely coordinated with the International Reconstruction Fund Facility established and led by the U.N. and World Bank.

The new Fund, authorized by the U.N. Security Council, would take over responsibility and assets from the Coalition Provisional Authority for the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI).⁵ A full accounting of DFI funds expended to date should be completed by the CPA by June 30 at the latest. The existing International Advisory Monitoring Board should be retained and amended to include no fewer than two representatives designated by the Iraqi caretaker government.

The Fund would be managed by an Executive Director named by the international High Representative and approved by the Contact Group. On a day-to-day basis, the Executive Director would report to the High Representative. The High Representative would appoint two Iraqi deputies chosen by the new caretaker government and approved by the Contact Group.

⁵ Authorized by U.N. Security Council resolution 1483, the Development Fund for Iraq is the current mechanism for feeding Iraqi oil revenues, repatriated assets, remaining oil-for-food funds, and interest earned on the funds into the Iraqi budget.

Secondary Recommendations

U.S.-funded reconstruction programs should make job creation and the provision of basic social services top priorities, with specific emphasis on programs for demobilized soldiers. Significant funds should be allocated to create special opportunities for demobilized soldiers. Working with the High Representative, World Bank and other donors, the U.S. should support a demobilization program providing job training and start-up capital. Credits should be provided to companies that hire demobilized soldiers for reconstruction contracts. To reintegrate soldiers from rural backgrounds, the transitional authority should work with local authorities to identify productive opportunities.

All U.S.-funded contracts should be awarded on the basis of open, competitive bidding. The proceedings of contract bidding, award and evaluation should be made available in full detail to the public. Regional and Iraqi firms and non-governmental organizations should be encouraged to compete and, where necessary, Iraqi entities provided with the assistance required to meet U.S. procurement, financial and other legal requirements.

Responsibility for U.S.-funded reconstruction programs should be shifted from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the U.S. Agency for International Development. Congress should give USAID the necessary flexibility to fund critical reconstruction programs with special attention to streamlined approval for funding to Iraqi civil society organizations. The United States should ensure that the Commander's Emergency Response Fund (CERF) remains replenished until civilian

management of the reconstruction is fully operational.⁶

The High Representative should work closely with the caretaker Iraqi government to draw up plans for an Iraqi Oil Trust Fund. The fund should be financed by a reasonable percentage of oil profits and governed transparently by a board of representatives comprised of Iraqi governmental and non-governmental representatives. The Trust Fund would use most of its funds for training and seed capital to increase Iraqi capacity to manage and serve the oil industry, as well as to support environmental, social and job-creation programs in oil-producing areas.

U.S.-funded reconstruction efforts should be re-oriented to expand Iraqi involvement and extend the benefits of democratization beyond key urban centers. In particular, efforts should be made to incorporate Iraqi expertise and participation in program design and implementation, including through the more than 200 local councils currently operating around the country. As security improves, concerted efforts should be made to increase the flow of development assistance to rural areas and to expand U.S. engagement with Iraqi institutions and local and international non-governmental organizations.

The United States should actively work to mobilize additional financial support. Former Secretary of State James Baker's current mandate should be broadened to

seek greater financial support for the reconstruction efforts in Iraq, particularly from Middle East and Gulf states that will significantly benefit from a more stable Iraq. To support Baker's efforts, the Administration should launch a new initiative on eliminating odious debt at the upcoming G-8 Summit, with the recommendation that Iraq be among the first countries considered for inclusion. The initiative should provide limited debt relief based on an assessment of the legitimacy of the debt incurred during Saddam Hussein's reign. Other countries undergoing major political or security transitions should also be considered in the first round of the initiative.

ON THE HOME FRONT

This strategy represents a marked departure from the Administration's policies to date. If the President is truly committed to getting things right in Iraq, he must level with the American people about the long-term risks and commitments required to successfully manage the changes he has put in motion in Iraq. Failure to tell the truth to the American people will only serve to erode support in the months and years ahead – at the cost of our security and Iraq's stability. To secure both the necessary financial resources and critical public support, the President should take the following steps.

Beginning in FY06, funding for military operations in Iraq and elsewhere should be incorporated into the regular budget cycle. There is little justification for funding operations and reconstruction through supplemental appropriations alone. Supplemental requests should be used only when truly unanticipated requirements emerge or the pace of activity rises to unexpected levels. The military is now planning multi-year troop rotations and has

⁶ According to the Office of Management and Budget, the CERF is already running low on funds. In the first six months of FY04, almost half of the \$549 million fund has been expended. A major new CERF fund is proposed by Anthony H. Cordesman in "Fallujah, Sadr, and the Eroding U.S. Position in Iraq," Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 30, 2004.

sufficient experience to project repair/replenishment rates on equipment and supplies.

Send the FY05 supplemental budget request to Congress now. A supplemental for the remainder of FY04 and FY05 will be necessary to ensure that there is no gap in funding for critical defense and other programs. Similar steps should be taken with respect to the budgets for the Treasury and State Departments. Special attention should be paid to procuring the necessary protective equipment for troops, fixing their compensation problems, and providing them with meaningful benefits, and to increasing the size of the army and providing aid packages to support international partners.

Announce the roll-back of tax-cuts on those making more than \$200,000 to finance the significant economic and military costs that will be incurred. The President should deliver a major Presidential address to acknowledge the mistakes that have been made, outline the requirements ahead, and inform the American people of what is required to actually achieve lasting stability in Iraq and prevent it from becoming a significant threat to U.S. security. He must make clear how many troops are needed, for how long and at what cost.

Actively seek bipartisan congressional consultation and support. The President should meet monthly with the bi-partisan congressional leadership, relevant committee chairs, and ranking members. This step should re-establish necessary avenues of communication and enable the executive and legislative branches to work toward establishing a unified bi-partisan consensus for national action on Iraq. This group should designate an observer delegation to the President's emergency International Summit on Iraq. Congress should exercise its responsibility to engage in the conduct of meaningful oversight hearings to address ongoing security, political and reconstruction challenges.

ABOUT THE CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS

The Center for American Progress is a nonpartisan research and educational institute dedicated to promoting a strong, just and free America that ensures opportunity for all Americans. We believe that Americans are bound together by a common commitment to these values and we aspire to ensure that our national policies reflect these values. We work to find progressive and pragmatic solutions to significant domestic and international problems and develop policy proposals that foster a government that is "of the people, by the people, and for the people."

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