

Center for American Progress



**SPECIAL PRESENTATION**

**“SWORDS AND PLOUGHSHARES: SUSTAINABLE  
SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN REQUIRES SWEEPING  
U.S. POLICY OVERHAUL”**

**MODERATED BY:**

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**FEATURED PANELISTS:**

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MR. RUDY DELEON: I'm Rudy deLeon, the senior vice president of national security programs here at the center and we've got an interesting morning of discussion for you.

Last fall, a striking consensus emerged among leaders in the national security community. To meet the complex challenges of our time, we must use all the tools of our national power: defense, diplomacy and development. This could not be more true than in Afghanistan. Over the last several months, the president, the secretary of defense, the commander of U.S. Central Command have all concluded that military means alone will not win the war in Afghanistan. To move in a new direction we must forge a new strategy.

In January, the Center for American Progress, under the auspices of a grant from the Hewlett Packard Foundation, convened a team of leading experts from the defense, diplomatic, and developmental fields to run a three-day simulation, which tested how enhanced foreign assistance in the U.S. foreign policy would advance our objectives in Afghanistan. The simulation tested how modernizing and enhancing developmental tools in Afghanistan and in the U.S. government would affect the ability of the U.S. to achieve both short and long-term objectives in stabilization and reconstruction operations. The results from that simulation, led by Dr. Reuben Brigety of the Center for American Progress will be briefed here this morning.

Though the challenges in Afghanistan are daunting, they are not insurmountable if we use the right tools. Our military is exceptional. The sacrifices, courage, and strength of our men and women in uniform are unmatched in the world. Achieving a modest level of security within Afghanistan is within our capability. However, now we must see to it that our civilian institutions of diplomacy and development are as robust, flexible, and effective in conflict situation as is our military personnel.

To continue the discussion this morning, we have two distinguished panelists. Dr. Patrick M. Cronin is the director of the Institute for National Security Studies at the National Defense University, Washington, D.C. He joined the INSS after serving more than two years at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, where he was director of studies and executive director of the Armed Conflict Database.

Dr. Cronin has a 25-year career inside government and academic research centers career, spanning defense affairs, foreign policy, and developmental assistance. Our discussion will be led this morning by Dr. Reuben Brigety, the director of our center's Sustainable Security Project and author of today's featured report "Swords and Ploughshares." Prior to joining the center, he served as a special assistant in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance at the U.S. Agency for International Development and also a career in the United States Navy.

So I will turn it over to Dr. Brigety and Dr. Cronin for getting the discussion going, but welcome. It should be a very interesting morning here at the center.

MR. REUBEN BRIGETY: Ladies and gentlemen, good morning. Welcome again to the Center for American Progress, as my boss Rudy deLeon said. My name is Reuben Brigety and we're very pleased to have you here with us today.

We are facing clearly a pivotal moment in Afghanistan. The president has clearly decided that this is a war which must be concluded successfully and by all accounts in the media and elsewhere, we are likely to see a new strategy out of the administration with regard to Afghanistan in relatively short order.

Here at the Sustainable Security Program, our approach to security is based on the premise that we actually make America more secure and support our direct national security interests when we focus on improving the lives of others, particularly in the context of developing countries and countries that are in conflict or in various stages of transition. Nowhere could this be more true than in Afghanistan.

Over the last several months, there has been much discussion on how to change or improve our military approach to Afghanistan and there has been some discussion, at least some recognition that the solution to Afghanistan is not military entirely. Indeed, that we have to take a whole of government approach and include diplomacy and development.

What we have not seen in any great detail thus far is a detailed analysis of what those non-kinetic instruments will have to be in order to achieve success in Afghanistan and more fundamentally what changes we might to have in our own government in order to be able to achieve those gains.

Now, this debate about Afghanistan has also been taking place in parallel to another debate that has been happening in Washington and that is with regard to reforming our foreign assistance mechanisms generally. It is broadly acknowledged that the ways in which the United States delivers assistance, particularly the ways in which it is coordinated with our military and other forms of government, is profoundly flawed – some would even say profoundly broken.

These two debates come together in the context of what our approach to Afghanistan should be. So last fall at the Center for American Progress, we decided to try to approach this problem and try to it in relatively novel way. We decided that we would host a simulation exercise to test many of the recommendations that we at the Sustainable Security Program have made over the last year or so about how to reform our foreign assistance mechanisms. And we decided that we would do it in a country that was vital to U.S. interests and where reforms of foreign assistance were indeed really quite important. And we chose Afghanistan.

So what we are going to do today is the following. I'll tell you a little bit about the purpose of our exercise. I'll talk about a little bit about the methodology. I will go through the results, which are printed in the copy of the report, which hopefully you received on the way in. We'll talk a bit about the recommendations that flow from this exercise and then we'll turn the floor over to my colleague, Dr. Patrick Cronin, for his response. And then we'll also open the floor for a conversation.

Before I do that, let me just issue a couple of words of additional thanks, obviously to the Hewlett Foundation who generously fund the Sustainable Security Program and made this particular report possible.

I'm also extraordinarily grateful to the twenty or so Afghanistan and development experts who came to participate in the early center exercise, some of whom are here today in the front row, whom you may be hearing from a little bit later. And I'd also like to thank the Institute for State Effectiveness run by Dr. Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart, who wrote the simulation for us and did an awful lot of hard work to make this happen.

So the purpose of the simulation was twofold. Again, the first purpose was to test many of the sustainable security foreign assistance recommendations for reform. Among them are things that we've articulated like the need for a national strategy for global development, the need for an increased bureaucratic presence for development. We have suggested that we think the best way to do that is to create a cabinet-level development agency, not unlike the British have in their Department for International Development, a substantial increase in the number of development personnel, et cetera. So that was the first purpose – to test those recommendations in a real-world environment.

The second is to develop relevant policy options for a foreign assistance reform generally and for Afghanistan in particular for all the reasons that I mentioned previously.

There were a couple of steps that we went through in order to achieve this when we started this program last fall. The first, as I mentioned, was to select an appropriate case study. We decided to go with Afghanistan for some reasons that are obvious, like its relevance to current debates, but some they're also a little bit less obvious. Afghanistan, even if we didn't have grave U.S. interests there, still meets many of the criteria of failing or fragile states that the United States will have to respond to around the world.

We should also note that when we decided to engage the Institute for State Effectiveness, we realized that we had enormous expertise in Afghanistan in the part of Dr. Ghani and Ms. Lockhart, who have from their various perspectives great experience both in Afghanistan and in development assistance generally. So when we decided to engage the Institute for State Effectiveness, they did a fantastic job writing a scenario. And this is essentially the methodology that we decided to use. We would conduct the scenario over the course of about two and a half days in three different rounds. Each round would have two parts: a Washington part and an Afghanistan part. And the rounds – as the rounds changed, we would gradually increase the sorts of foreign assistance

mechanisms that were available to the participants to achieve their objectives during the course of the simulation.

So round one was under the current set of authorities and capabilities of U.S. foreign assistance architecture. Round two would have a slightly improved set of mechanisms. And then round three would have what we call the maximalist set of capabilities. Maximal is defined by essentially sort of a blank slate wish list. If you had – if there were no politics involved and you had unlimited resources, what would we do with our foreign assistance mechanisms? And those are based largely on the policy proposals that we at CAP have articulated for some time.

As I mentioned, each round had two parts, a Washington part, in which case each of the participants was assigned a role to play that represented sum portion of the interagency. These roles included things like being the assistant secretary of state with responsibility for Asia, being the assistant administrator of USAID with responsibility for Asia, under which Afghanistan falls, serving as the director for operations of the Joint Staff, the director for operations of the U.S. Central Command, and various other sorts of tasks.

The tasks of round – of part A of each round was to develop a strategic plan for Afghanistan, so it was to take a strategic policy level look at how we should approach the country and what tools we could bring to bear. So in a sense, it replicated what we would do in the Washington interagency process.

Part B of each round, based in Kabul, was to develop an operational plan for Afghanistan. So each of the participants who had a Washington hat would then take their Washington hat off, go into part B of the round and put on a role based in Afghanistan, so things like being the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, being the USAID mission director in Kabul, serving as the commander of U.S. ground forces in Afghanistan. One person served as an army brigade commander serving as the lead element of provincial reconstruction teams, et cetera – again to the tune of about some 20 different roles. All of these roles in great detail in addition to the simulation schedule are available on our website, as well if you'd like to see this in any greater detail.

As I mentioned, each of the participants we invited had either substantial years of experience in Afghanistan or substantial experience in development assistance or some combination of the above. And we hosted it at the Airlie Center in Warrenton, Virginia, to which we also need to extend a word of thanks for their fantastic job they did hosting us.

So broadly speaking these are the results at how we – how the simulation was conducted. During round one – I should also say that each of the rounds was very lightly facilitate by Dr. Ghani, just to help the participants grapple with the challenges. And then each of the rounds was observed, both with independent observers in the room and also viewed remotely from another location, where those of us that were operating in what we

call the control cell could monitor everything that was happening and also watch for patterns in terms of decision-making.

Overwhelmingly in round one, as the group with their Washington hats on was trying to understand how we should focus on Afghanistan, there was an overwhelming focus on security. Although there was a general recognition that other things might matter, the first question that they tried to address was how does one achieve security on the ground based on the assumption that without security everything else was relatively irrelevant. And at the end of the round, they coalesced their conversations and came up with five priority actions that they felt needed to be priorities for U.S. policy in the grand scale.

One was the creation of a political breakthrough inside Afghanistan in order to create political space for debate. Another is obviously the development of a regional solution to include Afghanistan and Pakistan on the assumption that one can't view Pakistan alone, that the developments in Pakistan affect Afghanistan, even to some extent vice versa. The third was an emphasis on security, both internally and also with regard to borders. The fourth was an emphasis on governance and rule of law, and that includes everything from tamping down corruption to improving the ability of police forces. The fifth of the five developmental priorities was development.

So although the task was to think about a whole-of-government approach, there was a recognition that development is important, but it was seen essentially or listed as the last of the five. Not that it wasn't important, but all the others clearly had some level of precedence and so they clearly dominated the conversation.

After we moved from round one A in Washington to round one B in Kabul, thus the participants were thinking much more operationally about how to make these things happen on the ground, a couple of things surfaced.

The first was they recognized very clearly the need for an integrated civil-military plan in Afghanistan, that even given the top-line strategic objectives developed by Washington, it was vital to be able to develop an operational plan that linked civilian capabilities seamlessly with military capabilities on the ground.

Another major priority was the need to support the government of Afghanistan. Broadly, that meant improving the capacity of the government so that they can provide sources for their own people, so they could take care of their own border security and also provide for their own internal security and be effective partners with the government of the United States.

The third item was a need to focus on projects that would bring near-term economic development for a variety of reasons, both because it would increase revenue for the government, principally because it would give disaffected youth other things to do besides engaging in armed conflict, and also because it was one of the ways to provide services for the population.

In that regard, there were three critical operational tasks they came up with. One was the need to support agriculture. Afghanistan is clearly a majority agrarian society. Almost half of GDP comes from an agricultural product that is illicit – the growth of opium poppy. And thus the need to supporting agriculture both in terms of supporting infrastructure and supporting things like credit for farmers was vital to be able to move away from the opium trade and give farmers some alternative form of livelihood.

Another major near-term economic development issue was the need to improve education, both vocational education for technical jobs – mechanics, et cetera – and university education for the brightest Afghans. And this is true not only to build the intellectual capital for the next generation of Afghanistan, but also so young Afghans can begin to see their own future in their own country and again have productive things to participate in.

The final issue that was confronted was the issue of contractors. It was noted during the simulation, there are some 48,000 contractors in Afghanistan. It is very, very difficult if not possible to gain visibility on the activities of all of them. To the extent that U.S. government and other agencies perform their missions in Afghanistan through contractors, you're taking a very large percentage of the total amount of foreign assistance – it's going to managing or maintaining contractors, which means that you'll have a much smaller proportion actually making it – take into the ground.

At a presentation here several months ago, Dr. Ghani suggested that that number probably means that only about 20-25 percent of every dollar of foreign assistance actually makes it to programming on the ground when it's filtered through contractors of one form or another inside Afghanistan.

Now, we had an interesting development when we decided to move from round one to round two. We realized that both due to the group dynamics and how far they are pushing things that it actually wouldn't be much use in simply increasing the level of tools that are available to the participants incrementally. We thought that would be a waste of time, despite what we had planned for originally. So what we decided to do instead was go straight to round three; that is, go straight to the maximalist position to give the participants more time to grapple with the problems if they had the maximum set of tools available.

So we went straight to round three and something else happened additionally when we went to round three. Now, when you're doing a simulation like this, there're all – there are inevitably a number of constraints that one works against. And one of them was the availability of the participants for the entire exercise. For a variety of reasons, we were only able to get experienced USAID development professionals in the room on the second day of the exercise as opposed to the first day, meaning that they were there – they weren't there when we were trying to do operational and strategic planning under current set of conditions, but they were there when we were trying to do that similar planning under the maximal set of conditions. And we realized that the addition – well,

I'll save that for a little bit because it's one of the goodies of the report. They were added and it made a difference. Let me say that for the moment.

The second thing was that relatively early on in round three, we told the participants to assume a certain level of security, so they weren't thinking about security entirely and they could actually begin to think about how one deploys other aspects of development and diplomatic assistance to a much more robust scale.

Then finally, with those two sets of conditions involved, two things happened. One, the addition of the professional – the sort of longer-term experienced USAID and Treasury officials fundamentally changed the conversation. It dramatically changed the sorts of options that they were considered, dramatically changed the experience level in the room, dramatically even changed the framework within which the participants were looking at classical security problems and looking at the intersection between development and security.

To that end, the group focused on four essential issues that needed to be addressed from a strategic level. The first was agriculture for reasons that we talked about previously. The second was youth and the importance of engaging youth in productive activities. The third was funding and the significance of developing funding mechanisms that are much more flexible, that would allow the civilian development professionals to engage much more rapidly with their military counterparts to do programming. And that was multiyear nature so that you could actually do programming not based on any individual budgetary cycle, but you could plan projects that would take two or three years and know that you would have the working capital in order to execute it effectively.

The fourth thing was to focus on district-level planning. That is, instead of focusing on development projects through the government per se, focus on projects that provide direct benefit to the local population, not unlike the National Solidarity Program was done in Afghanistan for some time.

When we moved to round three B; that is, the operational focus, we saw yet again another slight change in methodology. Receiving an awful lot of input from the participants, they actually really wanted to think through the discussions they had in round three A in a much more detailed fashion and think through the strategic-operational nexus in much greater detail and to do so with an eye on what would actually be the fundamental game changers on the ground if we could actually do some of these things. And they came up with four basic issues that should be addressed.

The first is the need to integrate civil-military planning even to a much greater degree than it was stressed in round one A – that this integration is vital and that, indeed, without that level of integration, the implementation of any sort of strategy in Afghanistan would be for naught.

The second was the need to create a cabinet-level development agency precisely because they felt that it would help improve the level of integration both at the strategic level in Washington, even operationally on the ground.

The third was the need for police training. The lack of qualified police inside Afghanistan or police that were predatory in nature was seen as a major, major gap in governance, a major impediment to economic development, and a major impediment to security broadly. And it was assessed that one of the best ways to fill that gap is to remove or otherwise revise Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act, which prevents USAID from engaging in police training.

And the fourth was to focus on the security of the population as a military objective, which is a core precept of counterinsurgency strategy and is a different way of thinking from otherwise conventional military operations.

After those three rounds, we had what we called the hot wash, which was essentially an after action review in which not only the observers and the administrators of the simulation, but also the participants got to share their own thoughts of what they perceived and how this simulation was conducted, and also helped inform many of our analyses. And there were four key points that emerged from this.

The first was the – as I mentioned, the importance of having development professionals in the room. The participants themselves, indeed many of the participants who have long experience at the Pentagon, who were senior military officers, all said that having senior development professionals in the room fundamentally changed the conversation and they really actually wished they had that voice earlier on in the simulation.

The second was the use of development assistance as a counterinsurgency tool and the importance of linking development and counterinsurgency. In the Bush – the paradigm that was being used in the Bush administration in Iraq, to some extent in Afghanistan, of clear, hold, and build, if you were able to clear an area, you can't hold it and you certainly can't build on it unless you can bring development assistance tools very, very quickly to bear. And if they are to be able to do that because of inflexible funding mechanisms, because of the small number of development professionals in the room – development professionals on the ground – undercuts the credibility of our military force with the local population and therefore is a major (seam ?) of potential failure.

The third takeaway we had was that as maximalist as we thought our maximalist tools were, the participants and others thought that even that robust set or suite of tools was not enough. And what that tells us is that foreign assistance reform is vital and that we may very well have to go further than we initially thought.

The fourth key point was the importance of what was called catalytic development. So instead of doing development programming in which the West and our

allies were actually the provider of assistance, it was realized that we simply – even if we had, even if we wanted to, we did not have enough development professionals in the world to deploy to every place in Afghanistan that was important. Therefore, an opposite approach should be taken. It's importance to focus on development programs which would encourage the local government and encourage, indeed, local Afghan civilians to develop their own solutions to problems and trying to figure out creative ways to do that work all the way down to the micro-level to the extent that one can.

The finally is that clearly – as a result of all of this, it was clear that we have to take steps urgently – urgently – to achieve this integrated civil-military cooperation both at the planning level in Washington and in operational headquarters and also the execution level on the field.

And this leads us to the five major recommendations of the report. The first is integrated planning execution, all of which are in the copies of the report that I gave you. The list, you'll note from – basically includes recommendations that I've articulated earlier. The second is the importance of focusing on counterinsurgency and development. And there're two key points here. Afghanistan is a heterogeneous environment with regard to security, meaning that there are some places in the country which are incredibly insecure and highly contested. There're others which are more secure. One can think about this in sort of a red, yellow, green paradigm. Green places are more secure. Red places are highly contested. Yellow places are somewhere in the middle.

Heretofore, much of our development assistance has been focused in the so-called red areas; that is, the places where our troops are most fundamentally in contact. The majority of our participants, although not all, but the majority of our participants argued that what we should be doing instead is focusing development assistance on the green areas, both because they are more secure, because you can begin to gain – begin to achieve development gains and, three, to keep on side people that are in the green areas so that they don't begin asking the question, "Who do we have to shoot in order to get some development assistance around here?"

And the fourth is that if you can actually show the improvement of lives in the green areas, then that will serve a demonstrative effect in civilian population in the red areas at how much better their lives can improve should they begin to side with the government and others.

The fourth is the importance of catalytic development, as we've talked about before.

The fifth is that development professionals matter and therefore it is vital to increase the number of development professionals on both operational and strategic staffs and also with tactical units in the field. And finally, this notion that our maximalist measures – as important as we thought they were – actually don't go far enough and we need to be thinking much more creatively, indeed much more robustly about foreign

assistance reform as a vital national interest in Afghanistan in particular and then also with regard to our national security writ large.

So those are the essence of the reforms – of our results. I will turn the floor over now to my colleague, Dr. Patrick Cronin. Then we'll go to the floor for questions.

So Patrick, please.

MR. PATRICK CRONIN: Well, Reuben, thank you very much and let me congratulate you and the Center for American Progress for what was really one of the best simulations I've ever been involved in. You've got some of the experts – participants from the three days here in the front row and I know we want to hear from them when the Q&A comes around. But it was realistic. It was – involved experts. It allow for depth over the three days. And yet it also brought about the element of a deadline inside the decision making, which is realistic if you think about what the Obama administration has just recently done. They moved in and they said, “my goodness, we need and Afghan strategy.”

Well, they had to take the series of Afghan-Pakistan strategies and then try to review them and come up with a new integrated strategy. And we read every day in the press that we're very close to seeing what the outline of a new Afghan strategy is. So it's not unrealistic to give people just a very short time to deal with complex problems that had been around for years and to force them to come up with a new strategy that's integrated and comprehensive right away.

My comments are mostly positive or may be embroider on some of the themes of the report because I found very little to criticize in it. Let me just suggest that one of the – perhaps the red thread that runs through a lot of my thoughts on these issues is the difficulty, the need, maybe the failure to integrate economics and economic development into security, into strategy and operations, into plans, into implementation, into assessment, into intelligence. This is the big challenge in many ways. So this is part of a much larger set of challenges that governments face, that non governmental organizations face on how to try to weave these together. And to say that doesn't succumb to the belief that somehow if you have a comprehensive strategy, you can solve all the world's problems. Far be it from me to think that. I don't. In fact, it's just the opposite. I want to make sure that we are hard headed and realistic and not just cheerleading for a latest approach or a latest strategy. But at the same time, if we don't come up with all five of those elements you've identified – identified in the simulation, development is not just one of the elements. It's a package deal that if you're going to have some hope of being more successful, then you're going to need to resolve all of these challenges and that's really what “Swords and Ploughshares” finding sustainable security in Afghanistan is, I think, all about.

Let me make a couple of general comments about foreign assistance and then go into Afghanistan. The idea of the three Ds and I think I'm coded in a little blur, but you put together with my ear in the screen – it's a very creative photography – looking at

defense, diplomacy, and development it is an aspiration on the part of any government or organization to try to weave these different disciplines, professions, and instruments of policy together. There is no magic formula. We don't know how to do this well. We've done it better some times in the U.S. government. We've done it worse some times.

Having just come and I'll look at Donna – (inaudible) – and I hope she speaks up because she was one of the co directors on the Central Command assessment team effort, which was one of many efforts, to be sure, but a major effort with more of 300 people at the end of the day trying to figure out how do you figure out strategies for the greater Middle East, but also specifically challenges like Afghanistan and Pakistan. And you really can't win because if you're CENTCOM and you're trying to invite the interagency in, you'll be accused of militarizing the problem. If you don't invite the interagency in, you'll be accused of militarizing the problem.

The reality is that we'd rather go beyond CENTCOM or any one of the departments to figure out how to lead at the top an integrated approach. It has to really start at the National Security Council and the White House ultimately because there has to be somebody above these processes. I'm very heartened to see in this case a special envoy with someone like General Petraeus and with the team that's been identified going to Afghanistan because they actually can raise these issues above the usual bureaucratic politics and above the difficulties that we have here in Washington, where we run into political turf and bureaucratic turf so often.

There's another problem here, though, and that's the basic imbalance that we have in people and resources that are underscored in this report. When we talk about – complaining the militarization of foreign assistance, for instance, and I understand, Reuben, you testified on this yesterday and I apologize I wasn't privy to that, but the point is that rather than accusing the military of militarizing foreign assistance, rather than trying to slow down the military's march into this area, I think the happier medium is to accelerate the civilian growth in foreign assistance.

In other words, to say that once we enlarge our civilian capacity at State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development and beyond, both in terms of professionals and resources and authorities, then we'll have a more equal playing field. And it will be natural to overcome some of these, I think, somewhat unproductive discussions are we militarizing or are we not militarizing foreign assistance. The question's how do we get there and therefore we say things like militarization partly to get attention because we're trying to open up a debate and say how do we actually achieve and take the next step because we say there's no military solution to a complex problem like Afghanistan, but then we're unwilling to take those next steps. As you say, even the maximalist measures are insufficient. It's almost like the economic stimulus package. We're on the third tranche now of a trillion dollars and everybody recognizes the problem is bigger.

Well, this isn't that expensive, but the point is it is analogous in the sense that we keep undershooting the estimates of what's required. Again, that's a tradeoff. That's a

political decision. That has to be a political consensus in our democracy in coalition partners in the international community and above all with Afghanistan, but if you're serious, then you have to commit resources. You have to come up with the authorities. You have to identify the people that will actually implement the policy and the strategy.

On the strategy, so much of it centers really on kind of fundamental questions always. We don't spend enough time in Washington as a general rule on identifying the objectives and what is our objective. And so we immediately get into a caricature of objectives – counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, Jeffersonian democracy, failed state. So we have to come up with a realistic set of objectives that can be phased in over time. And in this exercise simulation, one of the factors you didn't mention is much of the report is to look at different phases. How much can you accomplish in 2009 this immediate phase? And then how do you bridge that into some kind of middle state? And ultimately, though, where are you going? Where do you really think we can, as an outside country working with others, help Afghans run Afghanistan, whatever that means?

Some say that Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires. I'm not disheartened by that because United States should not aspire to be an empire, is no an empire. If you're trying to build the capacity of the Afghans, then you may be able to achieve the success. If you're trying to run Afghanistan, then you're just into fail.

The regional approach was mentioned as well and that's very important. This report helps to reduce the problem. We always have to have reductionism to some extent, to try to neck down the problem to manageable sizes and yet at the same time, immediately when you get into a country as complex as Afghanistan, with such poorest borders and it's not just Pakistan, but it's Iran and it's the region and – and therefore, and the 40 plus countries that are involved in the coalition. It's a very complex regional and even international challenge and problem that it necessarily becomes very complex. And yet the need for something like a coin or a coin in development strategy I think is fundamental to the way ahead.

A book that's getting a lot of attention right now is David Kilcullen's new book, *The Accidental Guerrilla*, where he argues that you need to be mindful that before you escalate the number of U.S. forces and international forces in Afghanistan, remember that that creates a negative backlash. And so it's one of the many balancing acts that has to happen as he calls for far more military support to advice and to build the capacity of the Afghan national army, the Afghan police, of Afghan civil society, of governance, rule of law. And there then the question becomes how do you do that and how do you build those things. Just taking the issue of the Afghan national army and police and I'm looking at – (inaudible) – because he's a man who knows this better than anyone I know, just how difficult that challenge is. It's still too small a goal what we have right now and yet I don't know where the resources come for accelerating it.

Unless we get much more serious about providing the resources and there we don't see the debate on whether we're willing to provide these resources, but it's critical

if we're going to have Afghans manage the local security at the tribal local level, as well as the provincial and national level. You're going to have to have Afghan police and army better trained and in much greater numbers.

So let me delve a little more deeply into Afghanistan operationally, as we talk about a coin, a counterinsurgency approach, where you're putting the protection of Afghan lives into the center of your focus, of your efforts. And the phrase "to clear, hold, and build" is a simplistic one and yet it does capture so much of what the challenges are on the ground. And Reuben talked about this, how do you get not just to the build, how do you get to the hold, especially in those semi-permissive areas, those yellow zones that Reuben talked about in Afghanistan and it's never quite the stop light chart that may be good for a PowerPoint slide that we would like. I think I watched the news last night and they have some great footage from Afghanistan that kind of showed you just exactly what some people have to deal with on the ground in terms of a country where even the roads are only 20 percent paved. And that means the 80 percent unpaved are not very traversable.

But the question is how do we get to the hold and then ultimately to the build. It's my colleague T.X. Hammes that has reminded me that the Soviets had cleared Panshir Valley five times. That's kind of a reminder that this has been done before and it's also failed before. So it's going to have to be the Afghans who ultimately hold and then the question is how much can we, along with the rest of the international community, provide the means to build. And that's where the resources, the number of professionals, the authorities – again, your maximalist objectives – are still way under solved in terms of what is needed. If this is truly the commitment, if this is the agreement, if this is the policy or the strategy, it's going to take more. And to do it it's not just to agree on Afghanistan, it does mean fundamental reforms for our foreign assistance. And that – you alluded to the foreign assistance debate. Where is the debate? I've been part of that debate over the previous years, but there is deafening silence in this town right now over the future leadership of the U.S. Agency for International Development.

We've heard Secretary Clinton, on a very successful trip to Asia, talk about how the State Department is now firmly in control of two of the three Ds. Well, that's good, but Madam Secretary, how do you actually implement development without development experts? Where are they? And I worry about the morale, about the future of what has been seen as a tertiary part of the government that's now been promoted up and statured as part of essential to strategy, essential to security, not just to solving conflicts in failed areas, but to preventing future conflicts? How do we do this, when we're not yet focused seriously on fixing these instruments and policy, and not just U.S., but it's leveraging our ability to work with the international community, to work with indigenous forces because ultimately the problems are usually much bigger than certainly anything we can solve?

So that's where I'm really hoping that we're going to see some action in the coming weeks and months. I know a lot of this is held up because of timing. We have the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression. This is probably not the easiest time politically to talk about development assistance. We also have a vetting process that

has reverted to form. In our great democracy, we tend to make very difficult for the qualified people to find a way to high office. And we hope we can work through those challenges.

I just want to make one last point and that's the – going back to the threat of economics and security. In Afghanistan what we see with this Afghan election that is coming about now in August, the question of legitimacy. Does the Afghan government, after August of 2009 have sufficient legitimacy to move Afghanistan ahead over the next several years, even with great support? This is a key issue. And so there's no way you can work on the election or the legitimacy issue without thinking through the economic assistance and the military assistance and the political diplomatic assistance together. That's why, again, I'm glad that we have people like Ambassador Richard Holbrooke sort of on the job because there's not a tougher man in town to kind of sort knock heads together and say, "Let's get serious about a strategy, about an integrated approach." And people like General Petraeus, I know, Donna at CENTCOM and other military officials are happy to follow. As General Petraeus said at Verkunde recently to Richard Holbrooke, "I'm your wing man. I'm your support. I'm not going to leave. I'm here to support a political process." But we need now the economic and development process to be right up there with one of those three Ds, not some after thought behind the diplomacy and behind the defense.

Thank you.

MR. BRIGETY: (Inaudible.) Before we go to the floor generally, let me ask – as I said, we have some of our participants here. Anyone – any of you would like to make any comments? No. Donna, yes. Could I ask you to pass the microphone to Don, please, and then we'll go to questions from the floor.

Q: Thanks very much, Reuben and Patrick. First of all, I want to thank you and the Center for putting on this simulation. I thought it was also one of the best simulations I've been involved with. That's for sure. And I think a few comments that I'd like to make and I have some other colleagues here from Treasury and others and colleagues who were in the simulation. I wanted to pick up on three issues. And Patrick, you ended with the one that I wanted to pick up on.

One of the key things that we're seeing sort of not just in Afghanistan, but across the region is this issue of legitimacy. That populations are feeling that there is a legitimacy crisis because their governments are unable to respond to their needs, be that security, be that economic, be that development. And so I think that this is one of the key things that we write large need to be looking at in terms of how do we help build the legitimacy of the government and this is what several of the recommendations led to. How do you help have that sort of counterweight to obviously a military strategy that looks at on the civilian side what you can do in terms of building state effectiveness, on one hand, but also this catalytic type of development intervention? How do you then also help catalyze in particular economic development so that you have this – grassroots up and also obviously international and national economic development? The two have to

go hand in hand because if they don't, you're not going to have all elements of what we're looking at in terms of economic security et cetera.

So that's one overall point and I think the report captures that. And I just wanted to highlight some of the things you said.

Second thing, in terms of coin and looking at development as an element of the counterinsurgency, I really do believe that that is one of the key things and it truly is where we need to be moving in Afghanistan. And Reuben alluded to how we need to be focusing on some of the more – the more secure areas so that we can get development assistance there.

We also do need to figure out great – sort of innovative ways of getting this assistance into the red areas as well. So it's got to be a balance and you have to continue to move the circles out, so to speak, of the economic development piece.

The point I'd like to make here, though, is it's also not linear. It doesn't actually go clear, hold, build. There is way, there is a lot of back and forth and you can have great development in one area for a period of time and then somehow it sort of – because of a variety of reasons, it recedes. So I think we have to be very mindful of the fact that there is a big virtual process going on here. And as Tip O'Neill once said, "all politics is local," a lot of these issues and insurgency is local, and we have to be looking at that.

And then the third issue is just looking at the local dynamics. We have to get a lot better in terms of our tools and applying the tools that we have to really understand local population needs and help the governments respond to them. I think we often think we know what the population wants, but we don't often have the kind of informed opinions that we probably should have. And I think that we need to be better at developing that, so that we can respond and help the governments actually respond. We're there to assist the governments, but we do have tools and that gets to some of the flexibility. It gets to a lot of the things that you've both already spoken about.

So I just want to talk a little bit about that and I'm sure other colleagues of mine will have more to say as well.

MR. BRIGETY: Thanks very much, Donna. We have a limited period of time, so let's go straight to questions from the floor. Yes, ma'am here. Lorelei, you changed your hair color. Good to see you. (Laughter.)

Q: Thanks. My name's Lorelei Kelly. I'm the director of the National Security Program at the new Progressive Caucus Foundation. And I have – what you point out is sort of – there's a consensus on the left and right in this town for the need for national security reframing and reform. And you have the president saying, "we're going to put the word "supplementals" into the regular budget." Yet you still have people like Murtha putting an \$18 billion plan in the supplemental. It's the defense budget – the hardware items are still sucking all of the oxygen out of the room on national security. And right

now, our elected leaders have better cover than they've ever had on taking this on and making the guns versus butter argument within the defense budget, so it doesn't get taken down on domestic tradeoffs.

I have a question for you. It might sound crazy and Army people might be mad on me for this, but it seems to me that we need like a Judas strategy for Congress, which how, though, if we take this problem about balance in several military tools and make the Army the executive agent for a transition strategy in our own government for building up these kinds of tools and saying after 10 years, State Department, you are it. You're the one that has to have the personnel by then. You're the AID. You're the one that has to create the civilian tools for these kinds of problems that we're facing because it's taken – first of all to get the authority to develop the Civilian Response Corps took forever, even with consensus in the Senate to do it, to get 200 people I think now are standing in the Civilian Response Corps. What do you think this idea of just saying, okay, military, one of you service branches needs to be the executive agency for making this happen, do the division of labor, give it back to the civilians at the end of 10 years. Is that crazy or do you think that's possible? It seems to me that might be one of the only things that would work on Capitol Hill because the military does not get the same level of scrutiny as everybody else.

MR. BRIGETY: As an old Navy man, I'm not sure I want to trust the Army to do that task. (Laughter.) Just teasing. No, I think – you bring a broader, better point, Lorelei. I appreciate you're bringing up. And that is that for all sorts of reasons, we – it is much easier for our political culture to fund various aspects of our defense budget that may or may not objectively make us safe and much less easy for us to fund other aspects of our government in the State Department or USAID which have a clear contribution, direct contribution to our national security.

I am not a fan of turning that process over to the military, not – even though they're actually some of the greatest proponents of it – mainly because I think that – not to put too sort of hard phrase on that, but our political culture has to grow up in this regard. We have to be able to have this conversation among civilians, for civilians, for this capability. I think that sort of simply farming it out to the defense appropriation process because it's easier is bad. Now, having said that, what I will say is that this mission is not going to go away. And if we don't figure out a way to improve our civilian capabilities quickly, the military will continue to engage in this area. I testified on this, as Patrick said, at the House Foreign Affairs Committee yesterday. It's in all of our interests to be able to improve our civilian capacity in that regard.

I see a question or a comment from Jeremy in the back left. Then we'll go to Brian after that.

Q: Thank you. Thanks. Jeremy Pam (ph), Treasury. Thanks to Reuben and CAP and Patrick for this excellent simulation and excellent report. My question is really in the nature of a clarification because looking through the excellent report, there are two sections that I can imagine someone reading this possibly thinking our intention, but I

don't think they are and I just want to make sure that I'm right at understanding it. The fifth recommendation is that maximalist measures developed by the Sustainable Security Program and the Center for American Progress to ensure that development, assistance, and military operations work hand in hand are insufficient. Even we've presented with policy options that are generally seen as the most ambitious in the current foreign assistance reform debate, the participants felt that those expanded options were insufficient to achieve the desired result.

At the same time, the third recommendation is that the U.S. needs to use development assistance to build local capacity and solutions, rather than building dependence on external support. It's impossible for the U.S. to deploy enough personnel on the field to meet all the essential needs of a population. As a result, U.S. needs to develop U.S. assistance efforts that are focused on helping host government et cetera, rather than performing tasks strictly.

I just – my question is I just want to make sure, when you talk in – I think on the slide about sort of going beyond the maximalist measures, am I right in thinking that you're not arguing for just more. You're arguing, to use a phrase that I think CAP has used in other contexts, for kind of smarter approach to sustainable security, which by putting host government institutions at the center, relying on the host government, rather than bypassing it might require different kinds of programs and U.S. assistance providers. Am I right in thinking that?

MR. BRIGETY: I think that's a fair comment. And obviously there is some tension between the two, but I think the way around that tension is a recognition that we do not have the current set of tools that we need, even we – and I think the simulations showed us that we weren't even being as ambitious as we needed to be in order to bring this level of capability to bear in a meaningful way in Afghanistan and elsewhere around the world. That said, even if we were to have much greater capabilities, as you correctly said, it's not simply about numbers. It's about trying to figure out, having both strategies and mechanisms to support those strategies to do catalytic development better in a way that actually leads to a greater stability.

We'll go to Brian and then this gentleman here.

Q: Hi, I'm Brian Grzelkowski from Mercy Corps and one of the other participants is covering in the back rather than the front. Reuben, I just wanted to underscore the point you made before, but also maybe segue to your discussion with Jeremy. And that is one of the dynamics in the simulation I think probably is quite instructive to Patrick's point about current debates of balancing foreign assistance and institutional presence, is that it wasn't just – in the simulation, it wasn't just that there were more development professionals in the room, but as the simulation went on, there were more resources available as well. And that both of those – the combination of both of those factors enabled us to kind of start to think a little more creatively and push some other things that earlier in the discussion with kind of a more current real world scenario. You had a real focus on security. And we were able to kind of pivot and be a little bit

more creative once some of those dynamics changed. You had more of a presence of the development people and more resources to work with. And to the point of how we, in interagency dialogues, kind of recreate that dynamic I think it's pretty instructive.

MR. BRIGETY: This gentleman here and then we'll go to the right side of the room. (Inaudible.) Thank you.

Q: John – (inaudible) – a long-term Peace Corps background. One of the tools to bear is the National Solidarity Program. You mentioned that once. It truly does have a presence across the country. The stimulation spent a fair amount of time on that aspect.

MR, BRIGETY: We did in the sense that we raised it. Clearly one of the architects of the National Solidarity Program facilitated the conversation. So we actually had an awful lot of insight. But it was clear that that model or others like it, which actually brought development resources as close to the ground as possible and also, by doing so, helped them through local governments because local villagers have to decide the most themselves how they wanted to fund these projects. It was definitely one of the things that we talked about and it's also clearly one of the issues of catalytic development.

Yes, ma'am, here on the green. May I ask you to wait for the microphone, please?

Q: Kate Howard (sp). My question is, in this simulation, did you take the approach in reforming U.S. foreign policy to deliver development assistance more effectively? Did you also consider was it an "we have to do everything" approach, or was it "we will divide this among our allies, we will divide this among the Afghan government?" Because my understanding was, at least in 2006 and 2007, the Italians were going to work on justice. The Germans were training police. So I just wonder where that fit into this simulation. Thank you.

MR. BRIGETY: It's a great question. We decided to focus exclusively on the U.S. government, rather than allies for a couple of reasons. As you might imagine, the number of variables that one could put in a simulation like this are myriad. So we had to scope it appropriately and the other reason was that most of our – all of our recommendations thus far in the Sustainable Security Program have been focused on the U.S. government. So we wanted the simulation to focus in that regard, which is not to say – clearly there a component in the real world of engaging our allies on various aspects of this, but is what simply would be on the scope of our simulation.

Sir?

Q: I'm Dan Martin with Conservation International. First I want to applaud this integration that your leading is very much overdue. But I have a concern that I think I hear a contradiction. At the beginning you said something about how our development efforts are broken. This is a widely used description that AID is broken. And I wonder if

you're implying that that's purely a structural matter that could be cured by having a department of development or whether there are some paradigmatic problems, which is my guess. And the point that was raised earlier about legitimacy really gets at that because legitimacy is so very difficult to come by. If people in a country that we see as being all one color on a map don't really want to be part of the same political entity, providing water and power and police and so forth isn't necessarily enough to secure legitimacy. So this comes back to the question. Is there something more that needs to be done in terms of how we conceive that development mission than reorganizing our formal structure?

MR. BRIGETY: It's a fair question. I think the two are inevitably linked. I think the nature of the structure you have inevitably dictates the sorts of things you're able to do on the ground and therefore plays into doctrinally how you approach it and can conversely whatever your doctrinal approach is to what developments look like will inform what the structure should be. So to some extent, it's chicken and egg, but I do think they're related.

We have time for one more question. We go to this gentleman here on the right. Yes, please.

Q: Hi, Anthony – (inaudible) – I spent 30 years with the World Bank. One of the West goals in Afghanistan, apart from security development, has been to help us fight the drug war. And I wonder to what extent you've given thought to that aspect. My reading of the experience with alternative development elsewhere in the world, including Latin America, is that it's not encouraging. That once farmers get used to growing very profitable illegal drugs, it's difficult to offer them any large scales alternatives that can compete. How far does that record come into your thinking?

MR. BRIGETY: It's a great question. It's one that the participants to the simulation have struggled with a great deal, not only because the growth of opium and its impact on heroin trade is bad in and of itself, but also because it fuels the insurgency. So I think the way in which it was thought about is that there's – there basically was not a – we didn't have – the participants didn't have a luxury to ignore the drug problem or simply to assume that we can just allow the farmers to continue to grow it because that has to fight the drug problems – (inaudibility) – to fighting the insurgency.

Now, there are multiple ways in which the participants thought about it. One was, again, as I mentioned the focus on alternative livelihoods. There was a tiny bit of discussion on the margins about whether or not you focus on the interdiction strategy if they got at transit points, or whether or not you focus on crop eradication. But clearly there was a need to focus on alternative livelihoods. We did not focus on the record of alternative livelihoods in other parts of the world. We assume that an increased focus on agriculture development in Afghanistan could help turn that tide, but certainly it would be a difficult one.

I wish we had time for more questions, but we are dedicated to making everybody get out of here on time, support their day. I will surely be here afterwards if you have any more questions. Thanks again to our participants and thank you very much for coming. Have a good day.

(Applause.)

(END)