

CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS

INTEGRATING THE INSTRUMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

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LAWRENCE KORB: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. My name is Larry Korb, and on behalf of our president, John Podesta, and my colleagues at the National Security Team, I would like to welcome you to this event where we talk about integrating the instruments of national power.

We are releasing today our own national security strategy, but in terms of the impact that's going to have, one of the areas in which the Obama administration is doing – for the first time the Department of State is doing what they call a QDDR as opposed to the QDR, which is done by the Department of Defense.

And this is certainly a big step forward because one of the points we've made in our report, as well as when we did our first National Security Strategy a couple of years ago, is that you have to integrate all of the instruments of national power in order to have an effective foreign policy.

And here to talk about it today, we're very pleased to have Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter, who is the director of policy planning in the State Department. And of course this is probably one of the key jobs in the whole federal government. It was established by Secretary of State Gen. George Marshall, and among the distinguished people who have held it have been George Cannon and Kennan and Paul Nitze, and Anne-Marie certainly is in keeping with that tradition.

She's got a law degree. She's got a Ph.D. She's an author. She's a dean. She's been a faculty member at Harvard Law School and Chicago Law School. So please join me in welcoming to the podium Dr. Anne-Marie Slaughter. (Applause.)

ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER: Thank you. One of the things I didn't realize when I was appointed director of policy planning was that it meant for the tenure of my job I would be introduced in the same breath as George Kennan and Paul Nitze and would hope every time that I don't suffer too much by the comparison. It is a job with a storied history, as you can see on the wall, and everyone in it has to live up to those standards.

I'm very pleased to be here this morning, both because of the new report and because of the reports that it builds on, the 2005 report talking about integrated power, and then the report on sustainable security. One of the things Larry did not mention was that when I was at Princeton, John Ikenberry and I ran the Princeton Project on National Security and we drew heavily on Larry's work, Boorstin's work then.

And I'll also say, just more generally for CAP, I have been reading many of the CAP reports, most recently a wonderful report on human rights and technology. Many people think in these jobs you don't have time to read. I certainly don't have time to read lengthy tomes, but the think tanks in Washington have perfected the art of the executive summary and the punchy conclusions, and I found it to be very valuable.

I want to talk a little bit about the QDDR and how Secretary Clinton hopes that it will result in integrating two critical aspects of American power. The overall aim of the QDDR is to integrate and elevate development and diplomacy across the spectrum of the civilian American foreign policy, so to integrate and elevate development and diplomacy.

Before I talk more specifically about what that means, I want to actually give you an example of how development and diplomacy can and should fit together. And I'm going to draw this example from an e-mail that I received from Andrew Steer, who is my counterpart at DFID in Britain. Many of you know DFID is the stand-alone British development agency. It is a leader in many areas now in development. It is widely respected by development professionals.

When Andrew Steer came to see me we started talking about development and diplomacy and then he sent me the following e-mail. And if you will bear with me, I will read it from my BlackBerry.

So he writes: "Many, indeed most, development problems require more than money and technology. They require political power, whole-of-government approaches, tough choices by poor and rich countries alike, and a compact between them. Figuring out how to solve the problem is often the easy part. Building a political contest in which that solution takes hold" – I'm sorry, "context in which that solution takes hold is often much more difficult.

"Take agriculture and food security" – I did not ask him to take this example even though sometimes at the State Department it feels like all foods security all the time, but he chose agriculture and food security – "as an example, the reason that much of the developing world has failed to ensure food security over the past 25 years is not primarily because the West has failed to provide adequate money or that development agencies haven't had enough agricultural specialists, or that international research hasn't provided the right seeds, although all these things are required.

"Much more, it is because developing country leaders have not prioritized rural development, have assumed that ministries of agriculture are the sole solution – which they aren't – have failed to allocate funds and smart people to key priorities, and have failed to show leadership in mobilizing all these ministries toward a common goal of food security.

"It is also because leaders in rich and poor countries have failed to take the tough decisions to ensure that international and regional trade and investment systems are working properly. Development diplomacy fits in by bringing political, diplomatic and technical skills together to build political support for reform and to create a compact between rich and poor countries so that funds are provided in way that honors leadership and example.

"Thus, for example, to address food security in Africa, we need much more than meetings of agriculture ministers. We need developing-country presidents and prime ministers to bring their key cabinet players to the table. We need finance, trade and foreign ministers to be on the same page. We need trade barriers to be brought down, the environment for private

enterprise to be improved, microfinance and safety net programs to ensure buying power for the poor, trading infrastructure to be upgraded, and supplemental nutrition programs working.

“Creating such a set of reinforcing synergies is very hard and cannot be done by development specialists alone. It requires all hands on deck. As donor nations we need to use our political analysis to assess which leaders to invest in and our sharpest diplomats to work with our best development professionals to build a political climate in Africa to maximize the prospects of success.

“If we really want to address a problem like food security, we need our top leaders to address persistently with coalitions of leaders in developing countries, as Secretary Clinton did in New York after the Pittsburgh meeting. This then needs to be followed up tirelessly at all levels of government using diplomatic networks in the same manner that we would for political issues.

“This applies not just to developing countries, of course, but equally to donor nations, which need to be persuaded to show commitment to modern country-led approaches to development assistance.”

I read that at some length because it comes from DFID; it comes from an agency that is dedicated to development, that is telling us that even with the kinds of resources that we would like to see poured into AID here, you still need to integrate the power of development professionals, the ideas and the expertise, with the political clout and strategy and reach of diplomacy.

That seems to me to be the perfect example of integrated power in two critical areas of our foreign policy. That is what Secretary Clinton would like to see as one of her legacies, that development and diplomacy would be equal pillars of our foreign policy on the civilian side, and that they would work seamlessly, or as seamlessly as anything works in Washington, with DOD and with other agencies.

So with that as an umbrella, the integration and elevation of development and diplomacy, let me give you a vision of what AID and the State Department and MCC would look like if the QDDR were 100-percent successful; e.g., we reach the best recommendations, they get implemented, they get funded in Congress and they take hold. I've been in Washington long enough to know that's probably unlikely, but I want to start with the broader vision and then I'll talk about some more specifics and can take some questions.

If the QDDR were 100-percent successful, then in four to five years, what we would see is a State Department and an AID that had greatly enhanced capacity in a number of areas. To begin with, we would have much greater capabilities in the building of a new global architecture of cooperation. Secretary Clinton called for building a new global architecture of cooperation this summer.

The specific components would include a greater capability and greater strategy around building bilateral partnerships with emerging nations, and indeed with our traditional allies. We've already launched strategic dialogues, or re-launched them with Russia, the Strategic and

Economic Dialogue with China, a new set of strategic dialogues with India, and we are talking to other countries – Brazil, South Africa and other countries – about launching these dialogues.

But we would be thinking about these dialogues strategically. We would have the capacity to support them and also to develop them as ways of integrating emerging powers into the international system and partnering with them, both within and outside multilateral institutions.

Second, we would have much greater capacity to work within multilateral institutions. Multilateral diplomacy is hard. It takes a lot of patience. It takes a lot of coalition-building. It takes a lot of people, both on the development side and on the diplomacy side, to patiently push outcomes forward. Here, again, the integration of development and diplomacy is critical.

The German foreign ministry, together with the United Nations, offers a course in development diplomacy. It offers a course for its diplomats in how to work through multilateral institutions, global and regional, how to work with governments on a whole list of outcomes that are critical for development.

So we would be able to work much more effectively through multilateral institutions. That means more staff but it also means the organization and the resources and the authorities to deploy that staff, from the Human Rights Council to the WTO to environmental organizations, to the many other organizations across the world.

Third, and perhaps most originally for this administration, we would have a far greater capacity to work with non-state actors. And we've been talking about integrated power, largely in terms of government power, and yet everywhere you turn, it is clear that we need not only government power but the power of the private sector, the power of NGOs, the power of think tanks like this one, all putting in their comparative advantage and resources to tackle common problems.

I use as the example here the U.N. General Assembly in New York this fall where, on the one hand, at the U.N. you had traditional diplomacy being conducted on everything from nonproliferation to violence against women, in many important ways, and across town you had the Clinton Global Initiative, which is one of the premier fora for multi-stakeholder initiatives.

Every panel, whether it was on green energy or health care or education, more or less the same pattern: a couple of CEOs, a government official, both from the U.S. and from a foreign government, some NGO leaders, thinkers from universities or think tanks, all working together in a coalition to tackle one of these problems.

We have that capacity in many think tanks, in many private initiatives. We need much more of that capacity in government. Secretary Clinton appointed Ambassador Elizabeth Bagley as the head of the Global Partnership Initiative.

Similarly, the AID has the Global Development Alliance. Both of those are designed to reach out to non-state actors but they are a very small fraction of what we would have if we

really thought about both our diplomacy and development as being a part of integrative power, not simply across the government but across the society and the economy.

So in building a global architecture of cooperation, we would have greater capacity working with emerging powers, much greater capacity to work through multilateral institutions, and much greater capacity to work with non-state actors.

Second, we would have an AID and a State Department that had the capability to lead and support whole-of-government solutions. In a very interesting conversation with Gayle Smith in the White House about a month-and-a-half ago, we were talking about the challenges of development work and diplomatic work in an environment in which over half the agencies across the government do some work overseas.

I have to digress here for a minute because in 2004 I wrote a book about trans-governmental networks and the fact that central bankers and justice ministers and securities commissioners and environmental officials were all working with their counterparts abroad and all creating these networks.

And from the point of view of somebody who studied global governance, I thought that was a great thing. It provides an infrastructure for global governance that's between just national action and global action.

From the point of view of the State Department, it's a little more complicated. And that's not just true for the U.S. State Department and AID; it's true for any foreign ministry. Suddenly we have to look at all these different actors with lots of expertise, if we're talking about Global Health, CDC and HHS. If we're talking about the environment we're obviously looking at EPA. If we're talking about rule of law we're looking at Justice, we're looking at Homeland Security, we're looking at the FBI.

Lots of expertise, but how do we integrate those different expertise, those different initiatives within a larger foreign policy strategy that emphasizes both development and diplomacy. Gayle's point was it's perfectly possible to reorganize the org charts, but what truly will drive leadership in this arena is capacity.

If we have the management capacity, if we have the expertise on looking at the country as a whole, looking at the region as a whole, then we have the natural power to be able to work with others, sometimes to lead and sometimes to support whole-of-government initiatives. If the QDDR is successful, we will have that capacity and much more experience working across government.

Third, we will think in a much more systematic way about how we can invest in strong societies, both in the social sector in education and health and agriculture, and also in civilian security. And once again, we will think about this both from the diplomatic perspective and from the development perspective.

One way of seeing this enhanced capability is to think about the kinds of problems we face as a government, the kinds of challenges, from – indeed, they’re well laid out in the Integrated Power Report, but if we think about terrorism and violent extremism; if we think about fragile and failing states; if we think about the global economy, global pandemics, climate change – I have a hard time sleeping at night. This litany just kind of runs through my head on a regular basis.

But all of those problems require top-down solutions, they require a lot of intensive diplomacy and agreements and negotiation, but they also require bottom-up solutions. We’re not going to be able to tackle climate change, violent extremism or pandemics without working from the ground up in the health sectors, in the climate sectors, in how countries use energy, in education, in job opportunities for young people who might otherwise be tempted by violent ideologies.

So investing in strong societies has to become a core part of the way we think about our diplomatic mission, as well as our development mission, and not just in the poorest countries but across all countries.

Fourth area, if we were successful, is very close to the heart of the Integrated Power Report. If we were successful, we would have a much greater capacity to respond with a civilian operational response on the ground to both crisis and crisis prevention. These are the questions that are on the table every day in Afghanistan and Iraq.

But in terms of what capacity do we need on the ground for rebuilding in a post-conflict situation, but equally important, and indeed I would say more important – and it’s one of the emphases of the report – in a fragile state, in a failing state, what kind of capacity do we need on the ground with civilians, development experts, crisis managers, conflict specialists, on the ground, often with DOD to either prevent that crisis or to contain it or to reconstruct and stabilize afterwards.

And where should that be located? The one thing I always say is I’m quite certain that the QDDR will not recommend that that capacity be located entirely in DOD. There have been some proposals to that effect, and in general I’m not prejudging the outcome of all the many working groups that we have on these issues, but I’m pretty confident in saying I don’t think the recommendation will be to turn it over entirely to the Pentagon.

On the other hand, there are many other alternatives: building that capacity entirely within DOD, partly – I’m sorry, entirely within AID, partly within AID and the State Department. There are some proposals of a kind of hybrid entity between the Pentagon, AID and State.

The organization should follow the function, and what we absolutely need is the capacity to deploy civilians on the ground, indeed in many ways the way the military does, for a relatively short period of time. So we don’t necessarily need people who are coming in who are full Foreign Service professionals, although we need some of those, but we need the ability to get people on the ground in strength and with very specialized expertise.

And, finally, we would have greater capacity with respect to how we use contractors, when we use contractors, when we don't use contractors. This is a more internal inquiry but a very critical one as we look at how government has been outsourced and think about how it has to now be in-sourced, when, and based on what principles.

We would have much more flexible human resource policies, both with respect to building up the Foreign Service and development professionals, but also the ability to deploy those individuals, not only on the ground but possibly between sectors, in the private sector and in the NGO world on rotations of various kinds. And we would have a better long-term policy and planning capacity.

The QDDR is directly linked to the State Department budget process. This is actually somewhat new for us. For those of you who are used to planning environments, you will find this a bit surprising, but in general what my office does in policy planning is not connected to our resource management. That's obviously not the most effective way to get plans either adopted or implemented, and this process will change it.

So I know our time is running. Let me just say again that if the QDDR were 100-percent successful, we would have integrated development and diplomatic capacity across multilateral engagement partnerships, partnerships with non-state actors, across government in terms of whole-of-government solutions, across investing in strong societies, having a civilian operational response to crisis and crisis prevention. And, internally, we would have more flexible and stronger platforms for our operational success.

That's a vision of integrated power. Let's hope we can achieve it. Thank you.

MR. KORB: Thank you. (Applause.)

All right, we have about 15 minutes before Anne-Marie has to get back and do the QDDR and the floor is now open for questions. I would like to see if there are any members of the press who have questions for Anne-Marie. Okay, then the floor is open. Yes, ma'am? If you would identify yourself, we would appreciate it, and wait for the mike.

Q: Louise Diamond, Global Systems Initiatives. We seem to keep meeting this way.

MS. SLAUGHTER: We do.

Q: Okay, so I really appreciate the vision you're laying out, and two things jump out at me about – you didn't use these words but they're inherent in what you're saying. One is that there needs to be some attention to the culture change in these agencies between State and AID, between State and other agencies, their whole ways of doing things that get habituated. And I'm guessing – we know, when we do this kind of integration process, that one of the big obstacles is culture change. I wonder how you're addressing that.

And the other is you continue to use the word “capacity,” which is a very powerful word, and along with the culture change, what we know is that people don’t always develop this capacity inherently. They don’t walk in with it. Sometimes they need training. So to what extent are you looking at training needs?

MS. SLAUGHTER: Great. So culture change, absolutely. And even if, in my hypothetical, the QDDR were 100 percent successful and everything went exactly as planned, this would be a five to 10- to 15-, 20-year process. You do not change the culture of diplomacy and the integration of diplomacy and development professionals’ thinking about things from the top down and the bottom up simultaneously overnight.

Some of this is generational. Some of this is – will be the result of training. There are a number of things you can do. One of the things I alluded to toward the end is there are proposals for rotating State Department and AID members, not only through each others’ agency, which is pretty obvious, but also across government into other agencies and into the private sector and the nonprofit sector in ways that would, I think, give people exposure to other cultures, both within government but also outside government, that would be very valuable.

And if we think about how many practitioners of integrated power do this, they make sure that people have had exposure to those different cultures.

The other thing that we would really need and that I think all federal government agencies are wrestling with is how to enable project management. How can we pull together a team of people from across government agencies and have them work together on a focused set of goals? So we talk all the time about silos and these massive buildings.

We can’t break those walls down physically but we could virtually. Some of it is as simple or as complicated as having a government-wide database where you could type in “regional agricultural expert” and get everybody in government who would be connected to that, which is not impossible and the White House is doing some interesting thinking.

But one of the best ways to break down these cultural barriers is to have people working with each other very intensively on specific projects. Then that’s dissolved, the goals are achieved, and you move on to another one. With training, absolutely. Training is a big part of this, not only initial training but ongoing mid-career training in various ways. This is the subject of a whole sub-working group or two or three in group five.

MR. KORB: Okay. Yes, sir? And, again, wait for the mike and identify yourself, if you would.

Q: Matthew Reynolds, Grant Thornton, International, Global Public Sector. Having worked on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, one of the problems that we’ve seen is with the budgeting cycles – for instance, money that is asked for in 2005, is voted on in 2006, approved in 2007 and distributed in 2008. So there is a big lag between, you know, when you’re at your PRT and you’ve asked for it and when you actually get it.

So how do you see the integrated power that you're talking about overcoming some of the natural inefficiencies in the system?

MS. SLAUGHTER: Well, you would think me a true academic dreamer if I told you, well, after we finish reorganizing State and AID we're going to overhaul the federal budgeting process. That's beyond this review, but I do think there are things you could do more specifically that, again, DOD has managed to do more specifically with respect to funds made available to commanders so that when you allocate it, it's allocated with a range of possible uses. So it is not – it's not so tied to sector.

The same of course is true in the development arena where people on the ground say, look, you know, we end up with a whole lot of money for health when a country desperately needs infrastructure or agricultural assistance and it's tied so we can't use it.

So I'm not sure we can change the overall cycles but we can try to change the proportion between tied assistance and what some people would call walking-around money on a larger – in a much larger frame.

That overall goal is one of the reasons we're doing the QDDR, in the sense that we will be asking Congress for large increases. We know it's a time of constraint but this is an administration that said it wants to rebuild the civilian pillars of our foreign policy and the only way to do that is to ask for some major increases, also to ask for some changes in the way that those funds are allocated.

We're doing this review so that we can demonstrate very precisely why we need those funds, why we need those changes. We can make the case to Congress in a very systematic way that this is what the country needs to advance our interests in the world.

MR. KORB: Yes, ma'am?

Q: Thank you, Dr. Slaughter, for your remarks. I'm Lindsay Coates from InterAction. The critique I've heard of integrating diplomacy and development from both diplomats and development professionals is one of timeframe for goals. Diplomats tend to be problem-solvers in dealing with the immediate crisis.

The development timeframe is often 10, 20 years. I'm curious about the extent to which the QDDR is having a transparent conversation because that's not just culture; that's the nature of the work and could be a real barrier to achieving the vision you've outlined.

MS. SLAUGHTER: Thank you. So the first answer is, absolutely. The conversation is taking place group by group because each group is co-chaired by an AID and a State Department co-chair and each group is roughly equally composed of folks from AID and a few from MCC as well and from State.

So in terms of actually talking about the policies and then the capabilities, those perspectives are there. That said, I challenge that starting point because there are also many

diplomats who will say, well, we're thinking about a long-term strategy for this country. We're thinking about an emerging power and how this power is integrated, first into the region and then into the world.

We're thinking about how this power can actually become a responsible partner when we look at a lot of the emerging powers but not just the top emerging power; the sort of second and third tier as well.

And many of those diplomats see development professionals often focusing on much more short-term projects, and indeed some of the work and development, which I understand, says, look, you know, we can't develop a whole country; that requires a whole set of government decisions, but what we can do in particular areas is take advantage of this project, of this local government, of this infrastructure and make a difference.

So the standard frame I don't think holds in many cases, and I actually think it's valuable on both sides for development professionals to see the world from a longer-term strategic perspective just as it is for diplomats to be thinking about the time it takes to do some of the things we need to do.

That said, again – and I cannot stress this enough – this is an administration – and certainly it is baked into the way Secretary Clinton sees the world. When she looks at the problems that we face, she sees the need for development solutions. She sees that no agreement that we're going to be able to conclude with a particular government is going to tackle the issues of global pandemics or climate change or a stable economy or education of women and girls.

Those are development solutions. So that's got to be part of the way we as foreign policy professionals, whether we're on the diplomatic side or the development side, think about what we need to do, and that is a longer timeframe.

MR. KORB: Yes?

Q: Victor Stone (sp). The question I had is, do we risk the success of these ventures when we overtly include any of the military or law enforcement agencies in an integrated strategy, because in countries that we go into, the forces that are opposed to us, whether they be very small groups that don't like us or larger groups or people in the region who feel threatened, as soon as we give them the ammunition to say, oh, that's DOD, or that's the FBI, or that's – even Homeland Security, they're not really here to help you; they're here to establish a foothold in that place.

How do you alleviate that kind of problem when you have an integrated strategy? Isn't it much better to be able to say, oh, they're Peace Corps; they have nothing to do with any of the law enforcement type things?

MS. SLAUGHTER: Okay. Well, again, to some extent – and this actually goes to Lindsay's question as well – in some cases you're certainly right. So when I say we need development and diplomacy integrated and elevated, they're not going to be integrated in every

instance in every country. There are some capacities – Peace Corps is a good one, and actual combat troops on the other – that need to be separate and conducting their specific mission.

There are some who benefit precisely from autonomy, and when you look at a spectrum of development and diplomacy, you see some countries where really virtually our entire engagement with that country is development and where a political agenda or perceived political agenda is probably going to undermine the very things we want to do.

In other countries we are obviously mostly diplomatically engaged, obviously in much of the developed world, but also in some emerging powers we are not engaged really in a development way, so we're looking mostly at diplomacy.

Then there is an overlapping area in between, so I don't want to be understood as sort of saying at every point you have to have both parties doing the same thing, but there is a big area in the middle where you do.

I don't think, though, the answer is not to integrate with law enforcement or with DOD as necessary, and the reason is that often those government officials are in the best position to link up with their counterparts. It's tricky, I grant you, and you're constantly having to respond to conspiracy theories of various kinds. You've just heard Secretary Clinton in Pakistan directly engaging lots of claims as to why we were there and why we're sending in our troops or contractors.

The response I think is to take on those issues directly rather than to create firewalls that I think often don't hold up, but, more importantly, to use the value of a military reaching out to another military, of law enforcement professionals reaching out to other law enforcement professionals. Those connections, that culture of professionalism, is a very important resource for us. It's got to be done in a context that acknowledges these problems but I don't think the answer is not to do it.

MR. KORB: I'm afraid I'm going to have to put a halt to the questions for Anne-Marie because I promised to get her out of here by a quarter to 10:00 because she's got to go back and work on the QDDR.

But that – we're going to continue our program here with Gen. Eaton and myself. But those of you that are interested, before you read the QDDR, I recommend two books that Anne-Marie wrote while she was dean at the Woodrow Wilson School. One is "The Idea that is America: Keeping Faith with Our Values in a Dangerous World," and the other one that she wrote with John Ikenberry called "Forging a World of Liberty Under Law."

So please join me in thanking Dr. Slaughter very much for coming. (Applause.)

MS. SLAUGHTER: Thank you.

MR. KORB: And if I could ask Gen. Eaton to come up. Thank you.

All right, what we're going to do now, I'm going to briefly summarize our report. Some of the questions that have been raised actually got to some of the issues that we discussed. Then I'm going to ask Gen. Eaton to make a few comments. We've heard from development and diplomacy – we want to get a military input into this – and then we'll open it up to your questions and we'll be going until about 10:30.

Let me make a couple of points here. We talked about the QDR or the QDDR, and actually Homeland Security is also doing one called the QHSR. Now, these are all very good efforts, but one thing is missing: You need a national security strategy that guides these.

Gen. Zinni, who was the commander of the Central Command under 2000, put it very well when he said, you need a national security strategy document that will be a follow-up to the initial speeches and communication and will be the authority for our own government structure all the way down because from the strategy cascades the actions and the organizations and the allocation of resources to make that strategy happen.

Now, those of you that are familiar with the fact that Congress, in 1986, mandated that each year an administration send up a national security strategy and that when the new administration comes in, they get it out within five months because all of these efforts have to have – you know, have to have the guidance.

And so, what we've done in ours is put out our – we've updated our own national security strategy, which we put out in 2005, called “Integrated Power.” This time we're calling it “Integrating Security.” And basically we cover a lot of the points that Anne-Marie made in talking about the necessity for that.

But let me make one final comment here, and I think it's very, very, very important. We talk about after we give our recommendations, a lot of which Anne-Marie spoke about and you can read about. We gave you a summary and you can download the whole report.

One of the points that we made is until you get a unified national security budget, a lot of these things are not going to happen. And working with Miriam Pemberton from Foreign Policy in Focus for the last couple of years, we've tried to show how you could make those trade-offs. And we've taken the amount of money that first the Bush administration and now the Obama administration has given for national defense, for development and diplomacy and showed how you could get more bang for the buck by making some tradeoffs.

Because, as Anne-Marie pointed out, money is tight, and so the idea, well, okay, we'll put more money into it, it just won't work. So we've taken the amounts that are there, and in building on the reports that we have put out here in terms of sustainable security – and I was happy to see that Anne-Marie was talking to Gayle Smith, who was the person who did our sustainable security project before she moved over to the National Security Council, our studies and analysis on China and Russia.

Basically, we have talked about how you could have a more effective policy, but let me emphasize this point again before I turn it over to Gen. Eaton to make some comments.

Basically – all the rhetoric is fine, but I can tell you from my own days in government, in the final analysis, unless you get the money, it's not going to happen, and that's why we argue for a unified national security budget.

Now, with that, let me introduce our other panelists. As I mentioned here, we heard from development and diplomacy and we want to get a military viewpoint. And we're very fortunate to have today what I'd call – and I say this as a compliment – a soldier's soldier –

MAJ. GEN. (RET.) PAUL EATON: Thank you.

MR. KORB: – in Gen. Eaton. He's an infantry man, and to me that's the essence of the Army is the infantry. Gen. Eaton served for 30 years in the Army, saw combat in places like Iraq and Bosnia and Somalia. And basically you should know him for two things that I think are very important.

In addition to him being a soldier, all three of his children are soldiers, all of whom have been deployed to the combat areas – two sons and a daughter. When I first met Gen. Eaton down at the American Economic Association a couple of years ago, you know, he said to me, you know, we went to war and you guys went to Wal-Mart. Well, he went to war and his children are going to war, and I think that really says something about the type of soldier and father that he was.

The other is that you may remember a couple of years ago back in – everybody was saying that Donald Rumsfeld is messing things up; something has to be done. Well, Paul wrote about it in the New York Times and I think that led to the beginning of the end for Secretary Rumsfeld.

Gen. Eaton is a West Point graduate and he has a master's in French from Middlebury College, and he is now working in town with the National Security Network. So Paul, welcome here. We look forward to your comments.

MAJ. GEN. EATON: Very flattering. Thank you very much, Larry. And it's flattering to be up here with you in front of this august body with CAP.

First I'm going to make a statement and then ask a question. I went to the Army War College in 1993, and the first thing that happened was a welcome to all you lieutenant colonels and colonels, practitioners of the military art, and realize that you're about a third of the projected components of the national power; the others being the economic power of the United States and all the subsets that accrue to that, and the diplomatic power of the United States.

And they used a very simplistic approach, and it's a three-legged stool. And if the stool is not balanced out, that you've not balanced those components of national power, that you're going to have a policy, you're going to have a foreign policy that is probably not going to be all that it could be.

So you go from there – and a recent report from the commander of the 4th Brigade, 82nd Airborne, a colonel, a War College graduate, and he states in an interview that, I have got all the combat power that I need. What I need are water engineers, agricultural experts, medical personnel. I need to work judiciary issues.

So this is the colonel who went to the War College who clearly understands what Dr. Slaughter was talking about. And the output of all that is the military gets it, and the military right now has to do it when we are not able to develop the expeditionary requirements that you have for commerce, for transportation, for state to a degree, and agriculture certainly. So the military gets it.

And because we don't have a mechanism in government right now to project the other components of national power, the Department of Defense does it by default. We would rather go back to our core competency of fighting and winning the nation's wars and to get all the great American talent that we have to project.

And I'll use just one personal example. Coming back from France I was sitting on the airplane and I had this guy sit down next to me and he had dirty jeans on and a dirty t-shirt, and I said, what have you been doing? And he says, well, I've just come back from, at that time, Rhodesia, where I've built a chicken farm. And auspices of the U.S. government projected forward – he's a talented guy developing a chicken farm on a mass scale. That was his projection of U.S. national power.

So the question that I would ask – and I would ask it of Dr. Slaughter – is who is your champion on the Hill? The issue is money, as has been discussed here. And when the American Army sustained Desert One, the failed raid into Iran in 1980, and then we had Grenada, it became really apparent that not all was right in the Department of Defense and we needed a champion. And change is always easier from without.

So two senators, Goldwater and Nichols, in 1986, published the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and that was a formative event for the Department of Defense – changed everything. In fact, some would argue that it changed everything so well that we go back to an essay that appeared in 1993 called "The Coup of 2012," written by an Air Force lieutenant colonel named Dunlap. And it showed up in Parameters, I think, a military publication.

And this essay – quick read, very pleasant; I recommend it – reveals a military that has taken over all components of national power by default, a bloodless coup, a gift of government to the Department of Defense and to the military.

So when I see actions like the QDDR, when I see actions like Jim Locher and the Project for National Security Reform, when I see guys like Dr. Rudd (sp) out there talking in terms of there is no tasking authority in a centralized fashion in the government – when all of this is working and all of this is bubbling, from a military perspective I'm heartened, I like it, and I look forward to a champion coming up from the Hill to help State and others ram this thing through government.

MR. KORB: Okay, I think you've been very patient and so let me open it up to the floor and we can make some other points as we go. So the floor is open now for questions and comments. Yes, right back there. Again, please identify yourself and –

Q: I'm George Withers with the Washington Office on Latin America. And one of the things that has taken place, much as you described, the Department of Defense taking over State Department authorities, one example of that is the transformation – the ongoing transformation of combatant commands to join interagency security commands.

The Southern Command describes this as a way to facilitate all the national aspects of assistance and power, but in fact, they are, with their enormous resources, their people and their can-do attitude, are more able to set the agenda than just facilitate. And this isn't just something that will return to the core capabilities because it's being put in place not only in the Southern Command but in all combatant commands.

How is this transformation going to be dealt with in your report? Is there going to be a way to wrestle back this kind of control of the agenda from the military?

MR. KORB: Let me mention two things. One, I mentioned the budget. And, you know, I mean, if you do not make the tradeoffs in the budget, you know, for example, you won't be able to do it. But the other is we argued in here that you need a director of development, a Cabinet-level officer, or you could empower AID, make that a separate agency, and that person would basically be in charge of all development funds.

Again, if you take a look at the budget now, you have – the Defense Department has an awful lot of, you know, foreign aid money in its budget, and that shouldn't be under the control of the combatant commanders. It should be, you know, under the control of this new director.

And we also talk in the report about, you know, redoing the Foreign Assistance Act. I don't know if you've ever read it. I mean, my goodness. I mean, it's just unbelievable that that has to be restarted. I think if you do those two things you'll move in the right direction because, as we point out in the report, it's very good – very great for Bob Gates, the secretary of defense, to talk about it, but if the money doesn't flow and the authority doesn't flow, not much else will happen.

Okay, next question. Yes, Ambassador.

Q: Marisa Lino from Northrop Grumman. You hit the nail on the head. The problem is that the State Department and USAID have never had much of a constituency on Capitol Hill and the Department of Defense has. How do you change that?

You don't have – you know, you have military bases all across the United States. Obviously every – most members of Congress and senators have reason to have that constituency be important to them, very little reason for State Department and AID to have that same kind of interaction, and State has traditionally been really bad at their Hill relations.

MAJ. GEN. EATON: Great question, and until you said “bases” and then all politics as local comes to mind, you’re right. And the – but it is fair to note that the United States Air Force taught the rest of the Department of Defense how to lobby. And that – when the Air Force split out – you know, they have been truly masters and the F-22 is a great example of all politics is local when you spread the construction of this aircraft all throughout the United States of America.

So how do you do that for state? That’s a great question. And I go back to who is your champion? And who is the – who is that Goldwater and Nichols who will understand what needs to be done and will move this project forward?

And I think we have a terrifically golden opportunity with Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates. This is a moment in time with this president that I think that the support of defense, for all these good reasons, can be moral; I don’t know that it can be political. But I think we have such a great opportunity right now with the personalities in play.

MR. KORB: Yeah, let me make a point because you’re right once it gets up to the Hill, but as we try and point out in the report and working with Miriam Pemberton over the last couple years on this, if the executive branch does it, then the Hill will only make minor changes. So if the executive branch looks at it altogether – let me give you an example of a tradeoff that should be made.

If you’re worried about – and we point out in the report, a nuclear weapon falling into the hands of a – you know, one of these violent extremist groups and, you know, and them getting it to the United States, that’s much more of a threat than somebody shooting a missile with a return address, okay? But yet if you go back and you take a look at how much we spend on national missile defense as compared to the Coast Guard, okay – we spend more on this one program in the Department of Defense than the entire Coast Guard.

Well, that’s the real threat, and you don’t make those tradeoffs. So I’m saying if you put it in the Coast Guard budget or you put it in the State Department budget before it goes up, then I think you have a much better chance. Yes, Congress will, you know, make some changes.

But the executive branch has really got to take the lead and eventually Congress will do it. You know, it’s interesting – and, you know, Gen. Eaton mentioned, Goldwater-Nichols was the Congress’s idea, not the administration. I was there. We fought it like heck, okay? I did not fight it.

In fact, I got myself in trouble because I had written a book about the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and when Gen. Jones, who was the chairman, was pushing this against the administration, he gave a speech in which he said, well, the secretary of defense is, you know, opposed to it. One person supports me, and he mentioned me, which of course didn’t go too well with his boss.

But the Congress took the lead, and they gave up some of their own power, this, because when you had these unified commanders, okay, when you had more integration among the

services they were not able to divide and conquer. And after World War II – they used to have a Navy committee and a War Committee, you know, they joined them to the armed services.

So I think it can follow, but it's really got to be the executive branch that takes the lead in this, and that's why it's important for them to present their national security strategy.

After Secretary Gates released his budget this year, he had a breakfast the next day with a lot of people from the think tanks, and I said, what was the national security strategy that guided your budget and is going to guide the QDR? And he said, well, something he put out last fall. No, we've got a new administration, you see, and I think they need to make that very, very, very clear in their national security strategy, which was demanded by the Congress in the Goldwater-Nichols Act because they want it.

So they asked for it, so I do think you don't have to be as pessimistic. Obviously it will all be, you know, some pork barrel and all that type of stuff.

We also recommend in here increasing the number of Foreign Service officers, okay? You know, you could double the number that you have. We've got a lot of embassies, and you know better than I they're not fully staffed, and things like that.

Okay, we have a question in the back there.

Q: Thank you. Mike Pesner (sp), Senate Intelligence Committee staff.

MR. KORB: Okay, you're going to tell us how to do it on the Hill. (Chuckles.)

Q: I'm actually going to ask you because Goldwater-Nichols is a great example but, if anything, since 9/11 we've been moving in the other direction where we now have a Homeland Security Committee, which now plays in the national security field. And it even took an event like 9/11 to have the 9/11 Commission recommend consolidating appropriations and authorization authority for the intelligence field, and we haven't been able to make that reform.

So I'm pessimistic that we can have this kind of consolidation where it does involve giving up authority in Congress.

MR. KORB: Well, again, if the executive branch does it, it's already done, to a certain extent, if they've made the tradeoffs and they've done the integration. So then you, the Congress, can make some modifications.

But, for example, if you give more to the Coast Guard and less to the National Missile Defense, I don't see the Congress, you know, cutting the Coast Guard, you know, when it goes up, or maybe, you know, only marginally.

Okay, up here in the front. And please join in whenever you –

Q: Stephen Anderson (sp) with the Department of Justice and with the Civilian Response Corps.

Currently development is spread across USAID, the Department of State; even Justice has some, and it could be argued that this results in a certain amount of bureaucratic infighting and inefficiencies.

I wonder if you, Mr. Korb, and you, General, whether you've given any thought to how development should be – where it should be located, how its resources should be used within government to try to get through these bureaucratic infightings, and where even you think an entity like the Civilian Response Corps should be located and how its resources should be directed.

MR. KORB: Do you want to –

MAJ. GEN. EATON: Okay. I've had a series of meetings over the last 10 days with folks, trying to understand what has been done and postulated so far. And we had a number of really sharp people work for a couple of years to develop the result, the output of the Project on National Security Reform.

I mentioned Jim Locher. By the way, his organization has been unfunded now and so there is a lot of pro bono work going on over there. But we have an 800-page document that is – and I have – to be fair, I have not gone through the 800 pages yet but I'm working my way through it.

And the document that the Center for American Progress has produced is a very tight, very easy to understand, very well-laid-out short version of I believe what I'm going to conclude by reading the project report from National Security Reform.

So one of the people instrumental in that was Gen. Jones, now our national security advisor. Another person is Michèle Flournoy, who is policy over in the Department of Defense. All of those folks who contributed to this report are now in government but they are subjected now to the tyranny of the urgent and cannot think in terms of how do you implement this?

One of the things that I've discovered – and I'm happy for pushback here – is that before you get hired on to the National Security Council, you're asked a question: Is the council directive in nature? The answer to the question is, no, it is not directive in nature. It's advisor in nature.

And as a soldier, what I have concluded is there is no hard-ass colonel who is telling people in a directive fashion, in the development of a plan, how you were going to resource the plan. So what happens in the National Security Council – and, again, I am happy for pushback if this is not correct – is a negotiation with all stakeholders who have the resources because we have not developed an expeditionary capability in the rest of the departments.

The only department that has a true expeditionary quality is the Department of Defense. The personnel, the people in State who have, from a personnel perspective, an expeditionary quality, they have no logistics to support that expeditionary quality. That all resides in the Department of Defense.

So there is no mechanism today to establish directive authority, to establish tasking authority, and to make things happen in a comprehensive, integrated fashion along the lines that Dr. Slaughter discussed.

So until that agent, which has been identified and proposed in the Center for American Progress report – until that entity is created, which is that colonel I referred to, who will be directive in nature, and that your departments have been resourced to be expeditionary in nature, or at least a capacity to be expeditionary, this isn't going anywhere.

MR. KORB: Yeah, and I think Gen. Eaton has, you know, made the points, and that's why we talked about the fact you need a development czar, okay, somebody that does this. And you also need, if you will, a Goldwater-Nichols for the whole federal government. Remember, Goldwater-Nichols basically, for the first time, unified the Department of Defense. It was created in '47. It took like 40 years to, you know, work out all of these things.

But you need it for the whole federal government because when America goes to war, it's not just the military; it's the whole government that does, and I think that's what we need. That's why you need to identify people ahead of time, you know, who can go on things like PRTs and stuff like that so that when we need them we don't just have to rely, you know, on the military.

I just was over in Iraq in terms of, and you know, our joint campaign to plan to get out, there were people from DOJ over there, you know, basically. And so there are people there; we've just got to make sure there's enough of them and they're well-trained. And you can get people to volunteer.

I mean, you can get people who, like, might be assistant U.S. attorneys in fill-in-the-blank who basically would volunteer, say, if it's an emergency, kind of like the reserves. You know, call up and I'd be willing to go. But we really need to do that ahead of time because what happens is, you know, then a crisis comes up and then we're trying to, you know, make it up as we go and it doesn't work as well as it should.

So somehow or another you would hope – and I have to – when, you know, Gen. Eaton talked about, you know, you only have advisory, somebody ought to tell Henry Kissinger that, that he was just, you know, an advisor when he was national security advisor, or, you know, Brent Scowcroft, people like that, you know, who basically took charge. And somebody needs to take charge, and I would argue it really has to be in the – you know, somebody who reports directly to the president.

All right, next question or comment? Yes, ma'am. Anybody else who hasn't had one, because you've already had one, so let the gentleman behind you go and you'll get – you'll get the last one here.

Q: As –

MR. KORB: Please identify yourself, if you would.

Q: I'm Bob Ferrin (sp). I'm a former Foreign Service officer. As Lawrence Korb alluded to but I wanted to expand on that point, Kissinger turned the NSC – because Nixon wanted it that way – into an executive organ and many National Security advisors since then have – all they need to do really is get the president's signature on a memorandum giving instructions and they've turned the White House into the executive organ on national security and foreign policy.

My question is whether you, Gen. Eaton, or either of you, see the current team in the White House as not sufficiently using the potential that they have for getting the president directly involved in giving instructions and issuing directives and issuing orders to the rest of the government on national security issues.

Is that really what you're saying is that that needs to be done by the NSC and isn't being done and could easily be done if they just got Obama to start issuing orders and directives? I'm wondering if your call for a need for an executive decision-maker on development in these other areas discussed today calls for a decision-making role in the White House.

MAJ. GEN. EATON: I am a product of my past. I grew up in the military, literally, my family, and went into the military. And I am very used to a very strong executive in the term "commander." The president is our commander in chief. He has a staff, as does the Major General, who has a staff to develop and resource plans.

I believe that that staff could be the National Security Council but it is not – we have a departmental – departmentalism in Washington, D.C., right now. We have very powerful figures who run the Department of Defense, who run the Department of State and the rest of the departments.

And when the president invests power in the national security advisor, as the examples of Kissinger and Scowcroft, then that does solve that problem. And it turns the National Security Council and the National Security advisor into a true departmental chief of staff, directive in nature, where he has the voice of the president.

I can't see into that. What I lived in the Iraqi force development – in the Iraqi security forces development, I could not get Department of State and Department of Defense to agree on resourcing my particular mission. And that was a very narrow band requirement. What I see today is PRTs where we have a lot of military who are doing tasks that are rightfully tasks that would be done better, I would expect, by true experts in the field.

But because they are not coming from our departments, because we have not resourced our departments and given them the capacity that Dr. Slaughter discusses, there is no – and I am out in front of my headlights on this one because –

MR. KORB: Well, you're not on active duty anymore. You don't have to worry.

MAJ. GEN. EATON: Yeah. And she goes to the discussion on money. Well, the money comes from the Hill and it – it's so much easier just to say, okay, defense, you do it, because the president of the United States can't direct capacity development. He can't direct budget increases to support what he would like to do. I mean, this is – and I'm new enough to the town that I'm happy to have somebody else try to explain it.

MR. KORB: Yeah. Let me follow up on our question because I think it's a real key one.

One of our recommendations in here in dealing with violent extremists, which we say is one of the threats to national security, was to use the law enforcement system more. So we were very happy when, you know, Attorney Gen. Holder mentioned that the other day, but what worried me is when he was asked about it by Jim Lehrer, he said, well, he just told the president, you know, they didn't work this through the NSC.

Now, this is a very critical thing because it's an instrument for dealing with the threat to national security. Now, I understand the independence of the attorney general and everything, but this is not interfering in a court case; this is a change in strategy.

And if you remember the 2004 campaign, Sen. Kerry was mocked by, you know, people saying, well, this is a law enforcement problem and all this. So it's a fundamental change. I happen to agree with it but I do worry when I see something like that.

All right, next question? Somebody else had their hand up. No one? All right, ma'am, you.

Q: I don't intend to monopolize.

MR. KORB: That's okay.

Q: Lindsay Coates from InterAction. One of the things I'm hearing as a thread in the conversation is when Goldwater-Nichols happened, there were failures in the military that sort of created a burning platform –

MR. KORB: Right.

Q: – and the need to jump. When things changed and we had the Department of Homeland Security, there was a burning platform and a need to jump. I don't know what the burning platform is here, and I'm curious as to your thoughts on that.

MR. KORB: Well, I think the burning platform, basically – if you take the situation, for example, in Iraq, okay – the president has made a decision; we’re going to withdraw our troops after the election – you still have the PRTs over there, okay? If you take a lot of military people out, what happens to your commanders’ response emergency fund, okay? Who is going to be funding this? Where is the money going to come from?

Is there money in the State Department budget, the – do you see what I mean? Just things like that, that somebody needs to think about because even though, you know, we’ll have all of our combat troops out, according to the president, by August in 2010, you’re still going to be there. You’re going to have a limited number of troops. You’re going to have less combat brigades so it will be less money.

Well, who is going to be funding this? Where is the money going to come from? And it seemed to me that that’s the – you know, that’s the, you know, the burning issue that you have to use, for example, you know, something here and now, assuming that we don’t know what the president is going to do on Afghanistan, but everyone agrees that in the long term it’s not a military – the military can’t solve this thing.

I mean, so there are a lot of things that you could use if you wanted to make it the burning issue. And, you know, I have a great deal more confidence in Congress, okay, because of the fact that, yes, people will try and guard their, you know, particular fiefdoms and all that kind of stuff, but by and large the people over there give up a lot and they want to do the right thing.

And so there are ways that you can do it, and I really think that if the president started, next year in his 2011 budget, say, okay, here is my national security strategy, from the QDR, QDDR, QHSR. Okay, we’ve got all these, and as a result I decided that I’m going to do more for State and AID or Justice, whatever it might be.

I think that would get the Congress to begin, you know, taking, you know, a look at it, you know, in terms – and if we want to protect our security, we can’t just rely on, you know, the military. They’ve done their job and they’re overstretched. We need to, you know, to continue. I think it’s doable, and whatever else you may think about the president, he’s a heck of a speaker, an inspirer, you know. So I think, you know, he could make that case.

Paul, final comments?

MAJ. GEN. EATON: There’s a story about Grenada. I don’t know if it’s true or not, but it was then-Maj. Gen. Schwarzkopf, and he’s onboard a Navy command and control ship that can talk to anybody on the planet, apparently, except for Army infantry. And their mechanisms, their radios will talk anywhere on any system. They can talk to the Air Force, they can talk to the Marines, they can talk to the other Navy, but they could not talk to the 82nd Airborne on shore, running around with FM radios on their backs. No.

There is this story that Schwarzkopf had to stick a long whip antennae out a porthole with a battery-powered PRC-77 radio in order to work the communications. There is another story where a Ranger Company commander used his –

MR. KORB: American Express Card. (Chuckles.)

MAJ. GEN. EATON: – yeah, in a phone booth to guide naval gunfire because he had no means of delivering fire control to the Navy.

So that was a trigger point for Goldwater-Nichols to solve all these really outrageous problems between the services. And you can make a case to have a man like Stuart Bowen, who is the special inspector general for Iraq, do something in Afghanistan or Iraq that really does go after what Larry is talking about – take an analysis of the PRTs and reveal, in a very simple, straightforward fashion, the failings of the executive branch to properly resource the non-combat work that we need to do in phase four of our operations overseas.

MR. KORB: Well, I think on that note we'll stop. And it's very interesting – you talked about it – because it was not only Grenada; it was the horrible event in Lebanon where nobody seemed to be in charge. Was it the commandant of the Marine Corps? Was it the NATO commander? Nobody seemed to know. So hopefully we won't have a tragedy like that to deal with, but I do think you can use the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan as a way to move this forward.

And I want to thank all of you for coming. I want to thank Gen. Eaton and Dr. Slaughter for, you know, setting the stage. We've got summaries of our report there. We'll be downloading – you can download it, and they tell me in a couple of weeks you can have the printed copy if you like.

There's a number of people I want to thank – my coauthors on this, Laura Conley and Sean Duggan. I want to thank Emma Diebold and her staff for arranging this. I want to thank all of you for coming and we look forward to seeing you again. Thank you very much. (Applause.)

(END)