

SPECIAL PRESENTATION

**“AMERICA IN THE WORLD: FORGING A NEW VISION
FOR FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY.”**

**“CONFIGURING AMERICA’S DEFENSES TO 21ST
CENTURY REALITIES”**

**MODERATED BY:
MICHÈLE FLOURNOY, PRESIDENT,
CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY**

FEATURED PANELISTS:

**GORDON ADAMS, FORMER ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS,
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET**

**GENERAL (RET.) WESLEY CLARK,
FORMER NATO SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER**

**LARRY KORB, SENIOR FELLOW,
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MS. MICHÈLE FLOURNOY: We're going to start. We're going to ping pong around, so we'll start (Off mike.) then Gordon and then we'll come back and –

MR.: Okay, all right.

MS. FLOURNOY: Just listen for your names.

MR.: All right. (Laughter.)

MS. FLOURNOY: Can we get a signal when we can start? Okay. Well, good afternoon and welcome back. I'm Michèle Flournoy (audio break) Security, and we are very pleased to partner with CAP and the Century Foundation in putting together this panel on defense and national security for the 21st century.

We are very fortunate today to have a very distinguished group to have a conversation with this afternoon. The format is we're going to dispense with opening remarks and we're really going to just open it up for a conversation first within the panel and then with all of you.

We're really going to grapple with four key issue areas. The first is what are the kinds of challenges that we can anticipate the United States facing in the next 10 to 20 years? What does the future security environment look like? What kind of challenges, what kind of constraints will it impose?

And then within that context, what are the key roles and missions for the U.S. military and how do we help the military recover from the extraordinary strains that have been put on it in Iraq, in Afghanistan, and other operations? And how do we adapt that military for a future that may look very different than the past?

We're also going to touch on the question of rethinking our reliance and partnership relationships. How do we take a more multilateral – recover a more multilateral approach to our security, particularly where shared interests and shared threats and challenges are involved. And finally, we'll broaden the aperture a bit to look beyond the U.S. military to ask the question of how we might need to rebalance our portfolio of national security instruments.

I have a good friend who likes to say, we in the United States have one instrument on steroids and everybody else is on life support. And even if you're someone who likes to see a military on steroids as a strong tool of national power, I do think there is – in an era when just about every challenge we can think of, whether it's terrorism or proliferation, climate change, you name it, we need a whole of government approach and we need to look at how to create a more robust and balanced set of national security instruments.

So those – that’s a very broad set of issues on our plate and we’re going to do it all in the time allotted. But with that introduction, let me first briefly introduce our panelists. You have there bios. General Wesley Clark was a very senior officer in the U.S. military. His final position was SACEUR, the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, and head of a NATO organization as a U.S. general officer. Since leaving the military, he has been a business man, he has been a prominent author and speaker, and most of all known to all of you he was a Democratic candidate for president in 2004. And we’re very pleased to have him with us today.

Larry Korb is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. He has been at every major institution you can think of in town, from Brookings to CFR to others and also served in the Pentagon in the Reagan administration as an assistant secretary of defense.

And Gordon Adams, down at the end, is currently a senior fellow at the Wilson Center, has been a professor at GW University, and has now been stolen away by American University, where he will begin teaching this fall and had a charge of national security and defense programs in the Office of Management and Budget.

So we have a great panel here. I think my challenge is going to be trying to get a word in edgewise and making sure that all of you have a chance to ask questions. But let me start off by asking General Clark a question, and that is this first issue of a future security environment. What are the challenges that you see defining that future security environment for the United States broadly and for the U.S. military in particular?

GEN. CLARK: It’s the right starting point for this discussion and I am very glad we’re starting here. As I look at it, we have three sets of challenges defining security broadly.

First, we’ve got the interrelated problems of the Middle East and terrorism. So we’ve got the Arab-Israeli dispute. We’ve got the problems in Iraq. We’ve got Iran and its effort to acquire nuclear weapons. We’ve got other proliferation concerns in the region. We’ve got problems with Syria and Lebanon and we’ve got the problem of al Qaeda. All of these are in one way or another interrelated.

A second set of issues has to do with the emergence of new economic powers that can somehow challenge us in our traditional notion of who we are, because for more than a century we’ve been the largest economic force in the world. And now we can look ahead and see with the emergence of China and maybe India that this might not always be the case. They certainly have the possibility to have larger integrated markets, and I’m kind of a demand-side economist. There is plenty of capital floating in the world, and where there is demand supply will meet it. And so when you’re dealing with these large economies, you have to look ahead and say: what does it mean when China has a gross domestic product that may be larger than the United States? What will it do to the United States?

Will it constrain our freedom of action? Almost certainly. Will it challenge the economic security of ordinary Americans? Probably will. And what will it do to our image of who we are, our values that we espouse as a nation? Will we be able to reinforce our friends and support those who share our values or will we be somehow constrained and hedging on these things?

And I think there is a third set of challenges that are more global in nature in the sense that they don't just apply to us, they apply to everyone. And we have a role to play in addressing these challenges, but we can't solve them. We have to bring others on board.

First, in the direct terms of security, I believe that nations have a duty to protect those who for one reason or another aren't receiving the protection from their own state and this is a so-called right to protect. It needs to be explored, it needs to be developed, it needs to be legitimated, and then we're going to have to create the mechanisms to deal with it.

Disease, poverty, climate change – these are all the kinds of global issues that to deal with we require something more than the United States, and yet these issues pose a challenge to us because we as Americans are not secure unless these global issues are being satisfactorily addressed. And right now, they haven't been.

MR. FLOURNOY: Gordon or Larry, do you have any thoughts to add on the nature of the challenges we face?

MR. ADAMS: I like a lot of what General Clark said here about these challenges and I think a lot of them join the kinds of concerns that I would put on the list. I think I'd probably jump in pretty much in some combination of the second and third, which is the disparities and stresses and strains created by a globalized economy and information and communication systems that are tearing apart countries and posing challenges not just to us, but an awful lot of other countries in the world. In the long term, that is probably the greatest underlying challenge I think that we all – not just to the United States – have to deal with. And picking up on the theme of this particular panel, not one for which military power in particular is enormously well-suited to deal with, but which a good statecraft is.

I think the second set of challenges that in my hierarchy I would put at what I call governance, by which I incorporate things like failed states and problems of ungoverned zones, by which I incorporate brittle states and states that may collapse. Some of those are in the Middle East that General Clark referred to – states that are struggling post-conflict and trying to redefine themselves.

The ability of nations to acquire reasonably effective and reasonably responsive governance – you'll note I did not put the word democracy in there; that was deliberate – is a huge global international challenge. Some of those may well emerge as democracies, they may not, but reasonably effective and responsive governance is a huge challenge.

A third one that I would put on the table is the challenge of identity. Again, it is just cutting some of General Clark's issues in a slightly different way. The challenge of people who dislike each other or hate each other on the basis of ethnicity or religion, which is very widespread and goes broader than just a question of Islamic fundamentalism and its political or terrorist attributes in some sects, but is a global challenge of peoples being able to get along and to resolve those conflicts. And I think that is identifiably separate, though not unrelated to, the economic and governance challenges that we face.

And then there are a series of other challenges that are quite major, that are global in nature, and here I very much join General Clark, but these involve: globally, how do we sufficiently diversify and render affordable our energy resources? Major international challenge – cuts across these Middle East countries, but it's a global challenge as he just said with other countries requiring supplies. But also trafficking – trafficking in people, trafficking in drugs, trafficking in arms as a major link to international criminal conspiracies and the kind of health and environmental issues that are rapidly emerging in importance. They're going to have electoral importance I think in 2008 in this country.

So it's a very broad agenda. And as an agenda I think it picks up on a point that Michèle made at the beginning of the panel which is not all of those issues in fact, a substantial part of them, are not truly handleable (ph) or effectible by military means – that what they demand is an integrated approach to statecraft.

The other characteristic that they all share virtually to an issue is that they are multilateral in character. It used to be a dirty word, but I don't think it's a dirty word in this room. And our ability to develop and encourage and live within a multilateral system that helps tackle some of these challenges is going to be a very critical test of our statecraft.

MS. FLOURNOY: The one word I would add to this description of the challenges, which I think is very rich, is when you look at these challenges together and you consider them as an inheritance – what is being bequeathed to the next president – it's probably the most daunting and disturbing collection of challenges that's been passed on in more than a half-century. I think it's going to be incredibly difficult for the next president to prioritize. All of these issues are deserving of senior leader attention. All of these issues are deserving of U.S. action and priority, and yet it's just going to be a very daunting set of challenges.

I'd like, before we turn to the particulars of the recovering adaptation of the military as one of the instruments to meet these challenges, I wanted just also touch on the question of constraints. Some of them have been – at least in your comments you've mentioned potential economic constraints because of our national fiscal indebtedness. You've touched on issues – I think it was certainly Dr. Brzezinski touched on this – questions of U.S. moral authority being at a low point in the world and the imperative of rebuilding alliances and coalitions to meet some of these challenges.

If I could draw you out, General Clark, a little bit more on the question of constraints and how you would potentially deal with some of those.

GEN. CLARK: Well, I think that – just to pick up on what you’re citing as Dr. Brzezinski’s moral force – I think there is an issue with the legitimacy of U.S. power. We did spend 40 years after the Cold War, more or less, strengthening international law and building relationships. And we drew down on those relationships in the 1990s and then now in this period we have backed away from many of our previous efforts. The Geneva Conventions, which apparently don’t apply in some cases. The idea that U.S. soldiers should comply with international standards: we’ve gotten exemptions from all the countries before we commit our soldiers. And just the whole manner in which we went into Iraq. We violated basically every standard of just war theory in the Iraq operation, and so it’s taken away from our moral power, our image of a nation that was disinterested in itself that put standards above self-interest.

And now we don’t have that. And I think that undercuts every foreign policy and security initiative that we take. We’re still a very powerful country, but we’re not powerful in the sense that we were, let’s say, in 1991, 1992, 1996, 1997. We had a different stature then than we have now.

MS. FLOURNOY: And we’ll come back to this point later in the panel to talk about how might we try to actually restore that moral authority. But I want to turn to Larry Korb now and draw him out on the whole question of the military instrument. The military has undergone or experienced tremendous strains because of the repeated deployments and pace of deployments, strains that are manifesting themselves in terms of readiness, recruitment, retention, and so forth. And I want to ask Larry to talk a little bit about what needs to be done to restore the health and vitality of the U.S. military and, importantly, to adapt it to the requirements of the future.

LARRY KORB: Well, I can give you a short answer. If you want to improve Army recruitment you’ve got to get out of Iraq and you never – but first of all, I think it’s important not to overreact. Yeah, there are a lot of challenges, but the world is not a more dangerous place. I think, yes, it’s more complex, but it’s not more dangerous. We’ve lived through worse. I was on active duty in the Navy in the Cuban Missile Crisis. You’ve never seen anything like that. So I think it’s important and I think Dr. Brzezinski kind of mentioned that. So kind of relax. You can’t find perfect security, but with that, let’s put this thing into proper context.

The first thing you’re going to have to do is to reset the ground forces. Now what that means, basically, is you’ve got to get them the equipment that’s been lost or destroyed or left behind in Iraq or Afghanistan, because when we bought this equipment – tanks and trucks and armored vehicles we assumed it would last a certain amount of time. Obviously, in the harsh conditions, it’s hasn’t; because of combat it hasn’t. So you’re going to have to do that for the ground forces and that includes the National Guard because one of the things was we always would kind of give the National Guard the hand-me-downs and say, well, you know, we may probably never call you, but here’s a few things just in case.

Well, we saw that we've used them and have continued to use them and they also have a vital homeland security mission both in terms of with climate change you're probably going to have more natural disasters, as well as obviously you could have another terrorist attack. So what that means, basically, is you've got to set aside \$100 billion to reset the force – \$100 billion you had not planned on spending. Now, when we came out of Vietnam, we didn't do that. It took us over a decade to kind of reset it because that went into the – that had to compete with other things. But I think that has to be the first priority.

The second thing I think is that even if it means a smaller ground force, you cannot lower your quality standards. I agree we should be increasing the size of the active Army and the active Marine Corps. And one of the reasons for the active Army is that we found in Iraq and Afghanistan that you can't substitute technology for men and women on the ground. And given the list of things that have been outlined by General Clark and Gordon Adams here, I mean, there is all kinds of situations when you're going to need boots on the ground to bring about stability. But I don't think you should lower your standards because that's a recipe for disaster. I remember in the '70s, you had a commandant of the Marine Corps by the name of General Lou Wilson who came up when I was teaching at the Navy War College and he said look, "Look, they tell me I'm going to go to 190 – I'm not going to do it unless I can get the right people." And I think, if you take a look last year, General McCaffrey said, "You know, we gave over 10 percent of the people coming into the Army moral waivers and that's after lowering the recruiting standards for education and aptitude as well as raising the enlistment age to 42."

Similarly, if you take a look at the people washing out in basic training, that number has been cut in half. Well, if you're lowering your standards and you're washing out less people, that is not what you need. So I think that's the first thing – don't lower your standard.

Second, as you bring in more people, don't get them to replicate what you already have. We're going to need new type of forces to deal with things – for example, people say, "Well, after Iraq or Afghanistan you'll never do that again." Well, suppose there's a coup in Pakistan? I mean, that's one of the world's most dangerous places. Or a coup in Saudi Arabia where you're going to need people on the ground to do that.

We're terrific on our conventional capabilities in fighting other traditional conventional wars as we saw, for example, in Iraq, but we need to develop what people call peacekeeping and stabilization capabilities. To put it bluntly, we know how to win the war, but we need to know how to translate it into a stable peace. So you're going to have to, as get your new units, make sure that these units can specialize in this.

And then finally, I think you've got to be fiscally responsible. If history is any guide – when you end a conflict, whether like Vietnam for example, the end of the Cold War, given our financial situation there are going to be constraints on defense spending. And I think what you have to do is stop buying weapons that deal with threats from a

bygone era – Cold War type of weapons. So I think that's what you need to do to restore the readiness of your force and emphasize the new missions that you're liable to have to undertake. And you're not going to be unable to do the old missions because you're still going to have this force; this will be the expanded people in the ground force.

MS. FLOURNOY: I want to delve a little bit deeper into this question of does the force needs to grow because I know we have a variety of opinions on this subject on this panel.

Recently, the Bush administration has proposed to grow both the active duty Army and the active duty Marine Corps quite substantially after six years of resisting calls for force expansion, and I think what's really driven the change has been the experience of strain on the force in Iraq. But when you expand the force, you really can't do it in a kind of time scale that will be relevant for relieving strains in Iraq today.

When you're building and growing a new force, you're really building and growing for the future. So knowing that our panelists have a variety of views on the subject, I'd like to ask you to either make the case for or against why we need to grow the ground forces. And starting with you, Larry, and then I'll let General and Gordon responded.

MR. KORB: I think let's take the Army first. Because the Army National Guard has a mission in homeland defense, which previously was a secondary mission, it's not a secondary mission anymore. And as we've seen, when you use the Guard as an operational reserve, as we've had in Iraq because you simply don't have a large enough active Army, what's happened is you leave yourself vulnerable at home. If you go back and take a look at what happened in Hurricane Katrina, a number of lives were lost that did not have to be lost because the people and the equipment were not there.

The second thing is, I think that if you want to maintain a volunteer military, you've got to go back to the standards that we set that for every year you spend abroad in a hostile environment you should spend two years at home. With the force we have now, you came in many cases not even a year, but at most a year.

And again, I know people are going to say, "Well, you get out of Iraq, you'll never going to do that again." I would hope that you don't, but as I say, I worry most about Pakistan in terms of a very unstable country. And if you had a coup or something in Pakistan or Saudi Arabia and you had to send forces in for a prolonged period of time or to deal with some of the things we've talked about here before – weak and failing states – you'd want a robust enough ground forces to be able to do that. And so I think that's the reason primarily to make the case for increasing the Army.

And similarly, I think you can say the same thing with the Marines. The Marines are quick reaction force – they can go in. One of the things that we saw is after the horrible tsunami in Indonesia – before that, our standing was, like, below bin Laden's. But once we went in there, we were able to go in with the Marines and everything – you

know, the opinion of Americans went sky-high. And, again, I think you would want to have that force available.

Similarly, when we get out of Iraq, we're not going to leave the Middle East. I would like to leave a Marine expeditionary force with a carrier battle group there to be able to go back in and deal with the situation. So we're talking about increasing the Marines by roughly 20–25,000 or so, which to me is a good insurance policy given what I see as the instability in the global environment that certainly while we should get other agencies involved in other countries, the U.S. is going to be a vital part of it.

MS. FLOURNOY: General Clark, what do you think? Should we grow the ground forces?

GEN. CLARK: Well, is Gordon going to have an opinion on this? (Laughter.)

MS. FLOURNOY: He is.

MR. KORB: Yeah, he has a different opinion, so –

MS. FLOURNOY: He has a very different opinion.

GEN. CLARK: Okay, well I am very ambivalent and I'll tell you why I'm ambivalent.

MS. FLOURNOY: That's why we put you in the middle, between the two. (Laughter.)

GEN. CLARK: Well, I was going to say, I was going to let Gordon make the case and then I was going to be in the middle. But I'll go ahead right here and tell you what my ambivalence is.

Of course we need more ground troops. There is no question about it. You cannot rotate these soldiers in and out. You cannot have these men and women there 15 months. It's mostly a married Army. It's ripping the armed forces apart. It's inequitable. It's wrong that we were asked – our armed forces was asked to do this mission and the rest of the country is totally exempted from the kinds of sacrifices that were expected in wartime. And the armed forces, as a result, is becoming increasingly isolated. That's wrong.

(Applause.)

So if I could snap my fingers and have the approval authority, I'd say, absolutely, raise 100,000. Do it now, put them in uniforms, start them moving, give them nine months training. By next spring, they'll be there. The problem is it doesn't work that way. We're straining right now to bring in who we're bringing in. So when you say you want another 100,000 troops, if that means that we've got to enlist another 40,000 – 50,000 people, that's probably something we're not going to do with this foreign policy.

So my first answer was: don't change the size of the military, change what you're asking it to do. Get out of Iraq and do it as rapidly and effectively as you can. Now, there's no easy exit from Iraq, and so what we're asking of the men and women in uniform is continued sacrifice. So we can go for the authorization, we can put more people on the books, but getting them there and holding up standards is very tough.

And that's why I come down to this issue: I think it's time that Americans ask about the burden of manning the armed forces. I think this is an issue that has to be talked about. Charlie Rangel offered it three years ago, four years ago, and everybody pooh-pooed it, but it's going on four more years. We've got units now – some brigades are back on their fourth tour in Iraq. Captains – West Point graduates are punching out of the force not because they don't love the military or believe in the country, but because there is only so much you can ask of people. So we're in a difficult position and I think the American people need a chance to hear the debate, hear the discussion about if you're not going to pay people more money how much does it take to bring someone in and get the kind of person that you want?

Then what is the alternative? We're going to ask people to give up their time, their freedom, and serve the uniform even though it wouldn't have been their first choice. That's what democracies do. And at least we need to have this debate in a straightforward and open fashion. Maybe you don't draft for the active force, maybe you draft for the National Guard and Reserve, but you have to ask this question because the burden of raising the force in a timely fashion is so enormous that even if you authorize it, it may not be timely enough to preserve the quality and capabilities of the excellent Army that we have today.

MS. FLOURNOY: Gordon, your time to add two cents.

MR. ADAMS: I've got actually about 25 cents worth. (Laughter.) More than two cents, but what I don't have is a \$112 billion. It's a very striking issue to me. I've worried this issue a lot, because it does strike me as it's one of those issues whose time should not have come but somehow did. If I go around and I talk to people serving or formerly serving or people who are strategic analysts in Washington, D.C., inside the Beltway, I get the most peculiar sets of reactions to this question.

If one says, you know, growing the ground force is not the issue – we don't need to grow the ground force. Probably nine out of 10 of those active or retired or strategic analysts' heads nod in private. When you go out in the public arena, as far as I know, every Democratic presidential candidate except one has endorsed adding 92,500 people to the military and some more. And the Republicans have all endorsed it to a human being. There is this immense political hysteria about this issue. There is a sort of a combination of political opportunism out there in the land. If we can protect our Democratic you know whats, we'll call for 92,500 more people in the military and that will protect us from being accused of being soft on defense.

Or stress is horrible on the forces in Iraq. We've got to do something about that. Let's stipulate that: stress is horrible on the forces in Iraq. That's absolutely true. We should never have sent them there to begin with in my judgment. And one point on which I think all three of us agree, it is just time to figure out a decent way to bring them home. Now, most Democratic candidates and a few Republicans scattered hither and yon agree with that analysis, but to me, I find there's this disjuncture between private nodding of heads that this is not the issue and the public genuflection in the direction of growing the ground force disconcerting.

So I go around and I've tried to do a little bit of research. Where are our people? What's their analysis of the requirement for growing the ground force? And what I find is there's a long laundry list – I am not going to exhaust you with all of it – but a long laundry list of things that people think you might have to use such a force for, but precious little strategic analysis.

I'm struck, first off, when you look at the press briefing that David Chu and General Schoomaker gave back in January when they announced the 92,500 person to add-on into the ground forces, but they offered absolutely no strategic analysis of what it was for or what its mission would be. The structure that they offered you was we're going to build more brigades – brigade combat teams, which looked just like the other brigade combat teams that we have. Well, that to me didn't come across as a very persuasive argument about why we were adding 92,500 people to the military. What was it for? As General Clark said, it's not about Iraq, because this is not functional in terms of Iraq. This is for after Iraq and so the question is what are the missions?

And when I look at the work that people have done on the missions, I get a bunch of peacekeeping, combat invasions, counterinsurgency, stabilization, reconstruction, failed states, nation-building, counterterror, train and equip allies. General Scales (in Hill?) testimony, a platform that Larry Korb was on at the Senate Armed Services Committee about the massive demand for train and equip missions that our military was going to face globally in the wake of the Iraq war.

And one can go into the details on these and whether there is much analysis in all of this – there isn't much – but the first question that I asked myself was: where are people asking for us to do this? This comes back to Brzezinski's talk at lunch. Where have we ginned up as a consequence both of our success in Iraq – I hope you heard the quotation marks – and our ability to train and equip and deploy forces, our ability to conduct counterinsurgency operations, our ability to track down with military force terrorists – where have we demonstrated a singular track record of success that would lead the rest of the world to demand that we increase our capability to do those things? Nowhere. We don't have. We ever track record almost unblemished by success in the very things that we think we need to increase the size of the military to do.

Secondly, it is striking to me that the image that the United States has acquired because of the invasion of Iraq – what that has done to render other governments a little bit worried about whether they want our forces to be introduced to do any of those things. So I worry about that.

So there doesn't seem to be a strategy. There doesn't seem to be a clear set of missions. I have seen I think in none of the analysis that I have looked at – and probably Andy Krepinevich comes the closest – an analysis that draws a line between what forces are required – between what the forces are doing and what forces are required to do it. A really serious force analysis has not been done by anybody, which leaves us with a kind of a laundry list of things we might have to use the forces for.

I mean, let me take up the example that Larry provided, because other people have said it – Michael O'Hanlon said this – Pakistan: who in their right mind in this room believes for a moment that we are going to invade and occupy a country with 160 million Islamics with America's military forces? Who would for a moment believes we have the capacity to stabilize a population that large when those forces are not popular in that country? Who will ever believe we will ever build enough capability to do that? The answer is, we won't invade Pakistan with ground forces.

Now, if I were thinking militarily – and General Clark is the expert in this and God knows I'm not, but if I were thinking militarily about what I wanted to do to secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons, it wouldn't be to invade with 500,000 American infantry. It would be much more of an air and special ops operation that secured those warheads and got them out of the country. Now, I'm not going to go to details. You know, people much more qualified than I am on this platform to go into details, but that's where my thinking would go.

It's very hard, in other words, for me to come up with a scenario in which we are capable, welcomed, and likely to do it. Therefore, we have to ask ourselves, what is it – and this is why I want to put the strategic force in front of the expansion cart and say, what is it we want these forces to do? What is the American strategic purpose in the world? How do these forces fit in with a broader theory of statecraft, which we'll get to hopefully if I shut up, and therefore, in what numbers and with what kind of skills – this is General Clark's question. I think it's the right question, which is: what kind of forces do we want? And Larry has raised this, too. What kind of forces do we want? I don't think more is the answer. It's what kinds of forces and how they fit in with our theory of statecraft. That's not an easy question to answer because if they're counterinsurgency forces, you do have to answer the question of where we're going to fight those insurgents. There's only one place we're doing it right now of any large consequence for force structure.

MS. FLOURNOY: Gordon –

MR. ADAMS: If you're going to do – almost done. If you're doing a peacekeeping operation, where and with whom and who will invite us in? We generally avoid sending our troops into large peacekeeping situations in the past. We might want to avoid in the future but train up a capability to do it, and so on and so on down the line. In other words, for me the case is not made, and we've put the expansion issue ahead of the card of doing strategic thinking about what our purposes are and where force fits.

Sorry, that was too longwinded, but there you are.

MS. FLOURNOY: Okay. I appreciate it. Ladies and gentlemen, you've just heard a preview of the debate that is going to animate Capitol Hill later this spring and summer as Congress begins to wrangle over this question of whether and how to expand the force and I think –

GEN. CLARK: Can I have just a word on what Gordon said?

MS. FLOURNOY: Yes, please.

GEN. CLARK: I don't want to distract the panel, but I understand exactly what you're saying, Gordon, and you were there in the early days of the Clinton administration when we tried to work on the planning scenarios. And we went from – the way this worked was we've been through – what I am saying is we've been through this.

At the end of the Cold War, we were spoiled. We could look across the Iron Curtain, we could see the enemy armies lined up in Germany and Poland. How many tanks, how many trucks, what was their predicted rate of advance, how many artillery tubes, what did you need to beat it, et cetera. All that went away, so General Colin Powell and Lee Butler and people in OMB – they came up with the idea of a base force. Larry may have been part of that original discussion. The idea was pretty simply that you still need a big force because this is the United States of America. We are a world power. We don't have to have a threat. We should look at capabilities rather than threat.

So this was unsatisfying. People said capabilities – like what. Well, to drop somebody from the airplane, to invade, to – it was inherently unsatisfying, so we said, well, give us illustrative planning scenarios. So they created seven – I think it was – illustrative planning scenarios. This is about the time the administrations changed and I came in on the tail-end of this. And one of them was, let's say, a hostage rescue in Africa, takedown of a drug lord in South America, a coup attempt in South-East Asia, and then of course, there was your old stand-by, Saddam Hussein and Kim Il-Sung.

And so, we'd give these illustrative plans of ours and people would say, "Well, wait a minute, you don't need all these forces to do this hostage rescue?" No, you don't. "Well, how about the drug lord – how many divisions does it take to take down a Columbian drug lord?" Well, not many.

So then we went to the next form of the challenge. So, how can you possibly justify the size of the force? So then we created two nearly simultaneous major regional contingencies. Now, we knew they couldn't be simultaneous because then we would have had to buy a lot of stuff that we couldn't afford.

So we said: "Okay, well let's assume" – is there a rational for assuming they wouldn't occur exactly at the same time? Sure, because it takes some decision-making time. So let's say something happens in Iraq and then the Koreans, they wake up and 45 days later it starts in Korea. This lets you shift your strategic airlift capabilities and see

you have to buy more C-17s, but you could still use your divisions, you know. And so, we did a big study. It was called a Bottom Up Review and it was submitted and Congressman Spence challenged General Shalikashvili on this. And so the armed forces just ground in deeper and deeper and deeper on this until we finally became convinced that the mission of the armed forces was to fight Saddam Hussein.

And you know what? We did it. And we were good at it. (Laughter.) Less than three weeks and we were in Baghdad. It only took us 12 years of preparation, and once we got there we hadn't actually thought. It's what Shali used to say, "Real men don't do moutois (ph)." So when you tried to talk about these operations other than war, we didn't capture the attention of the services. It didn't drive equipment requirements and things. So I am very sympathetic to what Gordon is saying, but on the other hand we've all been down this path before, and if we follow it to its logical conclusion we'll get to the same point.

I'm telling you, China has a lot of people and I don't want to go there. (Laughter, applause.)

MR. ADAMS: Nor do I.

GEN. CLARK: So I think we've got to be very careful about this. Where did this come from to increase the size of force, because you don't know how long we're going to be in Iraq. Because we can't have these people going back with six and eight months and unprepared to do the job, people suffering from traumatic stress symptoms and other things – they need relief. They need some help and it's common sense that the only way you can do it is to try to get more people there to share the burden.

My ambivalence about it is that it's not a timely response. It's a logical response. But when you look at the mechanics of it, it won't work and that's why I think we have a different debate.

This other debate about the scenarios has to be merged into what Gordon and Michèle and Larry are going to talk about, which is beyond the military. How do we deal with the major security issues? We do have something on steroids and something on starvation diet and we've got to reverse that or at least address it. (Laughter.)

MS. FLOURNOY: I'm going to use that as my segue – thank you, General – into the last topic and then we'll open it up for questions from all of you and that is –

MR. : (Off mike, laughter.)

MS. FLOURNOY: It's all right. We appreciate it. Many of the challenges we face – virtually all of them – are going to require the integrated use of various instruments of international power, not only – military may or may not be relevant depending on the case, but diplomacy, public diplomacy, intelligence, homeland security, information, economics, and so forth. And so this question of how do you take a more integrated look

at the national security instruments we have and how do you create a more balanced and robust portfolio.

I know that CAP has done work in this area, Gordon has done work in this area. The idea of we need to start thinking in terms of not only an integrated national security strategy, but an integrated national security budget because, really, when you're making decisions about resource allocation, you're making decisions about allocating risk – where are you going to buy it down or where you're going to accept a degree of it and manage it.

And that affects not only decisions within the defense budget, but should be really affecting our decisions across the whole national security domain. So I want to give Gordon a couple of minutes to talk about how, if he were advising the next president first day in the office and he or she says: “How should I rebalance this portfolio to better position the United States to be more effective in the face of these challenges we talked about?” What would your advice be?

MR. ADAMS: Thirty seconds. I think that's where the issue comes and I think that's where General Clark was going with it and I know that Larry has done work on this, too, and it's – the question of rebalancing the toolkit of statecraft here is absolutely essential.

If we – Mr. President or Ms. President, if we decide that we're going to increase the military, we're going to make some of these choices a lot harder for you to do. And rebalancing is going to be a very essential operation to use the full spectrum of the toolkit and to gather the synergy of what the full spectrum can give you.

And that means not only money, it means some restructuring. And without going into a lot of details about what the restructuring is, none of the other tools in the toolkit are working very well. In fact, I would argue at this point even the defense planning toolkit is not working very well in terms of supplying our national security needs, but if we don't fix – I'm torn as to whether if we need a crisis – a real full blown blow-up of everything else in the federal government before we deal with this issue or there's enough attention on it now given the failures that we have encountered by simply continually asking the military to do some of these jobs.

There is a real risk facing us right now that the Congress has again deferred this year that we're going to take things like decisions about which countries we train and equip the militaries and giving the Defense Department the authority to make that decision, things like educating people about how to do stabilization and allowing the Defense Department to run the program, the thing about training people for stabilization operations through the Defense Department, things like subsidizing governments' budgets to participate with us on the war on terror through the defense budget, things like delivering foreign assistance through the (unintelligible) program through the defense budget.

We are right in the process right now pushing a lot of the capabilities into the one institution of American government would think is organized and capable of doing it, just adding to the burden that both of these people and myself have described on the military, which means turning around and facing what it is you do about what us budget weenies call Function 150, better known as the international affairs side of the federal government – how you restructure and integrate the foreign assistance mission, how you change the culture of the Department of State so that program management and implementation become as important as representation and negotiations; talk about how you create a culture of long term, strategic and budget planning in the Department of State and the foreign assistance community; things like how you create a department that shares missions of economic support as well as missions of diplomacy; things like work that's being done around this town on foreign assistance; how you integrate all the foreign assistance tools. Some president and some Congress someday are going to have enough intestinal fortitude to take the 15 to 20 different foreign assistance programs we have scattered across the federal government and put them in one place so you can plan them strategically and you can link them to our purpose as a nation.

Very little bits and pieces of that have gotten started. It is a very big challenge. There is a lot of work being done on it. I won't go into details here because I don't have the time, but just in the State Department, in our diplomacy and in our foreign assistance, we need not only more money and we need not only more people, we need a vastly better and more integrated structure that is capable of doing strategic planning and bringing people with program skills to their jobs.

I didn't mention public diplomacy because basically my belief about public diplomacy is that the most important thing – the most important element of public diplomacy is exchanges. It's people going there and people coming here and that's a long term investment of enormous value.

Everything else in my judgment is either broadcasting that we ought to leave alone or propaganda. And right now it's real hard to do convincing propaganda. It's hard to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear like in public diplomacy. So public diplomacy demands investments but a targeted and strategic investment.

Then the other piece, just real quickly, is that's all fine if you're dealing with these different piece in the toolkit. But we have to do something about integrating the pieces across the toolkit, because most of these challenges aren't things that just one tool in the toolkit gets to play with them. I know Michèle's done a lot of work on this, Larry has, Wes has. Doing proper contingency coordination on both conflict and weak states is a critical skills set. It is one that needs to be coordinated not in the State Department, (unintelligible) State's Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization – wrong office, wrong place, no money. You need to do this job at a revitalized National Security Council, which has been allowed basically to fester and disappear.

And more broadly, when you're setting national security key priorities like if it's counterterror operations, counterproliferation, if it's failed states policy, if it's reconstruction policy, if it's expanding good governance, you pick your four or five sets

and, in my judgment at least, you run a proper national security planning guidance operation between NSC, OMB, in the White House and you work it down the agency stovepipes to make sure the right places have the right tasks and that the tasks are synergistically integrated.

Last point, you think this is easy in the executive branch – try reforming Capitol Hill. More on that later. (Applause.)

MS. FLOURNOY: I know that Larry has also done a lot of thinking and writing on this topic, so –

MR. KORB: Look, I think we've got to look at national security and all of its components and any president can do that. When he or she gets there, they can look across lines. And let me give you an example without going on too long here.

You're spending more on National Missile Defense – one program in the Department of Defense – than you are in the entire Coast Guard. Now, if you're worried about somebody getting a nuclear weapon into this country it's probably more logical that they were trying to sneak it in through the ports than shoot it at you with a return address. And that's the problem that we have right now and that's not just the Coast Guard protecting the coast. I mean, that's picking up boaters on the weekends and all these other things that they do.

And that's your problem and so you do need – any president can just do it. I mean, obviously over on the Hill, it's not as easy to do given the committee structure and stuff, but if the president makes those trade-offs before he or she sends them up, you in effect have done most of – dealt with most of the problem.

Now, having said that, let me go back – a couple of things that came up here today that I think somehow we're missing a few things. If I listen to Gordon, I wouldn't need an Army. I don't know where the Army is going to go. I don't know who is going to be president. I wouldn't have gone to Iraq, but somebody did, okay. And somebody may have to go to Pakistan if there is a coup and people are worried about what's going to happen? And I think – we're not talking about doubling the size of the Army. We've been arguing this at the Center since 2003 that you needed a bigger Army for the things that Wes was talking about – you cannot put the strain on these people.

We have metrics that we're supposed to use. We're not. Two years at home for every year that you're deployed, okay? You can't do that now, so I don't know where you're going to go. And don't forget the Army is already expanding. The Congress has temporarily lifted the ceiling from 482, so it's already happening.

So now I also agree with Wes and I said this: don't lower your standards, okay? Mack Bergman (ph) and I, my colleague, we just wrote a piece in the *Los Angeles Times*. If you want to keep all these troops in Iraq for this period of time, you've got to go to a draft. You cannot maintain close to 200,000 people on the ground there without not only breaking the force, but acting immorally, okay? You can't do it. So Mr. President,

here's your choice – you want to do that? Go to conscription. If not, then you better get out.

So, yeah, I think that these are all very, very important points. This is the first war we've ever fought – extended ground war, no draft and we cut taxes. So, sure, nobody feels part of it and that's a big problem which is far beyond the scope of this panel.

MS. FLOURNOY: Thank you.

GEN. CLARK: Michèle, can I just come in some of Gordon's points and Larry's points about what has to be done for national security?

When we went into Haiti in 1994, we recognized that the real challenge wasn't the FAd'H in Haiti. There were 1,500 people. They had five V150 armored fighting vehicles, of which three were inoperative and only one had a working 50 caliber machine gun. And they were photographed every day by overhead imagery. We knew exactly where they were. So this wasn't a major threat militarily. But it was a major threat once we got there to maintain public order and then to try to reform and transition the government.

So we tried to create a mechanism and we formed a group down inside the Pentagon and then we shifted it over of to Dick Clarke at NSC. And I think, Gordon, you were part of that. At the time, we tried to give the National Security Council staff the ability to write a mission-type order.

So it would go like this. You know, DOD, go into Haiti and take down the Armed Forces; Department of Commerce, provide employment for one million Haitians; Department of Health, improve public health in Haiti; Department of Justice, train and supported a honest, effective police force in Haiti. And we went through this and we tried to do this. It sounded very logical.

But just to give you the kind of idea of how difficult it was, the Department of Justice at that time had an organization that said that they were there to do police training, but they could only begin work when an operation actually commenced because, by statute, they weren't allowed to have an inbeing authority. So we had to wait until the operation began before they could hire people to do the planning for what they should be doing when the operation began.

That wasn't the worst. So we challenged the Department of Commerce to provide jobs and so one of the assistant secretaries of commerce flew down with 30 businessmen on one of these Andrews Air Force Gulfstreams to Haiti and the idea was to show them Port-au-Prince and say, "Wouldn't you like to build a factory here?"

So they look at the Port-au-Prince, they looked at the market – and I love the people in Haiti, they are wonderful people, but if you were a businessman and you saw it in October of 1994, the mounds of garbage and poor people – and let me tell you

something, there was a weight control program in effect in Haiti. People didn't have enough to eat. You have never – there were no fat people in Haiti. There were nothing but people with their clothes falling off. I've never seen anything like it. It was desperation. And so we took these businessmen down. They looked at the trash and the poverty and the general atmosphere of restlessness and we said, "So what do you think about putting your factory here?" (Laughter.) And they said: "We'll be right back to you." And of course, no factories were put in Haiti. We didn't know how to create jobs.

And so I was back there 10 years, 11 years later in 2005 and I met the very same Canadian police official who had been there in 1997 and 1995. He said, "You Yanks failed. You invaded here once, you try to put a government in place, you got the police force built. All those people have failed. We're back here again and we're going to try to do the job right." He's still there. And the point is there is a lot of information here that we just – a lot of techniques that we don't know.

We need a cadre of experts on providing nation assistance that are not contractors, but that actually are giving professional development and work for whichever agency Gordon Adams would put them in under Function 150. I hope it's not the Defense Department. You know, I thought it should be a department of nation assistance or something because if you're interested in preventing war, you have to start at the beginning and that is with good governance. And we've got lots of talent and lots of Americans who can go help.

There is enormous talent in this country that we don't use because we don't have a way of reaching out to it. We've got lots of 40-something accountants and lawyers and engineers who would love to give six months or twelve months in a structured program and see some return on their skills and investment and be a part of America's future. We don't need 19-year-old well diggers or 19-year-old bayonet throwers – not for this purpose. What we need are experienced, capable people that fit within a structure with some capable leadership and some credibility. And the next president of the United States in his or her administration is going to have to grip this issue. (Applause.)

MR. KORB: You've already got that. The president has already put it in, but he hasn't backed it up. You know, the Civilian Reserve Corps are people to volunteer and this is the big mistake we made after September 11th. You could have gotten people to volunteer to do this. But whoever the next president is, he or she should go ahead and do this because people would be willing to do that and to go so the military wouldn't have to have to do it.

MR. ADAMS: I don't disagree, but – there is a but and it comes straight out of what General Clark said – this is hard and we're not necessarily the best people in the world at doing that. So when it fails, it fails big time. But don't be too hard on ourselves. This is extremely hard – building any nation, including this one, is extremely hard. And our ability to build anybody else has now been severely compromised by the way in which we entered Iraq and the failures of the way which we implemented in Iraq. So it's even harder for us to do now.

And the other thing is, to add a footnote to what Larry said, you have to invest in the tools. You've got the tools. Civilian Reserve Corps, good idea, just beginning to get some investment. There is a little police training outfit in Italy that was created in part because of the lessons learned in Haiti about training police and having the authority to train police. And they put that little police training facility, which trains African constabulary people, in Italy because the Italians know how to do that better than we do. So we nicely rode ourselves out of a lot of cooperation in Iraq, thereby losing the chance to leverage the capability of other countries who know how to do that.

Now where is that little training capability vastly underfunded and inadequately checked? It's in the State Department. You should see the organic design of the State Department. It's crazy trying to find this place, but it's there. And those are the kinds of capabilities that you would want to advise the next president to build on and integrate and develop and invest in and then to work multilaterally to obtain the cooperation of other people to invest in those areas where you are going to have real stability issues and real failed state issues.

MS. FLOURNOY: Let me just close out this part of the discussion by underscoring one of our main themes, which is the enormity of the inheritance for the next president. Not only will he or she face unprecedented challenges, enormous constraints, also significant opportunities, but this whole question of the U.S. government not really being optimized to conduct whole-of-government approaches, to actually integrate the instruments of our power effectively, and yet that's exactly what this new security environment requires day in and day out.

So the next president will have questions of fundamental strategy about use of force, about when to engage, when not to engage, how to engage; fundamental questions about roles and missions. Whose job is it? What is the appropriate role for the Defense Department? What other agencies should take the lead in some areas? Capacity and capability questions: even if you were fortunate to get your strategy and your priorities and your division of labor set in a reasonable amount of time, you might turn around and find that the current array of capabilities and capacity in the U.S. government don't actually give you many options that look very attractive. So, again, a huge number of issues on the plate that sound sort of bureaucratic and technical until you realize these are really going to be what either offers or constrains options for the next president.

So with that, let me open it up for questions. Yes, sir? Please tell us who you are, where you're from and then a short question, please.

Q: I'm Fitzhugh Lee. I'm a congressional fellow with the Department of Defense. I'm a Navy F-18 pilot. I've been to Iraq four times over my career. Would happily go back a fifth because I believe the consequences of a failed state there are worth that little effort. You all have touched upon the interagency process. You used every bit of the (dime?) acronym I think up there. It is broken. You all have said it's broken; I've experienced the fact that it's broken.

Do you think a Goldwater-Nichols type of legislation – monumental type of legislation which would reorganize the Department of Defense so it could operate more efficiently jointly is required here? And if so, what level of inertia would make that happen because, Lord knows, in my short time as a fellow I've tried.

MS. FLOURNOY: I'm going to use the prerogative of the chair, if I may, just to jump in on this one, since I wrote a report called "Beyond Goldwater-Nichols." My own view is that interagency reform is sorely needed. The only cautionary note I would say is that Goldwater-Nichols suggests that the answer is primarily legislative. I think when you really look at what needs to be done, from capacity building to better integration to changing incentive structures, it's a mix of executive action and legislative action. But I think it's got to be front and center for the next administration.

Unfortunately, I think the poisonous nature of the Iraq debate, the deep and bitter partisanship, is actually going to delay the national discussion that we should be having about what should we learn from this experience, what lessons do we take away; what best practices, if any, do we take away; what kinds of capacities do we need for the future? I don't think that discussion is going to happen until we settle on an eventual strategy for a way forward and eventually out of Iraq. So I think that is an absolutely critical national discussion in the area of presidential action and congressional action, but I think it's going to be deferred at least until after the next election.

MR. KORB: You can also find a lot of resistance. The Pentagon fought like hell against Goldwater-Nichols. In fact –

MS. FLOURNOY: In this case, they're very supportive because they don't want to be (inaudible).

MR. KORB: They are, yes, but it's not going to – yes. So you will encounter resistance, I think it's important to keep in mind, from the other agencies.

MR. ADAMS: Michèle has done some of the best work in town on this subject, so anything that I can add is secondary, but the interagency process is broken. It's partly things that ought to happen that require either statute or executive action, as she said.

It's also partly leadership, and it's leadership in two directions. It's leadership from the White House. If this is going to happen, it breaks enough china in the executive branch that the president has got to be committed, and he or she is going to have to make it happen by act of will in the executive branch. It's got to be day to day, daily important to make it happen.

The other area that's going to be really critical is Congress, because an awful lot of what you can't do in the executive branch will founder on the shoals of separate committee jurisdictions, committee turf protection, the inability to create a sustained dialogue between defense appropriators and foreign affairs appropriators, defense authorizers, international affairs authorizers, all of whom are going to have to get together and shake hands on the legislative piece here for this to happen, so it's a hydra-

headed leadership problem, as well as some of the statutory and executive branch things you can do.

MS. FLOURNOY: General Clark?

GEN. CLARK: I guess I wouldn't I go to Goldwater-Nichols-type legislation first. What I'd be looking at is the kind of cooperation between the executive and the legislative branch to get a better balance of contingency capabilities and funding across the departments. The Defense Department has been the go-to agency, and it gives a very unfortunate impression abroad that the United States is a militaristic power. The truth is we're the least militaristic power. Internally, nobody serves, nobody's drafted, every soldier doesn't know how to use – every citizen doesn't have an AK-47 in his home and so forth. This is not the way America is, but we need to rebalance so there's other go-to agencies beyond Public Law 4-10 for disaster assistance, and the Defense Department.

Now, how you get that done requires that you start with some logic that can be explained and then sold to the Congress and the American people about future security requirements. And then after you've gotten that understanding, maybe someone will say, well, gee, the legislation is maybe not right, the committee structure is certainly not right, but first I'd like to see the executive branch commit to taking some of the load off the Department of Defense as a go-to agency.

Everything that happens in the world doesn't require a man or woman with a Kevlar on to go there and be there. How about having somebody instead who actually speaks the language, understands the culture, and can bring other types of skills to bear and let the military provide a logistics function as backup?

MS. FLOURNOY: Thank you.

Yes, She's coming.

Q: Sameera Daniels (ph), Ramsey (sp) Decision. This is addressed to Gordon Adams, but it encompasses a great deal of commentary here. I've been reviewing a lot of the intelligence – the testimonies to different committees, and one of the things that just strikes me so absurd is that there's very little backup, and I've made this point before and it touches on what you said also, which is that there is very little analysis; in other words, there are gaps in analysis which contribute to the intelligence problems, for example, here and Iraq. And I see the same generic kinds of mistakes being made in reference to other instances and I wonder how you're going to correct that, because the general tendency is if you admit there are intelligence problems in Iraq, the same kinds of rhetorical problems are occurring in other issues and we don't recognize it because we have a bias toward one country or like some other country more. So I was wondering how you see it as a problem and how would you go about addressing it.

MR. ADAMS: Well, that's a big question and if other panelists have a way to tackle that as well. I guess my ingoing prejudice is that an attitude of skepticism is healthily. We do in Washington, D.C., tend to genuflect a lot of in front of the

(unintelligible) of apparent expertise and not ask the hard questions, not be skeptical. It's safer, it's easier. And any member of Congress, any staff person in Congress, any journalist who's here or elsewhere not asking the hard questions is making a mistake.

We didn't ask enough hard questions before we went into Iraq, not that the data wasn't out there. It's not that there weren't people out there with views that contradicted the official version, but the questions weren't asked and so the answers weren't reflected. And inside the food chain of the executive branch, alternative answers weren't wanted anyway. So my only answer is you just have to have a healthy attitude of skepticism about the expertise that's laid in front of you, about the views that are put in front of you, and always ask the hard question.

MS. FLOURNOY: The one thing I would add is that – and this goes to an aspect of leadership at the presidential level, at the cabinet level, what kind of command climate is created? Is it a climate where dissent is discouraged and punished – if you don't come with the right answer, don't speak up because you're at risk of jeopardizing your career – or is it a command climate that says, I want to hear the naysayers before I make the decision. I want to hear that dissent. I want to hear that best professional advice from the intelligence community, from the military, from the Foreign Service, and then I'll make my decision and then you can make your decision whether you need to resign and not be part of this or whether you need to salute smartly and carry out the policy, but the command climate I think is hugely important for correcting some of the gross mistakes that were made in recent years, and that can be done fairly quickly with the right understanding and the right leadership.

MR. ADAMS: I think that's really important. I just want to point out that in the five years that I was in OMB and was sitting in a lot of those meetings talking about some of these very tough issues that have come up, Haiti and others, very often there was one guy there who kept asking that hard question and demanding the right answer, and he's sitting to my right.

MS. FLOURNOY: Yes. That's right. Okay. Yes. I'm sorry.

General, do you want –

GEN. CLARK: Thank you.

MS. FLOURNOY: Okay. Yes, Miss?

Q: Hi. My name is Sarah Petrin, and I work for the Better World Campaign, which supports the work of the United Nations, and my question is for General Clark in regard to your comments about the capacities within the State Department to build up the civilian side of nation-building. And I'm curious if you could comment about your views as to whether the international community and the United Nations might be better than the United States to actually performing these tasks?

GEN. CLARK: Well, I do think it's an important question to ask, and I'm fully in support of the UN Development Program and international agencies, but I don't think the United States can be fully in support of them if it doesn't have some inherent capability to contribute, and I don't mean just NGOs to be on contract, but I mean the capacity to actually do the work and do the research.

Take the Department of Defense as a model. In the Department of Defense, we do studies,. In the Department of Defense, we look for technologies. In the Department of Defense, we develop leaders. In the Department of Defense, we manage relationships with educational institutions, for example. Now, who's doing that in the areas of failed states or preventing failed states? Who in the United States government has the capacity to do that? Sure, there are dozens of groups around including groups – a number of them in this town that I'm in communications with – who study these issues, and they occasionally get grants from USAID and they compete for paltry handouts from the government. But it's nothing like the organization and the impetus that the Department – if you really believe that the United States' security is dependant on resolving the issues of the Polisario and Western Sahara inside Morocco to head off another al Qaeda base, you probably wouldn't just be sending in a dozen Special Forces guys with radios to try to track down terrorists.

You'd probably have an entirely different approach, but that approach can't surface until we get it out of the Defense Department's structure, which has a sort of automatic round peg/round hole, square peg/square hole response, and into this National Security Council staff – a broader range of considerations, and those considerations aren't operative unless resources are put behind them. And that means human resources: people who say I've been there, I've studied this, five different Western Sahara cultures are there and this is what needs to be done and we brought them over for education. I mean, we just need a whole different supplementary or maybe alternative approach to the idea of creating AFRICOM and directing military assistance into it.

I was one of those who was warning in 1996 when we started the Africa Crisis Response Initiative, and started training African forces in peacekeeping and how to use M-16s that this certainly could be part of the solution, but wasn't an adequate response. And yet because it took money, budget authority, and was run by the Pentagon, it overwhelmed our ability to provide other needed efforts. And so I think that we can't move and rely on the UN to do this without having a substantial U.S. capability to fit in to the international peace and help shape it.

MS. FLOURNOY: Okay. Thank you.

Yes?

Q: Yes. Good afternoon. My name is Aukuno Jefitina (ph) from the EIR News Service. For the United States in my – I think to everybody's conclusion, to regain the position of the temple of liberty and beacon to other nations, it has to engage in scientific and technological development to people all over the world. I think it needs to do that. And, for example, during President Clinton's administration we had a situation whereby

Yitzhac Rabin and Yasser Arafat, September of 1993 with the Oslo Peace Accords, which was started in Vienna during 1991, and I think that the reasons why this Oslo Accord was sabotaged was because there was not an emphasis on economic development.

For example, again, if you look at the Middle East right now, the reasons why the Israelis keep on grabbing more settlements into Gaza and the West Bank is there's no water at all. I reemphasize, no water in the desert region, and this has been something that has totally been disregarded in the well-cloistered, air conditioned rooms all over the world, and in Europe water has not been discussed at all. So my question to the panel is, and General Wesley Clark brought up the question of poverty, and I think that just as there is morality in foreign policy, there also has to be morality in economic policy also.

So my question to the panelists is that shouldn't there be a reemphasis on the (oasis?) plan to make sure that in order to solve the problems in the Palestinian areas and in Israel, that there should be – for the United States to be seen as an unbiased peace broker, there has to be a comprehensive economic development plan for the Middle East in order to solve the economic problems in Palestine and also in Israel; that is, more water settlements, and also to make sure that in order to have a two-nation-state solution – because we all know the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict lies between Israel and Palestine. So that's my question to the panel.

MS. FLOURNOY: Thank you very much. General Clark?

GEN. CLARK: Certainly, we need an economic development plan, and it's never been more feasible than today, when the Middle East is awash with petrodollars and nations are looking for ways to invest. I see a lot of – I'm in the private sector on a probably 90 percent effort now, and I see an awful lot of infrastructure projects that are getting funded, including funding from Middle Eastern sources. So infrastructure is one part of economic development. It's not the only part.

But certainly, the United States should be helping and working with nations in the region who have these funds to come up with the economic component that could undergird a lasting relationship between Israel and the Palestinians that's mutually satisfactory. It can't be done unless America restores its moral authority.

And I just want to underscore what Brzezinski said, and I want to take one step further. We're not going to regain our moral authority until we actually look at the past. This is very hard for people to say, especially in an election year, because everyone likes to say let's just focus on the future, but the truth is that some monumental mistakes were made and I believe – I come from an institution, I grew up being taught that accountability for mistakes was an essential part of leadership. There needs to be some accountability for the mistakes that are present at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, and I'm not talking about a couple of soldiers being court-martialed for improper behavior. This goes to the very top of organizations in the executive branch, and you know precisely which organizations I'm talking about, and you know precisely who and whose memos

should be examined. And I believe that we're not going to clear the books and really regain our authority until we've opened the books and looked at them.

(Applause.)

MS. FLOURNOY: We're almost out of time. I'm going to give Larry and Gordon one minute each for final remarks.

MR. KORB: I think that when you take a look at the military, we need to understand that we can't replicate the military that we had in the Cold War and up to now. As you're going to be facing new challenges, you have to adapt the military to it. We talked a little bit about getting your ground forces accustomed to stabilization, operations, whatever term that you want to call it. It has to be robust enough that you can maintain it on a volunteer basis.

We haven't even talked about the other services. I think the Navy has to focus more on littoral combat close to the shore rather than open-ocean warfare. The Air Force has to emphasize being able to provide lift to get people there, be able to both the Navy to have offshore basing so that we don't have to rely on what my former boss Bob Boorstin used to call "ugly allies" to keep basis, and the Air Force has to be able to have the capability to strike anywhere in the world from the United States.

MS. FLOURNOY: Great.

Gordon?

MR. ADAMS: A couple of points just in closing. Coming back to the theme that I said earlier, I would put the strategic horse in front of the expansion cart; I would not grow the military, I wouldn't recommend the president endorse growing the Army at this point, but rather engage in the full scale review of strategic purposes and exactly where the military fits into that wider agenda of strategic purposes, and there are places where it will, but properly integrated and synergistic with the other tools. And that's point two: that it's very important to invest in and restructure the other tools of American statecraft so that we can do an integrated strategy and not be asking the military to do a whole bunch of ancillary missions.

The ancillary missions are dangerous because they deter from military core missions and capabilities, and they don't do them well; because they weaken our focus on investing in the balancing tools of statecraft. And to come back to the point that General Clark made earlier, whether we like it or not, putting a military face on America's global engagement does not suit our strategic purposes in the world.

MS. FLOURNOY: General Clark, any last comments?

GEN. CLARK: Two points. First of all, I think in terms of the armed forces we've got to think not only of the equipment that needs to be reset, but the fiber, the character, the nature of the armed forces. This is really a subject for a longer set of

comments, but we came out of the Vietnam War, we got rid of the soldier-scholar model. We went to a warrior model, and now we're into a war where we're asking our people to be more culturally aware, more sensitive, more refined, and so we're teaching these warriors to try to remember how to sit with Iraqis and respect the different religions.

It's a cultural problem that we're going to have to think about and it's compounded by what I see, unfortunately, as a certain amount of erosion of trust within the ranks of the armed forces. There are some in the more junior ranks who feel that those in the more senior ranks didn't speak up, say the right thing, exhibit the kind of moral courage that they're exhorting their subordinates to display every day on the streets of Baghdad. And this is not something that you can sort of wish away. This is something that's going to require the kind of organizational rebuilding that a football team does after a season, and we've got to give the time and give the direction to the military to do this. There's no question: mistakes were made at many different levels, and there's a lot of people who are going to want to get a lot of things off their chest if we can get to that point.

My second major point in conclusion is nobody really talked about Iran, and I'm kind of surprised. We're talking about the future of the armed forces, so these challenges are kind of behind us. There are some people in this town who believe the challenges are not behind us; they're in front of us. When Iran gets 3,000 centrifuges, conceptually, according to Mohammed ElBaradei, they can have the nuclear materials they need in 12 months to create a nuclear weapon. According to many people I've spoken to, that would be a mortal danger to a state in the region that the United States is sworn to protect and defend. And should that happen, the use of the military again is likely either by us or by that by that other state, and the consequences are unpredictable. And I hope we don't look so far ahead into the future that we neglect the most immediate and I think grievous challenge to American security over the next 18 months. Thank you.

MS. FLOURNOY: Thank you. It would be impossible for me to try to summarize the richness of this discussion, so I won't, but let me just say that I think we've managed to surface many of the issues that will be defining the public debate in the coming 15, 18 months, and then defining the agenda for governance when a new administration takes power, so thank all of you for your excellent questions and please join me in thanking our panel.

(Applause.)

MR. BOYER (?): Thank you, Michèle, and all of the panelists for that excellent discussion. We're going to have a very, very quick set change right now before we begin our final panel and closing remarks. There is coffee in the back, but we will be beginning in just a moment. Thank you.

(END)