SOURCE: AP

Anti-Syrian regime protesters hold a banner and Syrian revolution flags during a demonstration in the town of Haas in the northwestern province of Idlib, Syria.

Endnotes and citations are available in the PDF version of this issue brief.

As President Barack Obama and his national security advisors continue to weigh the costs and benefits of providing greater financial and materiel support for elements of the Syrian opposition—potentially including lethal aid—it is important to understand the structure of the Syrian opposition, which remains plagued by many divisions.

Supporting the foundation of a cohesive future government of Syria is one of the core objectives of the United States, as the Center for American Progress has stated in the past. The success or failure of efforts to form a more cohesive opposition will shape the ongoing effort to advance a transition in power from President Bashar al-Assad, as well as the stability of a post-Assad Syria. In order to understand the viability of U.S. policy options in Syria in both the near and long terms, a thorough understanding of the Syrian opposition—including its structure, leadership, funding sources, and internal divisions—is needed.

It is important to understand that information about the various rebel groups operating in Syria is limited. Policymakers and analysts are reliant on in-country reporting by the small number of journalists and intelligence officers operating in Syria, leading to gaps in knowledge, conflicting information, and a range of estimates that varies widely on the size of the rebel groups. In addition, obtaining reliable information is complicated by the fluid situation on the ground—alliances shift, rebel groups change in size and structure, and the relations between these groups evolve. That being said, a basic outline of the Syrian opposition can be pieced together through the information available in open- source reporting.

This issue brief outlines the official organization of the political and military elements of the Syrian opposition, along with the informal relationships and interactions between these groups, in an attempt to provide policymakers with a more accurate picture of the anti-Assad rebellion.

Limited national coordination

Two main organizations form the national structure of the Syrian opposition. The National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, also known as the Syrian Opposition Coalition, and the Supreme Joint Military Command, or SMC, are provisional bodies, formed in November and December 2012, respectively, with significant support from the international community. These two interconnected but independent bodies aim to coordinate a cohesive, national, and democratic opposition that could fill the potential power vacuum following President Assad’s fall.

There is a sizable discrepancy, however, between the structure that these bodies attempt to impose on the opposition movement, and the chaotic, disorganized nature of the various rebel groups on the ground that they represent. The Syrian Opposition Coalition and SMC are designed to impose a top-down national strategy and governing structure for the political and military arms of the Syrian opposition, using their international political, financial, and military support as leverage with in-country rebel groups.

Instead, the two bodies have displayed a limited ability to manage or control the myriad of opposition groups and civilian councils in Syria. They receive bottom-up legitimacy from in-country groups, which voluntarily pledge a degree of loyalty to these two national organizations in order to receive materiel and financial support from the international community. In practice, the Syrian Opposition Coalition and SMC are the international faces of the Syrian opposition and act to secure resources for the rebellion but have so far been unable to provide the internal cohesion or strategy they were designed to create.

The National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces

The National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, also known as the Syrian Opposition Coalition, or SOC, has been recognized as the legitimate political representative of the Syrian people by the United States and the majority of the international community but has not yet been recognized as the legal representative of the Syrian people. It was formed in November 2012 at a conference held by Syrian opposition groups in Doha, Qatar, based on veteran dissident Riad Seif ’s Syrian National Initiative proposal.

Objectives

The Syrian Opposition Coalition seeks to represent and coordinate the political elements of the Syrian opposition and unite them around a provisional government that would govern Syria following the collapse of the Assad regime. It is designed to provide international donors with a legitimate, unified channel for all aid to the rebellion by acting as a moderate umbrella group representing the majority of activists, militia, and local councilmen in the Syrian opposition. The formation of the SOC would, in theory, allow the Syrian opposition and the international community to isolate and marginalize more extremist elements of the rebellion.

Leadership

The Syrian Opposition Coalition is made up of 71 representatives of key opposition groups, including the Syrian National Council, the Muslim Brotherhood of Syria, the Syrian Revolution General Commission, Local Coordination Committees, local revolutionary councils from across the country, individuals with long histories of opposing the regime, and a small number of Kurdish political leaders. Ghassan Hitto, a Western-educated businessman strongly backed by the Syrian National Council and the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected prime minister of the Syrian Opposition Coalition’s transitional government in March 2013. Moaz al-Khatib, a moderate Islamist opposition leader, served as president of the SOC from its formation in November 2012 until his resignation this April following a dispute over Hitto’s election as prime minister. George Sabra—a Christian teacher, former communist, and chief of the Syrian National Council—is serving as the interim president in Khatib’s absence.

Internal divisions

The Syrian National Council—an organization founded in October 2011 in an attempt to form a unified opposition framework—is one of the Syrian Opposition Coalition’s main constituents, and current and former members of the Syrian National Council make up roughly half of the SOC’s leadership. Both Hitto and the Syrian National Council have deep ties to the Muslim Brotherhood, a point of conflict within the Syrian Opposition Coalition’s leadership and among its international backers.

More moderate opposition leaders such as former president Khatib have pushed for a transitional government—one that combines leadership of the opposition with members of the current Syrian government—as a means of retaining the governmental structure and avoiding chaos in the transition to an elected-civilian government. Prime Minister Hitto and members of the Syrian National Council have instead pushed for the formation of a provisional government, which would replace the current Syrian government and exclude all members of the Assad regime.

International backers have supported their preferred factions within the Syrian Opposition Coalition in an attempt to shape the political direction of the organization. Qatar and Turkey, who both have close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and share some ideological elements of their platform, supported Hitto’s election as prime minister. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, who are deeply suspicious of the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence within the nascent political organization, have been supportive of Khatib and members of his faction within the SOC.

As a political entity composed primarily of exiled Syrians—many of whom have not been in the country for months or years—the Syrian Opposition Coalition is frequently criticized by rebel groups for being out of touch with the in-country rebellion, contributing to its limited credibility on the ground. Whether or not it is able to effectively and prudently disperse the foreign aid it receives will likely determine its standing among rebel groups.

Funding

The Syrian Opposition Coalition receives political and financial support from Western and Arab states alike. Its primary backers are the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

The Supreme Joint Military Command

The Supreme Joint Military Command, or SMC, was officially formed to act as the Defense Ministry of the Syrian Opposition Coalition, yet it functions on its own authority. Rebel commanders from across Syria—260 in all—participated in its foundation in December 2012.

Objectives

The SMC’s primary goal is to unite the various armed groups in the rebellion and gradually form a national army by establishing a formal chain of command, though in practice little effort has been made by the SMC to control ground units, as its commanding officer publicly admitted. The SMC would then develop a cohesive national strategy by coordinating regional militias, existing provincial-level military structures, and international supply chains. As part of this process, the SMC was designed to reduce the influence of extremist groups in Syria by serving as the principal channel for all international financial and materiel aid.

Composition

The SMC comprises a council of leaders from various armed opposition groups and coalitions across Syria. The level of coordination between these armed groups and the SMC varies group-to-group. The council of leaders includes representatives from the Free Syrian Army, the Syrian Liberation Front, the Syrian Islamic Front, independent brigades, regional military councils, and defectors from the Syrian army. The council is made up of 30 elected members split evenly to represent the country’s five geographic fronts: eastern, western/middle, northern, southern, and the district of Homs. The council has no structural hierarchy, and command across the five fronts is not uniform. Instead, the SMC’s legitimacy is bottom-up, voluntarily given by the commanders that comprise it but with little coercive power by the SMC to control local commanders.

SMC Chief of Staff Gen. Salim Idriss—a former general in the Syrian army and current commander of the Free Syrian Army—is viewed primarily as a political leader rather than the head of a top-down chain of command. Gen. Idriss was chosen to facilitate coordination between the SMC, the Syrian Opposition Coalition, and the Free Syrian Army due to his strong relationships with foreign officials and international suppliers of arms and equipment. The SMC receives direct military aid from a number of Western and Arab states and has vowed that it will only disperse this aid to approved rebel groups operating under the SMC structure.

Funding

The SMC receives financial, materiel, and limited lethal support from Western and Arab states alike. Its primary backers are the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

Various armed opposition groups

The Syrian armed rebellion, often discussed as a singular movement working in unity to overthrow President Assad, is more accurately described as an array of ideologically diverse and uncoordinated brigades and battalions with limited areas of operation. One high-ranking U.N. official recently estimated the number of armed militias operating in the Syrian rebellion at “more than a thousand.” These anti-Assad groups range from defectors of the Syrian army to civilians with no formal military training to fighters affiliated with terrorist organizations.

Some brigades and armed groups have developed a degree of ideological and tactical cohesion by operating in larger coalitions such as the Free Syrian Army, the Syrian Liberation Front, or the Syrian Islamic Front. But even these coalitions are merely allied groupings of disparate brigades from across Syria and do not adhere to a uniform command structure. Despite the unifying goal of ousting President Assad, these alliances and their subunits have a range of tactics, constituencies, and visions of what a post-Assad Syria should look like.

The Free Syrian Army

The Free Syrian Army, or FSA, is the largest group within the Syrian armed opposition. It is an umbrella group comprising small, ideologically moderate, and uncoordinated militias and battalions operating at local levels. The FSA’s leadership is fully incorporated into the SMC and is closely linked to the Syrian Opposition Coalition. The term FSA has often been used to describe the overall armed opposition to the Assad regime, but, in practice, the FSA is one of several alliances of rebel groups operating in Syria.

Composition

The FSA is made up of small, localized battalions from all across Syria, organized loosely through provincial military councils. These battalions tend to fight in small geographic areas in defense of their hometowns and are less ideologically driven than others. It is estimated that there are as many as 50,000 fighters who align themselves with the FSA.

Command

Commanders of FSA-affiliated brigades and battalions do not receive strategic or tactical orders from FSA and SMC leaders such as Gen. Idriss but instead operate unilaterally in the control of their forces. The FSA leadership’s primary responsibility is to facilitate coordination between battalions. Gen. Idriss is officially the commander of the FSA but serves as more of a political leader than as a field commander.

Funding

The FSA receives financial, materiel, and limited lethal support from Western and Arab states through the SMC, as well as individual donors and informal funding streams.

The Syrian Liberation Front

The Syrian Liberation Front, or SLF, also known as the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front or Jabhat al-Tahrir al-Souriya al-Islamiya, is an alliance of approximately 20 brigades and battalions across Syria. An estimated 37,000 fighters are affiliated with the SLF, making it the largest coalition of rebels independent of the Free Syrian Army. Each of the SLF’s subunits has its own name and operates independently; there is no inherent strategic or tactical unity in the coalition. The most powerful and well known of these brigades are the Suquor al-Sham brigades and the Farouq battalions.

The SLF’s leadership has largely been incorporated into the Supreme Military Command, but the alliance remains more of a militant grouping than a political entity. SLF-affiliated groups are considered to be ideologically moderate Islamists, putting them at odds with some of the extremist groups operating in the country. While the SLF maintains brotherly relations with the FSA, it has criticized the FSA’s exiled leadership for being too detached from the realities of the in-country military conflict. The Saudi Arabian government has been the primary supporter of the SLF, but Saudi Arabia agreed in April to channel all future assistance through the SMC.

The Syrian Islamic Front

The Syrian Islamic Front, or SIF, also known as Jabhat al-Islamiya al-Tahrir al-Souriya, is an alliance of approximately 11 brigades and battalions across Syria, most notably the Ahrar al-Sham brigades. An estimated 13,000 fighters are affiliated with the SIF. SIF-affiliates are viewed as conservative Salafists, who are more religiously motivated than the Free Syrian Army or the Syrian Liberation Front. Most SIF-affiliated groups, however, are considered to be Syrian nationalists that don’t share the most extreme ideological elements of Al Qaeda-affiliated groups such as support for a transnational Islamic caliphate. The Syrian Islamic Front’s subunits each have their own name and operate independently but are beginning to merge leadership and forces, making it a more hierarchical and structured rebel coalition than the SLF or the FSA.

The Syrian Islamic Front’s leadership is not well incorporated into the SMC, but it has ties within the leadership council and its subunits have been cooperative with the SMC. The Syrian Islamic Front is largely financed by wealthy individuals from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf states.

The Nusra Front

The Nusra Front, also known as Jabhat al-Nusra, is an Al Qaeda-affiliated terrorist group, comprising approximately 6,000 foreign and domestic fighters. The Nusra Front has reportedly been receiving significant funding, arms, and training from Al-Qaeda and the Al Qaeda-affiliated group, Islamic State of Iraq. Some of Nusra’s fighters are foreign jihadists, many of whom are veterans of the Iraqi insurgency; it is unclear, however, what percentage of the Nusra Front’s supporters are foreign fighters as opposed to Syrian nationals. The Nusra Front is a well-armed group that has claimed responsibility for multiple suicide bombings and asymmetric attacks against Assad-regime targets. The Nusra Front is also considered to be a fiercely sectarian Sunni group in violent opposition to Syria’s Alawite community—an ethnoreligious group of Shiite Muslims who comprise 12 percent of the Syrian population and the majority of the Assad regime.

The Nusra Front has a mixed relationship with other elements of the Syrian rebellion. Shared opposition to President Assad and the effectiveness of Nusra Front fighters have led to some cooperation between the Nusra Front and other rebel battalions, including the SLF’s Deir ez-Zour Revolutionary Council and the Syrian Islamic Front’s Ahrar al- Sham. Opposition to the Nusra Front’s extremist ideology and the influence of foreign fighters within the group, however, has led to direct confrontation between the Nusra Front and other rebel groups throughout Syria. Leaders of the FSA and the SLF have sought to publicly distance themselves from the Nusra Front following its open pledge of allegiance to Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri.

Kurdish groups

Kurds are an ethnic group representing 9 percent of Syria’s ethnically diverse population and are concentrated in the country’s north and northeast regions. Until recently, most Kurds had not taken sides in the rebellion, but the expansion of indiscriminate violence by the Assad regime against population centers and the prospect of greater autonomy for Kurdish regions in Syria have led to an increase in Kurdish support for the rebellion. While Kurdish militias still prioritize the independence and protection of their communities over a nationalist or revolutionary agenda, their role in the conflict may grow. As of late March, the Kurdish People’s Defense Units, often referred to as the YPG, has agreed to share control of a district in northern Aleppo with other rebel groups. Additionally, some Kurdish fighters have been incorporated into the SLF, the Tawhid Brigade, and the Suquor al-Kurd Brigade. There have been reports of clashes earlier this year between Nusra Front battalions and Kurdish groups in the north, leading to criticism of the Nusra Front by fellow rebel groups for wasting precious resources that could otherwise be used in the fight to remove President Assad.

Independent groups

There are also roughly nine brigade alliances that operate independently of the Free Syrian Army, the Syrian Liberation Front, or the Syrian Islamic Front. Some of them have been incorporated into the SMC structure, while others, particularly fringe extremist groups, remain independent. The largest of these independent brigades is the Ahfad al-Rasul Brigade. Its leadership is incorporated into the SMC and it coordinates with the SLF. It is composed of an estimated 15,000 fighters and has been funded by the Qatari government. Other notable independent groups with leadership incorporated into the SMC are the Syrian Martyrs Brigade, the Fajr al-Islam Battalion, and the Al-Haqq Brigade.

Multiple funding streams

Support for Syrian opposition groups, particularly the armed portion of the rebellion, comes from a variety of sources, including national governments, wealthy individuals, and nongovernmental organizations. For the majority of the rebellion, financial and materiel support was delivered to Syrian opposition groups through ad hoc or informal channels, which created an uneven set of capabilities for armed groups and a disproportionate amount of influence by the most ideologically extreme groups. The expansion of the war, however, and the increasing, though limited, cohesion of the Syrian opposition has created a more formal process of support for the rebellion and has placed an emphasis on foreign-government aid. The core group of foreign-government supporters—including the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates—have pledged to direct all military aid and assistance through the SMC, allowing the coordinating body to direct funds as necessary to rebel alliances and brigades, a process the Center for American Progress has advocated for since August 2012.

Still, it is unclear whether this international pledge to use the formal SMC process will have the intended effect of forming a more cohesive Syrian opposition and strengthening the more moderate elements of the rebellion. The formal assistance processes are in their nascent stages, which have led to the inefficient dispersal of aid and supplies to the areas in need. Furthermore, many rebel groups, even those who are closely linked to the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the SMC, still receive much of their funding from informal channels and ideologically motivated supporters. Finally, in order for the formal process of assistance to work, Western and Arab governments will need to adhere to their pledges and maximize the amount of support delivered through the SMC, thus giving it the financial leverage it needs to coerce greater unity from the different rebel groups in Syria.

But several of the most important foreign-government funders of the opposition support specific factions within the rebellion, with Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates each backing different political and armed groups. Even the United States has supported rebel groups without going through the formal SMC process, as seen most clearly in U.S. training for Syrian rebel groups operating along the Jordanian border. The competition for limited resources within the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the SMC— exacerbated by informal funding streams and factionalism—poses the most immediate risk to the effort to create a cohesive, national Syrian opposition that could immediately step in and fill the ensuing security vacuum if and when the Assad regime falls.

Effect on U.S. policy options

Though the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the Supreme Joint Military Command have made some progress turning the Syrian rebellion from a disorganized series of armed groups and political actors into a united opposition force, their efforts remain far short of what is needed to establish a single, coherent voice and strategy for a post-Assad Syria. The current limitations of opposition coordination complicate existing U.S. policy options and demand greater planning for several potential contingencies stemming from the lack of a cohesive national opposition. As the Center for American Progress has stated on multiple occasions, increased materiel support and lethal aid to the rebels should be contingent on better organization by the opposition in order to limit the potential for a proliferation of weapons. Without a stronger mechanism by the SMC to distribute supplies and arms, it is unlikely that directly arming the opposition will contribute significantly to the anti-Assad effort. But failing to provide the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the SMC with any financial and materiel support will eliminate what little leverage they currently possess over the transition efforts.

Additionally, the internal divisions and lack of an effective national strategy by the Syrian opposition reduce the likelihood that the rebels will be able to contribute to several critical postconflict priorities. In particular, the prospects of securing Syria’s chemical-weapons stockpile, eliminating the space for terrorist groups to operate, safeguarding the country against collapse into sectarian violence, and leading the country through on effective and stable political transition are tenuous at best based on current levels of rebel organization. The United States and the international community will need to think carefully about how to address each potential contingency without being able to count on a unified Syrian opposition to shoulder the burden.

The central question for U.S. policymakers now becomes whether enough progress has been made and enough potential remains to establish a truly unified Syrian opposition. If the answer is yes, then a redoubling of efforts must be made to bolster the international and domestic legitimacy of the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the SMC. This includes ensuring that all international supporters of the opposition adhere to their commitment to deliver all funding, supplies, and arms through these formal channels.

If the answer is no, then policymakers should begin determining how best to pursue U.S. goals and priorities working through channels independent from the formal opposition. This may include independent action to secure or destroy chemical-weapons stockpiles, funding and training individual brigades for specific tasks such as maintaining a refugee camp on the border with Jordan, or reaching out to more moderate members of the current regime, who could help maintain order and security if and when President Assad is removed from power.

Understanding the capabilities and limitations of the Syrian opposition is crucial to assessing the situation in Syria and what options exist. Before any decisions are made, U.S. policymakers should consider whether the opposition has the capability to effectively and peacefully step in and assume control in a post-Assad Syria. Without factoring in the structure and organization of the Syrian opposition, there are simply no options on the table for U.S. policymakers.

Ken Sofer is a Research Associate with the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress. Juliana Shafroth is an Intern with the National Security team at the Center.

SOURCE: AP/ Evan Vucci

President Barack Obama answers questions about the alledged use of chemical weapons in Syria during a news conference in the White House.

The news that U.S. intelligence agencies have assessed “with varying degrees of confidence” that the regime of Bashar al-Assad “very likely” used chemical weapons “on a small scale” in Syria, along with recent Israeli strikes against select targets in that country, has been met with an all-or-nothing debate over potential U.S. policy responses. On the one side, advocates of intervention such as Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) and Michael O’Hanlon, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, have used these recent developments to argue for open-ended, large-scale U.S. military intervention in Syria’s stalemated civil war. The debate between these noisy interventionists and skeptics such as political commentator and blogger Andrew Sullivan, who appear primarily interested in countering interventionist claims and rhetoric, has obscured the possibility of an American policy response that is proportional to the transgressions of the Assad regime. But the national debate over what the United States should do in regard to Syria’s civil war and its chemical-weapons arsenal should not be framed as a false, all-or-nothing choice between large-scale military intervention and doing nothing.

The most common calls of those favoring intervention remain constant: arming Syrian opposition forces, imposing a no-fly zone over the country, or using ground troops to carve out safe zones inside Syrian territory to protect civilians. These options would likely have only a marginal impact on addressing the issue at hand—the regime’s likely chemical-weapons use. The United States has already reportedly trained rebels on securing chemical-weapons sites and stockpiles, and equipping the fractured rebel movement with antiaircraft and antitank missiles is unlikely to make much of an impact on the ground against regime forces. In any event, a rebel victory appears unlikely to be as swift as necessary to preclude further use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime—with or without arms supplies from the United States and Europe.

No-fly zones would address one aspect of the chemical-weapons problem. After a no-fly zone is established, the Assad regime would find it difficult if not impossible to deliver chemical weapons by aircraft. But unless the no-fly zone is extended to cover targets on the ground that are not related to ensuring the safety of allied aircraft, a country-wide no-fly zone would not address artillery or missile chemical-weapons delivery systems. In other words, a strictly no-fly-zone approach would stop only one possible method the Assad regime could use to deploy its chemical weapons.

If the overall goal is to prevent the Assad regime from using its chemical-weapons arsenal with airpower to the furthest extent possible, an even broader air campaign against the regime’s command and control, chemical-weapons sites, and missile and artillery batteries would be necessary. While the Nuclear Threat Initiative lists 12 major chemical-weapons facilities in Syria—including three depots—the U.S. intelligence community does not have firm knowledge of where the Assad regime’s chemical weapons are at any given moment. As Director of National Intelligence James Clapper put it, the ability of the United States to secure Assad’s chemical weapons “would be very, very situational dependent.” Even a more expansive air campaign targeting Assad forces on the ground is unlikely to eliminate the threat of Syria’s chemical-weapons arsenal.

What’s more, a no-fly zone is a technically ambitious military undertaking. While likely degraded by fighting over the last two years, Syrian air defenses likely remain more formidable than those faced by the United States and its allies in Libya and the Balkans. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Martin Dempsey put it, “The U.S. military has the capability to defeat that [Syrian air defense] system, but it would be a greater challenge, and would take longer and require more resources.” Keeping that system in check while allied warplanes conduct combat air patrols or take out targets on the ground would require constant efforts as well, with no foreseeable end in sight.

Advocates of a no-fly zone such as Sen. McCain argue that imposing a no-fly zone on Syria would not present the difficulties that Gen. Dempsey outlines because Israel is able to penetrate Syrian air defenses. But it is inaccurate to compare one-off Israeli air strikes against very specific targets—including strikes in which Israeli planes reportedly did not even enter Syrian airspace—to a country-wide air campaign aimed at either establishing a no-fly zone or sufficiently safe conditions to conduct air strikes against the Assad regime’s forces in the field. Quick strikes against discreet targets are a very different proposition than establishing and maintaining a no-fly zone for an indefinite period of time.

The question is not whether the United States and any partners in military action could, from a technical military perspective, establish a no-fly zone over Syria but whether doing so achieves America’s and its partners’ strategic objectives at an acceptable cost. If the overriding strategic objective is to prevent or punish the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons, a no-fly zone would fail to achieve it. Moreover, the number of aircrafts, the length of time, and hence the financial cost that such an operation would entail are much higher than those that a strike on a single target or series of targets would require. While an air campaign directed against the Assad regime’s ground forces might be more effective in addressing the chemical-weapons problem than a simple no-fly zone, it would require additional aircraft and time.

Likewise, safe zones established by U.S. or other foreign troops on the ground inside Syria to protect civilians would suffer from similar problems. They would not directly address the problem of the Assad regime’s chemical weapons and could provide tempting targets for the use of these weapons by the regime. Advocates of such safe zones should answer practical questions of logistics, rules of engagement, and diplomacy before their proposals are taken seriously, including how the forces conducting safe-zone operations would be supplied; how these forces are to defend themselves and the safe zones they establish so as to avoid the terrible fate of the Srebrenica safe zone in Bosnia; what diplomatic support the United States will get from its allies in Europe and regional partners such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel; and how the United Nations factors into this political-military equation.

All three options presented by the most vocal interventionists ultimately do little to address the problem of the Assad regime’s chemical weapons while at the same time drawing the United States deeper into Syria’s civil war. The two most aggressive options—some sort of an air campaign or the establishment of ground safe zones—would undoubtedly short circuit any attempts, however unlikely their prospects, to achieve a negotiated political settlement to end the civil war. Nowhere in the region—neither among America’s allies nor in the United States itself —is public opinion clamoring for the sort of intervention being advocated by Sen. McCain and others. A healthy measure of caution is needed when contemplating any military response to Syria’s civil war or the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons.

The U.S. policy response to the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons should be proportional to and directly address the actions in question. Diplomatic efforts should remain a key component both to determine the truth regarding current allegations of chemical-weapons use and to prevent their further use by the Assad regime. The Obama administration’s attempt to build the strongest and broadest possible coalition as it moves forward remains a vitally important task. Given the complex regional and international political and security dynamics, the United States cannot afford to go it alone in Syria.

Secretary of State John Kerry is traveling to Russia with hopes of reviving efforts to achieve a political solution to Syria’s civil war. Similar diplomatic efforts should be made to pressure Assad to refrain from using his chemical-weapons arsenal. Should such efforts fail and the Assad regime either uses or appears ready to use chemical weapons, the United States should be prepared to conduct limited military strikes against the regime’s chemical-weapons delivery, logistics, and command and control systems, as American Progress has argued. Such strikes would be proportionate to the imminent or actual transgression of the Assad regime’s chemical-weapons use.

The civil war in Syria remains a difficult problem, and the United States’ policy debate is ill-served by a discussion that reduces potential options to either costly, large-scale interventions that do not address the pressing problem of the Assad regime’s chemical weapons or simply doing nothing. All-or-nothing thinking should be resisted, and a broader conception of the tools at the disposal of the United States should be put forward. Keeping the United States’ response to the Assad regime’s offenses proportional should remain a guiding principle moving forward.

Peter Juul is a Policy Analyst at the Center for American Progress.

SOURCE: AP/Charles Dharapak

President Barack Obama speaks about his proposed fiscal year 2014 federal budget, Wednesday, April 10, 2013, in the Rose Garden of the White House in Washington.

In its latest budget proposal to Congress, the Obama administration has requested $526.6 billion in baseline funding for the Department of Defense, a $1 billion increase from the administration’s defense budget request last year. In accordance with the long-term budget plan it announced last year, the Obama administration’s FY 2014 defense budget request holds the baseline defense budget steady at historic highs after a decade of tremendous growth.

This is a missed opportunity to realign our national security priorities. Unnecessary defense spending does not make us safer; it diverts resources away from other critical investments here at home that create jobs and rebuild our infrastructure. Moreover, many of the big-ticket items in the Pentagon’s budget request are ill suited for dealing with the complex transnational threats facing the country today, serve only to reinforce the United States’ overwhelming superiority in conventional and nuclear weaponry, and come at a considerable cost to American taxpayers.

If Congress and the administration are serious about deficit reduction and serious about cracking down on wasteful federal spending, they should both aim to return the baseline defense budget to pre-9/11 levels as soon as possible.

A budget that’s holding steady

In unveiling its FY 2013 budget request last year, the administration announced its plans to reduce baseline defense spending by $487 billion over the next decade, as mandated by the Budget Control Act. These proposed “cuts,” however, came from projected increases in defense spending; the administration’s plan would have actually held the defense budget steady over the next 10 years in inflation-adjusted dollars.

With its FY 2013 budget proposal, the Obama administration ended the irresponsible increases in baseline military spending that have occurred since 9/11, but its long-term budget plan did nothing to reverse this growth or bring the budget down from near historic highs. And unfortunately, the proposed FY 2014 budget maintains this unwillingness to return military spending to prewar levels or historical norms in real terms.

Simply put, the United States can—and should—safely reduce military spending by more and can do so more quickly than the administration’s current plan envisions.

Despite the national concern about the size of the federal deficit, the Pentagon’s budget has remained relatively stable in real terms in recent years, as shown in Figure 1. In fact, the only noteworthy reduction in defense spending since 9/11 occurred this year, in FY 2013, when sequestration required a $41 billion cut.

An alternative to sequestration

In its latest budget proposal, the administration outlines a deficit-reduction plan, including both new revenues and spending cuts, which can replace sequestration and its across-the-board cuts. This plan includes about $100 billion in cuts to the defense budget beginning in 2017.

Sequestration, with its across-the-board cuts, is not a smart way to reduce defense spending, and the administration’s desire to replace these automatic cuts with a more targeted deficit-reduction plan is understandable. By cutting all programs evenly, sequestration denies Pentagon officials the ability to manage the budget drawdown by targeting underperforming programs while protecting initiatives that have proven effective.

Yet if the administration is truly serious about deficit reduction and cracking down on wasteful federal spending, the Pentagon can afford to cut more than $100 billion, and these cuts should begin before 2019. In fact, as shown in Figure 2, U.S. military spending reached unprecedented peaks during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the United States winds down its involvement in Afghanistan, it can return the budget to peacetime levels, which will require reductions of nearly $100 billion per year, not $100 billion per decade.

Responsible defense cuts

Over the past four years, the Obama administration has demonstrated that it is serious about protecting the United States and its interests abroad. But the country needs a defense budget that’s effective, not just enormous. In 2011 we spent more than China, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Japan, India, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Brazil, Italy, South Korea, Australia, and Canada combined on our military.

Last year the Center for American Progress released an issue brief outlining politically feasible defense cuts. If implemented, these reductions would present a moderate first step toward returning the budget to sustainable levels. Here are the ideas we proposed:

• Eliminate the Navy’s purchase of the troubled over-budget F-35C jet and instead purchase the effective and affordable F/A-18E/F jet. Savings: about $17 billion over 10 years.
• Reduce the size of our ground forces to their prewar levels. Savings: about $16 billion over the next decade.
• Reform the Pentagon’s outdated health care programs. Savings: roughly $40 billion over 10 years.
• Reduce the number of deployed nuclear weapons to 1,100 by 2022 from about 1,700 today. Savings: more than $28 billion over 10 years.

Further, Congress must also accept many of the administration’s common-sense cost-savings proposals, including modest changes to health care benefits for military retirees, the creation of a new Base Closure and Realignment Commission to close down unneeded military installations, and targeted reductions or slowing down the procurement of over-budget or ineffective weapons systems.

The United States faces no existential threats or rival superpowers. We should not be spending as much on defense as we did during the Cold War. Returning the defense budget to historical norms will force the Pentagon to better manage its affairs and will help ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent responsibly.

Lawrence J. Korb is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. Alex Rothman and Max Hoffman are Research Associates at the Center.

SOURCE: AP/Carolyn Kaster

Anu Bhagwati, a former Marine officer and executive director and co-founder of Service Women's Action Network, testifies on Capitol Hill in Washington, Wednesday, March 13, 2013, before the Senate subcommittee on Personnel hearing on sexual assault in the military.

A report released last week by the Institute of Medicine that assessed the health needs of Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans made national headlines by revisiting the high rate of sexual assault in the U.S. armed forces. While the Pentagon estimates that as many as one in three women experience sexual assault while serving in the military and 86 percent of these crimes go unreported, one particularly chilling study cited in the report showed that servicewomen who experience sexual assault in the military are nine times more likely to develop post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD, compared to other female veterans. What the report failed to mention is that when female veterans seek mental health services through the Department of Veterans Affairs, or VA, for PTSD related to sexual assault, they face long wait times, and their claims are more likely than other PTSD claims to be dismissed because of a lack of documentation.

Congress and the Department of Veterans Affairs can immediately act to alleviate the injustice faced by female veterans seeking VA services by ending the backlog and by passing the Ruth Moore Act of 2013, which would remove the burden of evidence the VA currently places on the backs of survivors of military sexual assault. The military must also recognize that women who volunteer to serve face an unacceptable risk of sexual assault by their fellow service members, and our country cannot live up to its promise of caring for our heroes as long as this disturbing trend persists.

End the Department of Veterans Affairs backlog

For veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan, challenges continue long after returning from deployment. Members of our military who have been injured or have experienced trauma in the line of duty have an obvious need for health services upon returning home, and the VA has been rightly criticized for failing to provide these services in a timely manner. There are currently an estimated 1 million veterans who are waiting for the department to process their disability and benefits claims. And although the VA reports an average wait time of 273 days, veterans filing their first claim wait an average of 315 days. Moreover, 58,000 veterans have been waiting in excess of two years.

The VA has presented a plan to eliminate the backlog and has set a goal to process all claims in less than 125 days by 2015. As the United States withdraws from Afghanistan and troops return home by the thousands, it is imperative that the department effectively implement the change necessary to allow our men and women in uniform to access the care they need and the benefits they deserve without long delays and bureaucratic hurdles. The VA must end the backlog so that all veterans, regardless of gender, will receive health care for the injuries and trauma they have sustained while serving our country.

End sexual assault in the military

Women make up roughly 15 percent of the active-duty military force and comprise 11 percent of combat veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. More than 150 servicewomen have laid down their lives in sacrifice for our safety and security, and two more have earned the Silver Star, the nation’s third-highest award for valor in combat. Furthermore, the role of servicewomen will only become more important as their representation in the ranks grows and they integrate into combat positions that were previously off limits under the ground-combat exclusion policy, which was repealed earlier this year. In short, servicewomen have performed their duties, and now it’s time for military leadership to perform theirs by ending the epidemic of sexual assaults within the ranks.

An estimated one in three women have experienced sexual assault in the military. In 2011 alone the Pentagon estimated that 19,000 men and women had been sexually assaulted, but less than 14 percent of these crimes were actually reported. Though this culture of underreporting is problematic in itself, the VA exacerbates this injustice by requiring documentation related to the sexual assault to approve a related PTSD claim. Essentially, the military recognizes that an overwhelming majority of sexual assaults go unreported, yet it also demands that veterans produce documentation to prove that the sexual assault occurred in order to receive treatment.

Pass the Ruth Moore Act of 2013

Last month, Rep. Chellie Pingree (D-ME) and Sen. Jon Tester (D-MT) introduced the Ruth Moore Act of 2013 into both chambers of Congress. If passed, the bill would remove the unfair burden of proof on veterans who have experienced sexual assault in the military by requiring VA health professionals to resolve every reasonable doubt in favor of the veteran, regardless of whether there is an official record of the trauma.

The requirements of the bill are not unprecedented. Prior to 2010 veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan who had seen combat were routinely denied care for PTSD because they could not produce formal documentation—such as a combat decoration, for example—which validated their combat experiences. The VA eventually relaxed these documentation standards because they were denying too many veterans care based on the paperwork they could produce as opposed to the experiences they recounted.

Unfortunately, service members who have experienced PTSD stemming from military sexual assault are still held to a more stringent standard despite the high rate of sexual assault within the ranks. Only 32 percent of PTSD claims stemming from military sexual assault are approved, compared to 54 percent of all PTSD claims. The VA has recognized that a veteran’s paperwork may not accurately reflect the nature of his or her service when it comes to combat-related PTSD, and this almost certainly holds true for service members who have experienced sexual assault. If passed into law, the Ruth Moore Act would ensure that a veteran’s PTSD claim would not be contingent upon a paper trail, which, by no fault of the veteran, probably does not exist.

Conclusion

The Department of Veterans Affairs must end the backlog of disability and benefits claims. The VA can request patience from our veterans, but our veterans cannot delay the effects of injuries or trauma incurred during their time of service. Every day that a veteran must wait for the VA to process a claim is a day that a veteran’s health needs go unaddressed.

Congress must also pass the Ruth Moore Act of 2013 so that veterans who have experienced military sexual assault will not be wronged twice—first by being subjected to the assault, and second by being denied mental health services stemming from the trauma.

If this country is to fully honor the service of our men and women in uniform, the Department of Defense must do everything in its power to end sexual assault in the military. Until that happens, passing the Ruth Moore Act and ending the VA backlog are merely bandages on a very ugly wound on our nation’s armed forces.

Katie Miller is the Special Assistant to the LGBT Research and Communications Project at the Center for American Progress.

SOURCE: AP/ Marco Jose Sanchez

Ray Jacques reads the San Francisco Chronicle's war special section inside a Starbucks coffee shop in San Francisco. Ten years after the invasion of Iraq, many members of the media who supported the war in 2003 are choosing not to comment.

For better or worse, the Vietnam War proved itself to be a learning experience for Americans and the U.S. government. In the military, it resulted in what became known as “The Weinberger Doctrine,” which set up a number of demanding conditions for a president to consider before committing significant numbers of troops to foreign wars. For the public, it led to the derisively termed “Vietnam Syndrome,” which combines skepticism toward the nation’s foreign policymakers with weariness about America’s often self-imposed global “policing” role in other countries.

It is unwise to rely on counterfactual history, but after the Vietnam War, it is worth examining the U.S. military’s avoidance of certain unpopular wars.  Consider, for example, the opinion conveyed by the bumper sticker “’El Salvador’ is Spanish for ‘Vietnam.’” These kind of sentiments, coupled with the military’s own desire to avoid wars that lacked strong public support, prevented U.S. proxy wars in Central America, southern Africa, and possibly the Middle East—at least for a little while.

In many respects, former President George W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq was an even greater catastrophe than Vietnam—one that is even less morally and intellectually defensible. And yet, as a nation, we appear to have learned virtually nothing this time around. As Peter Baker noted in The New York Times, “a conspiracy of silence” surrounded the recently observed 10th anniversary of the invasion. “Republicans and Democrats agreed that they did not really want to talk about the Iraq war,” wrote Baker.

This past month, the media has sought out some of the war’s most vocal supporters to reflect on lessons learned, if any, from their errors 10 years ago. A small percentage of the war hawks who originally supported the invasion sought to defend their initial views. An even smaller group apologized for their errors. But the overwhelming tendency among these formerly loquacious pundits and ex-officials was to change the subject away from the war itself. Read, for instance, George Packer’s 10th-anniversary essay in The New Yorker or Paul Berman’s in The New Republic or Kenneth Pollack’s interview featured in Ezra Klein’s column on Bloomberg.com to see if you can determine whether these one-time armchair warriors were expressing regret, or attempting to excuse their own lack of judgment. I sure couldn’t.

Then again, why should they reconsider? It’s not as if anyone—with the possible exception of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and President Bush—paid any kind of professional price for their colossal errors regarding Iraq. Certainly nobody’s career was hurt by the inaccuracy of rosy predictions about the war. Indeed, the opposite proved true: The Weekly Standard’s William Kristol perhaps predicted the outcome of the war most inaccurately, and yet he ended up with opinion columns in Time magazine and on the op-ed page of The New York Times. Once the war’s failure became clear, it’s as if the entire mainstream media decided to adopt the sentiments expressed by the liberal Washington Post pundit Richard Cohen, borrowed from the French ex-Stalinist Pierre Courtade: “You and your kind were wrong to be right; we were right to be wrong.”

Upon rereading their prewar arguments, one can understand the liberal pundits’ desire to change the subject 10 years later rather than revisit their fallacious arguments, or try to draw larger lessons from their mistakes. The liberal hawks—almost exclusively men—became men of ideas wanting to be men of action. They embraced what the historian Christopher Lasch called “the anti-intellectualism of the intellectuals”—to be bold, to reject doubt, and to fight with ideas rather than guns.

Instead of careful cost-benefit analyses of invading Iraq, these intellectual war hawks gave us airy phrases that did not address the actual difficulties the United States was likely to face in Iraq after the initial fighting was over. Many preferred to focus on what the war would do for America’s self-regard as a nation. When the twin towers went down in 2001, the liberal journalist George Packer began a collected set of essays called “The Fight is for Democracy.” Ten years later, he reminisced about his first thoughts after 9/11: “Maybe this will make us better.”

Packer and other liberal hawks, including Michael Ignatieff, Christopher Hitchens, Richard Cohen, David Rieff, Roger Cohen, and Jacob Weisberg, gained popularity in the media despite a gap in their lack of military experience. Indeed, none possessed any particular professional expertise on military strategy, Iraqi society, or the Arab world more generally. They saw their own ideas, as the neoconservative writer Jacob Heilbrunn would write, “as weapons in a moral struggle.”

Indeed, most liberal hawks gave little thought to the Bush administration’s ability to carry out the complicated tasks that would follow the relatively simple task of facing a badly armed third-world military force in open battle. Apparently they expected the postwar reconstruction of Iraqi governance and civil society to take care of itself. The hawks flattered themselves that they knew bigger, more important things than such trivial details. Author and journalist Christopher Hitchens made this plain in his 2010 memoir, when he casually observed that he and his comrades “rather tended to assume that things of [the] more practical sort were being taken care of.”

That’s as far as they got before making assertions and statements about why we needed to go to war. Now take a look at this chart to see where the war ultimately got us. The Vietnam War led to many tragic results, but at least it briefly taught the United States that wars in far-off nations were not endeavors to be taken lightly, or without an understanding of the culture we were seeking to reform—at least until 2003.

Many of the same people who treated the cautionary signals regarding Iraq so blithely 10 years ago now appear to be agitating for yet another adventure, this time in Iran. It would behoove us to ensure that we focus on the lessons of that catastrophe before embarking on yet another one. This time it won’t do to merely change the subject.

Eric Alterman is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress and a CUNY distinguished professor of English and journalism at Brooklyn College. He is also “The Liberal Media” columnist for The Nation. His most recent book is The Cause: The Fight for American Liberalism from Franklin Roosevelt to Barack Obama.

SOURCE: AP/Manuel Balce Ceneta

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta delivers his speech to Georgetown University students and faculty on leadership and public service in Washington, Wednesday, February 6, 2013.

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta will soon return to his home in central California and turn the Pentagon leadership over to his yet-to-be-confirmed successor. But the outgoing secretary’s last words of warning on budget sequestration to leaders in Washington have big implications—not just for the men and women serving in the armed forces of the United States but also for our friends and foes in foreign capitals around the world who are watching our every move in this budget crisis.

In early February the Pentagon announced that pending budget uncertainty would delay the deployment of the USS Harry S. Truman, an aircraft carrier, and the USS Gettysburg, a guided missile cruiser, to the Central Command areas of responsibility in the Middle East. Automatic across-the-board spending cuts known as sequestration—as well as the expiration of current continuing appropriations authority for fiscal year 2013—have a direct impact on America’s security at a time of uncertainty in the Middle East. While the U.S. Navy has pledged to keep the ships on high levels of alert, the decision to delay deployment was a visible sign that sequestration and continuing appropriations uncertainty hurts military readiness.

While the Pentagon was quick to point out that U.S. forces would continue to maintain a robust military presence throughout the Middle East, the budget impasse challenges the normal and routine process of rotating and replacing U.S. forces on a regular basis and disrupts military training.

On February 6, in remarks he made at Georgetown University, Secretary Panetta warned Congress about sequestration, saying:

This is not a game. This is reality. These steps would seriously damage the fragile American economy, and they would degrade our ability to respond to crisis precisely at a time of rising instability across the globe—North Africa to the straits of Hormuz, from Syria to North Korea. … This is no way to govern the United States of America.

These are sobering words of warning—words that point out how our national security interests are suffering because we are, as Secretary Panetta said earlier this month, “lurching from budget crisis to budget crisis to budget crisis.”

Secretary Panetta departs Washington as one of the most respected government practitioners of his generation. His service includes time spent as an officer in the U.S. Army; as a member of the House of Representatives, including as chair of the Budget Committee; as director of the Office of Management and Budget; as White House chief of staff; and, after a brief break spent at his home in Carmel, California, as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Finally, in 2011 he became secretary of defense.

His resume is impressive on every level, but two noticeable nonpartisan achievements stand out.

The first spans his time as house budget chairman to his time as director of the Office of Management and Budget to his time as White House chief of staff—a period during which he was integral to the strategy and architecture of several budget agreements that produced a balanced budget and surplus during former President Bill Clinton’s administration. Key to going from deficits to balanced budgets in just a decade were a series of agreements that moved in incremental but significant steps: spending limits in 1987; the Andrews Summit in 1990; the Deficit Reduction Act in 1993; and bipartisan agreements reached on spending targets and revenue levels in 1995 and 1996.

Secretary Panetta’s second standout achievement came during his tenure as director of the Central Intelligence Agency: his recommendation to President Barack Obama to launch the mission against Osama bin Laden in May 2011.

These were all significant accomplishments for the country. The balancing of the budget in 1998 and the killing of bin Laden in 2011 are among the most momentous national security accomplishments since the break up of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Secretary Panetta has a perspective that is unique and a track record that shows how to create bipartisan solutions. Clearly, what he has to say is important. He said the following in his remarks to Georgetown University:

My greatest concern today is that we are putting our national security at risk by lurching from budget crisis to budget crisis to budget crisis. … I was nominated to be the 23rd secretary of defense, based on my own experience dealing with budget issues as chairman of the House Budget Committee. I was director of the Office of Management and Budget. I knew very well the Department of Defense had a responsibility to be able to do its part in dealing with the fiscal crisis in this country.

Every budget summit that I had been a part of in the Reagan years, in the first Bush years, during the Clinton administration—every budget summit, we knew that defense had to play a role in trying to be able to control our deficits. Soon after I became secretary, I was handed a number of $487 billion, almost a half-trillion dollars, that I was to cut out of the defense budget. It was contained in the Budget Control Act, and I was required to be able to get that number of savings over the next 10 years.

After a decade of blank-check spending in the Department of Defense it was important to us, the leaders of the department, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the service chiefs, the service secretaries and myself, who strongly believe that we had to meet this challenge of reducing the defense budget. But we have to do it in a way that did not simply hollow out the force.

While budget cuts at the Pentagon are expected as U.S. troops continue to return to their home bases after a decade of military conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, Secretary Panetta and the Joint Chiefs of Staff took the necessary budget reductions as part of an integrated strategic and budget review. That review leveraged military and technological capabilities that include unprecedented interservice collaboration, cooperation, integration, and resource investments. The guidance provided by that review is designed to ensure continued U.S. advantage against emerging modern military and technological challenges.

But the planning that went into the strategic budget review is at risk because of the sequester, cautioned Secretary Panetta during his speech at Georgetown University:

My fear is that there is a dangerous and callous attitude that is developing among some Republicans and some Democrats, that these dangerous cuts can be allowed to take place in order to blame the other party for the consequences. This is a kind of “so what?” attitude that says, “Let’s see how bad it can get in order to have the other party blink.”

Thus, the warning that budget sequestration is “not a game”—and, in fact, that, “This is reality.”

As the United States rebalances its defense priorities and the Pentagon’s spending practices, more hard and thoughtful work will be required. Military requirements for new equipment have become so cumbersome that upgrades to the field have slowed to a trickle even while costs have escalated to a level that is neither practical nor affordable. The all-volunteer force—the bedrock of the U.S. armed forces—has seen a decade of cost growth that has weakened its long-term viability. And operations and maintenance spending—so critical to high levels of unit training and readiness, quality of life, and troop morale—are escalating at annual rates beyond any measure of inflation.

Finding answers to these questions will be vital to long-term U.S. security interests and will require smart moves to rebalance the defense budget after more than a dozen years of unconstrained spending. These issues, however, will not be resolved through budget sequestration.

Meanwhile, as Washington continues on a track of incessant political turbulence—with six-month temporary appropriations resolutions—the sense in foreign capitals is one of confusion. Other countries have mounting questions about America’s ability to perform its business when its elected leaders can’t even agree on a budget.

Last week Secretary Panetta’s deputy at the Pentagon, Ash Carter, testified before the Senate that the failure to turn off the sequestration mechanism could demonstrate to allies and enemies alike that the United States lacks critical resolve.

“The world is watching us,” Carter said during his testimony. “Our friends and our enemies are watching us … and they need to know that we have the political will to forestall sequestration.”

Even with the looming sequester, the United States remains the most formidable military power in the world, and deployed troops will continue to receive the critical resources that they need. But unless our leaders in Washington resolve our short- and long-term budget issues, our Navy cannot sail, and the training levels of our troops will continue to be reduced.

The necessary readiness of U.S. armed forces, along with Secretary Panetta’s declaration that sequestration “is not a game,” should spur Washington policymakers to find a practical budget solution and avoid sequestration.

Rudy deLeon is the Senior Vice President of National Security and International Policy at the Center for American Progress.

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Lauren Santa Cruz is a Videographer for the Center for American Progress. Katie Miller is a Special Assistant for the LGBT Research and Communications Project at the Center.

The opinions expressed in this video do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Marine Corps or the Department of Defense.

See also:

• Collateral Damage: How the Defense of Marriage Act Harms the Troops and Undermines the U.S. Military by Katie Miller

Music credits

“Tumblin Down” by CDK (ft. Kirkoid)
“Seven Hundred Beats” by Duncan Beattie
“Adopt a Black Dog” by Gurdonark

SOURCE: AP/Gregory Bull

The Defense of Marriage Act neither defends marriage nor contributes to the actual defense of our country.

See also: Video: How the Defense of Marriage Act Is Harming One Military Couple by Lauren Santa Cruz and Katie Miller

Endnotes and citations are available in the PDF version of this report.

In 2010 President Barack Obama signed the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Repeal Act, creating a path to allowing gay and lesbian service members to serve openly for the first time. Although this was a monumental achievement for our troops and for our country, gay and lesbian service members continue to face discrimination within the U.S. armed services. The Defense of Marriage Act, or DOMA, is a law that, for the purposes of the federal government, defines marriage as the union between one man and one woman. Despite same-sex marriage now being legal in nine states and the District of Columbia, the law prevents the federal government— and the military as a part of the federal government—from recognizing same-sex marriages. The Defense of Marriage Act governs who can be counted as a spouse in all aspects of federal policy, including enrollment in important military-benefits programs.

The United States has a moral obligation to care for its military members and their families. Congress has passed hundreds of laws intended to improve the quality of life of service members, veterans, and their families, which not only compensates military members for their sacrifices but also enables the armed forces to achieve high levels of mission readiness and effectiveness. Adequate compensation for military members and their families is necessary to the well-being of the entire force and is a critical component of our national security.

The Defense of Marriage Act was enacted before gays and lesbians were permitted to serve openly in the military and before same-sex marriages were legal in the United States. When Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act, it was not confronted with the fact that the law would force the military to deny support and benefits to legally wedded same-sex spouses. But that is the current reality. On average, 70 percent of an active-duty service member’s compensation comes in the form of benefits and allowances. Withholding the portion of these benefits that are intended to care for the spouse of a military member inflicts significant financial burdens on military families headed by same-sex spouses. Denying gay and lesbian service members and their families the benefits that years of experience have shown are essential to the proper functioning of our armed forces is counterproductive to the effort to recruit and retain these service members.

The Defense of Marriage Act neither defends marriage nor contributes to the actual defense of our country. Service members should never be forced to choose between continuing their service to our country and ensuring the financial stability and well-being of their families. In fact, it is our responsibility as Americans to ensure that our military families are rewarded for their many sacrifices—not burdened by additional sacrifices when they return from duty. Unfortunately, the Defense of Marriage Act forces the military to subject a subset of personnel to heavy financial burdens by withholding benefits even as their service remains paramount to the freedom, security, and prosperity of our country. Moreover, the Defense of Marriage Act compromises the efforts of Congress and military leaders to recruit, retain, develop, and honor our men and women in uniform. By preventing the military from recognizing the legal marriages of same-sex military couples, the Defense of Marriage Act contradicts numerous military initiatives and represents an injustice against the brave Americans responsible for defending us all.

Impact of the Defense of Marriage Act on gay and lesbian service members by the numbers

Nearly 100 laws provide a military spouse with support or benefit of some kind.

70 percent of an active-duty service member’s compensation comes in the form of allowances and benefits—separate from base pay, which provides the other 30 percent of compensation.

Housing

18 percent to 23 percent: the average increase in Basic Allowance for Housing at the “with dependent” rate.

$417,000: the maximum home loan amount from the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs for a legally recognized surviving spouse.

Health care

$0: the cost of out-of-pocket expenses for a service member with an opposite-sex partner to extend military health insurance and health care to eligible dependents.

$5,615: the average cost a military family headed by a same-sex couple will pay out of pocket to obtain health insurance—because same-sex spouses are not eligible for military health insurance.

Employment and education

27,000: the number of military spouses hired by 129 businesses through the Military Spouse Employment Partnership, a program unavailable to same-sex military spouses.

$18,077: amount of tuition coverage per year that a service member may transfer to a legally recognized spouse under the G.I. Bill.

$987: the monthly allowance for education and job training for legally recognized spouses of deceased service members.

Honoring families of the fallen

$564 to $1,884: amount of additional disability compensation awarded annually if a wounded warrior is supporting a legally recognized spouse.

$1,215: monthly allowance for Dependency and Indemnity Compensation, which goes to the surviving opposite-sex spouse of a service member who died while on active duty.

$8,219: annual income limit that the federal government ensures no surviving military spouse will fall below—if their marriage is legally recognized by the federal government.

Katie Miller is a Special Assistant at the Center for American Progress, where her work focuses on gender and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender issues in the military. 

See also:

• Video: How the Defense of Marriage Act Is Harming One Military Couple by Lauren Santa Cruz and Katie Miller

SOURCE: AP/ Juan Carlos Llorca

President Barack Obama speaks to troops, service members, and military families at the 1st Aviation Support Battalion Hangar at Fort Bliss in El Paso, Texas, on August 31, 2012.

In last night’s State of the Union address, President Barack Obama reaffirmed his commitment to the men, women, and families who have carried the burdens of a decade of war. In his first term, the president made veterans care one of his top priorities. As a result, as most federal agencies grapple with austerity measures, the president’s budget request this year includes $140 billion in funding for the Department of Veterans Affairs—a 40 percent increase in funding since the president took office.

Over the past four years, as the United States wound down its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Obama administration has poured resources into programs intended to support service members as they transition into civilian life, focusing in particular on three critical endeavors: reducing the rates of unemployment, suicide, and homelessness in the veteran population.

Yet as the United States ends its combat mission in Afghanistan and reduces the size of its ground forces to near prewar levels, the federal government will face a growing population of new veterans. In the president’s second term, the Obama administration, along with its partners in Congress and in the private sector, must continue the progress we’ve made in supporting our men and women in uniform as they come home from war.

Unemployment

The unemployment rate for the overall veteran population, 7.6 percent as of January 2013, is actually lower than the national unemployment rate, which has hovered around 8 percent for much of the past year. But this figure masks a significantly graver employment situation for Gulf War II veterans—those who have served since 9/11. In 2010 the unemployment rate for veterans who served during one of America’s recent wars stood at 11.5 percent; in 2011 it rose to 12.1 percent.

To address this problem, the Obama administration launched a broad array of initiatives to help service members translate their skills to the civilian workforce. Chief among these programs: a redesign of the military’s Transition Assistance Program, or TAP. Once commonly known as “death by PowerPoint,” the revamped version of this program includes individual counseling and career-specific curriculum. Perhaps most significantly, under the redesigned program, transition planning will be incorporated into the entirety of a service member’s career. That is, troops will begin preparing for their postmilitary careers as soon as they enter the force.

The president also worked with Congress to pass the VOW to Hire Heroes Act, which provides companies with a substantial tax credit if they hire unemployed or disabled veterans. Also, he used his executive authority to establish a national Veterans Job Bank and to create My Next Move, an online database that helps connect veterans with jobs that build off their military experience. Finally, the Joining Forces Initiative, headed by First Lady Michelle Obama and Dr. Jill Biden, has brought in private-sector partners to secure jobs for 125,000 veterans or military spouses in 2012 alone.

The administration’s full-court press appears to be showing results. In the last quarter of 2012, unemployment among Gulf War II veterans fell to 10.3 percent, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data. Yet even with these gains, too many capable and qualified veterans remain without jobs. In September 2012 Republicans in Congress blocked the passage of the president’s proposed veterans job corps. Intended to address the problem of post-9/11 veteran unemployment, the jobs bill would have hired veterans who have served since September 2011 as policemen, firefighters, and national park employees. Moreover, the $1 billion cost of the measure would have been offset through penalties on tax-delinquent Medicare providers, rendering it deficit-neutral.

Over the past decade, Congress has authorized hundreds of billions of dollars in supplemental war funding to provide our men and women in uniform the support they need while they are on the battlefield. This commitment should not end once they return home. Over the next four years, Congress should work with the president to fulfill our national commitment to the men and women who have served their country so admirably over the past decade.

Suicide, mental health, and traumatic brain injury

The Department of Veterans Affairs estimates that an average of 22 veterans committed suicide each day in 2010, the most recent year for which comprehensive statistics are available. The United States has a moral imperative to address the epidemic of veterans’ suicides and ensure our veterans get the care they need and earned.

The Department of Veterans Affairs has struggled to assess, track, and respond to the mental health needs of veterans, particularly those returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. This new generation of veterans has served in complex environments and against uncertain adversaries, often over multiple tours of duty without sufficient time between deployments. Additionally, the prevalence of improvised explosive devices and rocket-propelled grenades, along with improvements in battlefield medical care, mean that many more veterans return home with traumatic brain injuries or other disabilities, which can increase the risk of post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD, and other associated conditions.

The Obama administration has made mental health care for veterans, service members, and their families a high priority, issuing an executive order in August 2012 to improve access and increase the resources immediately available to at-risk veterans. The president’s order expanded the capacity of the Department of Veterans Affairs crisis line to ensure access to a mental health worker within 24 hours, and inaugurated a campaign to inform veterans and service members of the options available and the benefits of seeking care. According to the Department of Veterans Affairs, the veterans’ crisis line has made successful interventions in 26,000 cases of actively suicidal veterans to date, demonstrating the importance of removing barriers to early consultation for at-risk patients. The president’s directive also provided for an interagency task force on veterans’ mental health co-chaired by the secretaries of defense, veterans affairs, and health and human services, and ordered a review of existing programs to determine which are most effective.

Such interagency cooperation is crucial to tackling the issues of mental health care and suicide prevention for our veterans. As the Department of Defense confronts its own epidemic of suicides—the military lost more troops to suicide than to combat in 2012—the Pentagon and the Department of Veterans Affairs should look for opportunities to cooperate to flag and support at-risk service members, ensuring that they receive the support they need before, during, and after their transition from military to civilian life.

Homelessness

Upon taking office, Veterans Affairs Secretary Eric Shinseki set an ambitious goal of ending veteran homelessness by 2015. The most recent analysis from the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Housing and Urban Development estimates that there were roughly 62,600 homeless veterans in January 2012, a 7.2 percent decline from 2011, and a 17.2 percent decline since 2009—against a decline of 1 percent among the entire population. The Department of Veterans Affairs attributes the success to a concerted effort to increase awareness of Veterans Affairs services available to homeless or at-risk veterans. The department has announced $300 million in grants for community organizations serving homeless veterans. Over the next four years, the Obama administration and Congress should ensure the Department of Veterans Affairs receives the funding necessary to continue these impressive gains in combatting veteran homelessness.

A second-term agenda

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender veterans. This week, the Pentagon announced it will extend new benefits to spouses of gay service members.* Yet the Defense of Marriage Act, or DOMA, still denies the families of gay service members and veterans access to crucial benefits, including health care coverage, survivor benefits, and the right to be buried in a national cemetery alongside their loved ones. President Obama stated that he believes the Defense of Marriage Act to be unconstitutional and instructed the Justice Department not to defend the law. The Defense of Marriage Act denies gay troops, veterans, and their families access to many of the services designed to help them weather the long-term stresses caused by repeated deployments and military life. The administration should continue to do everything in its power to extend all legally possible benefits to gay veterans and their families, thereby ensuring that all service members and veterans, regardless of their sexual orientation, receive the support they deserve.

Civilian credentialing. For many highly qualified veterans, credentialing and licensing regulations pose barriers to transferring their skills to the civilian workforce. A veteran who has served as a medic in Afghanistan should not have to start from scratch in earning his or her civilian credential as a nurse or physician assistant. At the direction of President Obama, the Department of Defense created a Military Credentialing and Licensing Task Force focused on reducing the credentialing barriers for veterans in industries such as manufacturing, information technology, health care, transportation, and logistics. The task force has already rolled out its reforms in the manufacturing sector—allowing service members to test for civilian credentials immediately upon finishing their military training will lay the groundwork to provide up to 126,000 service members with the industry-recognized certificates they need. In its second term, the administration should continue its work to provide simple, logical avenues to civilian credentialing in the other sectors identified by the task force, including healthcare, information technology, transportation, and logistics.

For-profit colleges. The post-9/11 G.I. Bill helps thousands of veterans attend college each year. Due to these generous benefits, however, veterans can be lucrative targets for malicious or deceptive recruiting by for-profit colleges. Last year President Obama issued an executive order intended to protect veterans from recruiting by higher education institutions that have questionable credentials, low graduation rates, or that cost much more than public universities. This executive order will require for-profit colleges to disclose more information about student outcomes. But more needs to be done to help veterans make informed choices as they pursue postsecondary schooling. Last month the Department of Veterans Affairs launched its first study monitoring how veterans are performing at their universities of choice. In its second term, the Obama administration should expand its efforts to track how veterans are using their G.I. benefits, with the aim of ensuring that the program shows results.

Avert sequestration. With the end of the war in Iraq and the beginning of the drawdown in Afghanistan, the size of our nation’s ground forces will—and should—come down. But through this rebalancing process, it is essential that military and civilian leaders remember the debt that is owed to the men and women, and their families, who have borne the brunt of more than a decade of war. Ensuring that we take care of our returning veterans—making sure they can find jobs, use their G.I. benefits to go to college or receive additional training, get equivalent civilian credentials for jobs they performed in the military, receive prompt and excellent health care, and receive assistance in facing homelessness or substance abuse problems—is a moral imperative.

Sequestration remains a threat to our ability to fulfill these promises. While the Budget Control Act properly exempted most of the Department of Veterans Affairs from cuts, sequestration would still make it difficult to meet the needs of a rapidly growing veteran population by hitting the department’s administrative activities as well as veterans programs run through other departments, such as the Department of Labor. Congressional leaders, particularly those who voted to take us to war, must understand that the costs of our interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan will continue for decades after the conclusion of hostilities. It is essential that, having supported the wars, Congress continue to support the troops.

Lawrence J. Korb and Patrick Murphy are Senior Fellows at the Center for American Progress.

* In this column “gay” is used as an umbrella term to describe people that identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual.

SOURCE: AP/Manuel Balce Ceneta

Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta delivers a speech to Georgetown University students and faculty on leadership and public service in Washington, Wednesday, February 6, 2013.

Any day now, the Pentagon is expected to extend new benefits to the spouses of gay service members.* Although the Defense of Marriage Act—the law that defines marriage as a union between one man and one woman for the purposes of the federal government—prevents the military from extending at least 93 statutory benefits to military members in same-sex marriages, there are a number of benefits that can be conferred even while the Defense of Marriage Act remains law. Since the full repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” more than a year ago, military families headed by same-sex spouses have been barred from accessing these legally available benefit programs and support services.

In a letter to U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta in 2011, OutServe-SLDN, an organization representing actively serving gay military personnel, provided a comprehensive list of benefits that could be extended to military members in same-sex marriages independent of Supreme Court or congressional proceedings on the Defense of Marriage Act. The Pentagon should immediately revise its rules to ensure equitable access to military benefits for gay service members and their families to the extent possible under the law. Anything less than complete access to the following benefits means that gay service members and their families will continue to face harmful and unnecessary discrimination by the U.S. military.

Joint duty assignments

The Pentagon generally allows two service members married to one another to be assigned to the same duty station. Active-duty military members are required to relocate as often as once every two years, and this regulation assures dual-military families they will not be forced to separate as a result of the military’s need to routinely relocate personnel. As the regulation is currently written, same-sex spouses are not eligible for joint duty assignments.

U.S. Navy Petty Officer First Class Luz Bautista exemplifies the devastating impact this regulation can have on same-sex, dual-military spouses. In 2011 Bautista received transfer orders to report to duty in Illinois but her spouse was required to remain at her duty station in San Diego with their child. Adding to the couple’s stress, Bautista was also pregnant at the time. Whereas Pentagon regulations would have prevented a heterosexual dual-military spouse from being stationed across the country and away from family, the current regulations cannot guarantee the equivalent for same-sex dual-military families. As a result, Luz Bautista, her spouse, and their two children expect to be separated for three years.

The Pentagon should immediately change its policies to allow same-sex dual-military spouses to be considered for joint-duty assignments.

Command-sponsored dependent status 

When a service member receives an overseas assignment, he or she may apply for “command sponsorship” status for dependents. This designation allows the spouse of a service member to accompany the service member to the assigned military installation, obtain a visa more quickly, live in base housing, and receive host-nation legal protections.

Command sponsorship is critical in emergency situations—in the event of an emergency, including political unrest, war, natural disaster, and epidemic, the military may declare an evacuation of families. The Department of Defense will pay for the cost of transportation to a safe haven, lodging, meals, and the return trip for evacuated civilian family members. “Noncommand sponsored” dependents, however, which include a same-sex spouse, are only authorized one-way transportation back to the United States. Moreover, a same-sex spouse of a military member may be forced to leave the military base at a moment’s notice and be expected to fare on his or her own. Whereas a service member in a heterosexual marriage can be assured that his or her family will be taken care of in emergency situations, Pentagon regulations prevent the military from making that same guarantee to a same-sex spouse.

Interestingly, current regulations allow a same-sex partner of a civilian government employee to be considered for command sponsorship, but still prevent a same-sex spouse of a military member from applying for the same benefit. The Pentagon should revisit its rules for command sponsorship eligibility so that both civilian and military families, gay or straight, can be considered equally for command sponsorship.  

Military family housing 

Military family housing is available to service members supporting dependents. Though an opposite-sex spouse is considered a dependent under Pentagon regulation, a same-sex spouse is not. As a result, a heterosexual couple without children qualifies for military family housing by virtue of their marriage, whereas a military member in a same-sex marriage without children will be restricted to quarters designed for unmarried service members.

Furthermore, a number of military installations do not allow nondependents to reside in on-base housing, so the same-sex spouse of a service member may be forced to live off post, with exception.

The Pentagon should instruct the branches of the military to recognize same-sex spouses are dependents for the purpose of military family housing and on-base housing.

Exemption from hostile-fire areas 

In dual-military families, if one spouse is killed, becomes 100 percent disabled, or goes missing in action, the other spouse may be exempt from serving in a hostile-fire area. One such purpose of this policy would be to prevent a situation where a child loses both parents in the line of duty. The Pentagon does not currently extend this privilege to same-sex dual-military spouses or, subsequently, offer that same protection to their children.

Secretary Panetta should immediately revise personnel-assignment policies so that a same-sex spouse can be taken into account when determining if a military member receives an exemption from hostile-fire areas.

Spousal privilege in courts martial

With exception, a military spouse can refuse to testify against his or her spouse in criminal cases. This privilege is not extended to same-sex spouses under current Pentagon regulation, so a same-sex spouse can be compelled to disclose confidential information to be used against his or her own spouse in court.

Secretary Panetta should immediately revise Pentagon regulations to give same-sex spouses the same privilege in courts martial.

Legal services

Military members and their families receive free legal services. As military regulation is written, a same-sex spouse of a service member is not eligible for this benefit.

The Pentagon should immediately end this discriminatory practice and provide the same assistance to all troops and their families.

Hospital visitation rights

Federal regulations prohibit hospitals participating in Medicare from restricting patient visitation for a same-sex spouse. But current Pentagon regulations allow military health treatment facilities that do not participate in Medicare to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.

The Pentagon should issue explicit guidance that states a same-sex spouse cannot be prevented from visiting a spouse or a child in a military hospital because that couple’s marriage is not recognized by the federal government.

Family programs 

The military offers a number of family programs, including deployment support, marriage and family counseling, and relocation assistance. Each branch of service is free to determine its own standards of eligibility for these programs, which leaves room for discrimination against same-sex spouses.

Last month, Ashley Broadway, a same-sex spouse of an Army lieutenant colonel stationed at Fort Bragg in North Carolina, made national headlines when she was denied access to the on-base Army spouses club. Although the Army did correct the incident, the Marine Corps ordered its spouses clubs to allow same-sex spouses to participate in the programs.

The Pentagon should issue uniform guidance across the services, which explicitly states that same-sex spouses are eligible for military family programs. An act of discrimination in one branch of the military should constitute discrimination in all branches of the military.    

Military identification cards

A military identification card is required to enter many military posts and to access base facilities. When a service member marries a person of the opposite sex or has children, those family members are automatically eligible for military identification cards. Military regulations, however, currently do not allow a same-sex spouse to obtain a military identification card. This can be particularly challenging for same-sex spouses with children, as the spouse could not step foot on military grounds to take a child to a medical facility or to pick a child up from an on-post daycare center as regulations currently stand.

The Pentagon can immediately revise its regulations to allow a same-sex spouse to obtain a military identification card and receive access to the post and a number of its facilities. This would also enable a same-sex spouse to use base commissaries, exchanges, and morale, welfare, and recreation programs.

Commissaries and exchanges 

Commissaries and exchanges are on-base shopping centers open to military families. The military currently allows only military identification card holders to shop at commissaries and exchanges, therefore a same-sex spouse cannot purchase goods from these centers. And in certain circumstances, they may not be permitted to enter the building at all.

Morale, welfare, and recreation programs

Spouses and other dependents of a service member are authorized for unlimited use of military morale, welfare, and recreation programs—a network of free support and leisure services intended to improve the quality of life for military families. Access to these programs, however, is contingent upon a military identification card, and as a result same-sex military spouses cannot participate in morale, welfare, and recreation programs freely available to heterosexual spouses.

Conclusion

As outgoing Defense Secretary Panetta prepares to step down from his post, he can and must extend benefits to same-sex military spouses to the fullest extent possible under the law. Doing so would be a final demonstration of his commitment to making the military a more equitable institution for all Americans, gay or straight, man or woman. Our military members continue to serve their country with honor and integrity, and it is our duty to ensure that their families receive the support and benefits they need and have earned. And though equality for gay military members and their families cannot be achieved until the Defense of Marriage Act is repealed or ruled unconstitutional, the Pentagon can immediately send a clear message to Congress and the Supreme Court that there is no room for discrimination in the ranks.

Katie Miller is a Special Assistant for the LGBT Research and Communications Project at the Center for American Progress.

* In this column “gay” is used as an umbrella term to describe people that identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual.

SOURCE: AP/Pablo Martinez Monsivais

President Barack Obama greets members of the military and their family members in the East Room of the White House on Tuesday, April 12, 2011, after the launch of Joining Forces, the national initiative to support and honor America's service members and their families.

With today’s 20th anniversary of the Family and Medical Leave Act, it is appropriate to reflect on the ways that President Barack Obama has built on President Bill Clinton’s legacy of promoting balance between work and home and recognizing our changing family structure through legislation, especially for the military. Since 2010 President Obama has ensured that the Family and Medical Leave Act empowers military families to care for service members in times of illness and injury, and that they are guaranteed time to cope with the stresses that deployments place on families.

The military provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act are now more generous to military family members than they were in 1993, offering them 26 workweeks to care for a service member suffering from an injury or illness incurred in the line of duty, and 12 weeks to deal with child care, legal, and administrative issues that result from a military deployment. These provisions naturally fall in line with the act’s core qualification standards, which state that in order to be eligible for FMLA protections, an employee must:

• Have been on the job for at least one year
• Have worked at least 1,250 hours in the past year (about 24 hours a week)
• Work for an employer with 50 or more employees living within 75 miles of the worksite

But there are inherent problems with the Family and Medical Leave Act’s military provisions in definition, implementation, and evaluation. Here are three significant improvements the Obama administration and the U.S. Department of Defense can make this year to ensure that the act’s military family leave provisions have their full-intended impact:

Redefine “spouse” to include same-sex partners

A service member’s health and mission readiness is not just physical, emotional, or even spiritual. Retired Adm. Michael Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, affirmed that “total force fitness” also includes a service member’s “family and social relationships.” But because of the Defense of Marriage Act’s restrictions on the word “spouse,” the Department of Defense is prohibited from recognizing spouses of gay and lesbian troops as “family members,” meaning these spouses are ineligible for military family leave entitlements under the Family and Medical Leave Act. Especially given President Obama’s repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” in 2012, it is absurd that same-sex military couples are not guaranteed any such protections under the law if a service member is injured or ill. This creates a true barrier to a portion of the force being holistically healthy, cared for, and ready to accomplish their missions.

The Obama administration, with substantial support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the next secretary of defense, should immediately pressure Congress to repeal the Defense of Marriage Act as it discriminates against same-sex spouses and prevents them from being able to care for their injured or ailing loved ones with the same protections as traditionally defined military family members.

Reduce the qualifications for spouses

The lifestyle of the military spouse is far from standard—as Anne-Marie Slaughter recently pointed out in The Atlantic, Holly Petraeus, the wife of retired Gen. David Petraeus, moved 23 times in more than 30 years. Frequent moves often require a spouse to uproot their careers to start fresh somewhere possibly unfamiliar and unsuited to their skill set, and accruing enough time to qualify for leave under the provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act becomes severely if not impossibly reduced. It follows that the Family and Medical Leave Act standards should be less stringent for active-duty spouses, or for reserve and National Guard spouses who can prove their relocation was due to deployment.

There is a need for a more equitable standard that meets with the demands that duty relocation places on a military spouse. A six-month/625-hour standard for both full-and part-time employees working for a covered employer would be more achievable for a newly relocated spouse, for example. Already the White House’s Joining Forces initiative has made strides for military spouses to take their careers from one duty station to the next. The Family and Medical Leave Act’s military provisions should similarly be applied to ease the possible strain of multiple relocations and deployments.

Enforce the spirit of the Family and Medical Leave Act 100 percent

What if when our service members took their oath upon enlistment or commissioning, they pledged only 88.5 percent of themselves to defending our Constitution? Or 90.8 percent? Or even 97.1 percent? It’s a ridiculous proposition. They pledge 100 percent of themselves and are held accountable to that commitment under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. But those numbers above are real and they speak to the private labor force and the U.S. government’s level of commitment to ensuring military family members can care for their service member and cope with deployments.

These numbers reflect the results of a new line of questions about the efficacy of the Military Family Provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act, which were recently published in the Family and Medical Leave in 2012 Technical Report and submitted to the Department of Labor. According to the report, at best, 88.5 percent of Family and Medical Leave Act-covered employers, for example, would allow leave to care for an injured or ill service member, or for reasons related to deployment. Of worksites uncovered by the provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act, that number drops to 65.9 percent. The percentages are only slightly better when the survey weights answers based on the number of “employees at worksite.”

What the report fails to explain is why a covered employer wouldn’t provide 100 percent coverage for a military family member. In fact, it seems that isn’t even the purpose of the study. Whether weighted by worksite or weighted by number of employees, it is unacceptable that any Family and Medical Leave Act-covered worksite would report less than 100 percent coverage for a military family member coping with their service member’s illness, injury, or deployment. When commissioning future studies of the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Department of Labor has an obligation to service members and their families to go beyond simple “yes or no” questioning, and must fully investigate the gaps in coverage and then enact policies to fix those gaps.

Conclusion

When legislators and the Department of Defense take steps to resolve these issues, attention can then be turned toward other broader issues with military family provisions and the Family and Medical Leave Act in general. Two such issues include addressing the needs of the roughly 40 percent of uncovered private-sector workers and expanding elder care and paternity leave as a national standard. The extent to which these two issues affect military families is unclear, which is a problem unto itself. Since the Department of Labor solicits information about uncovered employers and employees, surely the next step is to use that information to address the concerns of these employers when it comes to hiring and providing leave to military family members.

2012 was a year of unprecedented recognition for our troops, veterans, and their families. First Lady Michelle Obama said, “You all represent the very best this country has to offer.” Now is the time to offer them the very best. Now is the time for swift legislative action and due diligence in reporting and fixing gaps in services and programs such as the Family and Medical Leave Act’s military family leave provisions. It is by taking action to ease the burden of their sacrifice that we can truly honor military families.

Eryn Sepp is the Special Assistant to the Chair and Counselor at American Progress, a veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and a U.S. Marine Corps spouse. With appreciation to Sarah Jane Glynn for help preparing this column.

Katie Miller is the Special Assistant for the LGBT Research and Communications Project at the Center for American Progress. Lindsay Rosenthal is the Special Assistant for Health Policy and Women’s Health and Rights at the Center.

SOURCE: AP/Gurinder Osan

U.S. Army Captain Hellie (last name not given) adjusts her helmet as she walks away from an Apache combat helicopter in Bagram, Afghanistan.

The changing nature of warfare necessarily means that women will be placed in positions where combat is inevitable. U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that enemy combatants prefer to bring the battle to civilian-populated areas, targeting both civilians and combatants and men and women alike. Policies designed to keep servicewomen from the frontlines of battle cannot be enforced where frontlines do not exist. Successful counterinsurgency operations have and will continue to demand that women soldiers are placed in combat regardless of whether their role is officially a combat role.

But due to the combat-exclusion policy set forth by the Pentagon in 1994, women in the Army and Marine Corps cannot formally be assigned to ground combat units. Instead they are deployed in combat zones attached to combat units though technically in a support role. The combat-exclusion policy prevents female soldiers and Marines from receiving recognition for their service in combat, which is crucial to promotion into the senior ranks of the military services. Blocking women from official combat occupations has presented a host of problems by creating two classes of service members based on gender—which neither preserves a legitimate national security interest nor shields women from enemy fire. Instead it protects and perpetuates the brass ceiling that women in the military have yet to shatter.

The impending change in Pentagon leadership will either blunt or bolster the progress of military officials and advocacy groups working to repeal the ban on women in combat. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta is expected to retire early in President Barack Obama’s second term, and former Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-NE) is the rumored frontrunner to replace him. Though Hagel has yet to reveal any position on the issue of women in combat, his political record should be of major concern to those committed to putting an end to the Pentagon’s combat-exclusion policy. Hagel has gone on the record opposing “social experiments” in the military—namely repealing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”—and received a dismal 0 percent rating from NARAL, a pro-choice organization that evaluates candidates’ voting records on abortion issues. These are both warning signs that his commitment to expanding opportunities for women in the military may be in stark contrast to that of his immediate predecessors.

Furthermore, the voices are growing louder on both sides of the issue, as the former commandant of the Army’s most senior educational institution publicly opposed lifting the combat ban shortly after four servicewomen filed a legal challenge to the combat-exclusion policy last month. Should Sen. Hagel receive the nomination as the next secretary of defense, it is imperative that he dedicate himself to making the military a more effective and gender-blind fighting force. Without strong leadership, the U.S. military’s steady march toward combat recognition for service women may come to an about-face.

Here are the facts you need to know about women and warfare:

1. Women are already serving in combat. Female soldiers are currently serving in combat zones alongside their male counterparts and have been for the past decade in Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, there are certain combat positions for which women provide a unique tactical advantage in counterinsurgency operations. Male service members, for example, are prohibited from looking at or speaking to Afghan women on patrols and from touching them at routine checkpoints to search for weapons and explosives—a challenge that poses a security risk that only female service members are equipped to address. The military has responded by creating Female Engagement Teams, or FETS, who are attached onto Army and Marine combat units, live in the same forward operating bases, and even conduct routine patrols but are not formally assigned to these units. This is a bureaucratic maneuver  that allows the military to access servicewomen’s labor in combat situations without actually having to recognize them as combatants.

2. The enemy does not discriminate on the basis of gender. More than 11 percent of combat veterans in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom are women, and more than 150 women have laid down their lives in sacrifice for our country. Thus, the ban doesn’t protect women in combat zones from enemy fire but denies them recognition of their service in combat. Despite the ban, two women have received the Silver Star, the nation’s third-highest honor for valor in combat.

3. Nobody is advocating for a change in standards. Ground combat occupations are among the most physically grueling in the military, and high physical standards are paramount to combat success. The military should not seek to change these standards, but repealing the combat-exclusion policy would simply allow every soldier and Marine to compete for these prestigious assignments—regardless of gender. Since 1999, women have been admitted to the Sapper Leader School—one of the most physically demanding programs in the Army—and more than 50 servicewomen have since graduated from the course, some even with honors, while being held to the exact same physical standards as male service members. Ironically, the course is designed primarily for a combat engineer position that, because of the ban, is currently closed to women.

4. Serving in the combat arms is a pipeline to career advancement, which women cannot access. In a report by the Military Leadership Diversity Commission—a group established as part of the 2009 National Defense Authorization Act to study diversity among military leaders—the combat-exclusion policy is identified as a barrier to promotion for women to the flag and general officer ranks. Despite making up 15 percent of the active-duty force and 20 percent of the reserve force, there have only been two female four-star generals in the history of the U.S. Armed Forces, largely because the most senior officers in the military come from combat arms branches. Fixing the gender disparity in the military’s highest officers begins with lifting the restrictions facing women earlier in their service careers.

5. The military, by its own initiative, is already working to expand opportunities for female service members in part as an acknowledgement that women are already in combat. Although opponents of women in combat may frame the issue as outside interest groups forcing social experiments in the military, the Defense Department has taken steps to expand opportunities to women of its own accord. This is, in part, a recognition that women are already fighting in combat units In recent years, the Navy has placed women on submarines, the Army has opened up six combat specialties to women, and the Marine Corps has admitted women to the infantry officer course, though more than 20 percent of jobs and 238,000 unique positions across the force remain off-limits to women.

6. Despite the fact that women are serving in ground combat, they have not received the same level of combat training as their male counterparts. Female Engagement Teams have been attached to elite units like the Special Forces, who have spent much of their careers preparing specifically for the challenges of ground combat. Women, in contrast, receive general predeployment training with the unit they have been attached as well as Female Engagement Team training, but their primary mission occupation specialty training is in a support role. As a result of the combat-exclusion policy, women do not undergo the same preparation for combat as the rest of the units to whom they are attached, which means they are at an increased safety risk compared to their male counterparts who have received combat-intensive training.

7. Delineating service members’ career trajectories based on gender creates a divisive culture that may contribute to sexual assault and rape in the military. According to the Department of Defense, one in three women in the military have experienced sexual assault during their service, and the majority of female veterans report that they were sexually harassed during their service. More than 80 percent of sexual assaults in the military go unreported. Because combat roles are the most honored and prestigious roles in the military, excluding women from these roles may subjugate them to being perceived as second-class service members. This hierarchal division of soldiers based on gender instead of performance or ability may be contributing to the military culture that has made sexual harassment, assault, and rape such a prevalent experience for female service members.

8. Female veterans who have served in combat may not receive the same benefits after war because they are perceived not to have been in combat. Women soldiers want and deserve recognition for their service to their country as a matter of principle, but acknowledgement for service in combat has important administrative implications as well. Veterans who have seen combat are eligible for an enhanced benefits package, which provides care and medication for all conditions potentially related to a service member’s time in combat. Women may have more difficulty producing documentation that accurately reflects their service, which results in female veterans not receiving the same level of health care as male veterans they served alongside in ground combat.

Female soldiers and Marines have and will continue to serve their country valiantly in combat zones. But the combat-exclusion policy fails to recognize the actual nature of these veterans’ service, effectively denying them opportunity for career advancement and contributing to a divisive culture of gender discrimination in the armed forces. The Pentagon has taken the first steps to ending the combat-exclusion policy of its own volition and should work to finish what it started by eliminating it altogether and establishing gender-blind standards for all military occupations.

It is critical for the betterment of our Armed Forces that the administration nominates a secretary of defense who understands that national security demands both a unified military force and the opportunity for the most qualified service members to rise to the top—regardless of gender.

Katie Miller is the Special Assistant for the LGBT Research and Communications Project at the Center for American Progress. Lindsay Rosenthal is the Special Assistant for Health Policy and Women’s Health and Rights at the Center.

SOURCE: AP/Carolyn Kaster

If carried out correctly, a well-managed defense drawdown can return the Pentagon’s budget to more sustainable levels without harming our national security or our economic recovery.

Endnotes and citations are available in the PDF version of this issue brief.

This year, in accordance with the Budget Control Act of 2011, the Obama administration released a plan to reduce projected military spending by $487 billion over the next 10 years as part of an effort to reduce the federal deficit. These reductions are a smart first step to rein in the Pentagon’s $620 billion per year budget, which has increased by 46 percent since 2001 and reached levels that exceed peak military spending during the Cold War.

The $487 billion in proposed cuts, however, come from projected increases in the defense budget. As a result, these “cuts” essentially keep the defense budget steady at its current level, adjusted for inflation, over the next five years, before allowing a return to moderate growth thereafter. In short, the Obama administration has halted the explosive increases in military spending that have occurred since 9/11 but has done nothing to bring the budget down from its current level, which remains near historic highs.

As Congress works to come to an agreement to avoid sequestration and put the country on a more sustainable fiscal path, targeted reductions in defense spending must be part of our budget solution. The Defense Department has enjoyed virtually unlimited funding since 9/11, and the Pentagon has continued to fare well over the past two years, avoiding real cuts while domestic programs have seen their budgets repeatedly slashed. Even as the department carries out $487 billion in “cuts,” in 2017 the Pentagon’s base budget will be larger than it is today and larger, in real terms, than it was on average during the Cold War.

A fair and balanced approach to getting our fiscal house in order requires looking for savings in areas that have seen the largest increases, rather than hitting areas that are already struggling. Our domestic programs—which fund our country’s investments in infrastructure, education, health, and scientific research—have already seen real reductions in their budgets while the defense budget continues to grow. The country may be in a time of austerity, but the Pentagon is not.

If carried out correctly, a well-managed defense drawdown can return the Pentagon’s budget to more sustainable levels without harming our national security or our economic recovery. In this issue brief, we recommend $100 billion in responsible reductions over 10 years as an initial target, a modest “down-payment” that would bring the defense budget back to its 2010 level in real terms. While greater savings are both possible and, we would argue, necessary, this brief outlines a menu of the most politically palatable cuts, widely endorsed by organizations on both sides of the aisle, including the Bowles-Simpson Deficit Commission, the Stimson Center/Peterson Foundation, the office of Sen. Tom Coburn (R-OK), the Project on Defense Alternatives, and the RAND Corporation.

As Congress continues its fiscal negotiations, it should consider the following reforms:

• Eliminate the Navy’s buy of the over-budget F-35C jet and instead purchase the effective and affordable F/A-18E/F jet to save $16.62 billion over 10 years
• Reduce the size of our ground forces to their prewar levels to save $16.16 billion over 10 years
• Reform the Pentagon’s outdated health care programs to save roughly $40 billion over 10 years
• Reduce the number of deployed nuclear weapons to 1,100 by 2022 to save at least $28 billion over 10 years

Responsible reductions in defense spending would force the Pentagon to better manage taxpayer money. Over the past decade, despite tremendous increases in defense spending, the Pentagon’s equipment has aged and the size of its combat fleets has shrunk as the department squandered $50 billion on weapons programs that were later cancelled and struggled with cost overruns on many of its major procurement programs. The Pentagon has been so poorly managed that it is unable to even conduct an audit—although it has set a goal of being audit-ready by 2014. The keystone of our country’s national security apparatus cannot keep track of how its money is spent or on what.

The Iraq War is over and the United States is on track to end major combat operations in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. At the same time the federal deficit is increasing, as is the need for investment at home. The United States is adapting a less expansive military strategy and does not face an existential threat abroad. Yet we continue to spend more on defense each year than we did at the peak of the Cold War. Congress’ choice is clear: will it cut $100 billion in unnecessary spending from the Pentagon or $100 billion from programs that protect the poor and vulnerable and support the middle class?

The cuts we outline below represent a politically feasible first step to be taken as part of a fiscal bargain to head off sequestration. That said, these cuts will not address the root causes of the growth in the defense budget. Fundamental reforms to the Pentagon’s procurement processes and personnel policies—including retirement reform—along with examinations of rising operations and maintenance costs and the pervasive use of contractors will still be necessary. But such reforms will never happen while the Pentagon and Congress live in the looming shadow of sequestration and the expiration of the middle-class tax breaks. These steps will allow Congress to reach a workable deal and buy time to deal with more fundamental issues.

Cut the Navy’s plan to purchase 237 F-35Cs (carrier-launched) multirole fighters and instead buy 240 F/A-18E/F fighters—saving $16.62 billion over 10 years

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program was meant to save U.S. taxpayers money by avoiding separate research, design, and testing processes to field fifth-generation aircraft for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. The program has failed in that regard, as costs have soared due to unforeseen design challenges.

Nevertheless, the Joint Strike Fighter should be built, especially since production of the F/A 22 Raptor—the Air Force’s fifth-generation stealth fighter—was stopped after the production of 187 aircraft. Additionally, many of our allies are waiting to purchase the Joint Strike Fighter, which will improve the ability of the United States to use military power in conjunction with allied forces and lower the unit costs of the jets for the United States.

While the overall F-35 program is strategically valuable, the plane is not an urgent national security imperative given the United States’ already overwhelming tactical air superiority. The United States currently has 3,029 fourth-generation tactical aircraft—three times more than our nearest competitor—and is the only nation fielding a fifth-generation fighter. Our command of the skies is not at risk.

Many in the Navy point out that the F-35’s air-to-air and air-to-ground missions can be capably performed by the existing fleet of F/A-18E/Fs. The only situation in which a fifth-generation, carrier-launched stealth fighter would be needed would be a large-scale strike on a technologically advanced enemy nation, in which case the Air Force’s fleet of F-22s and F-35s, or submarine and surface-launched cruise missiles could pave the way for further nonstealth strikes.

Indeed, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan Greenert publicly hinted at this future in a July 2012 article in the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings magazine, emphasizing the “need to move from ‘luxury-car’ platforms…toward dependable ‘trucks’ that can handle a changing payload selection.” As Greenert argues, our resources should be focused on improving our missiles, precision targeting systems, and unmanned vehicles rather than marginally improving our carrier-launched multirole aircraft. Indeed, if you accept the Chief of Naval Operation’s analysis, the onus for the Navy is on range, particularly with the development of long-range, anti-access and area-denial weaponry, and the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet jet has a greater range than the F-35C and similar speed.

The FY 2013 budget request calls for the Navy to buy a total of 237 carrier-launched F-35C fighters over the course of the program, totalling $36.828 billion. Given our tremendous numerical and qualitative advantage in tactical aircraft, the budget constraints facing the nation, the Navy’s expensive shipbuilding needs, and the operational environment outlined above, the Navy can capably perform its mission without further developing the F-35C. The F/A-18E/F is a capable, durable, proven airframe that can continue to be improved with electronic and payload enhancements.

Cancelling procurement of the Navy variant of the F-35 would cut $36.828 billion from the defense budget over the next decade, while buying 240 of the less-expensive F/A-18E/Fs would cost $20.208 billion. Therefore, by adopting this plan the United States would save $16.62 billion over the next decade while preserving American air superiority and ground-attack capabilities.

Reduce the size of the Army and Marine Corps to prewar levels—saving $16.158 billion over 10 years

If there is one thing the foreign policy establishment can agree on, it is that the United States will not soon engage in large-scale counterinsurgency or nation-building operations on foreign soil. With the end of the war in Iraq and the planned 2014 withdrawal from Afghanistan, it is natural that the size of our ground forces will come down. The Obama administration’s strategic guidance endorses this view and calls for a reduction in the size of the Army and Marine Corps as part of a shift of focus towards Asia and the Pacific.

In line with this strategic picture, the Department of Defense’s fiscal year 2013 budget request outlined a plan to bring the size of the Army from today’s 547,000 active-duty troops, down to 490,000 troops by 2017, roughly returning to 2002 levels. Likewise, the plan called for a reduction in the Marine Corps from 209,000 active-duty Marines to 189,000 Marines over the next three years, roughly approaching 2007–2008 levels.

The Pentagon’s troop reductions are wise and should be implemented, but there is room to go further. As mentioned, the United States is not likely to face another large-scale ground conflict in the foreseeable future, and the Army and Marine Reserve and National Guard components have proven themselves to be effective should the need arise for wider mobilization. Meanwhile, the low-intensity, asymmetrical conflicts we face today are primarily handled through the use of Special Forces and unmanned aerial vehicles. Finally, the experience gained over more than a decade of war in the Middle East has left the U.S. Army and Marine Corps as the most effective fighting force in the modern world. Efforts can and will be made to retain highly skilled noncommissioned and junior officers so the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan can be further institutionalized.

Given the budgetary environment, however, along with the strategic picture the United States faces today, further small reductions can be made. The Army could afford to gradually return to 487,000 active-duty troops, where it was before the war in Afghanistan, which would save $2.88 billion over the next decade. The Marine Corps should also return to pre-war levels of 175,000 active-duty personnel, saving $13.278 billion over the next decade. Combined, these troop reductions would save $16.158 billion over the next decade without compromising our national security or our ability to protect our interests and allies abroad. It would also protect our ability to quickly mobilize further ground forces should the need arise.

These end-strength reductions should not in any way impact our commitment to the troops returning from service in Iraq or Afghanistan. In fact, it is exactly this process of rebalancing our budget that will allow us to make the investments needed to provide job-placement, education, and health care to the troops who have sacrificed so much over a decade of war.

Reform military health care—saving $40 billion over 10 years

Between fiscal year 2001 and fiscal year 2012, the military health care budget grew by nearly 300 percent and now consumes about one-tenth of the entire baseline defense budget. Most of this cost growth stems not from providing care for active-duty troops, but from caring for the nation’s military retirees and their dependents.

It is imperative that active-duty troops continue to receive health care at no cost and that our country’s military retirees retain access to top-quality health care at a fair price. But the cost growth in the Pentagon’s current health care system is simply unsustainable in the long term. In the words of former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, military health care costs “are eating the Department of Defense alive.”

The Pentagon’s fiscal year 2013 budget request includes smart reforms to the Pentagon’s Tricare health care program that, if implemented by Congress, would be a first step toward restoring fiscal balance to the program. The Defense Department proposes to do the following:

• Raise enrollment fees and deductibles for working-age retirees to reflect the large increases in health care costs since the mid-1990s
• Peg enrollment fees to medical inflation to ensure the long-term fiscal viability of the Tricare program
• Implement an enrollment fee for Tricare for Life, a Pentagon-run plan that augments retirees’ Medicare coverage
• Incentivize generic and mail-order purchases for prescription drugs

Given the looming fiscal showdown and need to come into compliance with the restrictions of the Budget Control Act, Congress should defer to the judgment of our military leaders and pass these responsible health care reforms as a first step toward tackling the Defense Department’s crippling personnel costs. The Pentagon’s proposals would slow the projected growth of the military’s health care costs, resulting in savings of $12.9 billion between FY 2013 and FY 2017. We do not, however, count these savings toward our $100 billion target, as they are included in the $487 billion in cuts mandated by the Budget Control Act.

These reforms alone, however, will not be enough to hold the department’s health care costs steady at current levels, much less reverse the cost growth that has occurred over the past decade. To restore the Tricare program to stable financial footing, the Defense Department should enact measures to reduce the overutilization of services, particularly in the Tricare for Life program, which that has been responsible for most of the Pentagon’s health care cost-growth since 2000.

Such reforms would disincentivize enrollees from seeking unnecessary care, thereby maintaining the effectiveness of the Tricare for Life program while reducing its cost.

Create incentives to reduce the overuse of Tricare for Life services

Tricare for Life resembles private “Medigap” insurance in that it supplements Medicare coverage. By dramatically reducing enrollees’ out-of-pocket expenses, however, Tricare for Life eliminates disincentives to unnecessary care and leads to inflated expenses. To address this issue, President Barack Obama’s Simpson-Bowles deficit commission recommended modifying Tricare for Life so that it will not cover the first $500 of an enrollee’s out-of-pocket expenses and only cover 50 percent of the next $5,000 in Medicare cost sharing. That would reduce overuse of care, saving money for both Medicare and Tricare, the commission found.

The Congressional Budget Office analyzed a similar proposal, in which Tricare for Life would not cover the first $525 of out-of-pocket expenses, and only cover 50 percent of the next $4,725 in costs. Such a policy would “reduce the federal spending devoted to TFL (Tricare for Life) beneficiaries” by about $40 billion over 10 years.

Reduce the number of nuclear weapons—saving $28 billion over 10 years

Our massive nuclear stockpile—1,722 deployed warheads as of September 2012—is a relic of the Cold War. Our nuclear arsenal is expensive to maintain and largely useless in combating the threats facing the nation today, and we possess far more warheads than are necessary for deterrence and to ensure second-strike capability. Unsurprisingly, the Pentagon’s strategic guidance document, released in early January 2012, explicitly notes, “it is possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force.”

As the Obama administration seeks to find responsible reductions in defense spending, our bloated nuclear stockpile presents a tremendous opportunity for savings. Further, with the election over, President Obama, in his second term, has an opportunity to make significant progress on what has become one of his signature policy initiatives: working toward a world free of nuclear weapons.

According to Air War College and School of Advanced Air and Space Studies faculty members Gary Schaub and James Forsyth Jr., the United States can maintain an effective nuclear deterrent with an arsenal of 292 operational warheads and 19 reserve warheads—311 in total. Schaub and Forsyth contend that this number is more than capable of deterring known threats to the United States and hedging against unforeseen contingencies.

In the near term, however, given the partisan opposition to the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty), 311 nuclear weapons may not be a feasible political target, regardless of whether it makes sense strategically or financially.

Earlier this year the Obama administration was reported to be weighing cuts to a more moderate level of approximately 1,100 nuclear warheads. We recommend that the Pentagon reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal to this level by the year 2022. Such a cut would be a major reduction from the 1,550 deployed warheads mandated by New START and a promising first step towards a nuclear posture more in line with the threats facing the United States.

The total amount of funding allocated to maintain and operate the nation’s strategic nuclear arsenal is difficult to ascertain given the classified nature of the program. In fiscal year 2011, however, the United States spent $12 billion on its Major Force Program 1, which can be used as a very conservative estimate of the nation’s annual nuclear weapons expenditures. This program covers a broad range of nuclear weapons costs, ranging from pay and training for personnel to the cost of procuring the Air Force’s bombers and ballistic missiles. It does not, however, include many expenses stemming from the nuclear complex—such as weapons transport or research and development to design next generation delivery systems—and as a result it underestimates the true cost of our nuclear weapons program.

According to the U.S. State Department, the United States possessed 1,722 deployed warheads as of September 2012. Cutting to 1,100 deployed warheads over the next decade would represent a reduction of just over one-third from current levels, a financially and strategically reasonable step. Even utilizing the very conservative estimate of $12 billion per year in nuclear costs, phasing in a gradual reduction to 1,100 weapons by 2022 would save $28 billion over 10 years.

Conclusion

In recent history, the United States has cut its military expenditures by about 30 percent at the end of major conflicts. President Dwight Eisenhower cut defense spending by 27 percent after the end of the Korean War; President Richard Nixon reduced the budget by 29 percent as we withdrew from Vietnam, and Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clinton combined to cut military spending by more than 35 percent as the Cold War came to a close.

In analyzing the factors that have and should determine how much the United States can spend on defense, it is clear that the current level of defense spending can be reduced. We face no existential threats abroad at a time when we are long overdue for investment at home. The federal deficit is increasing, and the United States is shifting to a less expansive military posture and ending two wars. President Obama is seen as a strong foreign policy president and polling indicates that the American people support reducing the defense budget. Therefore, as part of a budget deal to reduce the deficit, avoid sequestration, and extend the middle-class tax cuts, the defense budget can be reduced by $100 billion without undermining our economic recovery or national security. The reforms above will not solve the long-term fiscal challenges facing the Pentagon, but they are a responsible, politically feasible first step that can and should be taken now.

Lawrence J. Korb is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress. Alex Rothman is a Research Associate and Max Hoffman is a Special Assistant with the National Security and International Policy team at the Center for American Progress.

SOURCE: AP/ Nam Y. Huh

As we remember the countless sacrifices made by all veterans since our nation's founding, we thank those still serving on our behalf and keep them in our thoughts and prayers.

This Veterans Day, we at the Center for American Progress continue to honor the brave men and women who serve or have served in the U.S. Armed Forces—especially those who have given their lives or suffered physical or mental wounds. We also honor the families who have endured the absence of a loved one and dealt with the wounds of war in order to make this service possible.

As we remember the countless sacrifices made by all veterans since our nation’s founding, we thank those still serving on our behalf and keep them in our thoughts and prayers. The Iraq war is over, and the United States is on track to end its combat mission in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Yet as our men and women come home from war, we must meet our obligation to provide them with the best possible care and support.

This by-the-numbers column illustrates the challenges that face our service members and veterans, from combat stress injuries to unemployment. With the presidential election over, President Barack Obama and Congress must work together to take care of our men and women in uniform, even and especially as they transition out of the service.

Who are our veterans?

• Approximately 22 million veterans are currently living in the United States.
• More than 2.3 million U.S. troops have been deployed to Afghanistan or Iraq since October 2001.

Employment

• 6.3 percent of veterans were unemployed in October 2012, as compared to 7.9 percent of the general population.
• The unemployment rate for Gulf War II-era veterans—those who served in Iraq and Afghanistan—averaged 10.2 percent in August–October 2012, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data.
• More than 75 percent of veterans report “an inability to effectively translate their military skills to civilian terms.”
• 61 percent of employers in a 2007 survey said they didn’t have “a complete understanding of the qualifications ex-service members offer.”
• College-educated service members who recently returned to civilian life earn almost $10,000 less per year on average than other college-educated adults.

Mental health problems

• Between 2005 and 2010, one service member committed suicide every 36 hours, according to a recent report by the Center for a New American Security.
• There were 38 suspected Army suicides in July 2012—a rate higher than one per day.
• Nearly 35 percent of deployed service members experience symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder,or PTSD, according to Stanford University estimates.
• 10 percent to 20 percent of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans have suffered a traumatic brain injury, or TBI, according to Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America estimates.
• The RAND Corporation found in 2008 that “only 53 percent of the service members who need treatment for PTSD, TBI, and major depression actually end up seeking help.”

Homelessness

• About 67,495 veterans were homeless on any given night in the United States in 2011—14 percent of all homeless adults—according to the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s Supplement to the 2011 Annual Homeless Assessment Report.
• Veteran homelessness has declined by nearly 12 percent since January 2010. The Obama administration has set a goal of ending veteran homelessness by 2015.
• Young veterans are more than twice as likely to become homeless as nonveteran adults of a similar age.

Addiction

• 27 percent of Army soldiers met the criteria for alcohol abuse in three or four months after returning from Iraq, according to a 2011 study by the National Institute for Drug Abuse.
• A 2009 Pentagon health survey found that one in four soldiers had abused prescription drugs.
• Combat veterans are 31 percent more likely to begin binge drinking than service members who do not experience combat.
• Surveys by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration found that “from 2004 to 2006, 7.1 percent of veterans (an estimated 1.8 million persons) met criteria for a past-year substance use disorder.”

How you can help

Below is a list of several organizations dedicated to helping the men and women of our armed forces and their families:

• Veterans of Foreign Wars
• The American Legion
• The Navy League
• Air Force Association
• Association for the U.S. Army

SOURCE: Flickr/U.S. Army Garrison-Miami

U.S. Coast Guardsmen talk to a recruiter at the South Florida Workforce and Society of Hispanic Veterans annual Free Job Fair. With more Latinos serving in the military it is important that we understand the circumstances confronting this population so we can better support every veteran, particularly when it comes to post-traumatic stress disorder.

Unlike other U.S. wars, the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have relied on a relatively small number of volunteers deployed multiple times. This combination puts an extreme mental toll on the women and men who serve and has put a spotlight on the increase in post-traumatic stress disorder, or PTSD, cases among service members. The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs recently reported that 15 percent of veterans from Afghanistan and Iraq currently suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder.

The situation is even more severe for Latino veterans. There are more than 1.2 million Hispanic veterans and the Department of Veterans Affairs reports that 39 percent of Hispanic veterans suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder—a condition they will have to cope with for the rest of their lives. Despite this prevalence, however, the needs of Latino veterans are often overlooked. With more and more Latinos serving in the military, it is important that we understand the circumstances confronting this population so we can better support every veteran.

In this column we will look at the reasons behind the recent rise of Latinos serving in the military and at the unique social and cultural barriers they face in receiving post-traumatic stress disorder treatment that is often a result of their service.

Rise in Latinos in the military

As the nation’s Latino population has increased at unprecedented rates, so has the percent of Latinos in the U.S. Armed Forces. Between 1994 and 2008 the percentage of Latinos in the military grew from 6 percent to 13 percent. In 2004 Hispanics made up 12.1 percent of the U.S. Army. This increase holds true for Latinas as well who now make up a larger share of military women than Latino men make up of military men. Latina veterans account for 7 percent of female veterans compared to 6 percent for Latino men. And in the coming years, Latinos are projected to make up even more of the veteran population: By 2020 Latina women will make up 9 percent of military veterans and Latino men will make up 7 percent.

This rise in military enrollment is due to more than just the growing number of Latinos in the U.S. population. First and foremost, Latinos continue to join the military out of a deep commitment to serve their country—40 percent of Latinos who joined the U.S. Marine Corps stated that patriotism was a major factor. Likewise, 24 percent of Latinos serving in the Army put “desire to serve my country” as their top reason for enlisting.

Another factor related to Latinos’ growing presence in the military is the fact that the Army has been actively recruiting Latino youth with Spanish advertisements in magazines, television, and radio in addition to placing Latino recruiters with potential Latino recruits. More importantly, over the last decade there has been an increase in incentives (not just monetary bonuses) to joining the military, which, according to RAND Corporation research, further drives Latino enrollment.

Not surprisingly, obtaining a higher education is cited by many Latinos as a reason for enlisting in the military. About 12 percent of Hispanics identified educational benefits as the major reason for enlisting and 88 percent of all Hispanics agree that a college degree is important to advancing in life. The Post-9/11 G.I. Bill signed by President Barack Obama in 2009 is the largest investment in veterans’ education since World War II, providing financial support for education to veterans who have served at least 90 days on active duty after September 10, 2001. With the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill, military veterans can receive full tuition at state universities, housing allowances, and book allowances. For low-income Latinos who have limited postsecondary education options, joining the military can be the key to social and financial mobility.

Post-traumatic stress disorder among Latino veterans

Given the increase in the numbers of Latinos serving, it is important that we understand the unique circumstances they face. Even when we control for factors like hazardous combat experience, Hispanic veterans have higher rates and severity of post-traumatic stress disorder than their white or African American counterparts. “Citizenship & Service: A 2004 Survey of Army Personnel” found that one-fifth of all Hispanics enlisted reported being discriminated against in their current unit due to their race or ethnicity. According to the report this discrimination was found to come from various levels: “27% of Hispanics said they had been discriminated against in current unit by an officer and 19% of Hispanics said by enlisted and warrants.” Overall, Hispanics and their black counterparts were less likely than their white fellow soldiers to feel that the Army was doing better than civilian society in terms of racial discrimination.

Studies say that prejudice and racial discrimination experienced during deployment is likely to worsen post-traumatic stress disorder. In addition to discrimination worsening post-traumatic stress disorder, Latinos have been found to disproportionately suffer more severe symptoms. Flashbacks, intense cognitive perceptions, and back or stomach problems are more likely to be experienced by Latinos than by the average veteran.

Considering the severity of their post-traumatic stress disorder experiences, it is important that Latino veterans are able to seek and access treatment. Unfortunately, many cultural barriers within the Latino community can impact a veteran’s willingness to seek treatment.

First, the stigma associated with needing mental health services can make it difficult for many Latinos to come forward with their post-traumatic stress disorder. Secondly, Latino-family norms of solving problems internally (familismo) may influence how Latinos fare in treatment. Trusting an outside therapist is a step Latino veterans might not take, especially since many Latinos have reported that they perceived Veterans Affairs staff as not able to relate to their personal matters. Thus, individual therapy, which is a common form of treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder, may not be as effective for a Latino veteran who has a strong sense of collective identity. Therefore, family therapy is one approach that could be explored as an option to address the mental health needs of Latino veterans. In order for Latino veterans to have equal and comparable post-traumatic stress disorder treatment, cultural norms must be understood by those providing treatment.

Cultural competency is important to ensuring all communities of color have equal care but it is especially important for Latinos who are one of the fastest-growing populations in our country. Like all veterans, when a Latino veteran returns home with post-traumatic stress disorder, their entire family is impacted. We must be able to adequately care for our veterans and this will demand understanding the unique circumstances veterans face due to their racial and ethnic identities. Failure to consider cultural norms will prevent Latino veterans from having adequate care when they return home, and that is a situation that is unacceptable.

Amy Navvab is an intern with Progress 2050 at the Center for American Progress.

SOURCE: AP/Jacquelyn Martin

Army Sgt. Brian Ellis, 22, of Canyon Lake, Texas, places a flag before each grave in preparation for Memorial Day, during the annual "Flags-In" at Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Virginia, on Thursday, May 24, 2012.

This Memorial Day the Center for American Progress honors our nation’s service members who have made the ultimate sacrifice for their country. On Monday we will pause to reflect on the service of the brave men and women who left their homes and their families since the founding of this great nation—some never to return—in order to protect their country and advance the pursuit of security and prosperity the world over.

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, more than 1,800 servicemen and women have been killed in Afghanistan. As we observe this grim milestone, we are also humbled by the remembrance of the 4,400 service members who fell in operations in Iraq, which drew to a close at the end of 2011. These figures do not include the more than 11,000 service members wounded in Afghanistan, the more than 30,000 wounded in Iraq, and the more than 100,000 who have suffered mental wounds in these two conflicts.

As we continue to wind down our military involvement in Afghanistan—10,000 U.S. troops left Afghanistan in 2011 and 23,000 more will leave by this summer’s end—it is appropriate to take this opportunity as a country to reflect on all that our troops and their families have sacrificed over the past 11 years.

Americans are united across class, gender, race, and politics by their sincere wish for the swift and safe return of our men and women in uniform. That being said, this year marks the first time since 2003 that more troops are returning home than going to war. Even so, our active-duty and reserve soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and coast guardsmen honor their fallen comrades’ legacies by continuing to serve their country both domestically and internationally in many capacities.

For their sacrifice, these men and women deserve more than our respect; they deserve to be supported by programs and policies that improve their quality of life both during and after service. Below is a list of organizations dedicated to helping the men and women of our armed forces and their families.

• Veterans of Foreign Wars: http://www.vfw.org
• The American Legion: http://www.legion.org/index.php
• The Navy League: http://www.navyleague.org/
• Air Force Association: http://www.afa.org/
• Association of the U.S. Army: http://www.ausa.org/Pages/default.aspx
• Marine Corps Association: http://www.mca-marines.org/
• Hero Miles: http://www.fisherhouse.org/programs/hero-miles/
• Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America: http://iava.org/splash/
• Military Officers Association of America: http://www.moaa.org/
• Association of the U.S. Navy: http://www.ausn.org/

SOURCE: AP/ Josh Anderson

Developing strategies that increase the likelihood of veterans completing their studies and earning their degrees will certainly contribute positively to this goal and simultaneously promote national competitiveness as well as appropriately compensating veterans for their service.

Download this report (pdf)

Download the introduction and summary (pdf)

Read this report on your browser (Scribd)

“The school that I actually went to knew nothing about [the] military and their concerns. … they didn’t have a certifying official or anything like that. … to have somebody there to help you with your veterans benefits is huge.”

— Student veteran enrolled at a community college

This quote speaks to just a few of the concerns of recent military veterans—women and men who have completed their service and been honorably discharged from the military—who are enrolling in college and universities in ever-increasing numbers. According to news reports, more than 400,000 veterans enrolled in institutions of higher education for the 2012 spring semester.

The U.S. government has traditionally shown its commitment to veterans through investment in higher education. The financial support veterans received for college through the 1944 Servicemen’s Readjustment Act, widely known as the G.I. Bill, was a transformational piece of legislation that made college accessible for more than 2 million veterans in the 10 years following the end of World War II. The first G.I. Bill is credited with increasing the number of college students threefold during the 1940s and 1950s. As a result the country gained an additional 450,000 engineers, 360,000 teachers, 180,000 health professionals, and 150,000 scientists, not to mention how transforming soldiers into civically engaged citizens contributed in large ways to the leadership of the nation.

Amendments to the Veterans’ Readjustment Act in 1952, 1966, 1977, and 1984 placed new restrictions on educational funding that offered lower levels of tuition support and in the last iteration required veterans to contribute $100 a month for 12 months to gain access to their benefits. That all changed with the Post-9/11 Bill—the Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008—the most significant increase in educational funding for veterans in several decades. Under the new Bill, honorably discharged military servicewomen and men are entitled to tuition and fees equivalent to the most expensive rate of in-state tuition at a public college or university in their state, a monthly housing allowance, and a yearly book stipend. The Post-9/11 G.I. Bill, according to a Veterans Affairs performance and accountability report, funded education and training for 555,000 veterans or their dependents in 2011 alone, investing more than $7.7 billion in education benefits that fiscal year.

This latest G.I. Bill has the potential to have as significant an impact on higher education, the U.S. workforce, and national competitiveness as its 1944 predecessor. But despite these glowing prospects and the fact that veterans are enrolling in college in record numbers thanks to the increased financial support the bill offers, the challenges and barriers being encountered by veterans at many institutions make it more likely that ex-G.I.s will leave college with debts instead of degrees. According to recent reports, news articles, and statements from government officials, returning veterans often face myriad challenges when it comes to higher education, including reacquainting themselves with academic work, navigating complex campus administrative systems, finding support services to meet their needs, encountering negative reactions from the campus community based on their participation in military conflicts, and having difficulty connecting with classmates and faculty. Many institutions are ill prepared to deal with these challenges and are often confused about where to begin determining what services student veterans need and how to provide them.

As the nation strives to reach President Barack Obama’s goal of becoming the world’s leader in terms of college completion by 2020, the needs and concerns of a growing veteran population must be addressed. Developing strategies that increase the likelihood of veterans completing their studies and earning their degrees will certainly contribute positively to this goal and simultaneously promote national competitiveness as well as appropriately compensating veterans for their service. As part of this effort to develop workable strategies, this report presents the Environmental Evaluation for Veterans Index, or EEVI, which will provide higher education institutions and policymakers with the tools needed to assess campus environments for veterans.

The EEVI is an assessment tool based on a comprehensive review of published research and recommendations related to working with the student veteran population, as well as the findings of a new multi-institutional study. The index allows institutions to clearly and consistently measure whether they have the services, policies, and sources of support necessary to assist returning veterans transition into higher education.

The EEVI creates opportunities for institutions, students, and policymakers to make sense of campus environments and their contributions to the success of student veterans. While this instrument shares some similarities with the “Veteran Friendly Toolkit” developed by the American Council of Education, or ACE, the EEVI offers an important and unique approach. The index allows an institution to assess its environment by identifying the areas in which a campus is lacking in meeting the needs of veterans before turning to the ACE “Veteran Friendly Toolkit,” which offers detailed guidance on how to develop various “veteranfriendly” programs and policies.

This report demonstrates how the EEVI can be easily used to assess the quality of an institution’s environment as it relates to student veterans based on three dimensions:

• Personnel and services—the existence of offices, services, and professionals that can meet and understand unique issues and concerns of student veterans
• Institutional structures—the existence of campus policies and procedures related to administering student veterans’ information, benefits, and services
• Social and cultural support—the extent of student veteran representation in the student body, veteran-specific groups and services, and quality relationships between student veterans, their peers, and faculty

The use of this instrument has powerful implications for institutions, students, and policymakers. We encourage institutions to use the EEVI for self-assessment, which can identify structural limitations that create barriers to the transition of veterans from combat to the classroom and that hinder the goal of improving student veteran outcomes. Further, institutions can use the EEVI to assess their progress in promoting more beneficial learning environments for student veterans, as well as providing a means to benchmark that progress against other institutions.

Just as the EEVI provides critical information for institutions, it also provides important consumer feedback for student veterans who are seeking learning environments that will optimize their chances of academic success, career development, and degree completion. The EEVI offers previously unavailable information and a way for student veterans to quickly compare and contrast programs, services, and support structures offered by different campuses. We strongly encourage institutions to publicize their responses to items on the EEVI, along with their overall scores, in institution materials, websites, and other resources that offer college information as a way of enabling student veterans to choose institutions that are most able to meet their needs.

Further, the information the EEVI provides is also beneficial for federal and funding organizations. It provides policymakers with the information they need to determine the availability and quality of services and programs at a given institution. In addition, the index offers a concrete benchmark to compare institutions and can be used as a measure to hold institutions accountable. At the same time the EEVI can be used to encourage the implementation of various strategies and the provision of resources that have been found to be successful in meeting the needs of veterans and fostering their academic attainment.

Download this report (pdf)

Download the introduction and summary (pdf)

Read this report on your browser (Scribd)

See also:

• Sending Veterans to School: Fast Facts on the Post-9/11 G.I. Bill

See also:

• Easing the Transition from Combat to Classroom by Kimberly Griffin and Claire Gilbert

SOURCE: AP/ Al Golub

Doug Lilly of Meals on Wheels delivers a meal to Ted Jenson, 73, in Modesto, California. House conservatives are prepared to cut programs for low- and middle-income Americans, including Meals on Wheels, in order to protect unnecessary defense spending.

House Republicans are asking low- and middle-income families to sacrifice health care and basic services to preserve redundant defense systems:

• They are prepared to slash funding for child and elder abuse prevention, Meals on Wheels, and foster care to keep a helicopter that costs five times as much as similar models yet is not much more effective.
• They are willing to raise taxes on the families of 5.5 million low-income children to purchase two submarines that are unnecessary to maintain our naval superiority.
• They are ready to force hundreds of thousands of working families to forgo health coverage in order to block any cuts to a nuclear stockpile whose size is largely a relic of the Cold War.

Here’s the background: The House Republican budget instructs the Ways and Means Committee to find $53 billion in savings in order to “protect national security from deep and indiscriminate cuts” that would otherwise take place in January 2013 due to the debt deal agreed to last summer. On April 17 the committee set forth their package, which exceeded the target. It proposes $68 billion in cuts and tax increases for low- and middle-income Americans.  

The chart below gives a side-by-side comparison of the cuts to low- and middle-income families that House conservatives are proposing in order to shield wasteful military spending from automatic cuts in the debt deal.

These cuts will fall mainly on middle-class families, the working poor, and the most vulnerable children in systems such as foster care. And they are entirely unnecessary.

We can make strategic cuts to our defense budget without undermining our national security, including reducing our nuclear stockpile while sustaining a credible deterrent and making more effective weapons purchases. In fact, the Center for American Progress has found more than $500 billion in Pentagon cuts that could be implemented over the next decade while still maintaining our vast military superiority. 

But if the House were really determined to avoid any defense cuts, there were many other places they could have looked for savings. For instance, the Ways and Means Committee has jurisdiction over taxes and could have easily found $68 billion in revenues from the wealthiest Americans. Simply asking millionaires to pay the same tax rate as many middle-class families would have raised $160 billion in 10 years—more than twice their target to avoid defense cuts.

Budgets are more than numbers on a ledger. They are statements of priorities. And this bill’s priorities are clear: It asks low- and middle-income families to foot the bill for outdated and surplus defense systems we don’t need.

Melissa Boteach is the Director of Half in Ten, Larry Korb is a Senior Fellow, and Max Hoffman is a Special Assistant at the Center for American Progress.