

Center for American Progress



SPECIAL PRESENTATION

“POWER AND SUPERPOWER: GLOBAL LEADERSHIP AND EXCEPTIONALISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY.”

MODERATED BY:

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AND DIPLOMACY, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS**

FEATURED PANELISTS:

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MR. SPENCER BOYER: Good afternoon. Thank you for joining us today for our discussion of the recently released book *Power and Superpower: Global Leadership and Exceptionalism in the 21st Century*, a joint publication of the Center for American Progress and the Century Foundation. I'm Spencer Boyer, director of international law and diplomacy, here at the Center and one of the editors of the book.

This volume is the fruit of tremendous efforts by many, both inside and outside of our two organizations. Last year, we convened a series of working groups, comprising experts, academics, and foreign policymakers to tackle some of the most pressing foreign affairs issue we face today. We were fortunate to have the assistance of these talented working group members, as well as exceptional authors who drafted papers for discussions at these meetings. The chapters in this book are the final product of this effort.

Power and Superpower lays out the themes of a progressive foreign policy vision for the 21st century which harnesses U.S. power wisely in support of a peaceful and prosperous world. The chapters in this book show why a commitment to multilateralism, strong international institutions, and the international rule of law that binds us all mattered in the past, matter in the present, and will matter in the future. Many of the chapters in this book also demonstrate why an American exceptionalism premised on the notion that the United States, as an inherently good and powerful country, should be exempted from global rules and obligation damages rather than furthers U.S. interests.

Our panel discussion today will focus largely on the exceptionalism issue as discussed in the book, in particular, the good and bad sides of exceptionalism. How it developed, how it's changed over the past several years and is currently being manifested in different areas of U.S. foreign policy, and what it means for international relations and ability to promote American interests worldwide.

I'm delighted to be joined by the authors of three of the chapters of the book, Charlie Kupchan, Bill Schulz, and Jim Dobbins.

Charlie Kupchan is professor of international relations at the School of Foreign Service and Government Department at Georgetown University, and is a senior fellow and director of Europe studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. From 1993 to 1994, he was director for European affairs on the National Security Council. He wrote his chapter while he was a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Bill Schulz is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress and adjunct professor of international affairs at The New School University. From 1994 until 2006, he served as executive director of Amnesty International USA, a position he assumed after fifteen years with the Unitarian Universalist Association, the last eight of those years as its president.

And last, but certainly not least, Ambassador James Dobbins. He's director of the RAND International Security and Defense Policy Center. He has held State Department and White House posts, including assistant secretary of state for Europe, special assistant to the president for Western Hemisphere, special adviser to the president, and secretary of state for the Balkans and ambassador to the European Community.

Please help me welcome all these panelists.

(Applause.)

Charlie, I'd like to start with you. To give us a framework for the discussion, please give a general overview of American exceptionalism. How it's defined, its history in the 20th century, and its positive and negative sides.

MR. CHARLES KUPCHAN: Thanks, Spencer, and delighted to be here for the launch of the book. It's nice to see the labors come to fruition.

I'm going to take just a couple of minutes to make some general remarks about American exceptionalism and how it is often seen and debated in the historical and the political science literature. But I want to focus most of my time on one particular brand of American exceptionalism, and that is what I would call liberal internationalism, the brand of American policy that was in place from Roosevelt through the 1990s, the particular type of exceptional American foreign policy in that it was American leadership in the world, but a brand of leadership that was particularly welcomed because of its consensual, open, transparent, multilateral nature. And that's somewhat exceptional, not just for the United States, but also for other great powers in the broad swath of history. But before I get to that, let me just make a couple of introductory comments about the theme of exceptionalism as it – addressed in the book but also in the broader literature.

I think usually the notion is reached to connote some type of unique exceptional nature of America as a great power. And the notion of exceptionalism goes back to the founding fathers, to the defining documents of the United States. You can find this idea in the Federalist Papers, in the Constitution, in early debates about foreign policy that the United States was not going to simply be just another major player. It rejected and indeed would work against the traditional balance of power politics that the U.S. leaders saw as dominating the politics and the geopolitics of Europe.

The United States would stand aloof from the traditional game of power politics. It would stand for self-determination, particularly in the Western Hemisphere, trying to drive European empires out of the Western Hemisphere – that was ostensibly the reason for the Spanish-American war at the end of the 1800. And the United States would be a city on the hill. It would serve as a shining example of liberal democracy, and it would, for the most part, export American ideals through example, rather than by force. Although at times, we've opted for force rather than example not necessarily with good results. But the idea is that America would craft the international system, to some extent, in its own image by serving as an example – a beacon to other nations.

I think that there is a certain amount of value in this perspective. I would say that this notion of American exceptionalism should be considered as one of several different strains that rises and falls as the kind of motivating vision for American foreign policy. It is present in our political culture. It is present in our political makeup, in our Constitution, and I think that's one of the reasons there always has been an idealist, almost self-restrained quality to American foreign policy. The leaders wanted it that way and it wasn't just that they didn't want the United States to become an imperial power abroad. They were also scared of centralization at home.

One of the main reasons they resisted the idea of American hegemony abroad is that they thought it would imperil civil liberties at home. And that's why for most of America's first decades, really until the 20th century, America's wars were fought, not by the U.S. Army, not really by the U.S. Navy which remained quite small until the 1890s, but by the separate militias of the states.

I would – I would however, be cautious about assigning to American foreign policy an exceptionalism throughout because I think, as I mentioned, it's one of several different strains in foreign policy – sometimes more present, sometimes less present over time. And what I want to do is focus the remainder of my time on one particular brand of American exceptionalism that I think was present, in a continuous fashion, from 1940s through the 1990s, and that is liberal internationalism – the brand of multilateralism that the United States adhered to.

And I would define liberal internationalism as a unique partnership between two different aspects of American leadership, one: power. And the other: partnership. That the United States would agree to project its power abroad in peacetime and in wartime – but that's less unusual – to preserve a global balance of power and particularly to prevent the domination of Eurasia by a hostile power, but it would also do so in a multilateral fashion. It would do so through alliances, through pacts, through international institutions, through the Bretton Woods system, through GATT, through the UN.

And this was unique in American history in large part because efforts to move in the direction of liberal internationalism had, before Roosevelt, been defeated by both the unilateralists and the isolationists. The isolationists said no to power and the unilateralists said no to partnership. And they both vetoed an effort by, for example, Woodrow Wilson to put this compact together at the cause of World War I and get the United States to join the League of Nations.

I would argue that what led to the creation of the liberal internationalist compact and its maintenance from Roosevelt through Clinton was the creation of a bipartisan center, a political consensus on American foreign policy that was cobbled together by Roosevelt and sustained quite solidly until the Vietnam War with a short blip during the Korean War. It then came down to some extent bipartisanship consensus after Vietnam, rose again during the Cold War when Reagan came to office, never back to pre-Vietnam eras.

But essentially you see a fairly secular rise in the bipartisanship in Congress, bipartisanship in the public until the end of the Cold War where it begins to sharply fall down. Bipartisanship reaches a post World War II low in the 94th Congress, after the Republicans win the House and the Senate, short jump after 9/11 by the 2003, 2004 Congress. We're back to the pre 9/11 levels of partisan foreign policy. And I only need to point to the recent votes on Iraq to suggest where we are today in terms of bipartisanship on the critical questions of America's engagement in the world.

So let me just say a couple of quick things about where this center on foreign policy came from and why it seems to be in such disrepair today. I think one can make arguments about the rise of liberal internationalism that are both geopolitical and domestic in nature. Geopolitically, the nature of the threat: first Nazi Germany and imperial Japan, then the Soviet Union, peer competitors forced the United States to project its power abroad in peacetime. The U.S. needed allies to be able to project power to Eurasia. It needed an open liberal international trading order to get recovery in Europe and Japan, to inoculate both parties against the possible return or the possible inroads of communism coming from either China or the Soviet Union. But I also think it's important to look at the domestic side of the equation.

Yes, Roosevelt exercised amazing leadership. Yes, he was one of the first presidents in American history to reach out across the aisle, to appoint Republicans to key international commissions, to work with Wendell Willkie – the person he defeated in the 1940 election – to fight against isolationism within the Republican Party, but he was also working with the domestic landscape that was quite conducive to bipartisanship. One: the North and the South were, for the first time in American history, in a political alignment on key questions of foreign policy. And that's in part because the North had emerged as an industrial powerhouse and therefore was no longer protectionist, so the North and the South were both free traders by Roosevelt's time. And it also was – the alliance came into being because Democrats had moved from the South to the North during the industrial era to find jobs, and therefore, the Democrats had for the first time in the modern Democratic Party a strategic foothold in the North.

We also find that there was, I think, a decreasing polarization of the party system and of the public because of the prosperity that followed World War II. And if the depression led to increasing socioeconomic divides and partisanship on global engagement in the economic arena, the post World War II boom created the de-idealization or – whatever the word – it got ideology out of politics because most people were enjoying rising incomes. And the gap between the rich and the poor was closing.

And then, another factor I think is important is that this was a shift toward a compact between power and partnership, not just at the elite level but at the public level as well. So for example, if you look at the public opinion during the '50s and during the '60s, yes, one day Americans wanted higher defense spending and a more aggressive approach to the Soviet Union. On another day, they might have wanted arms control and a more diplomatic approach, but Democrats and Republicans agreed. They moved together. They both supported power and they both supported partnership.

If we fast forward to today, we see a very different situation. We see a situation in which the Soviet threat is gone. The sense of unity engendered by that threat has not been replaced by the terrorist threat. We can talk a little bit why that's the case and I think it has something to do with the sporadic, illusive nature of the threat that we face. But also, I think, one has to look at domestic factors that even if there were a new peer competitor, it is possible that the bipartisanship would not return because many of the conditions that Roosevelt was able to work with to build the bipartisan center don't seem to be present today.

The North-South alliance has given way to a new regional divide. It's now red-blue rather than North versus South, but the implications are the same – much more difficult to build alliances that cut across different regions of the country and that unite Republicans and Democrats. At both the elite level and at the public level, we no longer see Democrats and Republicans moving together on the key alliance between power and partnership. The Republicans are generally becoming the party of power. The Democrats are generally becoming the party of partnership. And you see that very clearly in votes on defense spending, in votes on the war in Iraq.

That doesn't mean that there still aren't some who are in the center. I think some of the Democratic candidates certainly are, but they are being boxed around the ears by party activists who want clear deadlines for getting out of Iraq. And in the Republican Party, you might find still a Richard Lugar or a Chuck Hagel who are liberal internationalists, but there aren't many more that would say that we still need to adhere to the multilateral center.

And then, finally, rather than seeing an America where socioeconomic issues are uniting the parties, I think they are now more dividing the parties, because the income gap between the rich and the poor is growing, globalization clearly advantages some at the expense of others, and we are no longer seeing the same consensus on free trade that we had before.

Let me just end with a speculative thought. And that is that, I think, many people feel or hope that the veering away from liberal internationalism is all about George W. Bush. And I think that George W. Bush did play a very big role in undoing the bipartisan center and in taking America away from liberal internationalism. But the message that I want to leave with you today is it's bigger than him, that there are deeper secular processes that are working against the restoration of the bipartisan center in American politics.

Those of us who care and hope that America returns to liberal internationalism I think need to think hard and work hard about how to put the two parties back together on the same platform in which America is neither uniquely wedded to partnership and multilateralism, nor uniquely wedded to power, the projection of American military force overseas, but sees these two as intimately intertwined and critical to America's success as a global power.

So I think no matter who wins the next elections, those of us who care about American exceptionalism and a return to liberal internationalism have a lot of hard work ahead.

Thank you.

(Applause.)

MR. BOYER: Thank you, Charlie.

I'd like to move to Bill now. Bill, can you walk us through a bit how we got to this point in which the United States, the original champion of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and an international role model for freedom and democracy for so long could be now viewed by so many as a major violator of human rights. Is this assessment of the United States fair or accurate? And tell us a little bit about how American exceptionalism generally affects how we go about balancing liberty and security interests in our country.

MR. WILLIAM SCHULZ: Thanks, Spencer. Good afternoon. I want to begin to answer your question by describing a particular case that is emblematic of the absurdity of recent policy as an expression of American exceptionalism. At well over 70 years of age and weighing a mere 123 pounds, Mohamed Fiz was fortunate to be alive because Afghanistan could be a cruel place for the elderly and the infirm. But in February of 2002, Mohamed Fiz was alive, though he was not feeling well and he sought medical care from a clinic in the central Afghan province of Oruzgan.

At some point during his hospital stay, Mohamed Fiz was arrested by American forces in Afghanistan, tied up, blindfolded, and flown to the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay. Overnight, this fragile Afghan grandfather had been transformed into what General Richard Myers, the chairman of the joint chiefs-of-staff at the time, described as people "so vicious, if given a chance, they would gnaw through the hydraulic lines of a C-17 while they were being flown to Cuba."

Now, the only problem with General Myers' description was that Mohamed Fiz had no teeth. And it is true that neither did the U.S. case against him, because what U.S. authorities initially described as an al Qaeda membership card in Fiz's possessions, turned out to be a bus pass. And eight months after his harrowing trip to the doctor, Fiz was among the first four prisoner released from Gitmo. The *New York Times* described him as "babbling at times like a child." Since then, about 400 of the 700 and some prisoners at Guantanamo Bay have been let go, leading to the inevitable conclusion either that most of them shouldn't have been there in the first place, or that the U.S. has discovered a cure for terrorism with something like a 55 percent success rate. But the truth is, in fact, far less happy than that.

Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, the abrogation of the Geneva Conventions, secret prisons, extraordinary renditions, denial of due process, denial of habeas corpus, insisting that the U.S. will not mediate peacekeeping obligations if our military personnel were

subject to jurisdiction of the international criminal court, even in countries that recognize that court. All these are but the latest manifestations of a strain within the American tradition that Charlie has described to you – that understand the United States to have worried to exempt itself from rules that other countries are expected to follow, rules that in many cases, the U.S. was itself instrumental in making.

Now, as Charlie said, such exceptionalism has deep roots in American culture and I want to just say a few more words about that particular strain that he described. This strain is exemplified by the minutes of a Connecticut town meeting from the early 1700s that read as follows: “Passed three resolutions, voted first that the earth is the Lord’s and the fullness thereof. Voted second that the earth is given to the saints. Voted third that we are the saints.” And the reasons that Puritans regarded themselves as the saints was very simply because their presence on this continent had been ordained by God and their mission set by him, mainly in the words of John Winthrop to be a city set on the hill with the eyes of all people upon it so that men shall say of succeeding generations: “Lord, Lord – succeeding plantations: Lord, Lord make it like that of New England.

Cotton Mather – Cotton Mather even believed that the devil had intentionally placed the Indians on a continent uninhabited by Christians so that the gospel of Jesus Christ could never reach their ears. But the arrival of the pilgrims had outfoxed old Beelzebub.

Well, obviously, if your national purpose is to serve as a beacon of light to the rest of the world, it follows quite logically that you must be the one the stamp the world in your likeness, not to let the world stamp you in its. God did not place us on a landmass protected by two oceans, He – or I think far more likely she – did not allow us to survive intact as a union a blood wrenching civil war, He did not lead us across the prairies in pursuit of manifest destiny, He did not guide us in two world wars, He did not lend us a hand to defeat communism, He did not do all of this to see us end up subject to the whims and wheezes of some effete, snivelly-nosed, French sounding, pot smoking, hygienically challenged, Dutch bureaucrat in the Hague.

In 1885, 122 years ago, the best-selling book in this country was Congregational Minister Josiah Strong’s unapologetic plea to America to impose its Christian value on the world by force, if necessary.

In 1954, the Bricker Amendment which, despite the fact that the international law had little impact on U.S. practices anyway would have gutted that impact altogether, garnered votes from one short of two-thirds in the Senate. And in 2000, Condoleezza Rice, writing in foreign affairs, declared that “Republican policy – foreign policy in a Republican administration will proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests” – and now I ask you to listen to the next word carefully – “from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international community.”

So by the time we get to George Bush, the rest of the world no longer represented an opportunity as it did to Josiah Strong in 1885 or a threat as it did to John Bricker in

1954. Now the rest of the world was a figment of some damn liberals' imagination. You might – you might call this government by solipsism.

Of course, U.S. exceptionalism is not all bad. Ours is a powerful country, powerful countries do have interests different from those whose freedom our power secures, and sometimes, as in Kosovo, we have used that power wisely, even in the absence of a full international imprimatur. Frankly, I would not want the United States to conform our laws on free speech to international standards that allow the imprisonment of those who deny the holocaust. And unlike many countries, almost every U.S. ambassador, no matter the party, is willing to make representations to their host governments on behalf of political prisoners. This is nothing to be sneezed at.

But the exceptionalism of the ilk that snagged Mohamed Fiz has done us enormous damage. It has besmirched our reputation and sullied our good name. It has made it far more difficult to call repressive countries to account for their violations of the rule of law when we are guilty of violations like that ourselves. It's diminished our capacity to provide leadership on such issues as Darfur. It has confused both our allies and our competitors. If democracy promotion drives U.S. foreign policy but the U.S. can suspend the fundamental principles of democracy on a whim, than who truly is on first?

It has handed al Qaeda a golden gift on a silver platter, a ready recruiting tool, sure evidence, given that virtually all those subjected to our mistreatment are Muslim – that the war on terror is a war on Islam, not a defense of democratic principles. It's made life far more dangerous for American combat troops whose ability to appeal to the Geneva Convention is now compromised. And it has sent a message to Americans themselves that fear sanctions indulgence of our basest passions – that the ensemble of rights that we've always taught our children was a proud characteristic of this nation – that that ensemble can be dismantled in a heartbeat. It is, after all, a conservative not a liberal notion that society must design certain safeguards to protect us from our basest passions. But in this case, the government was the facilitator of those passions.

Well, fortunately, Americans are finally catching on thanks, first: to the courts which continue to invalidate the administration's mechanisms for bypassing justice, most recently, the military commissions. And second: to the debacle of Iraq which has proven that going at it alone is for the birds. What the world most admires about America – I tell you this from having visited more than 65 countries on every continent – what the world most admires is not our military mind or economic power or even our entrepreneurial spirit. What the world most admires is the vision this country, at its best, seeks to embody of a society that protects minorities, that keeps its promises, that respects other people views, and that guarantees due process even to the most evil person among us.

Betray that and we betray one of our greatest resources for fighting terrorism. Betray that and we invite our own destruction for what was a true in ancient Greece is just as true today – that the best way – the best way to keep your power is to spend your power wisely.

(Applause.)

MR. BOYER: Thank you, Bill.

Jim, many argue that the United States must act in an exceptional manner when it comes to using force and nation building, because the United Nations and other international and regional organizations are often just not up to the task. Can you talk a little bit about how you feel about this view? And do you think exceptionalism is a play in the way the United States has recently chosen to use force abroad and to conduct post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction missions?

AMBASSADOR JAMES DOBBINS: Well, thank you, Spence. Anybody looking at the American occupation of Iraq could be forgiven for thinking that this was the first time we'd ever done something like this. It was one unanticipated challenge after another. It was one improvised response after another. In fact – as I think probably most of you know – this was far from the first time that we'd done something like this. It was, in fact, the seventh time in little more than a decade that the United States liberated a society and then tried to help rebuild it.

Over that decade, we'd gone into Kuwait, and then into Somalia, and then into Haiti, and then into Bosnia, and then into Kosovo, and then in the Afghanistan, and finally in Iraq. And of those seven societies that we helped liberate and the tried to rebuild, six are Muslim. The only one of those societies that's not Muslim is Haiti. So when the American Army went into Iraq in 2003, there was no army in the world with more experience in nation building than the American. And there was no western army in the world with more experience operating within a Muslim society than the American Army. And so you do have to ask yourself: how we can do this so often, and yet do it so badly. And I think that it does come back, to some degree, to this exceptionalism.

Insofar as this principle applies to the field of nation building, it essentially means that we do the task exceptionally badly. And I think a reflection on why we could do it so frequently and yet not show some improvement over time has a lot to do with the controversy in this country over the whole concept of nation building that arose during the 1990s. The 1990s saw a rapid expansion in the number of these missions as the end of the Cold War brought an opportunity to end many of the proxy conflicts that the U.S. and the USSR had been feeding for several decades and created the possibility of broad international coalitions to address these peace building opportunities. During the Cold War, the United States invaded a new country on an average of about once every 10 years.

During the Clinton administration, that went up to an average once every two years. So you went into Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo in just a little over eight years.

The Bush administration came into office saying it wasn't going to do this anymore, and it invaded three new countries in its first three years in office. So we went into Afghanistan, we went into Iraq, and by the way, we also went back into Haiti in 2004.

So there was a great expansion in the number and scale of these missions. This was also true of the United Nations. During the Cold War, the United Nations initiated a new peacekeeping operation on an average of about one every four years. During – since 1989, the UN mounts a new peacekeeping mission on an average of about once every six months. And these missions are cumulative because they last 8 to 10 years on the average. And so if you're doing one every two years, it means pretty soon you're doing two or three or four at the same time, as the United States found itself doing in Bosnia, Kosovo, in Afghanistan, and Iraq all at once.

Similarly, if you're doing one every six months, it means pretty soon you're doing a couple of dozen of them, which is where the UN is. I think it has 18 at the moment. It's been up to 24 at one time.

Now, this put a good deal of burden on the system. It put a burden on the UN. And it put a burden on the U.S. which funds all of its own activities and 25 percent of the UN's activities. And the early efforts in this regard weren't very successful. You had the American failure in Somalia. You had the early UN failures in Bosnia. This colored American appreciation of the activity and made it much more controversial.

And so by the end of the '90s, nation building had become a pejorative term, and the new American administration came into office determined not to do it. And when they were finally forced by circumstances to engage in the activity, they remained determined to not do it the way the Clinton administration had done it. And the result was that the gradual process of institutional learning that had been built up through the '90s wasn't sustained and carried over into the new administration.

At RAND, we've done a series of studies on nation building which informed the chapter in the book we're talking about today on the subject. One of the books looked at the American experience in nation building, and the second volume looked at the UN experience. The volume that looked at the U.S. experience looked at eight cases going back to the German and Japanese occupations at the end of the second World War and at other American led cases that I've already mentioned. And the second volume looked at cases in which the U.S. wasn't involved or was only peripherally involved, where the UN was the dominant decision maker. And so the second volume looked at the UN operations in the Belgian Congo in the 1960s and then more recent post-Cold War, UN operations in Namibia, in Mozambique, in El Salvador, in Eastern Slovenia and East Timor, Sierra Leone. And in each case we looked at these from a standpoint of what can be learned, and to what degree have we gotten better as the result of repeated experience in the field.

We also compared the U.S. and the UN performance, and we had two criteria for success. One was: is the place still peaceful today? Did the piece hold? And secondly: is it still democratic today? And for the latter judgment, we didn't make our own judgment. We went to Freedom House and the University of Maryland, both of which index every country in the world on free, not free, on a sort of a one-to-ten scale. And we used their judgments. The U.S. scored a 50 percent success rate. That is Germany,

Japan, Bosnia, and Kosovo were considered peaceful and free. And Somalia, Haiti, Iraq, and Afghanistan were considered not peaceful and not free, at least not yet. The UN success rate on peace was actually seven out of eight. The only one that wasn't peaceful – considered peaceful when we wrote – was the Belgian Congo, now the Democratic Republic of the Congo. And that was peaceful for 30 years after the UN left. It fell apart again in the 1990s, but the UN peacekeeping effort did hold the place together for 30 years.

On democracy, given the countries I've mentioned, you wouldn't think the UN would score very high. They score six out of eight. Six out of eight of those countries are still governed by freely elected representative governments today.

Now, that raises the question of why the UN scored better than the U.S. on this quiz. And there are several reasons. One is case selection. We didn't pretend our – that our cases were all encompassing or that they were scientifically selected. If you picked different cases, you'd get different results. A second reason is that the U.S. efforts were almost all harder. They were peace enforcement rather than peacekeeping. Most of them either required a forced entry or at least required the threat of a forced entry in order to install themselves. In many cases, the U.S. were actually party to the conflict that was ending, so it didn't have the luxury of being impartial. And they were – and in several cases, the U.S. stepped in only after the UN had failed. So in both Somalia and Bosnia, the U.S. came in only after the UN had tried and failed.

But there's a third reason why the UN scored better than the U.S., and it's in many ways the most important reason because it's the only one you can do something about. And that's that the UN had become more professional. The UN had taken this mission more seriously. The UN had invested in its capabilities. The UN had, over time, build a cadre of professional experts who went from one mission to the next and became better as they became more practiced. And the UN had developed a doctrine for the conduct of these missions based on that experience, whereas the U.S. continued to do each of these missions as if it was the first one it had ever done. But more seriously, the U.S. treated each of these missions as if it was the last one it was ever going to do. And so when the mission was completed, it dissipated all the expertise. It didn't create an ongoing doctrine based on that experience. It didn't put the people who had – who had manned that operation into a personnel system that rewarded them for that service and made them available to do the next one. And so the U.S. wasn't maximizing its learning curve.

Now, the Bush administration has recognized that the American occupation of Iraq was not well managed, and it's admitted that. And the conclusion that's drawn is that we have to do better next time. And it has put in place some institutional arrangements which are designed to try to ensure that the U.S. does a better job next time. The State Department has finally created an Office of Stabilization and Reconstruction, the purpose of which is to create a cadre of expertise in this kind of activity and to build an ongoing doctrine. Something the UN created a similar office 15 years ago. The State Department created theirs last year. DOD has issued a directive making nation building a core mission of the U.S. Military, something Bill Clinton would have been impeached for

trying to put into effect, and the Pentagon slowly giving substance to that directive. And the White House, finally in 2006, reissued a presidential directive establishing an interagency framework for the management of these operations, which replaces the Clinton Administration directive which was allowed to lapse in 2001.

The administration has also, I think, taken in the last year or two a much more positive view regarding UN peacekeeping activities and has looked for ways to help the UN man and conduct these kinds of activities.

I attended a session with a number of senior Pentagon and UN personnel where the discussion focused on how the U.S. could help the UN better conduct these kind of activities. I was disappointed, however, that all of the discussion was people in the Pentagon explaining how the UN could learn from the U.S. examples, could profit from U.S. practice, and I did not hear a single individual suggest that perhaps the U.S. could learn something from the UN in this regard. And the UN, of course, does have a lot more experience. It's currently manning 18 different operations. It has 90,000 soldiers and police deployed which is not as many as the United States, but it's more than NATO and the European Union and the African Union and everyone else in the world put together. So it's a fairly substantial operation.

Now, if the administration has determined based on the setbacks in the American occupation of Iraq that they need to do better next time, I think the American people may have come to a different conclusion, and that is that we – that we shouldn't do it again next time. And I think there is a real danger that the sort of post-Iraq syndrome will be something similar to the post-Vietnam never again syndrome. Now, in the aftermath of Vietnam, the American military turned its back on counter-insurgency, forgot everything it had learned in Vietnam, went happily back to guarding the Fulda Gap and preparing for the Inchon landings. And as the result, when we were faced with the need to confront a virulent insurgency in Iraq, beginning in 2004–2005, we had to relearn a lot of those lessons which we're still having difficulty inculcating in a military institution that really would prefer to fight a different kind of war.

And I think there're some prospect that that will occur as regards the nation building paradigm as well; that is to say that there'll be a constituency on the extremes of the political spectrum: on one end of the extreme, people who don't want anymore humanitarian interventions, no more Bosnias. And at the other end of the spectrum: people who don't want anymore preemptive invasions, no more Iraqs. And between the two of them, they may squeeze out a center that would prefer that we become more professional at managing stability operations in the future. And so the real question is: can the American people, as the result of the failure in Iraq, come to two simultaneous conclusions? One is: yes, never again. Let's not – let's never again invade a large, hostile, Middle East country on the basis of flawed intelligence with a narrow, unrepresentative coalition. But on the other hand, if the Iraq war was a war of choice and a choice that probably had been better negative, Afghanistan really wasn't. And both of those conflicts left us with a heavy burden of nation building.

And so we really ought to get better at this, because occasionally, we're going to be saddled with it even if we take the most conservative possible attitude toward joining, let alone, initiating multinational interventions.

I'm hoping that we can chew gum and walk at the same time – that we can come to two simultaneous conclusions as the result of the disappointments in Iraq. But I have to admit that history is not particularly encouraging in that regard. (Applause.)

MR. BOYER: Thank you all for those presentations. I'd like to follow up with a couple of questions before opening it up to the audience. Let me start with a couple of specific questions and then one general one. And anyone can answer, but I'll direct this specifically to Charlie to start with. You mentioned that the threat of global terrorism has not been the catalyst for Republicans and Democrats to set aside their differences and coalesce around liberal internationalism. Can you just elaborate a little bit more on exactly why that is since it seems to be as great a threat to us as some of the challenges we faced in the past?

MR. KUPCHAN: I think it's a tough issue, and it's one that Peter and I struggled with in our chapter and other papers that we're working on. So I can just give you some initial answers to the question. And one of them is that the threat, as I mentioned, is much more sporadic, illusive, difficult to pin down, not sure what to do about it, not sure whether we should be dropping bombs, or dropping lessons on how to make Islam more pluralistic or both. So part of it is that – is of the nature of the challenge. The nature of the enemy is much different than when there's a Soviet Union or a Nazi Germany out there that you can find on a map, that you can contain, and that, if necessary, you can defeat with military force.

I think a second difference is that the impact here at home is quite different in that, yes, we are told that the United States is at war, but the messages that we are being sent are not ones that ask for sacrifice. We're generally not being told to go and volunteer on a production line or to go to your local recruiting station, because we now we have an all volunteer Army. And so I think there's a disconnect between what we are being told is – this is World War II, and then the sense of normalcy here at home, which isn't engendering the same sort of unity that existed during the disciplining effects of the Cold War.

And then finally, I think that the response to terrorism is necessarily or at least should be multilateral, but only in certain types of issue areas. So for example, on freezing assets, on intelligence sharing, on law enforcement, you have to do it with partners, because otherwise, you can't get at the cells. We have sleeper cells. We have networks that are all over the world. But when it comes to the big issue of military force, in general, the most successful use of force against terrorist attack is surprise attack, it's commando raids, it's special operations, it's covert operations, and, by their very nature, those tend not to be multilateral in the same way that NATO was the best response to dealing with the Soviet threat.

And so if you look historically at how powers respond to terrorism militarily, they generally do it alone. We went alone for the most part in Afghanistan; we went alone for the most part in Iraq; when the Brits had been fighting terrorism IRA, they were alone; when the French were fighting terrorism in Algeria, they were alone; when the Israelis are fighting back against Hamas, the U.S. is not flying close air support.

So for all these reasons, I think it hasn't restored unity. Plus, beneath the surface, I think the domestic landscape is quite different. If you had to say, which is more – which has greater explanatory power, the nature of the threat or polarization at home, I would say more the latter than the former.

MR. DOBBINS: Can I just add (off mike).

MR. : Sure.

MR. DOBBINS: Because I think that this was really a matter of choice. I think there was clearly a bipartisan and multinational consensus available in the aftermath of 9/11, and I think the administration chose, instead, to take the issue and make political capital of it by polarizing the issue and by identifying themselves in a way that – it was a calculated turning away from a bipartisan approach. I think it was clear, that in the aftermath of 9/11, there was a strong bipartisan and multinational consensus that could have been sustained. But sustaining it would have required, for instance, not invading Iraq – at least not in the absence of a broader international mandate.

MR. BOYER: Please.

MR. SCHULZ: And let me just add that I agree with what Jim said, and this was a predisposition that emerged out of neo-conservative political philosophy, which was informed in large measure by the notion propagated by Leo Strauss and others – the notion that the way that a nation gains moral clarity or national greatness is through juxtaposing itself and its value to an adversary, to an enemy. This is a fundamental principle of neo-conservatism. At the end of the Cold War, Norman Podhoretz, often regarded as the father of neo-conservatism bewailed the loss of what he called, quote: “a defining foreign demon” end quote. And I think that the reason that this occurred was, indeed, because it was in large measure – if not explicitly calculated – then at least a clear emergence from a predisposition of political thinking that the United States, in order to reach that level of moral clarity and national greatness that neo-conservatism called for, needed to have a clearly identified enemy.

MR. BOYER: I'll address this next question to Bill, but again, please comment if you like, Charlie and Jim. Many people argue that times have changed since 9/11, and we no longer have the luxury of being constrained by international human rights and humanitarian law norms. And that all the problems that you mentioned, Bill, in your remarks – the hurt legitimacy, confusing our allies, et cetera – is really just a price we have to pay to keep our country safe. What's wrong with this argument, what's wrong with the ticking bomb theory that sometimes torture or other things that are in violation of international law is what you have to do sometimes to keep us safe?

MR. SCHULZ: Well, let me say, first, that it is certainly true that the Geneva Conventions were created in a different sort of world, and that there may well be certain aspects of international law that do require revisiting. I don't know that there is anything magical about holding someone 48 hours without charge as opposed to holding them 72 hours. There may be certain provisions of our traditional understandings of jurisprudence that require revisiting in the light of a new kind of enemy. So I don't want to make this entirely a black issue.

On the other hand, I think what's quite clear is that pursuing the path that we have has done enormous damage just to our political ability to maneuver tactically and strategically, and I'll give a very recent example that was brought to our attention because of the Albanian visit of the president. We know that there are eight Albanians who were – sorry, eight Uighur Muslims from Xinjiang province in China who were placed in Albania, because Albania was the only country that would take them. There is something like 20 others still at Guantanamo Bay, and clearly, we cannot return these prisoners to China because they are under threat of torture or worse. Now, why is that? Well, it is because China has adopted the language of the war on terror and cites the United States' own practices for dealing with this group. The Uighurs are a group that, yes, advocates a certain kind of separatism and independence, but in large measure, has not done so through the use of violence. I'm not suggesting that the United States could prevent the Chinese from taking that perspective, but we have been deeply handicapped in even criticizing them in that respect.

Finally, with regard to torture and the traditional ticking bomb argument, the argument that torture is under some circumstances necessary in order to protect innocent people, in order to torture those who have information that will be designed to prevent a ticking bomb from exploding in the middle of a major city, there are several clear problems with this. That premise is premised upon the assumption – several assumptions – the assumption that the individuals who are to undergo torture have the information that is needed. Well, what is the percentage of odds that they have the information that is necessary to make torture justified; if there's only five percent chance, is torture still justified? It's premised on the assumption that the bomb will go off very quickly, very soon, but we know that what happens continually with the use of torture is that the slippery slope comes into place and rather than restricting our torture of prisoners to those who have information that in 10 minutes a bomb is going to go off, the torture becomes applicable to people in a wide variety of categories.

At Abu Ghraib, those prisoners were not tortured because they have information about a ticking bomb; they were tortured because they were being loosened up for military interrogators to gain information about longer term threats to American security in Iraq. And it's premised upon the assumption that in the long run, it will not alienate more people than can be saved by the procurement of that information. But I think the experience of many countries that have tortured – Britain, Israel, other countries – is that you may indeed, under some very limited circumstances, be able to procure information that may save 1,000 lives. But at the same time, you alienate – you so alienate and anger those who are aligned with the victims of torture that you may, in fact, merely be

generating far, far more potential bombers by that kind of act. And this, it seems to me, is an argument which would lead us to believe that this argument is fundamentally invalid, that this example is fundamentally invalid. And that as most interrogators with experience will tell you, torturing someone is the least effective way to procure accurate information.

MR. BOYER: Charlie, do you want to –

MR. KUPCHAN: Yes, I just wanted to add that I think that the way that you pose the question is reminiscent of the way the question is often posed in public debates. And it presents a false choice in that in most of those areas where the United States is being criticized abroad and at home for practices that are inconsistent with the rule of law, one can still be safe and honor the rule of law. So yes, should we just open Guantanamo and let everybody go home? No. But one can find ways that are consistent with due process to deal with these individuals. In the same respect, should we have more domestic surveillance? Should the NSA be listening to our phone conversations? Well, maybe they should. Maybe we need that, but there are appropriate legal means for such a program to be approved. The one area where I think things get a little murky is the one that Bill was just talking about, and that is rough questioning to avert a terrorist attack. I don't know a lot about that issue so I'll stay away from it. But 80 percent of this issue – the security and due process are not at odds; in fact, they go hand in hand.

MR. BOYER: Jim, did you want to comment? Let me ask one last question before opening it up to the audience. It's often said that a test of a good foreign policy is how we'd feel if other countries were doing what we're doing. And I'd like to get your responses to what the possible ramifications are for American interests if we don't change our course and we don't reinvigorate liberal internationalism. Do we risk the possibility of emerging powers such as China or India one day using our exceptionalism arguments against us? Anyone.

MR. DOBBINS: Well, I think you're already seeing that to some degree. And I think to the extent the United States doesn't harness international norms and broader multinational support for its objectives, it's making it less likely it's going to achieve those objectives as well as licensing those who may be working at cross purposes with the United States. And I think looking at opinion polling and the decline of support for American foreign policy around the world, we're already seeing dramatic negative effects.

MR. SCHULZ: And let me just add that the great tragedy here is not just that we betrayed our own principles; the great tragedy is that exceptionalism makes it far more difficult for the United States to provide the kind of leadership around critical issues be they Darfur or be they the potential of nuclear empowerment in Iran or threats from North Korea or anywhere else – far more difficult for the U.S. to provide the leadership, which under other circumstances, I think bipartisanly, we would want to the United States to provide because of the suspicion in which it is held, because of the disdain in which it is held.

Many people dismiss the polls that Jim just referred to in which we see the popularity and respect for the United States – its so called favorability rating plummeting by 20, 30, and 40 percent, not in the Muslim world where it plummets by 40 to 50 percent but among our strongest allies: Great Britain included, France, Germany, Spain. And dismiss this as relatively unimportant, but we all know that in order to effectuate our goals, we have to work in a complex world with a variety of players. We can't isolate Iran by itself, we can't deal with North Korea by ourselves, we can't deal with climate change by ourselves or with our trade and economic interests. We have to do this in a multilateral way, and we are enormously handicapped by this when our word is not trusted and when our reputation is sullied.

MR. KUPCHAN (?): Let me add just one point. I think what my two panelists were just talking what you could call sort of soft balancing – that other countries might not be forming military alliances against the United States, but they're doing things to make life less comfortable for us, whether it is on issues of international justice or global warming or missile defense – is the most recent thing that Putin is pushing back on. But there's a separate issue that I think we need to put on the table. And that is that we are also potentially putting at risk a broader rule-based order that needs to be robust and needs to adjust to the fact that there are increasingly new players at the table: China, India, Brazil – some of countries that were at the G8 meeting by invitation last week. And it seems to me that if we're not minding the store, if we are not breathing life into a rule-based order, then not only are we going to find our allies less willing to play by those rules, but critically, we won't be ready to adjust the system to incorporate new players that legitimately are saying, hey, we want a seat at the table.

MR. BOYER: Great. I'd like to open it up now to questions from the audience. Please, sir. And please wait for the microphone.

Q: My name is Greg Shepman (ph). I'm with the University of Central Florida. And I had a chance to skim the book, but I have a gazillion questions based on your (unintelligible) so I'll just ask two. The one on the book suggested that AID had been a failure and that it instead be reconstituted as a cabinet level agency so that, in part, we could begin to restore our credibility and be able to utilize our technological and economic development capabilities and expertise in doing that in particularly developing countries.

The second question that I have for you is about restoring our relationships internationally. Certainly, aside from a change in our administration here, there are lots of different programs, particularly for younger people that I'm talking about now and study abroad programs and language emersion programs that were not so geo-centric, social networking sites even that people are beginning to interact in new space internationally. So I was hoping you might be able to comment on those.

MR. DOBBINS: I think AID definitely needs more funding and more personnel. It's down to 1,000 career personnel at the moment, a dramatic decline from 10 or 15 years ago. I don't think it necessarily needs to be raised to a cabinet level. I think it's important that AID continue to function under State Department oversight. So I think

having it as a separate agency but one that responds to the secretary of state is probably the right place for it in the hierarchy.

MR. SCHULZ: Just a – I completely agree with you on the need for students, for outreach for contact. And we have to make sure that the concern about security doesn't come at the expense of foreigners being able to get visas and to study here and to keep the country a magnet in the same way that's so successfully been for generations.

MR. BOYER: Sir, you had a question. Please wait for the microphone and please identify yourself if you could.

Q: (Off mike) and I'm currently unaffiliated. The last time American moral authority seemed to be at these levels or possibly much, much lower would have been the 1970s, and the American people responded by electing a candidate who promised to restore it as a centerpiece of his platform: Jimmy Carter. Do you think we're at that level again? Do you think we're much lower? And what are the prospects that a candidate could step forward and make that the centerpiece of his platform?

MR. BOYER: Who'd like to take that?

MR. SCHULZ: Well, whether we're lower than the 1970s, I think is probably a question that could only be truly answered through polling data. Clearly, the Vietnam War and that period was one in which the United States' reputation was deeply harmed. But I think that the response of the United States in that context was far more narrow than we have seen over the last 10 years. After all, while the domino theory would have it that that conflict involved Southeast Asia far more broadly than just Vietnam, it was not understood to be a global issue. It had ramifications globally, but it was not itself a global issue. Certainly, what we've seen here has ramifications throughout the globe, primarily of course, among the Muslim communities, but well beyond that as well. And in that sense, I think – and I will say, in addition, that the mistakes which the United States made in Vietnam, again, were situations specific in large measure, and did not go to the very undermining of the international rule of order, as Charlie says, or the rule of law as I think we have seen in the last few years, at least not in large measure.

And so I personally, absent polling data, would say that we are in far worse shape than in that period, damaging though that period was. Now, as to whether a candidate can emerge to reclaim this, I think we are beginning to see some of the candidates who are addressing this issue. Obviously, it is a dangerous issue in the sense that it is so easy for those like Mr. Giuliani to push the fear card. And those who would have us take what Charlie calls more of a partnership approach are always in danger of being labeled as weak on security and always have to do so with a big stick, if not in the other hand, at least right behind the back so that people will believe that they will end up being safe. But I think that one of the results, as I said of the debacle in Iraq is that I think we are seeing more and more people who believe that unilateralism is simply a self-defeating perspective, self-defeating policy or strategy, and we therefore, I think, see an opening for a candidate, who, without in any sense sacrificing the commitment to national security, may be able to paint that security in far broader terms.

MR. BOYER: Jim or Charlie, do you want to address that?

MR. KUPCHAN: I would just add that I agree that things may be more serious now, because the Cold War existed and continued after the Vietnam War. And that created a structure that maintained America's role globally, that kept the NATO alliance together, and that made the implications of Vietnam somewhat more muted than I think the implications of Iraq will be. One sort of word of worry or anxiety on the question of who comes next. I don't think it's enough to have the right leader. I think you also have to have the right policy and politics in that, like it or not, we live in a country in which multilateralism requires the consent of the Senate. Like it or not, if you want to get the U.S. into major international institutions and pacts, you need 67 votes. And some of those 67 have to be Republicans, unless the Democrats just sweep the country, which is probably unlikely.

And so I fear that even with the right president, we may be back in an America that looks a lot like the first half of the 20th Century where there was no political consensus on foreign policy. So Teddy Roosevelt tries imperialism and the bottom falls out. Taft tries dollar diplomacy and the Democrats see it as a sock to big business, Woodrow Wilson comes along and says: "Collective security, we're going to be multilateral." And the Senate says: "Get lost." And then Hoover and Harding and others take us into an isolationism where inconstancy flip-flop. And I hope we don't go there, but given the Balkanization of our politics on foreign policy, I fear that we're headed in that direction.

MR. BOYER: Sir.

Q: My name is Martin (off mike). I'm a retired CIA analyst.

MR. BOYER: Please take the microphone there.

Q: And I was an aid to Senator Wellstone – the late, great Senator Wellstone. I noticed early on you were talking about nation building. I would submit very often we've been in nation destruction rather than nation building. Iraq may be the most recent example but certainly not the only example. We came very closing to destroying Vietnam, we did destroy the democratic government of Chile, and I could reel off all kinds of countries in Latin America which we've invaded, intervened, and had nothing to do with nation building. It had simply to do with protecting our own interests. General Smedley Butler wrote about that a long time ago, and he was absolutely right. Yet we continue to talk about nation building, and I'm not sure what we're talking about, either now or historically. I'd like a response.

MR. DOBBINS: Well, I think the two criteria that we set out in our volume indicate what the objectives of most post-Cold War missions have been, that is to leave societies in conflict or emerging from conflict, both peaceful and democratic, and the track record is actually pretty good. There's a sort of – I think a sort of an odd Cold War nostalgia. People think, well, the Cold War was a little tense, but it was really a lot more

peaceful and stable. That really wasn't how the Cold War was for most people. As you've indicated, there were any number of proxy wars going on which we and the Soviet Union were fueling in Angola and Mozambique and El Salvador and Nicaragua, in Vietnam, in Cambodia, in Laos. And in the '70s and '80s, 2,000–3,000 people a year were being killed in these conflicts. In the '90s – in the early '90s, that number was around 130,000 that were getting killed. And by 2003, the number of people getting killed in every conflict, in every place in the world, was down to 27,000. And the number of conflicts were down. In 1993, there were 60 different mostly civil conflicts going on. By 2003, that number was cut in half.

What's absolutely startling is that the number of people getting killed in conflict continued to go down after 2003, despite the destruction in Iraq and Darfur. That is, the number of the people getting killed today in international conflicts is actually lower than it was four years ago, despite the number getting killed in Iraq and Darfur. And the reason is basically because UN peacekeeping in sub-Saharan Africa has been so successful. And the Congo is five times bigger than Iraq. And so if you stop fighting in the Congo, you're going to save more people than you end up killing in Iraq. So the fact is that the number of conflicts continue to go down, the number of people who are getting killed continue to go down, despite setbacks, failures, and ill conceived ventures like Iraq. But if you look at the broader picture, the efforts that are being made by the international community in this regard are really quite remarkably successful.

Q: Hi. My name is Nana Picket (ph) and I'm from the Netherlands Embassy. And I had a question for Mr. Kupchan. You said that the Cold War is over, and I would just like your opinion about the recent exchange of words between Bush and Putin and maybe the freezing of the relationship again.

MR. KUPCHAN: I don't think that the relationship is frozen or that we're headed back toward a Cold War. I think that two things are running together to create a much more confrontational Russian government. And those two things are first of all: what we've been talking about here on the panel, and that is a sense within Russia, and it's shared I think by others, that the United States has been exercising leadership in a way that is insufficiently sensitive to the interests of others. And so to a Russian, if you look at a whole litany of issues from NATO enlargement to luring Georgia and other countries away from the Soviets or the Russian sphere of influence to the war in Iraq, to missile defense, there's just a sense that they have been treated with disregard by the United States.

And that was something the Russians felt they couldn't do much about for quite a while, but now they're flush with cash from oil income. Putin has amassed a huge amount of power in the Kremlin, partly by clamping down on democratic freedoms, but nonetheless he's a very powerful and popular leader. And so he's basically saying: "Hey, I've had enough." And he's pushing back. I still think that the bark is worse than the bite, that in general the Russians are still playing ball even as they use quite heated rhetoric, and their proposal over the summit about the Azerbaijani radar installation and an alternative is perhaps a diversion, but perhaps something more constructive. So I think that we're not in a situation in which a new geopolitical divide is opening.

MR. BOYER: Other questions. Sir?

Q: Dave Huckster (ph), Research Institute for Independent Living. And there are significant human and economic cost to military interventions. There's a Nobel laureate in economics that just did an assessment saying that the war in Iraq could pay two times for the social security. And my question is: has anybody done an economic analysis between the unilateral and multilateral approaches to the military interventions?

MR. DOBBINS: Well, there's a couple of ways – to some degree, I'd say two things about that which may not fully answer your question. First of all: there's a big difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Peacekeeping, which is what the UN usually does, presupposes that there's a peace to keep, that the sides have come to some kind of mutual accommodation and are prepared to accept some level of international oversight and enforcement. And so, most UN peacekeeping activities occur in the aftermath of a peace agreement, which the UN brokers. But it brokers it before it sends troops in. Peace enforcement tends to be a situation in which the sides don't want to stop fighting, and you're forcing them to stop fighting anyway. So if we went into Darfur today, that would be a peace enforcement mission potentially, if there wasn't a peace agreement. Kosovo was a peace enforcement mission.

And our analysis shows that peace enforcement is approximately ten times more expensive than peacekeeping. That is, if you can meet the conditions, that is a permissive entry, the parties are acquiescent, they may not be enthusiastic, they may not trust each other, but they are prepared for some level of international oversight, then you can conduct an operation in a society of the same size, same level of population, same level of government, at approximately ten times cheaper. So clearly, peacekeeping is the more cost-effective activity.

The problem of course is that peacekeeping doesn't stop genocide, peacekeeping doesn't stop aggression, peacekeeping doesn't stop famine, peacekeeping doesn't stop WMD proliferation. And if you're insistent on stopping those things, then you'll have to go to the higher level and more expensive level of intervention. And that level is so expensive that you're only going to do it in extreme circumstances; you're only going to pay the amount of money the international community paid to fix Bosnia or Kosovo. In relatively small societies that you care a lot about, and in places like Darfur, you're going to wait until there's an agreement, because it's just too expensive to fix in the absence of an agreement. And there always is an agreement eventually. I mean, civil wars do end. And when there's an agreement, a peacekeeping force becomes a very cost-effective instrument.

Now, the other economic data point is that most societies in conflict are societies that were in conflict before. That is these conflicts are cyclical, they go through periods of remission, and then they go through periods of increase. If a conflict comes to an end and there's no international intervention to oversee the implementation of whatever agreement brought it to an end, it will go back into conflict in four or five years. That's

like a 90 percent certainty. If you do deploy a peacekeeping force during that period of remission, the chances of the conflict resuming go down to about 10 percent.

So you have a very high level of effectiveness in peacekeeping forces that are deployed during those particular circumstances. And the costs of the peacekeeping force are much less than the cost of foregone GDP that the society, its region, and the world would suffer as the result of conflict. Societies in conflict are always societies in negative GDP growth, that is they're producing less every year than they did a year before. And once you bring that war to an end, even if you don't give any assistance at all, they go into positive growth. And so you can calculate the benefits of a peacekeeping operation, and the benefits considerably exceed the costs in terms of foregone GDP which would be the consequences of not deploying it.

MR. SCHULZ: I just want to add that I think it's important to distinguish between interventions for larger economic or geopolitical reasons and interventions of a humanitarian nature. And of course, as we know as of 2003, the UN has codified the circumstances under which the responsibility to protect can be invoked. The reality is, if we look at the last few years, at examples of humanitarian intervention or particularly humanitarian or the possibility of humanitarian intervention, many of those have been relatively un-costly, or would have been, including Darfur today. If we look at Rwanda, for example, General Dallaire, the UN general on the ground there asked for an additional 1,500 troops to save 800,000 people. That's a relatively modest expenditure of resources. In East Timor, the resources that were required to stop the bloodshed itself were relatively modest.

Now, of course, the aftermath of that, in part because of problems in the society, and in part because of some of the administration of peacekeeping has been problematic. But to stop the violence itself, relatively modest, even in Kosovo relatively modest, certainly in terms of expenditure of the lives of allies. And in Darfur, we know that a no-fly zone over Darfur would go a very, very long way to stopping the Janjaweed militia who are covered by the Sudanese Air Force when they undertake their genocidal invasions of the pastoralists' villages.

So we are looking at a number of situations here or we have seen a number of situations where intervention for humanitarian purposes is of relatively modest cost compared to interventions for other purposes, most notably of course, Iraq. It's not surprising, of course, because the world community is not going to intervene in Chechnya where the costs would have been enormous, because there is a great power involved there. Most of the interventions of course take place – humanitarian interventions take place in countries which would have themselves relatively modest military power. But I think the distinction is important.

MR. BOYER: Sir. And since we have only a couple of minutes left, I'll take his question, and then the gentleman in the back in the green at the same time.

Q: Thanks. Andy Loomis, Georgetown University. And I have – all three panelists have alluded to the relationship between exceptionalism – U.S. exceptionalism

– and erosion of U.S. leadership. And I'm curious, what metrics you're employing in your own minds when you look at U.S. leadership, and how we can know whether it truly is eroding or not? What metrics are you using, and to what extent is that an elite phenomenon or a public phenomenon versus an elite phenomenon. In other words, to what degree is public opinion driving that behavior by international elites? Thanks.

MR. BOYER: Okay. And let's just take the question in the back there, and wrap up.

Q: Matthew Goetz from the Institute for Policy Studies. And I was just wondering if you could comment on the role that American-led, multinational corporations may have in securing peace and stability in areas that have been hit by conflict such as Iraq?

MR. BOYER: Who would like to start?

MR. SCHULZ : Well, in terms of the metrics, one of them is very simple. It is public opinion overseas with regard to U.S. leadership. And again, whether or not we think that the perceptions are accurate. The reality is that we can very clearly measure a very, very significant decline in perceptions of U.S. leadership. In the human rights field, for example, very recent polls have shown that over the last eight years, the rating in Germany and Great Britain of the U.S.'s leadership on human rights issues has plummeted 42 percent in Germany and 36 percent in Great Britain. And that is true of favorability ratings across the board having not just a specific human rights focus as well. So one metric is simply perception of U.S. leadership, because that perception obviously has then – often has profound implications for the ways in which those governments are able or willing to respond to the needs that the U.S. is expressing for various kinds of partnerships.

MR. BOYER: Does anyone want to take the question on the role of multinational corporations?

MR. DOBBINS: I'm not sure what was really meant by the question. It's clear that the U.S. government – and not just the national security elements of the U.S. government – the U.S. government more comprehensively have privatized a large number of functions. So many government functions that would have been government functions 5, 10, 20 years ago are now functions that the U.S. government contracts out. And that's true in Iraq, just like it's true in New Jersey. And so there are, in addition to 140,000 American troops in Iraq, there are 30,000 or 40,000 American contractors in Iraq, all of whom are working for multinational companies of some sort – sometimes very small ones, sometimes they're not really multinational; they're just American contractors. But some of them are big ones like Bechtel and others.

USAID does all of its work by contract. USAID employees basically just administer contracts, but the actual development work is done by contractors. Some are NGOs. Some are international NGOs by which you simply mean they're not for profit, but they essential operate the same as a multinational corporation except they don't make

a profit. And others are for profit. In the AID world, a lot of them are for profit, and they're development organizations that are doing development – and some of them are quite expert at it – and they're doing it for profit under contract AID.

So there's a lot. Now, to the degree to which U.S. corporate interests impel interventions, I suppose there are instances where that may be the case, but I don't think that that's a major factor in determining where the U.S. intervenes. We don't have any corporate interests in intervening in Bosnia or Kosovo, for instance.

MR. BOYER: Well, thank you all for that fascinating and enlightening discussion, and thank you all for coming today. And if you've not yet bought the book, please do so. It's in the back there.

Thank you.

(Applause.)

(END)