Footnotes

1. In 1997 it was confirmed by an investigatory committee that Russia shipped 8 Scud launchers and 24 missiles to Armenia between 1992 and 1996. See Nikolai Novichkov, "Russia Details Illegal Deliveries to Armenia," Janes Defense Weekly, April 16,1997, p. 15.

2. Belarus announced that they will acquire the Iskander-E from Russia by 2010. "Belarus to Acquire Russian Multi-Warhead Missiles by 2010," Financial Times, 12 November 2004.

3. In December 2003, Libya privately pledged to the United States that it would eliminate all Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)- class missiles, that is, missiles that can travel over 300 kilometers with a payload of at least 500 kilograms. It was agreed, at the time, that the Scud-B missiles would be modified and kept for defensive purposes. See Paul Kerr, "Libya to Keep Limited Missile Force," Arms Control Today, may 2004, p. 28. However, in September 2004, Paula DeSutter, assistant secretary of state for verification and compliance, testified before the House Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, saying, "Libya…has agreed to destroy its Scud-B missiles." See "Completion of Verification Work in Libya," Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, September 22, 2004. There have also been unconfirmed reports that Libya attempted to purchase No Dongs from North Korea prior to its December 2003 decisions to cease its pursuit of unconventional weapons. See www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/Missile/3834_html.

4. In December 2003, Libya privately pledged to the United States that it would eliminate all missiles covered by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), that is, missiles that can travel over 300 kilometers with a payload of at least 500 kilograms. It was agreed, at the time, that the Scud-B missiles would be modified and kept for defensive purposes. See Paul Kerr, "Libya to Keep Limited Missile Force," Arms Control Today, may 2004, p. 28. However, in September 2004, Paula DeSutter, assistant secretary of state for verification and compliance, testified before the House Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, saying, "Libya…has agreed to destroy its Scud-B missiles." See "Completion of Verification Work in Libya," Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance Paula DeSutter before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Human Rights, September 22, 2004. There have also been unconfirmed reports that Libya attempted to purchase No Dongs from North Korea prior to its December 2003 decisions to cease its pursuit of unconventional weapons. See www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Libya/Missile/3834_html.

5. An unidentified missile traveled 62 kilometers in a test firing on November 22, 2001. See Don Kirk, South Korea Launches Missile In Its First Test Since Las Year," The New York Times, November 23, 2001.

6. The Jerusalem Post reported the development of an advanced Syrian modification of the Scud-C (which could possibly be the Scud-D tested in September of 2000), but this report has not been confirmed by Western sources. See Arieh O’Sullivan, "Syrian Super Scud Ready Soon—Source," Jerusalem Post, September 16, 1999.

7. Nuclear Threat Initiative, "Syria: Missile Capabilities." Available at www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/syria/missile/print/4126_4127.prt.

8. Ibid.

9. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance 2007, p.373.

10. This program was reportedly initiated in autumn 1995 and is based on the Sky Bow II SAM.

11. Jane’s Defense Weekly reported March 26, 2001, that Taiwan had deployed up to 50 Tien Chi missiles on Tungyin Island and at an undisclosed second location.

13. In 1989, the United Arab Emirates reportedly attempted to purchase 25 Hwasong-5 (Scud-B variant) missiles from North Korea. According to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the UAE was not happy with the missiles and they were never operationalized. There is no publicly available evidence to confirm these reports, however. See the Monterey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies "A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the DPRK." Available http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op2/fbmsl.htm.