

From 9/11 to Iraq and 7/7 to New Orleans: Are We Safe At Home?

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Introduction

Madeleine Pooler has given me a broad assignment – talk about homeland security, Iraq, Katrina, international development, intelligence and Islam. At first blush, they might appear disconnected. Actually, they are all integrally linked. I'll spend some time reflecting on what we have come to call the global war on terror; how we are safer today than we were four years ago, but not as safe as we were two years ago; how the terrorism threat to the United States is changing and growing; the implications it has for security here at home; what has to change in my view as we move forward; and an approach to national security that we as progressives should pursue in the divided political landscape that we have in this country today.

Global War on Terror

I know some of you here tonight suffered great personal loss on September 11. It has changed us.

On the morning of September 11, I walked across the plaza of the World Trade Center to my office three blocks away at around 8:15 a.m. When the first explosion occurred 31 minutes later, we saw the smoke emerging from the North Tower, but didn't know what had happened aboard American Flight 11. At 9:03 a.m., when United Flight 175 struck the South Tower, there was no doubt that this was a terrorist attack and that only one group could have been responsible.

That evening, the President declared a "war against terror." He did not declare war specifically against al Qaeda, the network that developed and perpetrated the attack, or its leadership, including Osama bin Laden, who was by that time well known to us. Rather, he declared war against the tactic they employed. He also focused then and later through the axis of evil speech on state sponsors who harbor and support terrorists.

Unlike the Cold War, when we battled an ideology as much as the Soviet Union, we launched a one-dimensional strategy – well, two if you include listening tours – where we would be prepared to employ military force not just to preempt or prevent emergent threats but as George Packer says in *Assassins' Gate*, to send troops "everywhere to fix the world once and for all."¹

This was a means, to the odd mix of conservatives and neo-conservatives who dominate the Bush administration, of reasserting U.S. leadership. But they overlooked that the Cold War was won by military deterrence, combined with economic strength, academic opportunity, political resolve, religious freedom, cultural diversity and individual initiative that ultimately made our system more effective and more attractive than any other. Instead of remaining the hopeful beacon for the world, we have become a pariah in critical parts of the globe.

I remember a couple of years ago listening to a talk on NPR from the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, where the Hungarian Ambassador to the United States was describing how important western music was behind the Iron Curtain. Our parents were convinced that rock and roll was the end of civilization as we know it, but here was this future international figure surreptitiously following the exploits of Traffic, Blind Faith and Three Dog Night. Al Qaeda and its allies are afraid of that power, but “Made in the USA” was viewed positively until recently around the world and in the Middle East, even Iran. Joe Nye calls this “soft power,” that we can be more successful when the world is attracted to what we stand for², and not confused by a Vice President who somehow believes that torture is in our self-interest.

Words have meaning. The Pentagon has begun to recognize that we cannot win what it calls the G-WOT – the Global War on Terror – by military means alone. There was an attempt to change the name to G-SAVE, the Global Struggle against Violent Extremism. The President rejected the new term, although he recently borrowed Christopher Hitchens’ Islamo-fascism phrase in a speech at the National Endowment for Democracy on October 6th, and compared Islamic radicalism to communism.³

We have a President who prefers war terminology and, not coincidentally, relies disproportionately on military force.⁴ And to understand why our strategy has floundered, it’s useful to focus on the administration’s own words – four statements in particular. To paraphrase:

- First, the only way to defeat terrorism is to stay on the offensive;
- Second, they hate who we are, not what we do;
- Third, we are fighting them over there rather than here; and
- Fourth, you’re doing a heck of a job, Brownie.

Staying on the Offensive

The President has said many times that the only way to defeat terrorism is to remain on the offensive. This is unsustainable for several reasons.

Taken to its literal extreme, it means perpetual war. The neo-conservatives looked at Iraq as way to surround Iran on one side and threaten Syria on the other and expected the dominos to magically fall in place. There was a plan for the invasion, but not for what followed. What motivated Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney, hardly proponents of nation-building, was a desire to knock off Saddam, install Ahmed Chalabi and leave. The

“Mission Accomplished” declaration of May 1, 2003 was their exit strategy before the Pottery Barn rule intruded.

This was a tragic war of choice. The administration consciously ignored post-Saddam planning that had been done under a program called Desert Crossing during the late 1990s. They ignored the fact that, while imperfect, containment was working and eroding Saddam’s ability to threaten his neighbors. They decided to do this through an ever-shrinking coalition of the willing rather than through an international security alliance like NATO that could have provided staying power and legitimacy.⁵

It is also unsustainable because such a strategy will fairly soon break our military. We simply cannot keep 135,000 troops in Iraq indefinitely. Tragically, we have just crossed the 2,000 mark in combat fatalities – a small number relative to other wars, but one with growing political significance. A majority of Americans now believe the war in Iraq was a mistake, calling to mind the admonitions of Caspar Weinberger during the 1980s and Colin Powell during the 1990s that we ultimately will not prevail in war unless we sustain the support of the American people.

What is ominous for the military is the impact the war is having at recruiting stations across the country. The Army, Marines, National Guard and Reserve are all struggling to meet their quotas. This is not to suggest that we will move to a draft. We have demonstrated that we can build the finest force in the world through an all-volunteer military. But our strategy is driving a wedge between the military as an institution and a society that no longer believes what the administration is saying about Iraq. And while our retention of experienced soldiers remains high, as we know from other experiences in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans, there is a limit. Many soldiers in Iraq today are already on their second tour. If we send them back a third time, their families are going to say ‘enough’ and we will lose an increasing percentage of them.

For both strategic and military reasons, we need to reduce the impact that Iraq is having on our military, and especially the National Guard. Otherwise, as we saw 30 years ago, we will spend a generation repairing the damage. As it is, we have already spent \$200 billion in Iraq and will probably spend another \$2-300 billion before the last soldier departs Iraq, and we have replenished equipment being used at a much more substantial rate than anyone envisioned. These are resources that we are not able to invest in other components of national security, including protecting what is valuable to us here at home.

What We Do

There is a false debate in Washington, one of many related to Iraq. They hate who we are; they hate freedom. Karen Hughes, in her listening tour last month, should now understand that they hate what we do, the influence we wield in the Middle East, the perception that we prop up autocratic governments that deny human rights, political expression and genuine opportunity for their people, all in pursuit of oil.

Robert Pape of the University of Chicago has written a book called *Dying to Win*, an interesting and controversial study of insurgent campaigns that engaged in suicide terrorism. According to Pape, the most significant factor is secular, not religious: the presence of a foreign or external occupier. Religion is a major contributing factor, particularly if the religion of the occupier differs from that of the occupied. Perhaps most importantly, suicide terrorism relies on community support; that is, the supporting population condones murder as a tactic, and at least tacitly supports recruitment by treating those who commit suicide as heroes.⁶

There is evidence, if the recent correspondence from al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi is authentic, that there is a genuine debate in progress in the Islamic world over the tactics being employed in Iraq, including Muslim-on-Muslim violence and its impact on the civilian population in Iraq.⁷ Regrettably, by our actions, we are undermining rather than empowering moderate Islamic voices that could help de-legitimize terrorism as a weapon in the 21st century.

In fact, in Iraq, we have fallen into al Qaeda's trap. We have created an opening for Sunni jihadi influence that did not exist under Saddam. According to experts we have recently talked to, the Baathists who began the insurgency in the aftermath of the U.S. invasion are losing their influence. Al Zarqawi is gradually assuming greater control. Secular Sunnis are increasingly being converted to jihad. While the U.S. presence helps with recruiting, their ultimate goal is not to defeat the United States – they recognize that we will leave at some point – but to establish a Caliphate in Iraq. Given the Sunni numerical disadvantage, this may not be realistic. But it certainly underscores the genuine threat that Iraq will descend into civil war, if it has not done so already.

This should give us pause in the current debate over staying vs. withdrawing. We are fighting a different war in Iraq today than we were two years ago and our strategy must adapt because the present course is not working. What is missing is a realistic discussion of the stakes in Iraq – what will happen if we leave too quickly, and what our forces can accomplish by staying. One may be preventing Iraq from becoming a Taliban-like Afghanistan.

Fighting Them There, Not Here

The administration's approach also contains a flawed premise that we can choose to fight them over there rather than here, as if terrorists are incapable of operating in two places at once. But as attacks in Bali, Madrid and elsewhere indicate, fighting them in Baghdad does not prevent al Qaeda or its "regional chapters" from acting elsewhere. A second problem is that Iraq has become the training ground for a new generation of terrorists who are learning deadly skills that can potentially be used elsewhere.

Ironically, this was raised two years ago by none other than Secretary Rumsfeld. In an October 16, 2003 memo to his senior staff, he wrote: "Today, we lack metrics to know if we are winning or losing the global war on terror. Are we capturing, killing or deterring

and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas and the radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against us?”⁸

If the increasing number, range and lethality of terrorist attacks are not enough, the nature of the threat is changing. Al Qaeda had a more corporate structure four years ago. Now it has a franchise strategy where affiliates or sympathizers are facilitating home-grown attacks. This is what potentially happened in London, where while at least one member of the original plot received outside training, the plot itself was initiated and executed without outside assistance by young jihadists who were angry and isolated from the broader society they decided to attack. The second attack was a copy-cat strike, where they tried to employ a bomb recipe available on the Internet. Thankfully it didn't work.

People frequently ask why we haven't been attacked in four years. Ultimately, no one knows, but there are a number of possible explanations. First, it has become harder for al Qaeda to organize and operate. Second, perversely, 9/11 set a very high bar of success. As we know, it was audacious. It was deadly. Al Qaeda has always put a premium on high profile targets and on success. They are patient. Third, we are fortunate in the United States that Islamic Americans are far more integrated into society than their counterparts, particularly in Europe. But none of these factors preclude an attack in the future.

Homeland Security on the Cheap

Clearly, whenever we leave Iraq, we are going to need to rely more on defense than offense. We are obviously not prepared for another attack. Hurricane Katrina exposed the fact that the homeland security architecture put in place after 9/11 didn't work well. It is under-resourced, both in terms of people and money. We have a lot of work to do to reduce our vulnerability to terrorism.

The management challenge facing the Department of Homeland Security is significant. Those of us who have worked at the Pentagon still consider it a work in progress almost 60 years after the National Security Act of 1947 that created the Department of Defense. No one could expect a new structure that cobbled together 22 agencies (many of them basket cases) without a unifying culture to be perfect. But in the middle of a so-called war, we expected it to be competent. It wasn't.

Much of the problem is philosophical. The Bush administration prefers to play offense than defense. It agreed to form the Department of Homeland Security in June 2002 so as not to get out-flanked politically going into the mid-term elections. However, throwing a bone to his base, the President said that it would be formed within existing levels of budget and manpower. The post-9/11 requirements for counterterrorism significantly added to the existing workload of existing organizations like FEMA. Personnel were taken from the response and recovery Peter to pay the security Paul. The results were tragically evident in and around the New Orleans Superdome.

Despite being at war and at risk, the Bush administration does not believe that homeland security is a federal responsibility, nor a vital component of national security. State and

local governments and the private sector do have significant roles to play in homeland security, but the federal government has to lead. We shouldn't federalize disaster response, but the federal government must be there when needed. It must provide more support, not unfunded mandates. In the critical hours after the levees broke, the federal government was missing in action.

We have not done enough to improve our domestic intelligence. Recent alerts in New York and Baltimore demonstrate how our intelligence is fragmentary at best. At the same time, one of the key lessons of London is that we are unlikely to have any advance warning of a future attack. The British, which have a much stronger internal security apparatus than we will ever have, did not detect the plots of July 7 or 21 before they occurred, despite heightened security.

Against this backdrop, let me offer six specific strategic recommendations.

Iraq

First, we must reduce and restructure our military presence in Iraq. We have to move beyond the fruitless political debate where the only options are "stay the course" and "cut and run." To the architects of this strategic blunder, it is necessary to acknowledge that Iraq is making us less safe.

Iraq is, as Rumsfeld suggested, emboldening a new generation of jihadists. The current course will not succeed and makes our broader struggle more difficult. We cannot defeat the insurgency militarily; to succeed, we have to remove the reality of the occupation that fuels much of the violence and inhibits Iraqis from taking responsibility for their own future.

However, this does not mean that we can walk away from our commitment to Iraq, including our military commitment. Three years ago, Iraq was not strategically important in the war on terror. Now, it is a tragic self-fulfilling prophecy. But it requires us to evaluate Iraq not on the miscalculations of the past, but on the realities of the present. What does that mean?

During the first half of 2006, with a new constitutional government in place, we need to give Iraqis the primary responsibility to defend it, starting with Main Streets and then extending to institutions of government and ultimately to its borders. We need to encourage the Sunnis to maximize their participation in the new government and the Shia and Kurds to show greater flexibility on constitutional changes so that progress is achieved in defining the role of the central government; protects minority and women's rights; clarifies the role of religion in society; and gives all elements a stake in a future together, not apart.

Over roughly an 18-month period, we should be down to 50-75,000 troops who would back up the Iraq security forces, continue to train more Iraqi units and conduct combined counterterrorism operations to strike at al-Zarqawi's structure. There should be a

timetable for this restructuring, but not for the residual force. Some troops will need to stay in Iraq for years, but this approach would be more sustainable and I believe ultimately more successful. It is entirely possible that the most significant role our troops will play is managing the eventual dissolution of Iraq and preventing regional interventions by Turkey, Iran or Saudi Arabia.

Needless to say, we are not going to hear that level of candor from the Bush administration.

Review Middle East Policies

Second, we need a complete review of all policies that directly impact the Middle East and the Islamic world. The President needs to reinvigorate the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, including a genuine commitment of his time and energy. Rather than A-B-C – “anything but Clinton” – President Bush should employ President Clinton, the former President Bush and those who have worked tirelessly through the years on Middle East peace, throw out the Road Map and replace it with a full-court press that will result in U.S. recognition of a Palestinian state by the end of 2008 in return for a declared end to violence against Israel. The Bush administration wrongly believed that the road to Jerusalem flowed through Baghdad. It is possible that progress in Jerusalem can help in Baghdad.

More broadly, the push for political reform should continue, but be more realistic. The trajectory is as important as the specific destination. Democracy may well be the ultimate answer, but we cannot democratize the world overnight – certainly not by imposing democracy through endless military interventions. The goal is not to establish a perfect democracy – we know that is not possible from our own experience in Florida and Ohio. But democracy done badly without the development of strong institutions actually can lead to tyranny – one vote, one time.

A more realistic intermediate goal in Iraq and similar societies is, as suggested by Fareed Zakaria, constitutional liberalism, which is less about government’s form than its goals – protecting individual rights against coercion from any source – state, church or society; the rule of law and promotion of competing power centers; and genuine checks and balances.⁹

Democracy is also more than elections. Free and fair elections in most Middle East countries today would produce governments hostile to the United States, closer to Iran’s theocracy than Jeffersonian democracy. An interim approach to democracy should emphasize responsible and responsive governance – encouraging more countries to open political debate, reduce corruption, and invest in societies. Just look at how the U.N. investigation by Detlev Mehlis of the Rafic Hariri assassination has captivated the region. Al Jazeera read the report on air in its entirety. The report is seen as an international and not a U.S.-imposed finding, which makes it much harder for the Syrian government to discredit.

Energy Security

Third, we must create an energy policy that recognizes the degree to which oil skews our foreign policy, supports autocratic regimes, funds state sponsors of terrorism and extreme forms of Islam and rightly or wrongly fuels anti-Americanism.

We are trapped in what Michael Klare calls a “strategy of maximum extraction.” We talk about reduced reliance on imported oil, but imported oil from the Persian Gulf will actually increase over the next 15 years. Gulf oil production will have to increase 85 percent from current levels to meet anticipated global consumption.¹⁰ That is, says Matthew Simmons in *Twilight in the Desert*, not likely to happen. Price spikes and supply disruptions will continue in the future.¹¹ To Klare, who teaches up the road at Hampshire College, the first Gulf War was to protect Saudi Arabia and its proven oil reserves. The second Gulf War was to establish a sympathetic government in one of the top five producing countries to enable expanded production. If unchanged, future Gulf Wars will be required to sustain our current way of life. The growth of exurbs is a political and security challenge. We have to act based on the knowledge that oil will inevitably run low and ultimately reach empty.

No one knows when that day will come, whether 10, 20 or 50 years from now. The current consumption patterns of the developed world, led by the United States, and the developing world, led by China and India, are unsustainable. In fact, demand is already beginning to exceed supply – we see that in the rising cost of a barrel of oil from the previous band of \$25-30 to now \$60-70 per barrel. While there will be fluctuations, it is going to keep going up. Saudi Arabia is no longer able to serve as the swing producer, able to compensate for system disruptions whether from Iraq, Iran or Venezuela. We will be lucky if Saudi Arabia can maintain its current level of production. Virtually all of the new fields coming on line, both within OPEC and outside OPEC, are simply replacing receding production from aging fields in Norway, Russia and the Gulf.

A bumper sticker that calls for energy independence has no meaning in a world of global energy markets. We cannot drill our way out of this dilemma. ANWR is about ideology, not practicality. If hydrogen is part of the answer, we have to figure out ways of producing it without making the environment worse. If nuclear is part of the answer, we have to reach an international agreement on controlling the fuel cycle and managing the attendant proliferation risks. We also have to solve the NIMBY problem that surrounds energy infrastructure.

Seventy-five percent of our oil consumption involves transportation, so public transportation has to be expanded. We must think of stronger CAFE standards not as a needless constraint, but a necessary step to a realistic lifestyle. We have to think in more integrated terms – electricity generation that also produces heat, agricultural production that produces a burnable waste, wind and solar where it makes sense. Experts term this co-generation.¹² Whatever the solution – diversified sources of energy (oil, coal, nuclear, bio-fuels and renewables) and redundant and resilient delivery systems – it will take 20-30 years to achieve. We have no time to waste.

Democracy, Development and a Balanced Strategy

Fourth, if we desire a broader national security policy, we need to invest in a broader set of tools to shape and sustain a more peaceful and prosperous world. Among other things, we need to create a constituency for international development assistance. This is the hearts and minds front that we have provided rhetorical support for, but little in the way of real resources.

There will be a need to defeat or capture hard-core terrorists through law enforcement and military means. We have to eliminate terrorism's sources of support and legitimacy. These will primarily be through non-military means. This requires an expansion and redistribution of national security resources.

Today, 88 percent of what we spend on national security is dedicated to the National Defense component of the federal budget – the military and intelligence community. Six percent is devoted to homeland security and six percent to international affairs. Given those numbers, no one should be surprised that we have a militaristic strategy. As Willie Sutton said about robbing banks, our strategy follows the money. The Center for Defense Information estimates that the current budget allocates roughly \$7 in defense spending for every \$1 in non-military spending. It recommends the ratio should be 4-1.¹³ This can be achieved simply by shifting the \$100 billion per year we are currently spending on Iraq to other priorities as we reduce and ultimately withdraw our forces from Iraq.

Selling such a concept will be difficult. The American people don't like the concept of foreign aid and think we provide far more than we actually do. And what we provide is seldom sustained and usually structured in ways that diminish its impact. Jeffrey Sachs believes that we could end extreme poverty that afflicts the one-sixth of the world that fights for survival on less than \$1 per day if the developed world would dedicate seven-tenths of one percent of GDP to development assistance.¹⁴ The tithe at many of our churches is higher than that. For the United States, that would represent an increase of \$40 billion per year on top of the \$15 billion we currently devote to that purpose. This is a lot of money, at a time when our budget is already in stress. But the question is not whether we can afford it, but whether we can afford not to.

To suggest that we have no responsibility to invest in a safer, more sustainable world is to believe that the problems of the world will not reach our shores. We know, however, that is not true – given global concerns about avian flu, HIV/AIDS, global warming, failing states and terrorism. When we add in the cost of recent interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo, significant and sustained international development assistance will be cheaper – in both blood and treasure.

Real Homeland Security

Fifth, as Hurricane Katrina showed us, we need to get serious about national preparedness and risk mitigation, particularly within the private sector. Disasters, whether natural, man-made or terrorist in nature, are going to happen. What we saw in late August was homeland security on the cheap. It was not very good.

Governments at all levels failed – small government in action. Instead of strong direction from Washington, we have confusion, and a failure to provide the resources necessary to improve our ability to mitigate against, respond to and rapidly recover from a disaster. The private sector, which owns 85 percent of our critical infrastructure, is right now only a part-time player – active where market and security interests align, but dangerously passive absent government incentives or standards. We need to turn the system right side up, where preparedness is driven from communities up to state and federal governments. Local communities need to harness the capabilities of the private sector.

Otherwise, as we are seeing in New Orleans, we confront a vicious cycle where cities can't recover without a functioning economy; businesses can't resume operation without a workforce; and the workforce can't return until the community is safe and the environment restored. States need to look for synergies across their counties and between states. None of this will get done without federal leadership – providing incentives for change; setting national standards that make sense; and, where there is substantial risk, enacting regulations to protect its citizens and make disasters less likely to occur.

One example is wastewater treatment plants. Most are locally operated and use chlorine gas as a disinfectant. Chlorine gas is extremely hazardous as it is transported on rail cars or stored on rail sidings, and makes our communities vulnerable to a man-made or terrorist disaster. Inherently safer alternatives already exist, using either a less toxic industrial product or ultra-violet radiation. Some communities have pursued this risk-reduction strategy, which does involve fairly significant capital costs and slight increases in the monthly bill for the average customer.¹⁵

This will take more resources than are being dedicated to homeland security at the present time. It will also require Congress to put the national interest above parochial interests and direct more of our effort where the threat and risk is highest and where the consequences of a disaster are most significant.

Integrated Power

And, finally, we have to rebalance how we exercise our national power. If there is anything remotely resembling a silver lining emerging from Iraq, it is that the manner in which conservatives define power – purely in military terms – and the messianic way in which neo-conservatives wish to exercise that power have both been discredited. As Francis Fukuyama recently said, the Bush Doctrine and concept of preemption are history.¹⁶ So, what do we as progressives advocate as an alternative?

I recently participated in a three-day conference to discuss a new grand strategy for U.S. leadership. There was a lot of discussion and surprisingly (or not surprisingly) little consensus. Most agreed that there was too much emphasis on military power; a few suggested that the United States should command less power and influence in the world – try putting that one into a campaign slogan.

I invited the group to attempt to describe in one word what the unifying concept behind a post-9/11, post-Iraq strategy would be. We know what the other side believes – freedom! Who is against the concept of freedom? But freedom as a driving force suggests that we will do what is necessary to liberate people and countries that do not mirror our society.

What are some of these operating principles of an effective and progressive strategy? They might include:

- Globalization, which as we have seen involves constructive and destructive forces, and entails winners as well as losers;
- Community or sustainability, one reflecting the fact that whatever the challenges, we cannot solve them alone; the other emphasizing that we live in a world where resources are potentially scarce and unevenly distributed;
- Prosperity or security, the former envisioning a world of great potential, one that does not involve zero-sum calculations; the other playing on fear and envisioning a world that is inherently dangerous; and
- Engagement or dominance, certainly concepts that are not mutually exclusive, but one that implies a heavier reliance on diplomacy or containment, the other suggesting the raw exercise of power.

I suggested integration – it is a wonkish word that may or may not be right for a political bumper sticker – but it conveys a great deal of what we as progressives can successfully advocate as a unifying principle of a balanced and effective national security approach.

It assumes that the United States will maintain a leadership role in the world and will remain the preeminent power in the world. But it recognizes that we cannot solve the challenges we face alone, whether challenges involving the environment, global health, international capital flows, jobs, crime, conflict and violence. Integration means that the United States will pursue solutions in concert with other countries – this does not preclude the United States from taking action as it warrants, but it acknowledges that whatever we do will have impact on others.

It also recognizes that we will continue to confront non-state actors and rogue states that are outside the global system. To the extent we are battling what Thomas Barnett termed “disconnectedness,” societies that have fallen behind or societies that have chosen to remain beyond the global forces shaping the world today, we have to build a bridge to the 21st century, as President Clinton used to say. We also have to convince traditional societies that bin Laden’s bridge to the 7th century is the wrong way to travel.

Within this gap are countries and forces that will pose the most significant security challenges to the United States. In some cases, military action may be necessary to create openings, but as we have seen in Iraq, it is an imperfect instrument and not the ideal delivery system for democracy and development.

Close

The issue is not U.S. power; it is how responsibly we exercise it. The issue is not whether one party or the other will preserve our military strength; it is deploying that force with clear and achievable missions, rooted in sound intelligence and not ideology. The issue is not the existence of the United Nations and other institutions; it is how we lead them. The issue is not whether we prefer to focus on domestic vs. international politics; it is recognizing that what happens half a world away will ultimately find its way to Main Street. The issue is not whether there is uncertainty in the world; but how we manage risks so as to keep the American people safe at home.

We can't afford to shy away from this debate. Our beliefs should not be guided by what is politically expedient. Our policies must be rooted in a national security strategy that is global in scope; balanced in approach; guided by hope, not fear; and unites rather than divides the world in which we live.

¹ George Packer, *Assassins' Gate*, p. 60.

² Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power*, p. 11.

³ President Bush Discusses War on Terror at National Endowment for Democracy, transcript available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/10/20051006-3.html>.

⁴ Al Kamen, Post-Postwar, "In the Loop," *Washington Post*, August 3, 2005, p. A17, available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/02/AR2005080201673.html>.

⁵ Tom Clancy and General Tony Zinni, *Battle Ready*, p. 7.

⁶ Robert A. Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, pp. 21-22.

⁷ Bernard Haykel, "Terminal Debate," *The New York Times*, October 11, 2005, p. A27.

⁸ Rumsfeld's war-on-terror memo, October 16, 2003, reprinted in *USA Today*, October 22, 2003, available at <http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/executive/rumsfeld-memo.htm>.

⁹ Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom*, pp. 19-20.

¹⁰ Michael T. Klare, *Blood and Oil*, p. 79.

¹¹ Matthew R. Simmons, *Twilight in the Desert*, p. 334.

¹² Kenneth F. Deffeyes, *Beyond Oil*, p. 183.

¹³ Center for Defense Information, *Report of the Task Force on A Unified Security Budget for the United States*, 2006, available at <http://www.cdi.org/program/documents.cfm?ProgramID=15>.

¹⁴ Jeffrey D. Sachs, *The End of Poverty*, pp. 18-20.

¹⁵ Linda E. Greer, *New Strategies to Protect America: Securing our Nation's Chemical Facilities*, p. 6, available at <http://www.americanprogress.org/site/apps/nl/content3.asp?c=biJRJ8OVF&b=681085&ct=625335>.

¹⁶ Francis Fukuyama, "The Bush Doctrine: Before and After," *Financial Times*, October 11, 2005, available at http://www.sais-jhu.edu/insider/pdf/2005_articles/fukuyama_ft_101105.pdf.